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RESTORING PARMENIDES’ POEM 
Christopher J. Kurfess, Ph.D. 
University of Pittsburgh, 2012 
 
The history of philosophy proper, claimed Hegel, began with the poem of the Presocratic Greek 
philosopher Parmenides. Today, that poem is extant only in fragmentary form, the various 
fragments surviving as quotations, translations or paraphrases in the works of better-preserved 
authors of antiquity. These range from Plato, writing within a century after Parmenides’ death, to 
the sixth-century C.E. commentator Simplicius of Cilicia, the latest figure known to have had 
access to the complete poem. Since the Renaissance, students of Parmenides have relied on 
collections of fragments compiled by classical scholars, and since the turn of the twentieth 
century, Hermann Diels’ Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, through a number of editions, has 
remained the standard collection for Presocratic material generally and for the arrangement of 
Parmenides’ fragments in particular.  
This dissertation is an extended critique of that arrangement. I argue that the 
reconstructions of Parmenides’ poem in the last two centuries suffer from a number of mistakes. 
Those errors stem from a general failure to appreciate the peculiar literary character of his work 
as well as the mishandling, in particular instances, of the various sources that preserve what 
remains of his verse. By reconsidering a number of rarely questioned assumptions underlying the 
standard presentations and by revisiting the source material with greater care, a number of 
scholarly impasses that have beset the discussion of this difficult text are resolved, and the 
foundations for a more faithful and fuller reconstruction of Parmenides’ work are established. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The chapters that follow are contributions toward a reassessment of the sources for, and a new 
arrangement of, the fragments of the poem of the early Greek philosopher Parmenides of Elea. 
While attitudes about Parmenides’ verse and estimations of his thought have differed markedly, 
the composition of the poem in the early fifth century B.C.E. is widely regarded as one of the 
landmark moments in the history of Western thought. Hegel, for instance, pointed to 
Parmenides’ poem as the beginning of the “proper history of philosophy”, explaining his claim 
thus: “Philosophy began in the Eleatic school, especially with Parmenides. Parmenides, who 
conceives the absolute as Being, says that ‘Being alone is and Nothing is not.’ Such was the true 
starting-point of philosophy, which is always knowledge by thought: and here for the first time 
we find pure thought seized and made an object to itself.”1 With less sympathy, but no less 
grandly, Nietzsche wrote of Parmenides, “By tearing entirely asunder the senses and the ability 
to think in abstractions, i.e., reason, just as if they were two thoroughly separate capacities, he 
demolished the intellect itself, and incited people to that wholly erroneous separation of “mind” 
and “body” which, especially since Plato, lies like a curse upon philosophy.”2 The poem has 
received comparably momentous acclaim (and blame) from many quarters since, with 
Parmenides having been dubbed, by one author or another, the father of idealism, rationalism, 
materialism, metaphysics, ontology, logic, philosophical method, and so on. In evaluating such 
claims, we would do well to remember that Hegel and Nietzsche, like all others who have spoken 
of “Father Parmenides” since, knew his work only in the form of fragmentary quotations found 
1 Wallace and Findlay (1975) p. 126. 
2 Nietzsche (1911) p. 124. 
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in the works of other authors of antiquity. The latest author known to have consulted a complete 
copy of Parmenides’ poem was Simplicius of Cilicia, whose commentaries on Aristotle, which 
preserve most of what survives of the poem, were written in the middle of the sixth century C.E. 
Since the Renaissance, the closest that students of Parmenides have managed to get to reading 
the original poem has been by way of collections of fragments compiled by classical scholars. 
Since the appearance of its first edition over a century ago, the standard presentation of 
Parmenides’ poem has been that found in the various editions of Hermann Diels’ Die Fragmente 
der Vorsokratiker. 
 Interest in the thought of Parmenides and other Presocratics has grown steadily since, but, 
despite an ever-increasing number of studies from classicists and philosophers over the last 
century, including several critical editions of the text, Diels’ text has remained the basic 
presentation of Parmenides’ poem. The first edition of Diels’ work appeared in 1903 and quickly 
established itself as the standard collection of the fragments of Greek philosophical writing 
before Plato. In that and the following three editions (published in 1906, 1912, and 1922) Diels 
repeated, with occasional textual changes, an arrangement of Parmenides’ fragments that had 
appeared earlier in his 1897 book, Parmenides Lehrgedicht, and his 1901 volume, Poetarum 
Philosophorum Fragmenta. The arrangement of Parmenides’ fragments in the fifth (1934) and 
following editions (1951 and later), edited by Walther Kranz, featured more substantial changes 
to Diels’ earlier arrangement, so that we ought properly to speak of two presentations of 
Parmenides’ poem in Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, that of the pre-Kranz editions (specified 
hereafter by “FdV”) and that of the Diels-Kranz editions (hereafter “DK”). It is the latter that is 
the generally accepted presentation of the poem today. For the most part, scholarship on 
Parmenides takes the basic arrangement of the fragments for granted and, where it concentrates 
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on textual questions, tends to focus on narrower issues, such as the merits of competing textual 
variants, the meaning of doubtful words, the proper construal of difficult syntax, and the 
identification of possible allusions to earlier literature. The placement within the poem of several 
fragments is disputed, but rarely is the overall arrangement questioned, and even less frequently 
do scholars ask whether, in the case of composite fragments drawn from multiple sources, the 
constitution and enumeration of individual fragments provided by DK is the best possible 
treatment of the source texts in question. In this dissertation, I revisit the task of reconstructing 
the poem and I argue that the standard treatment mishandles the source material in several 
important respects. 
 Its success in collecting and making accessible the fragmentary texts scattered throughout 
the vast range of Greek and Latin literature makes Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker an 
indispensible boon to the student of Presocratic philosophy. An unfortunate by-product of that 
success is that the sources for those texts are rarely properly scrutinized for what they have to 
contribute to our understanding of the fragments that they preserve. In order to assemble an even 
moderately complete picture of the better-preserved philosophers included in its collection, the 
texts from which the fragments and testimonia are drawn are presented in so truncated a manner 
that they provide only a minimal sense of the broader context from which a given fragment 
comes. Not infrequently, this leads to the fragments being read and studied entirely separate from 
their original contexts. As concerns the text of any given Presocratic, this, in turn, can engender 
either of two mistaken impressions: (i) that the arrangement in which the isolated fragments are 
presented in DK is definitive; or (ii) that the arrangement of the fragments as presented is 
essentially arbitrary. 
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 Sometimes both mistakes can be found simultaneously, even among specialists well-
versed in the literature. Néstor-Luis Cordero, for example, the author of many books and articles 
on Parmenides, including an essay, “L’histoire du texte de Parménide”, detailing the history of 
the reconstruction of the poem from the Renaissance on, has recently written about Parmenides’ 
fragments: “It is impossible to know (except in one case) what place in the Poem each of these 
quotations should occupy. Since the first attempts at reconstruction, they have been arranged in 
accordance with the conceptual content of each “fragment”.”3 Cordero makes mistake (ii) in 
claiming that it is impossible to know where all but one of the fragments stood in the poem. In 
fact, of the nineteen fragments recognized as authentic by Diels-Kranz (whose arrangement 
Cordero follows in the work from which the above statement comes), the sources that quote them 
give us at least some relatively explicit indication of the place they occupied for nine of them. 
The basic structure of the DK arrangement of the fragments is principally the result of these 
indications of placement rather than the “conceptual content” of the fragments, but readers are 
often unaware of this. Cordero makes mistake (i) in his handling of what he thinks is the one 
exception to the general dearth of information about placement. The fragment to which Cordero 
is referring is a quotation preserved by Sextus Empiricus, which Sextus tells us is the beginning 
of the poem. As it so happens, that quotation is (rather arbitrarily) divided in DK into two 
separate fragments, and Cordero follows suit. 
 A concise yet nuanced introduction to the sources for early Greek thought, admirably 
aware of both the merits and dangers of Diels-Kranz’s methodology, is Jaap Mansfeld’s 
“Sources”.4 Unfortunately, the closing words of that paper offer a prime example of mistaking an 
unquestioned contemporary supposition, canonized in DK, for fact. Mansfeld claims, 
3 Cordero (2004) p. 16. Cordero objects to the use of “fragment” to refer to what he prefers to call “quotations”, thus 
the quotation marks. 
4 In Long (1999) pp. 22-44. 
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“Simplicius’ quotations enable us to see that the long continuous text of Parmenides, quoted by 
Sextus […] is in fact a patchwork, combining passages from different sections of the poem and 
omitting crucial lines in the proem. This should serve as a warning: even where we do have long 
verbatim fragments, we cannot always be certain that the extant text is correct, or allows a 
correct impression of the work from which it has been cited or compiled.”5 Mansfeld is referring 
to the very passage mentioned by Cordero. Mansfeld claims that Simplicius’ quotations reveal 
Sextus’ text as a patchwork because he assumes that Simplicius’ quotation of the “crucial lines” 
that Sextus is accused of omitting also comes from the beginning of the poem. Simplicius, 
however, makes no such claim about the verses in question. While Mansfeld is perfectly correct 
to warn us against accepting long verbatim passages uncritically, he could not have come to the 
conclusions he did without a conviction (which he shows no sign of having questioned) that 
changes made by Diels and Kranz to Sextus’ text were correct. The chapters that follow 
constitute an extended questioning, from various angles, of a number of such common 
assumptions in the reconstruction of Parmenides’ text.   
* 
 While modern readers have the additional difficulty of dealing with a fragmentary text, 
confusion over Parmenides’ work is not a modern phenomenon. Long before it was lost, 
Parmenides’ poem made a strong impression on its readers, who had difficulty agreeing what to 
make of it. Given the state of the evidence for the intellectual climate of the early fifth century 
B.C.E., any account of the immediate reactions to the poem involves much guesswork, but to 
judge from what we have, the central concepts in the philosophical or physical systems of his 
younger contemporaries Anaxagoras of Clazomenae, Empedocles of Acragas, and the atomist 
Leucippus (perhaps of Elea, perhaps of Miletus) all appear to have been shaped by a serious 
5 Mansfeld (1999) p. 39. 
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engagement with Parmenides’ thought. If the dramatic depiction of Plato’s Parmenides can be 
relied upon, other early readers ridiculed the poem, leading Parmenides’ fellow citizen and pupil 
Zeno to mount a counter-attack in the form of a series of paradoxes still famous today. The 
sophist Protagoras of Abdera, for his part, seems to have attacked Eleatic monism, while 
Melissus of Samos, perhaps another of Parmenides’ pupils, wrote a prose work, On Nature, or 
On Being, defending it. Gorgias of Leontini, in turn, penned a piece of Eleatic-inspired 
reasoning, On Non-Being, or On Nature, but whether that work argues for or against Eleatic 
views, or is seriously intended as an argument at all, is far from clear. Controversy over its 
significance appears to be as old as the poem itself, and difficulties in ascertaining just what 
Parmenides might have been saying continued, and proved philosophically fruitful, for as long as 
the poem was read.  
 The vast array of impressions made by the poem on different thinkers is not only 
testimony to the enduring philosophical significance of Parmenides’ work, but it also, I think, 
offers a hint about the literary character of the work. That the aforementioned figures, with 
access to the complete poem, held such different opinions about it is an indication that even its 
earliest audience tended to leave an encounter with the poem with only a partial understanding of 
what it was they had experienced. In the modern scholarly literature, difficulties in reading the 
poem are commonly attributed to Parmenides’ attempt to present an entirely novel, austerely 
logical philosophy in the constraints of traditional hexameter poetry. Implicitly or explicitly, the 
common judgment is that, whatever truth or depth there might be to Parmenides’ philosophical 
teaching, his poetic achievement was not of the same order. (Ancient authorities are often 
invoked in support of this judgment, but the opinions of the ancients are not as one-sided as they 
are generally presented to be.) While it is only fair to concede that both Parmenides’ thought and 
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his mode of expression present many difficulties, the suggestion that these are due to 
Parmenides’ failings strikes me as a suspiciously convenient way of avoiding our own 
shortcomings as readers. The condescending attitude towards Parmenides’ poetic ability not only 
serves to mask the limitations we may have in appreciating his verse, but, more problematically, 
presupposes that we are in a position to judge what it was he was trying to express. It may be, 
however, that Parmenides meant for his audience to struggle over the poem, and that it is only by 
working through the difficulties of expression that we will really come to grips with whatever it 
is he was saying. Put another way, the puzzlement over the poem which has persisted from its 
first appearance down to the present day may be a deliberate effect of the poem, because it was 
intended to be something of a riddle. If so, then readers too eager to recast the poem’s message 
according to their own pre-set categories, whether to pass judgment on its exposition or to adapt 
its findings to their own philosophical agenda, will be missing something important. 
 Plato dramatizes this predicament well in his depiction of Socrates’ experiences with 
Parmenides and his poem. In the dialogues, Socrates is portrayed as acquainted with the poem in 
his youth, and as retaining, near the end of his life, both a reverent admiration for Parmenides’ 
depth and a cautious regard for the subtlety of his manner of expression. Plato’s Parmenides 
takes us back to Socrates’ youth, setting him among an audience of Athenians who have gathered 
to hear a reading of Zeno’s paradox-laden work. Zeno has come to Athens with Parmenides for 
the Great Panathenaea, and he is using the visit as a chance to make a proper presentation of his 
book, some version of which had apparently been circulating without his consent. After the work 
has been read, an enthusiastic Socrates asks Zeno to return to the opening argument, questioning 
him about what it says and offering his own opinion of how Zeno’s work compares to 
Parmenides’ poem, which Socrates has evidently studied and holds in high regard. Zeno 
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encourages Socrates by remarking that his understanding of the argument is on the right track 
(though his grasp of the intent of the work may not be entirely correct) and Socrates, perhaps too 
eagerly, goes on to put additional questions and challenges to Zeno, parsing Zeno’s argument in 
terms of the notions of “forms themselves” and “participation”. Although Pythodorus, the host of 
the event and one of the characters in the chain of transmission in the dialogue’s dramatic frame, 
is said to have been concerned that Socrates’ argumentative zeal might have offended the Eleatic 
guests, Parmenides and Zeno instead smile knowingly at each other, as though impressed by 
Socrates’ abilities and familiar with the difficulties he is raising. Parmenides himself then speaks 
with Socrates, echoing Zeno’s earlier remarks by praising Socrates’ enthusiasm for argument yet 
hinting that Socrates still has some work to do in order to understand their accounts fully. After a 
brief but devastating examination of Socrates’ understanding of “forms” and “participation” 
ending with a confession by Socrates that he is entirely at a loss about where to turn next, 
Parmenides explains to him: 
That is because you are undertaking to define ‘Beautiful’, ‘Just’, ‘Good’, and other 
particular Forms, too soon, before you have had a preliminary training. I noticed that the 
other day when I heard you talking here with Aristoteles. Believe me, there is something 
noble and inspired in your passion for argument; but you must make an effort and submit 
yourself, while you are still young, to a severer training in what the world calls idle talk 
and condemns as useless. Otherwise, the truth will escape you.6  
 
Yet again, Socrates’ passion for logoi is praised, while once more Socrates is reminded that a 
deeper inquiry is required if the truth is not to escape him. An example of the “severer training” 
to which Socrates must submit himself occupies the remainder of that demanding dialogue. 
Socrates looks on and listens while Parmenides and the young Aristoteles play out a “laborious 
game” and examine Parmenides’ own “hypothesis” of the One, 7  ultimately concluding that 
6 Parmenides 135c-d, as translated in Cornford (1939) p. 103. 
7 See Parm. 137b.  
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“whether there is or is not a One, both that One and the Others alike are and are not, and appear 
and do not appear to be, all manner of things in all manner of ways, with respect to themselves 
and to one another.”8  
 We are to imagine that Socrates’ early encounter with the visitors from Elea had a lasting 
effect on him, for in the Theaetetus, on the eve of the indictment that will lead to his death, 
Socrates recalls that encounter in the middle of a conversation about episteme with the 
mathematician Theodorus of Cyrene and his promising young student, Theaetetus of Athens. 
Following a discussion of the views of those who claim that all things are in flux, the time comes 
to discuss those who, like Parmenides and Melissus, appear to claim the opposite. Despite his 
earlier insistence that these figures must also be considered, Theodorus, in what will be his final 
exchange in the dialogue, declares his intention to bow out of the conversation. When 
Theaetetus, eager to hear the views of Parmenides and Melissus investigated, reminds him of his 
earlier promise, Theodorus assures the youth that Socrates will still accommodate him. But 
Socrates surprises Theodorus by saying that he too will decline to discuss these figures:  
  A feeling of respect keeps me from treating in an unworthy spirit Melissus and the others 
who say that the universe is one and at rest; but there is one being whom I respect above 
all: Parmenides himself is in my eyes, as Homer says, a ‘reverend and awful’ figure. I 
met him when I was quite young and he quite elderly, and I thought there was a sort of 
depth in him that was altogether noble. I am afraid we might not understand his words 
and still less follow the thought they express. Above all, the original purpose of our 
discussion—the nature of knowledge—might be thrust out of sight, if we attend to these 
importunate topics that keep breaking in upon us. In particular, this subject we are raising 
8 Cornford (1939) p. 244. The dialogue ends with Aristoteles’ answer to this formulation, “Most true.” Cornford 
unfortunately recasts the form of the work after 137c, eliminating the answers that Aristoteles gives in the dialectical 
exercise, so the closing words are missing from his translation. Cornford justifies his procedure as follows: “Since 
Aristoteles contributes nothing, nothing is gained by casting the arguments into the form of question and answer. 
The convention becomes tiresome and cumbrous; it only increases the difficulty of following the reasoning.” 
(Cornford (1939) p. 109) I trust that Plato was better equipped than Cornford to judge whether anything is gained by 
the form in which he cast his own dialogue. Cornford’s laudable enthusiasm for the reasoning combined with a 
disregard for the form in which it is cast is a convenient example of our problem.  
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now is of vast extent. It cannot be fairly treated as a side issue; and an adequate handling 
would take so long that we should lose sight of our question about knowledge.9  
 
Since the encounter in his youth, it appears that Socrates has moderated his earlier “passion” 
somewhat and come to appreciate that we cannot do justice to Parmenides’ conception of the 
One if we do not approach it in the right spirit. While no less dedicated to the giving and 
receiving of accounts, Socrates’ earlier confidence in his grasp on the texts of Parmenides and 
Zeno has been replaced by caution. In particular, Socrates now senses that the present discussion 
(for whatever reason) will not be able to provide an adequate treatment of what Parmenides said 
(τὰ λεγόμενα), let alone the thought behind it.10 The recognition that there is difficulty even in 
determining what was said (apart from what he had in mind in saying it) is an indication, I think, 
that his early experience of aporia with Parmenides has led Socrates to a greater appreciation of 
the expressive subtlety of the poem. An ancient anecdote informs us that the “noble depth” 
(βάθος … γενναῖον) that Socrates praises in Parmenides was one he also associated with 
Heraclitus of Ephesus, of whose writings Socrates is reported to have remarked, “The part that I 
understand is excellent (γενναῖα), and so too is, I dare say, the part I do not understand; but it 
needs a Delian diver to get to the bottom of it.”11 That is, the obscurity for which Heraclitus was 
famous is also a feature of Parmenides’ work, and comparable care is called for in reading it.  
9 Theaetetus 183e-184a, as translated in Cornford (1935) pp. 101-102. 
10 The distinction Socrates draws in the Theaetetus between Parmenides’ “words” (τὰ λεγόμενα) and the “thought 
they express” (τί … διανοούμενος εἶπε) echoes the repeated praise, by Zeno and Parmenides, in the Parmenides, of 
Socrates’ keenness for logoi (cf. τὰ λεχθέντα at Parm. 128c2; τῆς ὁρμῆς τῆς ἐπὶ τοὺς λόγους at 130b1; and ἡ ὁρμὴ 
ἣν ὁρμᾷς ἐπὶ τοὺς λόγους at 135d3), followed in each instance by an indication that Socrates still fails to grasp fully 
the matter at issue.  
11 Diogenes Laertius, Vitae II. 22, as translated in Hicks (1972) vol. I, p. 153. Cf. Vitae IX.11-12 for the source of 
the story and a variant account of it. On Socrates’ use of “depth” in the Theaetetus, Seth Benardete comments, 
“Such a use of “depth” is not common in prose. Herodotus speaks of “ways deeper than the Thracians” (IV.95.1), 
and Socrates is said to have remarked that Heraclitus’ writings need for their interpretation a Delian diver (Diogenes 
Laertius II.22); cf. Laws 930A.” (Benardete (1986) p. I.188, n. 67) Cf. Simplicius, in Phys. 36.31 (Diels), where the 
commentator appears to present Socrates’ remark about Heraclitus as Plato’s remark about Parmenides.  
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 Just what all of this says about Plato’s own views of Parmenides is left an open question 
for readers of the dialogues to answer for themselves, but it is perhaps not an implausible 
assumption that the uncommonly high regard Socrates is made to show for Parmenides (in sharp 
constrast to Socrates’ account in the Phaedo of his disappointment upon reading Anaxagoras’ 
work) is a reflection of Plato’s own experience with the poem. The reverent reserve that Socrates 
exhibits towards Parmenides in the Theaetetus carries over into the dialogues that serve as its 
sequels. In the Sophist and Statesman, set on the day following the conversation of the 
Theaetetus, Theodorus introduces into the company a stranger from Elea, who takes over 
Socrates’ usual role of chief speaker. Although the stranger certainly discusses aspects of Eleatic 
thought in the attempt to define who the sophist is with Theaetetus, and who the statesman is 
with Theaetetus’ friend, also named Socrates, one may doubt whether the proper treatment of 
Parmenides postponed in the Theaetetus is ever attempted in the dialogues. Our Socrates, the 
irrepressible gadfly of Athens, remains remarkably silent for nearly the whole of both 
conversations, and the discussion that he proposes to have with his namesake, in which it seems 
the philosopher would have been defined, is left unwritten.  
 Whatever else this may reveal about Plato’s attitude towards Parmenides, I take it that 
part of the point in the open-endedness of the dialogues’ portrait of Parmenides is that Plato does 
not presume that one can do justice to what Parmenides said or thought without an uncommon 
readiness to reconsider one’s own preconceptions and a willingness to approach the matter with a 
degree of care rarely found even among those of some intellectual distinction and promise. It is a 
fair inference also, I think, that, in contrast to many of his modern descendants, Plato did not 
regard his predecessor as incapable of expressing himself adequately.  
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 The caution of Plato’s mature Socrates will serve as something of a model for this study. 
Neither disregarding Parmenides’ manner of expression nor presuming that we possess a 
sufficient grasp on the intent of the poem in advance of our attempt to struggle through it, the 
following chapters are offered as contributions toward a new reconstruction of Parmenides’ 
poem. As Socrates did with Zeno’s work, we will begin by revisiting the beginning of the poem. 
Mindful of the dangers in being too eager to render a judgment, we will delay declaring what the 
proem means until we can become surer about just what it said. This is itself a task that will 
entail reconsidering a host of popular opinions about the reconstruction of the text and playing a 
game with a discipline that may at times seem laborious and may run the risk of striking many as 
idle and useless. How much closer to the truth we may be at the end of our game I will not 
venture to say here, but there will be some progress as we see our way clear of a number of 
longstanding mistakes.  
 Also in keeping with Plato’s example, we shall leave much unsaid. I have no pretensions 
of giving a comprehensive or definitive treatment of all that pertains to the reconstruction of the 
poem. With new critical editions of several of the major sources for the poem currently being 
prepared, such aspirations would be premature in any event.12 What I hope to provide in what 
follows are good reasons for rethinking a number of generally unquestioned presuppositions 
underlying the current arrangements, some clarification on how certain bits of underappreciated 
evidence should be taken into account in future efforts to reconstruct and to read the poem, and 
some preliminary but defensible proposals on how to fit several “new” fragments, hitherto 
12 In 1985, Leonardo Tarán gave a report of then ongoing work on a new critical edition of Simplicius’commentary 
on Aristotle’s Physics (see Tarán (2001) pp. 625-645). In 1987, Ilsetraut Hadot wrote that the preparation of a new 
crtical edition of Simplicius’ de Caelo commentary, with annotated French translation, had been undertaken “several 
years ago” by Phillipe Hoffmann (Hadot (1990) p. 275). I have not seen a recent report of the state of either project, 
but presume these are still forthcoming. The Oxford Classical Text of Proclus’ commentary on Plato’s Parmenides 
by Carlos Steel (in 3 volumes, 2007-2009) has recently been completed. A new critical edition of Sextus Empiricus 
is needed, but I do not know whether one has been planned. 
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regarded as corrupt variants of known lines, into a presentation of the poem which is fuller and 
more cohesive than prior ones. On none of these points, naturally, will what follows be the final 
word on the subject. 
* 
 Between this introduction and what is labeled as the conclusion of this study, there are 
four chapters, divided into two parts. These two parts are meant to be independent essays, with 
distinctly different starting points. The discussion of the second part will not take for granted the 
discussion of the first part, and offers a separate, if ultimately related, argument. Though 
independent, the two parts are complementary, both applying the potentially cumbersome 
caution called for above to separate sections of the fragments, the first part examining a number 
of common assumptions about the proem, and the second part doing something similar for the 
Doxa. This will involve an amount of repetition as different approaches to the questions involved 
give rise to related problems, but as I hope will become clearer as we proceed, such repetition is 
not altogether out of place when dealing with Parmenides’ poem. 
 The first part consists of three chapters focused on the beginning of the poem, or proem. 
In it, I argue that, contrary to the presentation of the poem in nearly every edition of Parmenides’ 
work in the last two centuries, Sextus Empiricus has preserved the opening of the poem largely 
intact. The general acceptance of the major alterations made to Sextus’ quotation by various 
hands is due, I claim, to a widespread failure to appreciate several important features of 
Parmenides’ mode of expression. Attention to the text of the proem itself, to the contexts in 
which it is quoted, and to other evidence of its early reception reveals that Parmenides did not 
share quite the same interests that interpreters often expect in a philosophical author. Apparently 
less interested in straightforward exposition than some of his later interpreters, Parmenides, like 
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Empedocles and others after him, introduced elements of obscurity into his poem intentionally. 
The proem is replete with verbal ambiguities, convoluted sentences, impressionistic imagery, and 
seemingly pointless repetitions. Nonetheless, patient analysis of the intricacies of the proem and 
comparison of various related texts can reveal a demonstrable integrity to the passage, even if it 
leaves us somewhat at a loss as to the meaning of it all.  
 The first chapter examines the long quotation that Sextus Empiricus presents as the 
beginning of the poem and the supposed evidence that shows it to be a patchwork, defending the 
arrangement of the text as Sextus preserves it. In the course of so doing, key methodological 
points come to light for the assessment of the source material generally. Most prominently, it is 
seen that Diels, Kranz, and other editors have failed to appreciate the special significance of 
repetition in Parmenides’ poem, which has led to numerous instances of mistaking different but 
similar portions of the original poem for a single passage. An analysis of repeated words (and 
roots) in the lines presented by Sextus reveals the integrity of his quotation, which is found to be 
structured around interlaced patterns of recurring forms. 
 The second chapter consists of a careful reading of the two most important source texts 
for the proem. By reading and comparing the accounts of Parmenides in Sextus and Diogenes 
Laertius, we can discern a shared source whose anachronistic reading of lines from the proem 
heavily influenced both presentations as well as, indirectly, most modern interpretations. 
Recognizing the nature of that influence helps to formulate an alternative understanding of those 
lines that accords better than the dominant one with the arrangement of the proem argued for in 
the first chapter. As a result, the common opinion of scholars on the meaning and status of logos 
in the poem is called into question. Given the predilection of historians of philosophy for 
portraying Parmenides as the father of logic (as exhibited in the remarks of Hegel and Nietzsche 
14 
 
  
quoted at the beginning of this introduction, and repeated countless times since), the 
consequences of that questioning may well require significant changes to the story that we tell 
about early Greek philosophy as a whole. 
 The third chapter provides additional support, through a detailed reading of a portion of 
Empedocles’ poetry, for the structure of the proem presented in the first chapter and for the 
attitude toward logos discerned in the second. A sampling of Empedocles’ verse provides close 
parallels for various elements in Parmenides’ proem. Moreover, examination of the context in 
which the Empedoclean lines are preserved—another passage from the same book of Sextus 
Empiricus’ adversus Mathematicos—reveals a parallel instance of modern editors’ overzealous 
“corrections” of a text preserved by Sextus. When these “corrections” are ignored, overlooked 
aspects of Empedocles’ work also come to light, and the ties to Parmenides’ work are seen to be 
even closer than is commonly realized. 
 The second part, a (lengthy) single chapter, addresses problems in the reconstruction of 
Parmenides’ poem from a different direction, focusing on the relationship of the Doxa or “Way 
of Opinion” to the better-preserved Aletheia or “Way of Truth”. The fourth chapter considers 
that relationship in light of a recent challenge to the prevailing arrangement of the fragments. In 
a series of articles focused on the status of doxa and of scientific inquiry in Parmenides’ poem, 
Néstor-Luis Cordero has been advocating an alternative ordering of the fragments, departing 
dramatically from the arrangements of DK and its predecessors. Maintaining, contrary to most 
interpretations of the Doxa, that doxai and “physics” were entirely unrelated notions for 
Parmenides, Cordero seeks to disentangle their common, but supposedly mistaken, association. 
According to Cordero, this confusion, which arose early among Parmenides’ ancient readers, has 
been ubiquitous in modern times because the scholars responsible for the reconstruction of the 
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poem have, in some measure accidentally, tended to place fragments of a “physical” nature in the 
Doxa. Cordero’s own suggestion is that some sort of “physics” was a part of Parmenides’ “Way 
of Truth”, and he proposes a new arrangement of the fragments in which material generally 
assigned to the Doxa would be included in the Aletheia. Through a detailed response to 
Cordero’s accounts of the reception and reconstruction of the poem, as well as his novel 
proposals for the placement of the purportedly “physical” fragments, this essay provides an 
overview of the early efforts of modern scholars to arrange the fragments and the evidence of the 
ancients that lay behind them. While Cordero’s proposals for the fragments in question are often 
found to run contrary to the evidence provided by the sources that quote them, his questioning of 
the common association of the Doxa with “physics” is important nonetheless. After the largely 
critical bulk of the rest of the essay, the chapter concludes with a suggestion that, though his 
changes to the ordering of the fragments are untenable, Cordero’s doubts about the “physical” 
character of the Doxa are in a certain manner on point, if not in quite the way he envisions.  
 The final chapter of this dissertation is a conclusion in name only. Although I will 
summarize there the lessons learned thus far, relating the findings of the two parts to one another, 
it will be clear that we nevertheless find ourselves still at the beginning of an inquiry. We shall 
indeed be better prepared than before to engage in a full-scale reconstruction of the poem, but 
that will remain a task for the future. In addition to summarizing the ground we have covered, 
therefore, I will also offer glimpses of what can be gained by continued study of the sources for 
the poem along the lines begun in the preceding chapters. The benefits of the approach we will 
have made will be seen to extend beyond the task of reconstructing Parmenides’ poem, offering 
improved prospects for better understandings of the many later thinkers and writers influenced 
by him.  
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 As for the reconstruction itself, we will have to rest content with having found a few 
“new” fragments and having established a rough skeleton which future work will help to flesh 
out. Given the finds in the earlier chapters, further review of other source texts with a better 
understanding of Parmenides’ use of repetition holds the promise that a number of other “new” 
fragments, previously considered to be duplicate quotations or corruptions of known portions of 
the poem, will come to light. 
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PART ONE 
 
 
CHAPTER ONE – RESTORING PARMENIDES’ PROEM 
 
I advance, in what follows, a seemingly straightforward but apparently unpopular suggestion. At 
VII.111 of his adversus Mathematicos, Sextus Empiricus quotes, and subsequently comments 
upon, just over thirty-five verses as the beginning of Parmenides’ poem.1 Sextus provides no 
indication that the lines quoted are anything other than an unbroken, continuous passage, and it is 
my contention that they are in fact just that. To my knowledge, this suggestion has not met with 
the approval of any editor, commentator, or translator of Parmenides for at least a century.2 Since 
Hermann Diels’ first edition of what remains of the poem,3 no presentation of Parmenides’ work 
has given the arrangement of the opening lines of the poem as they are found in Sextus. Among 
the reputedly critically-minded tribes of classicists and philosophers to have considered 
1 Adv. Math. VII. 111-114.  
2 The depth and breadth of my knowledge on this score are of course limited. I have not endeavored to ground this 
claim with an altogether exhaustive investigation into the scholarship of the last hundred years. Nor, I ought to add, 
should the above sentence be taken to imply that the suggestion I am advancing was much more accepted before the 
twentieth century than during it. More will be said of the earlier presentations of the poem in the second part of the 
dissertation. A convenient survey of the developments in the reconstruction of the poem from the Renaissance on is 
provided in Cordero (1987). 
3 Diels’ first presentation of Parmenides’ poem, which has been the basis for all subsequent arrangements of the 
fragments, appeared in 1897 in Parmenides Lehrgedicht (= “PL”). Diels repeated the arrangement, substantially the 
same (but with the introduction of “A fragments” and “B fragments” to designate testimonia and verbatim 
quotations respectively) in Poetarum Philosophorum Fragmenta (1901) and in the early editions of Die Fragmente 
der Vorsokratiker (1903; 1906 (2nd ed.); 1912 (3rd ed.); 1922 (4th ed.); collectively referred to below as “FdV”). Later 
editions of Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, edited by Walther Kranz (and hereafter abbreviated “DK”), featured 
changes to a number of the fragments, including the proem. With rare exceptions, to be discussed below, Kranz’s 
alterations to Diels’ arrangement of the lines quoted by Sextus has been followed by subsequent scholars. For the 
end of the proem as it appeared in Diels (1901), see the appendix to this chapter, Texts: A, page 51 below. 
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Parmenides’ poem since Diels’ time, John Burnet, F. M. Cornford, W. K. C. Guthrie, Martin 
Heidegger, G. S. Kirk and J. E. Raven, Leonardo Tarán, Hans-Georg Gadamer, A. P. D. 
Mourelatos, M. E. Pellikaan-Engel, Jonathan Barnes, David Gallop, A. H. Coxon, Patricia Curd 
and John Palmer have one and all accepted the arrangement of the proem that either Diels or 
Kranz had offered.4 I propose, on the contrary, that Sextus’ text be allowed to stand more or less 
unmolested. In so doing, I am not suggesting that we ought to accept Sextus’ presentation of the 
proem uncritically (the lines quoted have naturally suffered their share of textual corruption, and 
the interpretation of them which he records is certainly open to question),5 but simply that the 
run of just over thirty-five verses which Sextus quotes as the beginning of the poem gives neither 
too few nor too many lines. When so read, the lines, though certainly puzzling, exhibit an 
integrity of style and sense that is disrupted if the changes incorporated into the DK text are 
accepted.6  Moreover, as we consider these lines anew, a number of interesting and enlightening 
points for our understanding not only of the proem but for the rest of Parmenides’ poem will also 
come to light. 
 
 
 
4 See Burnet (1930) pp. 172-173; Cornford (1939) pp. 30-32; Guthrie (1965) pp. 6-9; Heidegger (1992) p. 4; Kirk 
and Raven (1957) pp. 266-268; Tarán (1965) pp. 7-8; Gadamer (1998) pp. 96-99; Mourelatos (1970/2008) pp. 279-
280; Pellikaan-Engel (1974) pp. 2-10; Barnes (1982) pp. 155-157, with pp. 610-611, n. 2; Gallop (1984) pp. 48-53; 
Coxon (1986) pp. 45-51 with commentary, pp. 156-171; Curd (1998/2004) pp. 18-23; Palmer (2009) pp.362-363. In 
his Lectures on the History of Philosophy (delivered in the early decades of the nineteenth century), Hegel begins his 
discussion of Parmenides’ text with the passage as presented by Sextus (but including corrections from Diogenes 
Laertius in line 34; see Hegel (1892) p. 251). He may not have known of the lines from Simplicius’ commentary on 
Aristotle’s de Caelo (= “in Cael.”) which Diels (editor of the Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca series (= “CAG”) 
that would publish the commentary in 1891) inserts within the proem. Hegel remarks in his notes on the sources of 
Greek philosophy that of Simplicius’ works there was “much still unpublished” (1892, p. 168). 
5 It should be noted, however, that the interpretation which Sextus reports is not necessarily his own. Indeed, as I 
will discuss in the next chapter, there are indications not only that the interpretation comes from elsewhere, but that 
Sextus does not endorse it. 
6 For Sextus’ text, incorporating some corrections based on Diogenes Laertius, see Texts: B, page 52 below. 
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Unreliable Sextus 
The unanimous acceptance of the changes to Sextus’ text is surprising in light of the fact that he 
is regularly admitted to have been a relatively reliable source. Diels, for instance, although 
confidently altering Sextus’ text by interpolating into it two lines preserved in Simplicius’ 
commentary on Aristotle’s de Caelo, 7  still defended the general reliability of Sextus’ 
presentation of the proem, attributing what appeared to be the omission of two lines in his text to 
a simple saut du même au même. 8 Coxon, although he maintains that “it is clear from the 
manuscript variants that nearly all the errors are medieval and that the text from which Sextus 
was copying preserved a reliable tradition of Parmenides”, nevertheless appears so committed to 
the additional change made by Kranz9 that he regards “Sextus’ apparent unawareness that the 
last five and a half lines of his quotation cannot have followed immediately on the first thirty” as 
evidence that the reliable text that Sextus had before him could not have been a full version of 
the poem. 10  More recently, Simon Trépanier, seeking to cast doubt on Sextus’ testimony 
7 As noted in Texts: A. I will be referring to this as “Diels’ addition”, and I will call the relocation (into what 
becomes DK B 7) of the final lines quoted by Sextus “Kranz’s move”, using these phrases as shorthand for the two 
major changes to Sextus’ quotation that result in DK B 1. As discussion of the earlier editions of the text in chapter 
four will make plain, neither change originated with Diels or Kranz. To judge from Tarán’s account in his 
commentary on the proem (1965, pp. 17-31), it was the arguments of Karl Reinhardt in particular that convinced 
both Diels (eventually) and Kranz of the correctness of “Kranz’s move”. Tarán explicitly rejects Reinhardt’s 
reasoning, but claims, “Nevertheless, we possess enough evidence in the fragments themselves to reject Sextus’ 
arrangement.” (1965, p. 21). As I hope to show, Tarán’s (and others’) understanding of “the fragments themselves”, 
where this differs from the actual selections preserved for us by various authors, needs careful rethinking.  
8 “1,31.32 sind durch Simplicius als Fortsetzung von V. 28-30 verbürgt. Man hat aus dem Fehlen der beiden Verse 
bei Sextus die Berechtigung herleiten wollen, die sonstige Ueberlieferung des Empirikers zu verdächtigen, um freie 
Hand zu erhalten zu allerhand Umstellungen. Ganz mit Unrecht. Sextus will offenbar keine Excerpte, keine 
willkürlich gewählte Folge der Verse, sondern das ganze Proöimium geben. Das Auslassen der Verse fällt lediglich 
den Abschreibern zur Last, die von ἀλλ’ (31) auf ἀλλὰ (33) übersprangen. Die Paraphrase beweist für diesen 
Sachverhalt nichts. Denn sie wird gegen Ende recht kurz, um auf die Hauptsache, das Kriterium, zu kommen (35-
37). Die inhaltlich mit 30 zusammenfallenden Verse konnten darum wie viele andere unberücksichtigt bleiben.” (PL, 
p. 57) 
9 I.e., the relocation and accommodation of the lines from Sextus which followed the lines added by Diels to a 
position immediately preceding DK 8, resulting in DK 7. Again, though Kranz was not the first to make this 
alteration (Simon Karsten and others preceded him in it, as did, in a way, Joseph Scaliger), I shall, in order to avoid 
unnecessarily complicating the present discussion, refer to this simply as “Kranz’s move”.   
10 Coxon (1986) p. 5. Coxon fails to offer any argument for his premise “that the last five and a half lines of his 
quotation cannot have followed immediately on the first thirty”, without which Sextus’ “unawareness” of that 
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elsewhere, grants that “in other cases Sextus seems reliable enough as a witness”, but cites 
Parmenides’ proem as an instance where “he is clearly not.”11 Indeed, doubt about Sextus’ 
testimony here has become so universally accepted as to appear a settled issue even in editions of 
Sextus’ work. In his translation of Against the Logicians, in a note on the thirtieth verse quoted 
by Sextus,12 Richard Bett remarks: 
The lines so far make up almost all of the prologue of Parmenides’ poem as we have it; 
Simplicius gives us two additional lines. As Simplicius’ multiple quotations make clear, the 
remaining lines quoted by Sextus come from a different point in the poem (after the two “roads of 
inquiry” have been introduced and one has been dismissed). Where Sextus has “spirit of a road” 
(thumos hodoio) Simplicius has “story of a road” (muthos hodoio).13 
 
Why this long tradition of regarding the usually “reliable enough” Sextus as so manifestly 
misleading in this instance? With Bett, as with the other commentators, the matter is “clear”. 
And here, at least, we are given something of a reason: “Simplicius’ multiple quotations”. This is 
a bit elliptical, but Simplicius is a valuable and reliable source, and were it the case that he had 
repeatedly quoted the five-plus lines remaining in Sextus’ passage with explicit mention of 
where they stood in the poem, the matter might well be clear. The situation, however, is not quite 
impossibility would seem prima facie evidence that the passage is an uninterrupted whole.  Elsewhere Coxon makes 
the allied but equally unsubstantiated claim: “No reasonable doubt is possible that θυμὸς in Sextus’ quotation of 
[DK B 7, line] 6 is an error for μῦθος [one of the accommodations necessary for Kranz’s move] and that the lines 
are identical with the first words of fr.8 as cited by Simplicius.” (1986, p. 193) I hope to show that such doubt is not 
only reasonable, but, given its due, is a key to an improved understanding of the text. 
11 See Trépanier (2007) pp. 213-214, n. 84. Trépanier appears to refer to two such passages: Sextus’ quotation of 
Parmenides’ proem at adv. Math. VII.111, and adv. Math. VII.123-125, where lines from Empedocles (DK 31 B 2 
and 3) are quoted. As it is Sextus’ reliability in the latter passage that Trépanier is calling into question, the 
Parmenides quotation is the only real parallel adduced to support the claim, and no argument for its unreliability is 
offered beyond quoting Coxon’s remark above about Sextus’ “unawareness”.  In doubting the reliability of Sextus’ 
quotations of Empedocles, Trépanier is following the lead of Brad Inwood (cf. Inwood (2001) pp. 212-219, 276-277) 
and M. R. Wright. Wright’s justification for dividing DK 31 B 3 into two parts also relies on assuming an error in 
Sextus’ quotation of Parmenides’ proem: “That Sextus does omit a considerable number of lines from his quotations 
without indicating that he does so is supported by his citation of Parmenides earlier at 7.111. There frs. 7.2-6 and 
8.1-2 of Parmenides run straight on from fr. 1.1-30, although it is known from Plato (Soph. 237a, 258d) and 
Simplicius (in Cael. 557.25 to 558.1-2) that the lines were not consecutive.” (Wright (1981) p. 157, emphasis added.)  
As we shall see, what “is known from Plato … and Simplicius” about the proem is less than scholars are in the habit 
of claiming. We will have occasion to consider Sextus’ quotations of Empedocles in chapter three. 
12 I.e., the point at which Diels added the two lines from Simplicius’ in Cael. 
13 Bett (2005) p. 24, n. 49. Against the Logicians is an alternative title for books VII and VIII of adversus 
Mathematicos (also known as Against the Dogmatists). 
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so simple. In fact, “Simplicius’ quotations” introduce two quite separate textual points, which we 
must distinguish carefully from one another before we can claim that anything is clear. The first 
is the question of the “two additional lines” Simplicius gives. These are quoted, once, in his 
commentary on the de Caelo (hereafter “in Cael.”), and bear on what I refer to as “Diels’ 
addition”.14 As I hope to show below, there are reasons for doubting the assumption that these 
lines come from the proem. An independent question is raised by a number of passages in 
Simplicius’ commentary on Aristotle’s Physics (hereafter “in Phys.”) which present two issues 
relevant to what I am calling “Kranz’s move”:15 (i) of the lines which comprise the end of 
Sextus’ passage (D.1), one of them (ἀλλὰ σὺ τῆσδ’ ἀφ’ ὁδοῦ διζήσιος εἶργε νόημα) is quoted five 
times (twice alone (D.5 and D.6), three times (D.2-4) preceded by a line that does not appear in 
Sextus’ passage: οὐ γὰρ μήποτε τοῦτο δαμῇ εἶναι μὴ ἐόντα, or some variant thereof); (ii) the 
final words of Sextus’ text (μόνος δ’ ἔτι θυμὸς ὁδοῖο / λείπεται) bear a definite resemblance to 
the opening lines of DK 8, which Simplicius quotes on three occasions in the same commentary 
(D.7-9). Simplicius’ quotations of the verse ἀλλὰ σὺ τῆσδ’ ἀφ’ ὁδοῦ διζήσιος εἶργε νόημα, 
particularly the one at in Phys. 78.6 (D.5; cf. D.9), do give evidence for linking it with other lines 
of the poem, but nothing in any of the contexts of those quotations suggests that lines 32-34 of 
Sextus’ proem (i.e., DK 7.2-5) might belong with it on those occasions. As for the six words at 
the end of Sextus’ quotation, their resemblance to the opening words of DK 8 is, although 
striking, not exact. As Bett himself notes, where all the manuscripts of Sextus read θυμὸς ὁδοῖο, 
the lines from Simplicius begin by speaking of a μῦθος ὁδοῖο. Coxon, as noted above,16 was 
convinced that θυμὸς could not be correct, and that the lines must be identical, but there are 
additional discrepancies between the two texts. In Sextus, the metrically necessary μόνος is the 
14 See Texts: C.5 (page 53 below) for the lines quoted in Simplicius’ in Cael. 
15 For the texts of Simplicius’ quotations relevant to this question, see Texts: D, page 54 below. 
16 See footnote 10. 
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only attested reading, while in two of the three places that Simplicius reports his lines, the better 
attested reading is the epic form μοῦνος.17 Moreover, while the sentence Sextus was reading 
apparently ended with λείπεται, the one in Simplicius carries on for another two words.18  
Simplicius’ testimony, then, does not in fact contradict Sextus’, but, as Diels assumed in his 
earlier arrangements,19 may merely provide evidence of repetition within Parmenides’ poem and 
of variation within repeated phrases. I stress “repetition” because while the repetition of lines is 
obviously a regular feature of epic verse, the importance of this for the reconstruction and the 
reading of Parmenides’ poem has not, I think, been fully appreciated, even by those who 
emphasize the need for reading Parmenides in light of his epic models. 20  The supposed 
contradiction that Simplicius provides to Sextus’ citation may amount to no more than this: (i) 
verses modeled on lines 28-30 of the proem appeared in later, as yet unidentified, contexts; and 
(ii) following a repetition of line 31 of the proem (as DK 7.2), the closing words of Sextus’ 
quotation were echoed (with a substitution of μῦθος for θυμός, among other changes) at the 
beginning of DK 8.21 It is the widespread failure by scholars to appreciate the simple possibility 
17 Coxon prints μόνος in his text, and remarks in his commentary on 8.1, “The epic form of the adjective is μοῦνος 
(cf. [DK 2.2]) but Homer has μονωθείς in Λ 470.” (1986, p. 194) This does not really address the variant readings in 
Simplicius, where μόνος is a more likely corruption from μοῦνος than vice-versa. This concern (among others) with 
Kranz’s arrangement was raised by P.J. Bicknell in Bicknell (1968a). In Sider (1985), David Sider also argues for 
the epic form, and the discontinuity of DK 7 and 8, but is not led by this to reconsider the placement of DK 7. 
18 I am assuming that Sextus did not end his quotation mid-sentence, although this is indeed a possibility. As there is 
not, however, any comment in what follows on the final sentence of his quotation, there would seem to be little 
reason for Sextus to have bothered quoting it at all, only to break it off mid-sentence. 
19 Fragment 7 of Diels’ original arrangement (before the reordering by Kranz) was simply the two lines quoted 
thrice by Simplicius (see Texts: D.2-4) and by Plato before him (see Sophist 258d, and cf. 237a). 
20 E.g., Mourelatos (1970), Sider (1985), Newell (2002), and Robbiano (2006). 
21 As has been pointed out to me by Edwin Floyd, there is a Homeric model, featuring a substitution of μῦθος, for 
such echoing of phrasing at Odyssey 1.358-359 (μῦθος δ’ ἄνδρεσσι μελήσει / πᾶσι, μάλιστα δ’ ἐμοί· τοῦ γὰρ κράτος 
ἔστ’ ἐνὶ οἴκῳ), where the poet recalls the phrasing of Iliad 6.492-493 (πόλεμος δ’ ἄνδρεσσι μελήσει / πᾶσι, ἐμοὶ δὲ 
μάλιστα· τοὶ Ἰλίῳ ἐγγεγαάσιν) and 20.137 (πόλεμος δ’ ἄνδρεσσι μελήσει). In the Iliad, the contexts of the two 
passages call for understanding ἄνδρεσσι (and thus the overall sentiment) differently on the two occasions. In the 
earlier passage, spoken by Hektor to Andromache (intriguingly named, considering the statement being made), anēr 
indicates “man” in contrast to “woman”. In the later passage, spoken by Poseidon to Hera, the contrast is between 
“men” and “gods”.  In the Odyssey itself, where the many senses of anēr are a concern from the opening word on, 
the pattern is repeated, with additional variation, ten books later at 11.352-353 (πομπὴ δ’ ἄνδρεσσι μελήσει / πᾶσι, 
μάλιστα δ’ ἐμοί· τοῦ γὰρ κράτος ἔστ’ ἐνὶ δήμῳ), and occurs a third time, ten books (to the line) farther on at 21.352-
23 
 
                                               
  
that different sources for Parmenides’ poem are sometimes quoting from similar, but separate, 
passages, that has made so many feel that the “improvements” to Sextus’ text were so clearly 
correct.  
 
Finding Fragments: Methodological Points 
It is an understandable impulse that lies behind the alterations made by Diels and by Kranz, so 
universally taken as the definitive word on the lines from Sextus. It is only natural to want to 
assemble the fragments available to us into the most coherent wholes possible. Diels’ addition 
seems to supply lines which we would not otherwise have known were missing from the proem 
and which have struck scholars since as among the more noteworthy therein.22 Kranz’s move,23 
meanwhile, may appear especially attractive because it fills a known lacuna just before DK 8, the 
longest continuous (and, many would claim, most philosophically significant) fragment extant. 
Such changes seem attractive, for they look like definite scholarly advances, providing us an 
improved sense of the overall structure of the poem. Piecing together the fragments can be an 
alluring exercise (and I shall offer some of my own proposals by and by), but some initial 
caution is called for. Prior to any reconstructive efforts, we must make as careful an assessment 
353 (τόξον δ’ ἄνδρεσσι μελήσει / πᾶσι, μάλιστα δ’ ἐμοί· τοῦ γὰρ κράτος ἔστ’ ἐνὶ οἴκῳ). As has been further pointed 
out to me Professor Floyd, the treatment of Iliad 6.493 by editors provides a parallel to the editorial situation of 
Parmenides’ text. In place of the reading given above, which is found in the overwhelming majority of manuscripts 
and printed by van Thiel (1996), most editions, including the Oxford Classical Text of Munro and Allen (1920) and 
M. L. West’s recent Teubner edition (1998), print πᾶσι, μάλιστα δ’ ἐμοί· τοὶ Ἰλίῳ ἐγγεγαάσιν, “correcting” the 
manuscripts’ ἐμοὶ δὲ μάλιστα to μάλιστα δ’ ἐμοί on the basis of the appearance of the latter at Iliad 22.422 and its 
recurrence in the Odyssey. 
22 This is especially so after Kranz’s move, which turns those lines into the closing lines of the proem. G. E. L. 
Owen begins his influential essay “Eleatic Questions” (1960, revised and reprinted in Allen and Furley (1975) pp. 
48-81) with a discussion of these lines, described as “already for Diels in 1897 the most controversial text in 
Parmenides” (p. 49).  Owen commits the common error already discussed when he continues, “It occurs, according 
to Simplicius’ quotation, at the end of the goddess’ opening remarks.” The context of Simplicius’ quotation in the de 
Caelo commentary in fact does not refer to the “goddess’ opening remarks” or otherwise explicitly locate the lines 
in the poem.  
23 See footnotes 7 and 9. 
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of the evidence as we can, in order to prevent unwitting errors later on.24 Instead of instinctively 
assuming that all similar lines in what remains of Parmenides’ poem are points of overlap in the 
original, I suggest that where the available evidence might place similar, and even identical, lines 
in different contexts, we should be prepared to accept that, like Hesiod and Homer before him, 
and Empedocles and Lucretius after (and imitating) him, Parmenides repeated phrases, whole 
lines, and even runs of multiple verses at various points in his poem. We should not rush to piece 
together smaller fragments into larger ones simply because they share similar phrasing, and we 
ought to be especially wary when doing so would force us either into dismembering the larger 
and more coherent passages that do remain or into an artificial choice between apparent textual 
variants, when multiple “variants” may well be true readings and valuable aids to our 
appreciation and understanding of the poem. As we shall see, both of these unfortunate 
circumstances result from the “corrections” to the proem made by Diels and Kranz. 
Diels, I claim, was right in resisting the impulse to assume that the recurrence of a single 
hexameter, ἀλλὰ σὺ τῆσδ’ ἀφ’ ὁδοῦ διζήσιος εἶργε νόημα, in Sextus, Simplicius, and Plato 
meant that these authors were quoting those words from precisely the same point in Parmenides’ 
poem. Still, Diels did not see equally clearly in all instances, and I think that we can improve 
upon his efforts by hesitating over the interpolation that he himself admitted into Sextus’ text. 
24 This is a less alluring enterprise, and if it is indeed true that no treatment of Parmenides in the last century has 
regarded Sextus’ version of the proem as needing neither supplement from Simplicius (Diels’ view) nor pruning 
(Kranz’s view), that is probably because it has seldom occurred to scholars even to raise the question. Many 
treatments of Parmenides pay little attention to the proem, and almost all are content to take the arrangements of 
Diels and/or Kranz for granted. There have been a few scholars, since Kranz’s alteration, who have voiced a 
preference for Diels’ earlier arrangement, or some variation thereof, but even these have not questioned Diels’ 
interpolation of the lines from Simplicius into Sextus’ quotation. One is Cornelia J. de Vogel, who prints Diels’ text, 
noting Diels’ objections (“VS4,, p. 151”) to the combination of  Sextus’ final lines with fr. 8 (de Vogel (1963) p. 37). 
Bicknell, in the article mentioned above (1968a), proposes a reinterpretation of the end of the proem, based on but 
modifying Diels’ arrangement. Bicknell also proposes to read DK 6, 4, and 8 as a continuous passage. The result has 
been described as “peu convaincante” by Denis O’Brien (in Aubenque et al. (1987) Vol. I, p. 245, n. 23) and has not, 
as far as I am aware, had any defenders since. Bicknell’s suggestions and the criticisms of them will be discussed 
below. A third to depart from the DK text is Philip Wheelwright; for his remarks, see Wheelwright (1960) pp. 96-97 
and 294, and footnote 26 below. 
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His incorporation of the lines from Simplicius’ in Cael. within Sextus’ proem did not simply 
supply a pair of seemingly missing lines, but created two difficulties that remain with us today: 
first, the addition of these lines has forced every editor and translator of the text since to choose 
between competing adjectives modifying Ἀληθείης in the lines preceding them. Although 
uncontested itself, the interpolation has generated a distracting dispute among the poem’s 
commentators that cannot be said to have been settled.25 Second, the additional lines turned a 
coherent passage into an awkward one. Burnet, adopting Diels’ text for translation in the second 
and subsequent editions of his Early Greek Philosophy, felt this, and indicated the resulting 
discontinuity by a row of asterisks immediately following the inserted lines.26  
By preserving Sextus’ proem undisturbed, we can avoid generating these problems for 
ourselves. If we allow the possibility that the discrepancies found in the citations of otherwise 
reliable witnesses may be due to their having different portions of the poem in view, it is not 
surprising that the dispute over the variant adjectives modifying Ἀληθείης has been inconclusive, 
for the alleged conflict between the quoting authors looks like a phantom one. When we cease to 
regard the verses quoted by Sextus and Simplicius as quotations from the same portion of the 
poem, the difficulty of choosing between their respective readings disappears. The second 
difficulty, while less celebrated, is equally illusory. Because of the popularity of Kranz’s move, 
and a general lack of appreciation for the coherence of the proem, readers are less familiar with 
25 There are in fact three competing variants. In addition to those of Sextus and Simplicius, a third comes from 
Proclus’ commentary on Plato’s Timaeus (= “in Tim.”). Of the three supposed variants, Proclus’ εὐφεγγέος is by far 
the least favored, but Sextus’ εὐπειθέος and Simplicius’ εὐκυκλέος both have their supporters.  
26 See Burnet (1930) pp. 172-173. Wheelwright (1960, p. 96), who adopts a very similar order (but with the extra 
addition of what stands today as DK 7.1 between Diels’ addition and the remainder of Sextus’ quotation,  effectively 
making DK 7 fragment 2 of his own arrangement), deals with the discontinuity by inserting a title, “The Way of 
Truth”, between his fragments 1 and 2. Wheelwright claims in a note (p. 294) on his own fragment 2 that, “In Sextus 
Empiricus’ quotation this passage follows the next to last sentence of Fr. 1. Parts of the new passage are quoted by 
Plato, Sophist 237a, Aristotle Metaphysica 1089a 4, and Simplicius, Comm. on the Physica, p. 650; but only Sextus 
quotes the whole of it.” This last remark is mistaken, because the line shared by the other three authors (DK 7.1) is 
not, as has been pointed out, in Sextus at all. Mistakes of this sort can be very difficult to avoid when working from 
DK, and underscore the need for a reconsideration of the various sources of the poem in light of the possibility of 
deliberate repetitions. 
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this problem, but it does not arise without Diels’ addition. The more sensitive we are to the 
internal coherence of the proem as quoted by Sextus (about which we shall learn more as the 
chapter proceeds), the more averse we will be to alterations that will disturb its integrity.  
Should we, in reconstructing the poem, resist allowing Parmenides the kind of repetition 
that I am suggesting, Diels’ second difficulty helps make Kranz’s move seem attractive, at least 
initially. The lines which seemed awkward following Diels’ addition can be removed from the 
proem and transplanted so as to mesh with the beginning of DK 8.27 As already mentioned, 
however, despite the seemingly satisfying results, Kranz could not accomplish this without 
making certain other accommodations. Sextus’ θυμὸς ὁδοῖο must be changed to μῦθος ὁδοῖο, 
μόνος must be read in Simplicius against the “better” manuscripts’ μοῦνος, and we must imagine 
that Sextus decided to end a quotation in the middle of a sentence which he need not have 
included in the quotation at all. If at present these seem relatively minor points, they may appear 
less so as we proceed and come to better appreciate the intricate structure of the passage 
preserved by Sextus.  
Diels’ and Kranz’s “corrections”, then, give the appearance of being elegant solutions, 
but at the cost of suppressing legitimate and potentially important readings, introducing difficult 
new problems, and disturbing what I hope to show is a demonstrable (if under-appreciated) unity 
in the received text. Accordingly, it may well be worth our while to examine each of these 
“improvements” to Sextus’ presentation of the proem in a bit more detail, keeping the possibility 
of repetition in mind.  
 
27 Kranz’s fragment, i.e., DK 7, also includes, before the relocated lines from Sextus, a line quoted in isolation by 
Aristotle in the Metaphysics, and by Plato and Simplicius in connection with the line identical to the first of Sextus’ 
displaced lines (i.e., as the first line of the couplet that appears in Texts: D.2-4). See the preceding footnote for 
Wheelwright’s treatment of this line. 
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Diels’ Addition 
With the texts before us, the reasoning behind Diels’ interpolation seems obvious enough. The 
first two and a half lines quoted in Simplicius’ in Cael. (Texts: C.5) are, but for one word, 
identical to lines 28-30 of Sextus’ quotation, and, absent the idea that these lines might have been 
repeated within the poem itself, Diels felt justified in inserting the unparalleled final two lines 
quoted by Simplicius. This would seem to be a standard enough reconstructive procedure and I 
have yet to find anyone expressing doubt about Diels’ alteration. Still, there remain the two 
significant difficulties already mentioned: there is a standing scholarly dispute over that one 
word, and the lines from Sextus that would then follow the added lines do not fit particularly 
well with what now precedes them. We will save the latter difficulty for our discussion of 
Kranz’s move, and turn now to the question of the variant adjectives applied to Ἀληθείης. 
When we take a careful look at all the various sources for the lines in question, two 
distinct grades of textual variation become apparent. The lines as they appear in Plutarch (C.1), 
Diogenes Laertius (C.2), and Clement (C.3) present, when compared with one another and with 
Sextus’ text, the sort of corruption or variation we would normally expect to see among authors 
quoting the same original text: the easy substitution of ἀτρεκὲς for ἀτρεμὲς; ἡ μὲν and ἡ δὲ for 
ἠμὲν and ἠδὲ; the replacement of ταῖς (or τῇς)28 with αἷς; the alteration of οὐκ ἔνι to οὐκέτι, and 
28 Pointing to the form τῆς in Diogenes’ text (C.2), and claiming that ταῖς is “a form totally alien to Homeric and 
Hesiodic morphology”, Sider (1985, p. 363) argues for τῇς here. That Parmenides must conform to Homeric or 
Hesiodic morphology is implied in an earlier remark, in defense of reading ἐς for εἰς in line 10 of the proem: “I am 
merely asking that Parmenides be edited according to the same standards we apply to his literary models, Homer and 
Hesiod.” (p. 362) While Sider may well be correct in both readings, each of which has some textual support,  the 
general editorial principle seems to equate the inescapable fact that Hesiod and Homer are among Parmenides’ 
literary models with the implausible belief that they are his only literary models. Some two centuries or more 
separate Parmenides from these writers, during which time other influences, with differing idioms, had no doubt 
come along. I am also dubious of Sider’s additional assertion about τῇς: “And if Parmenides used the Homeric form 
once, he would have used it consistently; hence B 12,2 ταῖς should probably also be read as τῇς.”(p. 363) First of all, 
Homeric spelling itself is hardly a model of consistency; second, even if it were, I see no reason to think that 
Parmenides was not at liberty to depart from it whenever it suited his purposes to do so. We have already, in fact, 
seen evidence of such freedom in the choice of μόνος in the last full line of Sextus’ quotation, where the epic μοῦνος 
is metrically unsuitable. Cf. Coxon’s remarks (1986, p. 7) on Diels’ reservations (PL, pp. 26-27) on this score. 
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the interesting but unlikely substitution in Diogenes of σε θεὸς for Sextus’ σ’ ἔθος. The lines 
from Diogenes even offer substantial improvements over readings found in the manuscripts of 
Sextus: κρῖναι and πολύδηριν where Sextus has κρίνε and πολύπειρον (the latter evidently 
repeated from two lines above).29 Indeed, the manner in which Diogenes quotes his text is so 
similar to the treatment found in Sextus following the extended quotation of the passage (both 
present a reading in which logos is taken as Parmenides’ criterion of truth, citing nearly identical 
runs of verses, with line 31 omitted, in support of the claim)30 that they appear to be relying on 
the same (probably Stoic) source for the interpretation they record.31 Significantly, all of these 
texts agree in reading εὐπειθέος for the adjective modifying Ἀληθείης. In sum, none of the 
variations between these texts (C.1-3) and Sextus’ (B) is difficult to account for, and nothing 
from these texts would lead us to believe that the authors are quoting from different passages of 
the poem.  
It is hardly surprising, when multiple other authors are already believed to be quoting the 
same lines of the proem, that Diels would assume that the passages from Proclus (C.4) and 
Simplicius (C.5) were additional instances of the same. But, while there are errors of the same 
type as in the first group, in these cases there is also variation of a different order. Neither 
εὐκυκλέος in Simplicius nor εὐφεγγέος in Proclus is an obvious source for corruption into 
εὐπειθέος, or vice versa. As pointed out above, the unquestioned presumption that Simplicius 
and Proclus must have been quoting from the proem has led to considerable disagreement over 
29 A similar slip occurs in Bett’s translation of Sextus, where the Heliades are called “Daughters of Night” under the 
influence, one imagines, of the nearby “house of Night” (2005, p. 24).  As Sider (see the preceding footnote) 
suggests, Diogenes may offer an additional improvement if the τῆς of his text is read as τῇς.  
30 Note particularly this missing line. Its significance for the interpretation reported will be treated in the next 
chapter.  
31 As will be discussed in detail in the next chapter, it is worth distinguishing between the Stoic interpretation each 
author is reporting and what we might be able to glean of Sextus’ and Diogenes’ own views about the matter. Tarán, 
strangely eager to pin the allegorical interpretation of the proem on Sextus and Sextus alone, rides roughshod over 
this distinction (1965, pp. 17-22). 
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which adjective truly belongs with “Truth”. Most who take up the issue are defenders either of 
εὐπειθέος or εὐκυκλέος, and solid reasons can be and have been mustered in support of each.32 
The arguments against any of the readings, however, including εὐφεγγέος, are far less 
convincing. Coxon, for instance, dismisses εὐφεγγέος with the claim that “Proclus’s quotations 
from P[armenides] seem generally to be from memory”,33 but this ignores the fact that Proclus 
not only quotes the couplet with that reading but explicitly comments soon thereafter on 
Parmenides’ reasons for calling truth εὐφεγγής. 34 Each author also exhibits other variations 
unparalleled in the others: there are two additional lines in Simplicius, and, in Proclus, we find 
τῶ μὲν or τὸ μὲν rather than ἠμὲν in the first, and the nominative δόξαι rather than the accusative 
δόξας in the second line of the couplet. These differences, together with the three different 
adjectives, suggest that a better solution to the potential problems posed by the testimony of 
Proclus and Simplicius against Sextus is to suppose that we have evidence for three different 
passages, each featuring a recurrent Parmenidean couplet, but distinctively marked by its own 
characteristic adjective. In this way, the apparent conflict between our sources vanishes, and we 
are able to keep the full range of potentially significant readings. In addition to a restored proem 
based on Sextus, we will also find ourselves with two “new” fragments, the places of which 
32 For reading εὐπειθέος rather than the εὐκυκλέος of DK, see, e.g., Jameson (1958) pp. 21-26; Mourelatos (1970) 
pp. 154-155; and Coxon (1986) pp. 168-169. Defending εὐκυκλέος, see Tarán (1965) pp. 16-17 and Mansfeld 
(1995a) p. 232. 
33 Coxon (1986) p. 168. Not infrequently, the appeal to “quotation from memory” seems a poor substitute for a more 
thoughtful consideration of the wide range of reasons why one author might be quoting another inaccurately.  
Doubtless, many a misquotation has occurred because an author has misremembered and failed to check his source, 
but before speaking as though we possess certain knowledge about the reading and writing habits of individuals 
dead a millennium or more, it is worth debating the alternatives. 
34 The larger context is clipped in the presentation in DK (A 17), so this regularly goes unnoticed. Coxon, however, 
provides the necessary context himself in his selection of testimonia (1986, p. 132). 
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within the poem will have to be determined, and the significance of which will have to be more 
fully assessed, apart from our consideration of the proem.35 
 In advance of that fuller treatment, it is worth making some initial observations on 
Parmenides’ interesting employment of these lines. When we suppose three different passages, 
we may then notice that on each occasion when the goddess invokes the “untrembling” heart of 
Truth, Aletheia ironically appears less constant than we might have imagined:36 a new adjective 
appears each time. Moreover, it is specifically the “heart” of the adjective, positioned in the 
“heart” of the verse (with seven syllables on either side), that changes: within the EY-xxxx-EOΣ 
pattern common to each, it is only the inner four letters of the words that alter. Parmenides’ 
interest in preserving this pattern (whatever it may mean to him) seems confirmed by his use 
here of the genitive form εὐκυκλέος (< *εὐκυκλής); in DK 8.43 the “regular” form εὐκύκλου (< 
εὔκυκλος) appears.37 It has been argued in favor of reading εὐπειθέος in the proem that it suits 
the context particularly well. Mourelatos, in so doing, also notes how the resulting balanced 
contrast of faithful Truth (Ἀληθείης εὐπειθέος) and true faith (πίστις ἀληθής) fits into an array of 
such contrasts in the two lines.38 It will be worth considering how the other adjectives may fit 
into whatever contexts we might find for them. 
Inspection of Diels’ addition, then, not only shows that positing repetition in Parmenides’ 
poem is a simple way to reconcile many of the supposed inconsistencies between the sources for 
35  For the present, I shall call the texts from Proclus (C.4) and Simplicius (C.5) fragments X and Y respectively, 
thus the line numbering found in the appendix. In later chapters, we shall encounter other “new” fragments, hitherto 
regarded as corrupt variants of recognized lines. 
36 On the ironic undercurrent of Parmenides’ employment of Homeric idiom, see Floyd (1992). For an extensive 
exploration of this aspect of the poem, see Newell (2002). 
37 Here then is a second instance of Parmenidean orthographical inconsistency, contrary to the assumption of Sider 
noted above (footnote 28). In his own arrangement of the fragments, Sider prints DK’s choice of εὐκυκλέος in the 
proem rather than Sextus’ εὐπειθέος, but may convey his reservations about the inconsistency that results in a note 
on the “unique” form: “Many scholars prefer the alternate reading εὐπειθέος, ‘persuasive’, cf. 8.43.” (Sider and 
Johnstone (1986) p. 11) 
38 See Mourelatos (1970) pp. 156-157, n. 61. Also worth noting, for what follows, is the chiastic arrangement of the 
words in the contrast. 
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the poem, but also illustrates how Parmenides can use repetition as an effective literary device. 
We need not undervalue our sources, or the poet himself.  
 
Kranz’s Move  
We have already seen that Kranz’s transposition of the end of Sextus’ quotation into DK 7 does 
not work without introducing certain changes to the text. Nonetheless, many have been prepared 
to make them, given what seemed to be evidence confirming the lines’ new location. Tarán, as 
noted earlier,39 even when rejecting the arguments that motivated Kranz, insists that “we possess 
enough evidence in the fragments themselves to reject Sextus’ arrangement.” He continues, 
Fr. II.1-2 begins to point out the two ways of inquiry (εἰ δ’ ἄγ’ ἐγὼν ἐρέω, κόμισαι δὲ σὺ 
μῦθον ἀκούσας, || αἵπερ ὁδοὶ μοῦναι διζήσιός εἰσι νοῆσαι) and therefore must have stood 
almost immediately after fr. I, while fr. VII.5-6 (κρῖναι δὲ λόγῳ πολύδηριν ἔλεγχον || ἐξ 
ἐμέθεν ῥηθέντα) shows that there has already been an exposition, for these words refer to an 
ἔλεγχος already given by the goddess (cf. Verdenius, p. 64 with note 1 and the comm. to fr. 
VII.5-6) and consequently they could not have come immediately after fr. I.40 
 
This evidence of the “fragments themselves” hardly seems compelling. Even if it is true that 
lines 1-2 of fr. 2 suggest that they follow “almost immediately” after fragment one,41 how does 
that prevent the first fragment from being a few lines longer? As for the ἔλεγχος, the aorist 
participle ῥηθέντα suggests that the youth’s judgment of it will not take place before it has been 
spoken (which is hardly surprising), but it does not require that it has already been spoken as of 
this point in the goddess’ speech. Tarán’s reference to his commentary on fr. VII (= DK 7) does 
not help matters. The specific note on lines 5-6 referred to simply reiterates the claim that “the 
“much contested proof” has already been given by the goddess”, again citing Verdenius (while 
39 See footnote 7. 
40 Tarán (1965) pp. 21-22. 
41 I fail to see why beginning to point out two ways of inquiry in DK 2.1-2 should prevent there being intervening 
fragments between the proem (on anyone’s ending) and these lines. The earlier arrangements by Diels presented DK 
2 as fr. 4, with DK 4 and 5 intervening between fr. 1 and it. 
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taking exception to his placement of the fragment).42  Elsewhere in his discussion of fr.VII, 
Tarán adduces what might look like better evidence: 
Moreover, a text of Simplicius proves: (a) that he took fr. VII.2 to refer the second way; 
(b) that fr. VII (at least fr. VII.1-2) came after fr. VI; (c) that he made a distinction between 
the second way and the doctrine attacked in fr. VI (cf. Simplicius Phys. 78.2 ff.: μεμψάμενος 
γὰρ τοῖς τὸ ὂν καὶ τὸ μὴ ὂν συμφέρουσιν ἐν τῷ νοητῷ “οἷς ... ταὐτόν” [fr.VI.8-9] καὶ 
ἀποστρέψας τῆς ὁδοῦ τῆς τὸ μὴ ὂν ζητούσης “ἀλλὰ σὺ τῆσδ’ ἀφ’ ὁδοῦ διζήσιος εἶργε 
νόημα,” ἐπάγει “μοῦνος δ’ ἔτι μῦθος κτλ.) Since there are good reasons to reject Sextus’ 
arrangement which would place fr. VII.2-fr. VIII.2 immediately after fr. I.30 (cf. comm. to fr. 
I.1-32) the evidence provided by this passage of Simplicius has to be considered decisive 
both for the relative order of VI, VII, and VII and for fr.VII.1-2 being directed against the 
second way of inquiry.43 
 
The “good reasons for rejecting Sextus’ arrangement” here are merely mentioned, not laid out, 
and we are referred back to the unconvincing passage we have already encountered.  Nonetheless, 
the passage of Simplicius discussed is an important one, to be considered decisive, as Tarán says, 
for the relative order of fragments VI, VII and VIII.44 Of course, we may regard the Simplicius 
passage as decisive for the order of these fragments without sharing Tarán’s tacit assumption that 
this conflicts with Sextus’ arrangement. As indicated in the parenthesis of Tarán’s point (b) 
(underlined above), it is only lines 1-2 of Tarán’s fr. VII that are actually fixed as following fr. 
42 Tarán (1965) p. 81. Verdenius claimed that ἐξ ἐμέθεν ῥηθέντα “could not be taken to mean ‘the enquiry which I 
recommend to you’ (Diels), or ‘which I submit (Capelle), or again, ‘which I expound’ (Albertelli), but only ‘the 
proof which I have uttered’ i.e., which I have given you.” (1942, p. 64) This argument appears to rest on the notion 
that the aorist participle establishes an absolute time by which the elenchos has been spoken. This is not true, but a 
number of other scholars have followed Verdenius on this point. Cf. e.g., Mourelatos (1970) p. 91, n. 46: “As 
Verdenius […] saw, the aorist ῥηθέντα clearly shows that the ἔλεγχος has already been delivered”; Curd (1998) p. 
62, n. 107; and Cordero (2010) p. 243. J. H. Lesher, in Lesher (1984) pp. 17-18, n. 19, seems to echo this view in 
remarking that Diels “did not consider the possibility that the elenchos might already have occurred, ending with the 
krisis at 8.1 in part, I suspect, because he had placed lines 3-6 of Fr 7 at the end of the long Fr 1, which is far too 
early for any elenchos to have taken place. When he confronted the fact that the elenchos would have to have been 
spoken by the end of the initial fragment, he was forced to regard it merely as a ‘prospective’ reference to the 
elenchos yet to come in the doxa section, surely an odd reading of an aorist participle.” Lesher does not mention that 
in placing the lines where he did Diels was (more or less) following Sextus, nor does Lesher elaborate on why this is 
supposed to be “surely an odd reading of the aorist participle”. In a later publication, Lesher appears to have 
reconsidered, noting on the participle, “The fact that the goddess refers to the ἔλεγχος as ‘spoken by her’ does not 
imply that she has spoken it prior to Fr. 7; it may just as easily consist in the argument presented in Fr. 8 following.” 
(Lesher (1998) p. 38)  
43 Tarán (1965) p. 76 (underlining added). 
44 Tarán’s numbering here matches that of DK. I am less sure that the passage affords sufficient evidence to justify 
the claims of Tarán’s points (a) and (c), but (b) seems generally right, although, as I shall discuss presently, it needs 
stricter qualifications than Tarán applies. 
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VI, and, as has been pointed out already, line 1 is not in Sextus’ passage at all.45 The passage of 
Simplicius that Tarán quotes is perfectly consistent with a two line fr. VII, as in Diels’ original 
arrangement, prior to Kranz’s move. Tarán does not appear to take into account the important 
fact that, unless we make the overzealous identification of the last six words of Sextus’ proem 
with DK 8.1-2, none of the authors who appear to be quoting from DK 7.1-2 associates them 
with any of the other lines from Sextus’ passage.46 The evidence that Tarán adduces accords 
perfectly with assuming two (or more) separate passages. Tarán is not unaware of this possibility, 
but insists: 
 Some scholars would detach these lines [i.e., DK 7.3-6] from fr. VII.1-2 (cf. note ad loc.) but 
there is no good reason for doing so. The fact that Sextus quotes fr.VII.2-6 where line 2 is the 
same one quoted by Plato and Simplicius makes it reasonable to assume the unity of the 
whole fragment; this is strengthened by the fact that the content of lines 3-6 is not 
incompatible with that of lines 1-2, as Reinhardt believes.47 
 
Again, it is difficult to see what makes for a “good reason” here. Since no source for 
Parmenides’ poem other than a modern editor ever actually “attaches” line 1 of DK 7 to anything 
from lines 3-6, it is a bit perverse to demand a good reason for “detaching” them. Behind the 
appeal to the “fact” that Simplicius, Plato, and Sextus are quoting the “same line” is the tacit 
assumption that Parmenides would not have repeated the line. I have been calling this 
assumption into question generally, but this particular line, ἀλλὰ σὺ τῆσδ’ ἀφ’ ὁδοῦ διζήσιος 
εἶργε νόημα, is already one of the more conspicuous cases of Parmenidean repetition (Tarán’s 
own reading of 6.3 is πρώτης γάρ σ’ ἀφ’ ὁδοῦ ταύτης διζήσιος <εἴργω>), making it an especially 
weak link on which to hang the unity of his (and DK’s) fragment seven. Nor is the unity of this 
45 Nor in fact is it quoted by Simplicius in the passage Tarán is discussing. Thus, to go by Simplicius alone, only line 
7.2 (possibly without line 1) must lie between VI and VIII.  If, following Sextus, we restore most of DK 7 to the 
proem, there will remain a “fragment Z” (at least DK 7.2, possibly DK 7.1-2, which would match Diels’ original fr. 
7) between DK 6 and 8. 
46 See Simplicius (at the passages compiled in D.2-9), Plato (at Sophist 237a and 258d), Aristotle (at Metaphysics 
1089a4), and the commentaries of Ps.-Alexander and Syrianus on Aristotle’s passage. 
47 Tarán (1965) pp. 76-77. 
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pieced-together fragment particularly strengthened by the additional alleged “fact” that lines 3-6 
are “not incompatible” with lines 1-2. Not only are the same lines “not incompatible” with the 
first thirty lines of Sextus’ passage, but they are actually so preserved and handed down to us by 
a credible authority! Moreover, their proximity to one another and relative order are corroborated 
by the report of Diogenes Laertius.48 
As noted earlier, problems with Kranz’s move had been raised by P. J. Bicknell. 49 He 
departs from the arrangements of both Diels and Kranz, and thus in certain respects anticipates 
the present study, but objects (repeatedly) to arrangements that make for repetition in the poem. 
One of the principal merits of Kranz’s move, according to Bicknell, is the elimination of “the 
need to regard [Diels’ original 7.2] as a later repetition of a verse from the prologue”. 
Nevertheless, Kranz’s arrangement makes for other problems (most of which should be familiar 
ground by now):  
   1. The well-attested μοῦνος at Simplicius’ Physics (145.1ff.) has to yield to μόνος so that 
the metre of fragment 8 line 1 is preserved. This involves violation of the principle that of 
two readings the more ‘difficult’ one is normally the more acceptable. 
   2. Sextus’ addition of six lines to the prologue drawn from some other part of the poem is 
perhaps less likely than his omission of verses between lines 30 and 31. 
   3. The unanimous reading θυμὸς at line 35 of Sextus’ citation is ignored. 
   4.  If we suppose that fragment 6 preceded fragments 7 and 8 fairly closely, and this seems a 
fair supposition, the poem becomes, in this section, intolerably repetitive. In the space of a 
few lines, Parmenides twice warns against following the opinions of mortals and at the end of 
fragment 7 line 2 (ἀλλὰ σὺ τῆσδ’ ἀφ’ ὁδοῦ διζήσιος εἶργε νόημα) he repeats fragment 6 line 3 
(πρώτης γάρ σ’ ἀφ’ ὁδοῦ ταύτης διζήσιος <εἴργω>) almost verbatim. Parmenides is not a 
master poet, but here at least the goddess’ pronouncements are singularly uninspired.50 
 
To avoid these difficulties, Bicknell recommends restoring the end of Sextus’ quotation to the 
proem, where, along with the two lines inserted by Diels, DK 7.1 will also be included, 
immediately following them. DK 6 and 8, Bicknell further recommends, can be seamlessly 
48 As already mentioned, we shall compare the accounts of Diogenes Laertius and Sextus in the next chapter. 
49 Bicknell (1968a). See footnotes 17 and 24.  
50 Bicknell (1968a) pp. 46-47. 
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bridged by DK 4, instead of either Diels’ or Kranz’s fragment 7.51  Among the advantages 
Bicknell claims for his arrangement, “we avoid having to suppose irksome repetitiousness by 
Parmenides’ goddess”.52  
  Bicknell aims both to give due deference to the sources for the poem and to put 
Parmenides in the best possible poetic light. This is, indeed, a marked improvement over 
interpreters who exploit Parmenides’ reputation as a poor poet in order to justify their neglect of 
the literary dimensions of his work and to rework the evidence of the sources to suit their own 
sense of what Parmenides must have meant to say. Still, the repetitions that Bicknell finds 
“irksome”, “intolerable”, and “uninspired” might not have seemed so to Parmenides or his 
desired audience. While I share Bicknell’s other concerns, and think it important not to dismiss 
them, his intolerance towards repetition seems mistaken, especially when considering a poet who 
opens his poem by repeating the same verb four times in the first four verses, and whom Proclus 
quotes as saying, “It is all the same to me / Where I shall begin, for I shall come back to it again. 
(fr.5)”53 The removal of any trace of a fragment 7 from between DK 6 and 8, against the explicit 
evidence of Simplicius, seems to me hard to justify on stylistic grounds, particularly when what 
we can discern of Parmenides’ own style suggests a different sensibility. If, on the contrary, we 
should grant that repetition is a conspicuous (if possibly peculiar) trait of Parmenides’ muse, we 
can eliminate a whole host of other seeming conflicts, simply by following, in the main, the lead 
of our sources. 
 
51 This is attractive in that it finds a seat for DK 4, but the elimination of any trace of a fr. 7 from between DK 6 and 
8 runs afoul of the text of Simplicius that Tarán rightly emphasized as decisive on the point. Bicknell refers to this 
ordering as “a fair supposition”, perhaps indicating that he regards it as a good enough guess without being fully 
aware of the information about the ordering that Simplicius provides.  
52 Bicknell (1968a) p. 49. 
53 Proclus, in Parm. 708.10-11 (Steel), as translated in Morrow and Dillon (1987) p. 83. 
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Irksome Repetitions 
We have already, in our examination of Diels’ addition, seen something of Parmenides’ verbal 
dexterity in his use of the different adjectives modifying Ἀληθείης, where the pointed variations 
within the repeated line play provocatively against our expectations of an ἀτρεμὲς ἦτορ. This use 
of repetition to unsettle the audience begins to appear a characteristic feature of Parmenides’ 
verse when we reconsider the restored (i.e., Sextus’) text of the proem. For, when we pay close 
attention to the patterns of repeated words in the proem, a carefully constructed and perplexingly 
rich array of repetitions begins to reveal itself. 
Repetition within the proem has been observed on occasion before, but few have 
regarded it as a point in the poem’s favor. Those who note the four forms of φέρω in the four 
opening lines, for instance, typically cite this as an example of Parmenides’ shortcomings. Some 
are quite unequivocal in their judgment. Kirk and Raven claimed that Parmenides “has little 
facility in diction”, 54 while Barnes describes Parmenides’ hexameters as “clod-hopping” and 
“ungainly”, and his choice to write in verse “unfortunate” and “hard to excuse”.55 Even among 
authors who hold Parmenides’ poetry in higher regard, the repetition can seem overdone: 
Mourelatos, for instance, while calling for qualifications to the overly harsh criticisms of other 
scholars, points to the recurrence of φέρω in the opening lines as an example of “awkward and 
pointless repetition.”56 Against this general trend, Peter Kingsley has insisted that the repetitions 
are neither clumsy nor pointless, but deliberately composed, “with consummate craft”, for a very 
particular purpose. 57  The repeated words in the proem are used, he claims, to create an 
54 Kirk, Raven and Schofield (1983) (= “KRS”) p. 241. 
55 Barnes (1982) pp. xvi and 155; Barnes (1987) p. 129. 
56 Mourelatos (1970/2008), p. 35. 
57 Kingsley (1999) p. 117. In particular, drawing in part on evidence from archeological finds in Velia in the 1960s 
linking Parmenides to a medical center of some sort, Kingsley presents Parmenides and his school as a circle of 
mystical healers as much as “natural philosophers” of the Ionian mold, and argues that the proem reproduces an 
37 
 
                                               
  
incantatory effect, inducing in the audience an altered state of consciousness, priming them for 
the exceptional teaching to come. The multiple instances of “carry” that occur are themselves 
intended to carry the audience into a sort of trance, and the repetitions of “axle” and “pipe” (in 
the descriptions of the chariot in line 6, and of the gates in line 19) contribute to a sense of 
whirling and piping that the incantation aims to bring about.58 
Setting aside for now the very interesting question of the intent of the repetition, I agree 
heartily with Kingsley in his conviction that Parmenides’ employment of repetition is neither 
amateurish nor inartistic. Not everyone, it must be admitted, is instantly enchanted by 
Parmenides’ verses, but with repeated readings the craft that Kingsley refers to becomes clearer.  
 
Chiasmi 
It is worth spending some time spelling out, since I have not found it done elsewhere, just how 
carefully structured the pattern of repeated forms is in the proem. As is pointed out by critics and 
admirers alike, the first four lines feature a fourfold repetition of φέρω. What seems to have gone 
unnoticed is that these four instances of the verb are the backbone of an extended chiasmus: the 
presentation of the words ἵπποι - φέρουσιν - πολύφημον - φέρει over the course of first three 
lines is concisely recalled, in inverted order, in the fourth: φερόμην - πολύφραστοι - φέρον - 
ἵπποι.  
ἵπποι ταί με φέρουσιν, ὅσον τ’ ἐπὶ θυμὸς ἱκάνοι,  
πέμπον, ἐπεί μ’ ἐς ὁδὸν βῆσαν πολύφημον ἄγουσαι  
δαίμονος, ἣ κατὰ πάντ’ ἄτῃ59 φέρει εἰδότα φῶτα·  
incubation experience. On incubation generally, see Deubner (1900) and Hamilton (1906). For a more recent 
collection of relevant source texts, see Edelstein and Edelstein (1945) pp. 209-254.  
58 See Kingsley (1999) pp. 116-135. Cf. too Gemelli Marciano (2008) pp. 21-48 and Ustinova (2009), esp. pp. 191-
209. 
59 Ignoring differences in word breaks and accentuation, the manuscripts of Sextus’ text agree in the sequence of 
letters παντατη. This is generally regarded as corrupt and attempts to correct it abound, but the reading is sanely 
discussed and defended by John Newell, whose text I adopt here. See Newell (2002) pp. 282-293 and the earlier 
discussion in Tarrant (1976). The word ἄτη (or possibly the name Ate) may seem surprising if we expect to hear 
38 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
  
τῇ φερόμην· τῇ γάρ με πολύφραστοι φέρον ἵπποι… 
 
The return at the end of the fourth line to the opening word of the first brackets off these first 
four hexameters as a whole of some sort, despite the fact that the opening sentence itself, the 
periodos proper, is as yet unfinished. This constitutes an additional Homeric element to add to 
those observed by various commentators hitherto. As pointed out by Samuel Basset, the proems 
of both the Iliad and Odyssey feature something similar:  
At the end of the proem in both poems the thought returns to the beginning. This is better 
done in the Odyssey, where θεά, εἰπὲ καὶ ἡμῖν, repeats with a pretty chiasmus μοι ἔννεπε, 
Μοῦσα, of vs.1. This ‘paragraphing’ is less clear in the Iliad; still ἐρίσαντε . . . Ἀχιλλεύς 
(vss. 6f.) repeats the thought of μῆνιν . . . Ἀχιλῆος, and the question, τίς τ’ ἄρ σφωε θεῶν 
ἔριδι ξυνέηκε μάχεσθαι; recalls us to ἄειδε, θεὰ.60  
 
With its “pretty chiasmus”, as in other respects,61 the Odyssey is the closer text to Parmenides’ 
proem. Beyond being pretty, however, and serving to “paragraph” this part of the proem, it is not 
easy to say what further function the chiasmus serves. As Basset himself observes elsewhere, “In 
modern editions we often find the remark, “Note the chiastic order,” but rarely any reason for 
doing this.”62 From studies of the device in various literary traditions, John Welch suggests that 
one effect of the more elaborate chiastic structures, that is, those involving more than two pairs 
assurances that the philosophic inquirer is on the right path, but it actually sits nicely among a number of 
“bewilderment”-inducing elements at work here. Contributing to a general sense of disorientation and anxiety in the 
passage are the use of the ambiguously gendered nouns ἵππος and δαίμων, fixed as feminine only by the pronouns 
that follow them; the uncertainty over whose the θυμὸς of line 1 is;  the abundant use of relative and other 
subordinate clauses, making the main clause somewhat difficult to discern; the lack of a direct object for πέμπον (in 
line 2 as well as  in line 8), which generates a sense of expectation never quite fulfilled; the apparently allusive, but 
obscure phrases  ὁδὸν πολύφημον,  εἰδότα φῶτα, and πολύφραστοι ἵπποι; and the uncertainty of the referent of ἣ in 
line 3 (it may refer to either δαίμονος or ὁδὸν), which may carry over  to the repetitions of  τῇ in line 4 (possibly “to 
her” as well as  “in/on this way”).  
60 Basset (1923) p. 340. 
61 Even without the emendation of  ατη to ἄστη, line 3 can be said to recall the third line of the Odyssey, while the 
immediate leap into a journey already underway,  the multiple poly- compounds (particularly πολύφημος), the 
anonymity of the figures spoken of, and the prominence of the feminine figures (and objects) all underscore the 
connection. Cf. Havelock (1958) and Frame (1978) pp. 158-160 and 170-74. 
62 See “Appendix: The Relation between the Aristarchan Deuteron Proteron and Chiasmus” of Basset (1920) p. 59. 
While Basset is concerned there with the distinctions between various figures of inversion, my own use of “chiastic” 
here is a broad one. At present I am interested only in pointing out the observable structures in the proem that can 
help us gauge the integrity of the passage as given by Sextus. 
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of terms, is to emphasize what lies at the center of the chiasm.63 If such is the case here, attention 
is drawn to the intriguing phrase “witting wight” (εἰδότα φῶτα).64 
As mentioned, however, with the opening sentence not yet complete, this first 
“paragraph” is not independent of what follows. Just as it caps a first chiasmus, ἵπποι in line four 
opens a second, still more elaborate one: ἵπποι (4) - ἅρμα (5) - κοῦραι (5) - ἄξων and σύριγγος (6) 
- πύλαι (11) and θυρέτροις (13) (ignoring for the moment the repetitions of κοῦραι in lines 9 and 
15, between which Νυκτός twice appears, at lines 9 and 11) are revisited, on the far side of Dike, 
in the shorter span of lines 17-21 : πυλέων, θυρέτρων (17) - ἄξονας, σύριγξιν (20) - κοῦραι  (21) 
- ἅρμα (21) - ἵππους (21).  
τῇ φερόμην· τῇ γάρ με πολύφραστοι φέρον ἵπποι  
ἅρμα τιταίνουσαι, κοῦραι δ’ ὁδὸν ἡγεμόνευον.    5 
ἄξων δ’ ἐν χνοίῃσιν ἵει σύριγγος ἀυτήν  
αἰθόμενος - δοιοῖς γὰρ ἐπείγετο δινωτοῖσιν  
κύκλοις ἀμφοτέρωθεν -, ὅτε σπερχοίατο πέμπειν  
Ἡλιάδες κοῦραι, προλιποῦσαι δώματα Νυκτός,  
εἰς φάος, ὠσάμεναι κράτων ἄπο χερσὶ καλύπτρας.   10 
ἔνθα πύλαι Νυκτός τε καὶ Ἤματός εἰσι κελεύθων,  
καί σφας ὑπέρθυρον ἀμφὶς ἔχει καὶ λάινος οὐδός·  
αὐταὶ δ’ αἰθέριαι πλῆνται μεγάλοισι θυρέτροις·  
τῶν δὲ Δίκη πολύποινος ἔχει κληῖδας ἀμοιϐούς.  
τὴν δὴ παρφάμεναι κοῦραι μαλακοῖσι λόγοισιν    15 
πεῖσαν ἐπιφραδέως, ὥς σφιν βαλανωτὸν ὀχῆα  
ἀπτερέως ὤσειε πυλέων ἄπο· ταὶ δὲ θυρέτρων   
63 Welch (1981) p. 10: “As the structure expands in number of elements, the abrupt repetition by which the last 
elements of the first [half] of the system become the first elements of the second half can draw unusual attention to 
the central terms, which are repeated in close proximity to each other. [...] An emphatic focus on the center can be 
employed by a skillful composer to elevate the importance of the central concept or to dramatize a radical shift of 
events at the turning point. Meanwhile, the remainder of the system can be used with equal effectiveness as a 
framework through which the author may compare, contrast, juxtapose, complement, or complete each of the 
flanking elements in the chiastic system. In addition, a marked degree of intensification can be introduced 
throughout the entire system both by building a climax at the center as well as by strengthening each element 
individually upon its chiastic repetition.”  
64 Though not itself a repeated phrase within this chiastic structure, I take it that the focusing effect described by 
Welch nonetheless highlights its innermost element. While its precise significance here is not readily apparent, the 
audience may be expected to recall φῶτα here when in DK 14 the moon, with apparent reference to its reflecting the 
sun’s light, is described as an  “alien light” (ἀλλότριον φῶς), playing on the Homeric phrase “alien wight” 
(ἀλλότριος φώς). Some connection is thus made between the “knowing” or “seeing” mortal travelling the 
polyphemos path in line 3 and the prominent use in the Doxa of φῶς/φάος as the “principle” opposed to “night”. 
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χάσμ’ ἀχανὲς ποίησαν ἀναπτάμεναι πολυχάλκους  
ἄξονας ἐν σύριγξιν ἀμοιϐαδὸν εἰλίξασαι,  
γόμφοις καὶ περόνῃσιν ἀρηρότε· τῇ ῥα δι’ αὐτέων   20 
ἰθὺς ἔχον κοῦραι κατ’ ἀμαξιτὸν ἅρμα καὶ ἵππους.  
 
Again, it is easier to note the chiasmus than to feel confident about what, exactly, it is doing, but 
I take it as self-evident that the pattern of repetitions is deliberate. Curiously, however, there 
seem to be indications that the symmetry between the two “halves” of the chiasmus is 
intentionally askew: as with lines 1-4, the first “half” here again occupies a greater number of 
verses (incorporating within itself another chiasmus, if Ἡλιάδες ... Νυκτός (9), Νυκτός τε καὶ 
Ἤματός (11) qualifies); ἄξων and σῦριγξ, though repeated, have changed sense from (chariot) 
“axle” and (musical) “pipe” in line 6 to “(door-)post” and “socket” in line 19 (which helps to 
obscure the repetition in most translations); the repetitions of κοῦραι, as observed, do not all 
seem to fit into this frame; and, while the whole appears to revolve around Δίκη πολύποινος, the 
repeated words do not pinpoint this center precisely.65 
Still other patterns of repeated words emerge when the first twenty-one lines are taken as 
a whole, framed again by forms of ἵππος: as ἵπποι at the opening of line 1 was answered by ἵπποι 
at the end of line 4, so πέμπον, the first word of line 2, is answered by πέμπειν at the end of line 
8. (Cf. too αὐταὶ in line 13 with αὐτέων in line 20.) Also conspicuous (once one begins attending 
to these things) is how verbs of “bearing” (the four occurrences of φέρω already indicated) and 
“sending” (two occurrences: πέμπον, line 2; πέμπειν, line 8) are replaced by repeated “holdings” 
(ἔχει, lines 12 and 14, ἔχον in 21, and perhaps ὀχῆα in line 16) and “pushings” (two occurrences: 
ὠσάμεναι, line 10; ὤσειε, line 17). There is also a second pair of poly- compounds with 
65 This vagueness is also exhibited by the component parts of the chiasmus itself, with the exterior, single-word 
elements (i.e., the “mares”, “car”, and “maidens”) defining the outer bounds of the chiasmus more sharply than the 
two-word, inner elements (of which the “axle(s)-pipe(s)” pairing, occurring each time, within a single verse, is 
perhaps still “sharper” than the “gates-doors” pairing, reinforcing the sense of a nebulous center). 
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πολύποινος in line 14 and πολυχάλκους in 18, between which intriguingly occur one instance, in 
new compounds, of each of the stems combined with poly- in the earlier pair: the phem- of 
πολύφημον recurs in line 15 with παρφάμεναι, and the phrad- of πολύφραστοι in the adverb 
ἐπιφραδέως of line 16.  In line 18, of course, there is the relatively obvious figura etymologica 
χάσμ’ ἀχανὲς. The repetitions of κοῦραι not only feature in the second,  more elaborate chiasmus 
spanning lines 4 and 21, but over the course of that passage overtake the total number of 
repetitions of ἵππος to that point,66 a development that parallels the syntactical dominance of the 
maidens: it was initially the mares doing the bearing and sending, but the maidens gradually 
emerge as the ones leading the way (5), taking control of the πομπή (8-9), arranging for the 
opening of the gates (15-16), and keeping the car and the mares on track (21).   
This composite passage, framed by forms of ἵππος that open and close two separate 
chiastic structures, does not initially seem to be structured around a chiasmus itself. In fact it is, 
but to see it we have to extend the passage to the next mention of “mares” at line 25. As just 
noted, the number of occurrences of “maidens” and “mares” is made equal at four each with the 
appearance of ἵπποις in line 25. Taking all these instances into account, along with the two 
instances of Νυκτός between the two instances of κοῦραι that did not fit the pattern of the second 
chiasmus above, we find a third chiasmus in the proem, one composed of double occurrences of 
the same word: ἵπποι (1), ἵπποι (4) - κοῦραι (5), κοῦραι (9) - Νυκτός (9), Νυκτός (11) - κοῦραι 
(15), κοῦραι (21) - ἵππους (21),  ἵπποις (25).67 Recalling that the phrase εἰδότα φῶτα, at the end 
of line three, was situated at the center of the first chiasmus of lines 1-4, it seems more than 
66 This will be leveled out at line 25 so that the number of “maidens” and “mares” in the proem as a whole is equal 
at four, although the goddess’ addressing of the narrator as κοῦρ’ in line 24 adds an (intentional) element of 
insecurity to this sense of balance. 
67 Observe that,  for the “mares” and “maidens”, even the placement of the words within their respective verses fits 
the chiasmus: ἵπποι (1, first foot), ἵπποι (4, final foot) - κοῦραι (5, second and third feet), κοῦραι (9, third and fourth 
feet) -  // - κοῦραι (15, third and fourth feet), κοῦραι (21, second and third feet) - ἵππους (21, final foot),  ἵπποις (25, 
first foot).  
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coincidence that the phrase εἰς φάος, at the beginning of line 10, is at the center of the present 
chiasmus.68 Once again, however, detecting the pattern does not serve to simplify matters. Much 
as the fitful “heart” of the various Ἀληθείης … ἦτορ verses seems to run counter to what one 
might expect, the “centers” of these chiasms only amplify the atmosphere of oddity of the proem: 
the “witting wight” is strangely borne along “in bewilderment”, while the light at the center of 
the present chiasmus is positioned between mentions of Night.69 As noted in connection with the 
first four lines,70 the increasingly elaborate patterning of repetitions as the proem proceeds seems 
designed to disorientate.71 As we read on, we become enmeshed in an intricate web of sounds, 
images, and semantic associations that may excite our interest, but provide no very certain sense 
of who is on this journey, where the journey is headed, or what to make of all.  
 
The Unity of Sextus’ Quotation 
Having gained from the foregoing some sense of the role that repetition plays in the structure of 
the proem, we are in a better position to observe the unity of the text as Sextus gives it. As we 
read the remainder of the proem, the way that ἵπποις ταί σε φέρουσιν of line 25 recalls the 
opening words of the proem is unmistakable. What is less obvious is that the rest of the opening 
line, ὅσον τ’ ἐπὶ θυμὸς ἱκάνοι, is also echoed in the words that form the transition from the 
proem to its sequel: μόνος δ’ ἔτι θυμὸς ὁδοῖο (/ λείπεται). Not only is the scansion identical, but 
68 The connection between the phrases is (orthographically) closer if we keep εἰς, instead emending to ἐς, as 
recommended by Sider (see footnote 28), but cf. footnote 97 below.  In any case, from Parmenides’ pun in DK 14 
(cf. footnote 64), it is clear that he associates φῶς/φάος (“light”) and φώς (“person”).  
69 This again anticipates DK 14, which opens with the phrase νυκτὶ φάος. (The reading νυκτιφαὲς in DK and other 
editions is an emendation by Scaliger.)  
70 See footnote 59. 
71 Contrast the view of Cordero, who, from the questionable bases that (i) “At a time when sages […] expressed 
themselves in prose, […] Parmenides decided to compose a Poem”, and (ii) “Although Parmenides is of Ionian stock 
and most of the inhabitants of the Elea region are Dorians, the poem is written in the pan-Hellenic dialect of the 
Homeric poems”, concludes from “all these details” that “Parmenides wants to interest (and be understood by) the 
widest possible public.” (2004, pp. 14-15, italics added)  Cordero goes on to describe the proem as “a series of 
images easily interpretable by the public of his time.” (p. 17, italics added)  
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even the sequence of vowels is the same up to the final word of each verse (which still opens 
with an aspirate in each case).72 As with ἵπποι in line 4, which closed the first chiasmus and 
opened the second, the latter half of line 35 closes the proem as a whole by echoing the θυμὸς 
clause of line 1, while also anticipating the opening clause of DK 8, with which Kranz and 
company mistakenly identify it (but where, as already noted, Parmenides will replace μόνος with 
μοῦνος, and θυμὸς with μῦθος). The passage framed by these echoes of the separate halves of the 
opening line, meanwhile, is another “paragraph” of the proem, in which more of the verbal 
dexterity already noted is on display.  
One such instance begins with the replacement of the first person with the second person 
pronoun in ἵπποις ταί σε φέρουσιν. This calls our attention to the placement of personal pronouns 
in the proem thus far. After appearing in the opening phrase of the poem, ἵπποι ταί με φέρουσιν, 
we next find μ’ (following ἐπεί) in line 2, then με again two lines later (following two 
occurrences of τῇ in the same line), with two more occurrences further on in two consecutive 
lines (22 and 23). As for the second person pronoun, σε first appears in the phrase echoing the 
poem’s opening in line 25, appears next one line later (following ἐπεί), then two lines later 
(following two occurrences of τε in the same line) with (when we allow ourselves to ignore 
Kranz’ move) two more occurrences, a bit later, in two consecutive lines (31 and 32). This 
parallelism extends to the placement within the line of the first three instances of each pronoun: 
1 ἵπποι ταί με φέρουσιν, …  25 ἵπποις ταί σε φέρουσιν … 
2 πέμπον, ἐπεί μ’ ἐς ὁδὸν  …  26 χαῖρ’, ἐπεὶ οὔτι σε μοῖρα … 
...      … 
4 τῇ φερόμην· τῇ γάρ με …  28 ἀλλὰ θέμις τε δίκη τε. χρεὼ δέ σε … 
 
72 The pattern of consonants before θυμὸς also exhibits considerable balance: nasals and sibilant with the omicrons, 
followed by a dental before ἐπὶ and ἔτι.  
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It is, I think, no accident that the pronoun proceeds farther into the line each time. This seems 
linked, moreover, to the parallel use of ὁδός, which appears twice in the “με” paragraph (in lines 
2 and 5), but four times over the span of lines 27-35, where it is thrice paired with the 
demonstrative. Just as there is a progression in the first three uses of each pronoun further into 
the hexameter each time, the phrase “(this) way” actually makes a complete journey across the 
verse, occupying the first foot of line 27, the second and part of the third in line 31, stretching 
from the third into the fifth foot in line 32, and ending the line in 35: 
ἵπποις ταί σε φέρουσιν ἱκάνων ἡμέτερον δῶ,    25 
χαῖρ’, ἐπεὶ οὔτι σε μοῖρα κακὴ προὔπεμπε νέεσθαι  
τήνδ’ ὁδόν (ἦ γὰρ ἀπ’ ἀνθρώπων ἐκτὸς πάτου ἐστίν)  
ἀλλὰ θέμις τε δίκη τε. χρεὼ δέ σε πάντα πυθέσθαι  
ἠμὲν Ἀληθείης εὐπειθέος ἀτρεμὲς ἦτορ  
ἠδὲ βροτῶν δόξας, ταῖς οὐκ ἔνι πίστις ἀληθής.    30 
ἀλλὰ σὺ τῆσδ’ ἀφ’ ὁδοῦ διζήσιος εἶργε νόημα· 
μηδέ σ’ ἔθος πολύπειρον ὁδὸν κατὰ τήνδε βιάσθω,  
νωμᾶν ἄσκοπον ὄμμα καὶ ἠχήεσσαν ἀκουήν 
καὶ γλῶσσαν, κρῖναι δὲ λόγῳ πολύδηριν ἔλεγχον  
ἐξ ἐμέθεν ῥηθέντα. μόνος δ' ἔτι θυμὸς ὁδοῖο    35 
λείπεται. 
 
Displacing lines 31-36 with Kranz would obviously obliterate this effect, and including two extra 
lines between verses 30 and 31 with Diels would mar it considerably by widening the gap 
between the first two occurrences of the phrase.73 
By keeping Sextus’ text, we also find a third pair of poly- compounds in the proem, 
πολύπειρον and πολύδηριν, in lines 32 and 34. This mirrors the proximity of the placement of the 
first pair in lines 2 and 4, and it is probably no coincidence that the first adjective of the pair here, 
73 Although only two lines would be added, they would significantly affect the continuity of the lines. In the text of 
PL, Diels marks a paragraph break after the added lines (see Texts: A), and, as mentioned above (footnote 26), 
Burnet and Wheelwright introduce even stronger breaks.  
45 
 
                                               
  
πολύπειρον, could be read as agreeing with ὁδὸν,74 like πολύφημον, the first adjective in the first 
pair. This pair of poly- compounds thus suggests a return to the beginning of the proem, 
matching the return to θυμὸς (again, not a mistake for μῦθος) in line 35 which marks the end of a 
very complex period. The overall impression created by these elements is that of an extended 
kuklos coming to a close. It is easy to imagine that Sextus concludes his quotation at this point 
because it is here that one senses the multiplicity of threads introduced over the course of the 
proem being gathered together and rounded off into some sort of whole. Of course, it is not a 
resounding conclusion, and like a number of such “paragraph” markers already encountered, it 
points beyond itself, but, even if not perfectly well-rounded, it is a convincing enough conclusion 
that we can see why Sextus would include the final sentence in his quotation even when no 
specific comment about it will be forthcoming. 
In rushing to point out the final “paragraph” of the proem I hurried over the important 
lines 22-24, where our narrator meets his goddess: 
καί με θεὰ πρόφρων ὑπεδέξατο, χεῖρα δὲ χειρί  
δεξιτερὴν ἕλεν, ὧδε δ’ ἔπος φάτο καί με προσηύδα·  
ὦ κοῦρ’ ἀθανάτοισι συνάορος ἡνιόχοισιν, 
  
The repetitions of με have already been noted. Less strikingly, χεῖρα δὲ χειρί recalls the 
occurrence of χερσὶ in line 10, and with πρόφρων the prefix προ- seems to assume a certain 
degree of prominence, anticipated in line 9, which carries on into 26, perhaps suggesting a sense 
of the progression of the journey.75 And, while not an actual repetition, ἡνιόχοισιν may strike the 
74 It can also be taken, as the majority of readers seem to do, with ἔθος. I am inclined to regard this as a deliberate 
syntactical ambiguity, but feel that the line divides most naturally between πολύπειρον and ὁδὸν, and if pressed 
would take πολύπειρον with ἔθος. 
75 Though the goddess’ apparently kindly reception of the kouros, taking his “right hand in hers”, as many have 
translated it, may appear an unalloyed expression of welcome, Floyd has pointed out that the expression πρόφρων 
ὑπεδέξατο and the repetition of the word for “hand” link this scene with other epic instances of greeting where an 
element of deception or misperception is regularly at play (see Floyd (1992) pp. 252-255). There is, moreover, an 
additional subversive subtlety in Parmenides’ expression here: the goddess is not exactly said to take the kouros’ 
“right hand in hers”, but to take his right hand with her hand. That is, it is only the hand of the kouros that is 
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ear as an echo of ἐν χνοίῃσιν in line 6. These, along with other less apparent repetitions not 
included in the chiastic structures already treated, find a place when we finally come to consider 
the proem as a whole. The following schema will help to bring these out: 
 A. πέμπον (2)  
  B. ὁδὸν (2) -  κατὰ πάντ’ (3)  - ὁδὸν (5) 
   [C. ἐν χνοίῃσιν (6)?] 
    D. πέμπειν (8) -  προ|λιποῦσαι δώματα (9) 
      E. αἰθόμενος (7) - χερσὶ (10) - αἰθέριαι (13) 
       F. ἀμοιβούς (14) 
         G. ἀπτερέως (17) 
         H. χάσμ’ ἀχανὲς (18) 
        Gʹ. ἀναπτάμεναι (18) 
       Fʹ. ἀμοιβαδὸν (19) 
      Eʹ. ὑπεδέξατο, χεῖρα δὲ χειρί (22) / δεξιτερὴν (23)  
    Dʹ. δῶ (25) -  προὔ|πεμπε (26) 
   [Cʹ. ἡνιόχοισιν (24)?]  
  Bʹ.  ὁδὸν (27) - πάντα (28) - ὁδοῦ (31) -  ὁδὸν κατὰ (31) - ὁδοῖο (35) 
    Aʹ. λείπεται (36) 
  
Within the frame suggested by the occurrences of θυμός in lines 1 and 35, we first observe that 
the midpoint of our 35-plus-line proem coincides neatly with the phrase χάσμ’ ἀχανὲς at the 
beginning of line 18 (H). While we noted the phrase earlier, it now emerges that this figura 
etymologica playing on a chi-based verbal root is, appropriately, the centerpiece of a chiasmus 
spanning the whole proem. The elements of this chiasmus, however, only become evident when 
we observe that Parmenides is not only repeating whole words, but certain stems and roots, too. 
Once we are alerted to this, we see that the “gaping gap” at the middle of the proem is flanked on 
specified as the right hand, suggesting that the goddess, if not up to something sinister, is at least not engaging in the 
encounter on the same terms as the youth. Parmenides underscores this slight subversion of the conventional 
greeting by arranging his verses so that the adjective specifying the kouros’ hand as “right” (δεξιτερὴν) is placed at 
the far left of the next verse. That this no accident is made clear by Parmenides’ similar trope in the single-line 
fragment DK 17, δεξιτεροῖσιν μὲν κούρους, λαιοῖσι δὲ κούρας (“on the right, boys, on the left, girls”), where “right” 
(related to kouroi) appears on the left-hand side of the hexameter, and “left” on the right-hand side. 
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either side by ἀπτ- (G and Gʹ), and more remotely by ἀμοιβ- (F and Fʹ). Outside of this core is a 
more complex pair of elements, where a pair of αἰθ- stems surrounding the maidens’ “hands” (E) 
is balanced by the pair of δεξ- words containing the “hands” of the youth and the goddess (Eʹ). 
The next set, D and Dʹ, is still more involved. In each pair, the pattern emanating out from the 
center of the chiasmus is: δῶ-, the prefix προ-, the verbal stem πεμπ-. In Dʹ, this is concisely 
achieved with two words. In D, it takes three, since the prefix is attached to a different verbal 
stem. The stem in προλιποῦσαι is not otiose, however, because, as a glance at A and Aʹ reveals, 
it plays its role in the overarching structure πέμπον (2) - προ|λιποῦσαι δώματα (9) - δῶ ... 
προὔ|πεμπε (25-26) - λείπεται (36) (A – D – Dʹ – Aʹ). Whichever verb appears without the 
prefix on one side of the “houses” (or the “gaping gap” at the center) appears with it on the other 
side, and vice versa.  
 Of the two remaining elements in the scheme above, C and Cʹ make a somewhat 
questionable pairing. There is no repeated root or stem involved, just a similarity of sound, and, 
as indicated by the brackets and question marks, the placement in the scheme does not fit 
perfectly: Cʹ, in line 24, should be placed between Dʹ (25-26) and Eʹ (22-23). Still, despite the 
lack of any real etymological connection, ἡνιόχοισιν may nonetheless have been felt to echo ἐν 
χνοίῃσιν, and as we have seen what seem to be intentional elements of asymmetry in earlier 
chiastic structures, we might be expected to tolerate them here.  
The final pair, B and Bʹ, might also seem odd. Again, it is not word stems that are in play, 
but rather the repetition of whole words (as in the chiasms treated earlier), and, as with D and Dʹ, 
the parallelism between the elements is also peculiar. Taking these points hysteron proteron, it 
can be observed that, though it adds ὁδοῦ and ὁδὸν between the occurrences of κατά and πάντα, 
Bʹ nonetheless preserves, in inverted order, the pattern that B establishes with ὁδὸν - κατὰ - 
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πάντ’ - ὁδὸν. With its additions, Bʹ adds the flourish of placing each interior element in that 
pattern within its own “cell”, between one accusative and one genitive form of the same word.76 
This involves greater departures from the stricter correspondence that we saw in comparing D 
and Dʹ, but even this, I think, is not without its place in the greater whole. Looking at the whole 
structure, we notice that the farther we stray outside the root-based core of F-G-H-Gʹ-Fʹ, 
increasingly greater anomalies occur in the correspondence between one side of the “gap” and 
the other. The dissonance is just enough at each stage as to seem continually disorienting, but 
never so great as to violate the overall pattern.77 As we depart from the center, the tension grows 
by gradual steps, devised carefully enough that at the extreme limits of the structure, in A and Aʹ, 
we can recognize as corresponding elements two antonymic roots! B and Bʹ occupy a definite 
place in this progression, with Bʹ repeating the patterns of B in a more fragmented fashion (over 
the space of nine lines) than in any of the “inner” correspondences, but still shy of the starker 
contrast achieved in A and Aʹ, which sets “escorting” or “sending” against “leaving behind”. The 
reason why B and Bʹ feature whole word forms as opposed to roots is, I think, because this pair 
forms one of the links between this chiasmus and the other patterns of repetition already 
observed.78 Like the instances of κοῦραι and the forms of ἵππος shared between earlier chiasms, 
the use of ὁδός in framing B and Bʹ binds this root-based chiasmus to the earlier ones, forming a 
complicated quilt of overlapping but distinctly discernible structures.  
76 But with different genitive forms. Note too that the chiastic order in Bʹ is so carefully preserved as to have the 
accusative that κατά governs precede it. The increase in the number of “ways” is probably not without meaning of 
its own. One of the more contested points in current Parmenidean scholarship is the precise number of “ways” of 
inquiry travelled or entertained in the poem.   
77 Thus the present chiasmus seems to answer to or correspond in some manner with the second chiasmus, the outer 
edges of which seemed more clearly defined than the interior ones, which seemed centered vaguely around Dike, 
with the “doors” and “gates” on either side. 
78 Perhaps, however, κατά (like προ-) should be regarded as something in between a root and an independent word, 
so that B and Bʹ are not quite the exception that they appear in this respect. 
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All four extended chiastic structures are thus bound together, unifying the passage 
through the various repeated forms shared between them. Irksome or no, these repetitions in the 
proem are obviously intentional, very intricately patterned, and of some special interest to 
Parmenides. Even if we cannot say with certainty just what Parmenides’ purpose was in 
producing these designs, they make plain the tightly-knit integrity of the passage. Indeed, in light 
of what we have so far discerned, Diels’ addition seems intrusive, while Kranz’s move looks like 
an especially infelicitous attempt to make the evidence fit preconceived notions about what 
Parmenides means to be telling us and how he composed his poetry. Moreover, given 
Parmenides’ manifest repetitiousness, it seems perfectly possible that the lines found in 
Simplicius and Proclus that are similar (but not identical) to verses 28-30 of Sextus’ quotation 
came from elsewhere in the poem.  
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Appendix to Chapter One: Texts     
Texts: A. The end of the proem in Diels’ Poetarum Philosophorum Fragmenta (1901) 
 
      καί με θεὰ πρόφρων ὑπεδέξατο, χεῖρα δὲ χειρί  
  δεξιτερὴν ἕλεν, ὧδε δ’ ἔπος φάτο καί με προσηύδα·  
  ὦ κοῦρ’ ἀθανάτοισι συνάορος ἡνιόχοισιν,  
25 ἵπποις ταί σε φέρουσιν ἱκάνων ἡμέτερον δῶ    
  χαῖρ’, ἐπεὶ οὔτι σε μοῖρα κακὴ προύπεμπε νέεσθαι  
  τήνδ’ ὁδόν (ἦ γὰρ ἀπ’ ἀνθρώπων ἐκτὸς πάτου ἐστίν),  
  ἀλλὰ θέμις τε δίκη τε. χρεὼ δέ σε πάντα πυθέσθαι  
  ἠμὲν Ἀληθείης εὐκυκλέος ἀτρεμὲς ἦτορ  
30 ἠδὲ βροτῶν δόξας, ταῖς οὐκ ἔνι πίστις ἀληθής.    
<ἀλλ’ ἔμπης καὶ ταῦτα μαθήσεαι, ὡς τὰ δοκοῦντα    
χρῆν δοκιμῶς εἶναι διὰ παντὸς πάντα περῶντα>. 
     ἀλλὰ σὺ τῆσδ’ ἀφ’ ὁδοῦ διζήσιος εἶργε νόημα 
  μηδέ σ’ ἔθος πολύπειρον ὁδὸν κατὰ τήνδε βιάσθω,  
35 νωμᾶν ἄσκοπον ὄμμα καὶ ἠχήεσσαν ἀκουήν 
  καὶ γλῶσσαν, κρῖναι δὲ λόγῳ πολύδηριν ἔλεγχον  
  ἐξ ἐμέθεν ῥηθέντα. μόνος δ’ ἔτι θυμὸς ὁδοῖο     
  λείπεται  . . . 
 
      22 θεὰ  = δαίμων (3); clausula versus homerica      23 sqq. cf. Hom. α 120 sqq.     24 ἀθανάτηισιν Brandis at cf. 
Parm. 53        24 συνήορος  homerice (θ 99) Brandis; at cf. κρᾶσιν 16, 1;   δίκρανοι 6, 5. Xenoph. 1, 4. Emped. 20, 6  
25 cf. Σ 385. 424  26 μοῖρα κακὴ cf. N 602 al.      29 ἠμὲν] τὸ μὲν Procl.      εὐκυκλέοςSimpl.(DE; εὐκύκλιος 
A): εὐφεγγέος  Procl.: εὐπειθέος Plut., Clem., Sext., Laert. ἀτρεμὲς Clem., Sext. paraphr. Simpl.: ἀτρεκὲς Plut., 
Sext. text., Laert.  Veritatis cor intrepidum est Ens globosum, immotum        30 δόξαι vel δόξαις Procl. ταῖς Clem., 
Sext., Simpl.: αἷς Plut.: τῆς Laert.      ἔνι] ἔτι Laert.       31.32 transsilulit homoearcto deceptus Sextus; plus omissa 
rati plerique fr. 2—7 intercalant     31 μαθήσεαι DE: μαθήσεται A: μυθήσομαι F 32 χρῆν vel χρὴν Simpl.: 
χρὴ Peyron       32 δοκίμως εἶναι libri, quod Wilam. explicabat: ‘die Hypothesen, die sich durch das ganze 
Lehrgebäude hindurch bewähren, haben in einer probehaltigen Weise Realität’, id quod pugnat contra ontologiam 
Parmenidis, quae nisi in uno ente nihil probabile aut reale agnoscat. nam hypotheses fingere  si voluisset suae 
Veritati consonas, monismum, sicut antiqui Iones, non dualismum commendavisset. teneo δοκιμῶσ(αι) εἶναι vulgari 
elisione (cf. Xenoph. 3,5) ‘wie man bei gründlicher Durchforschung annehmen müsste, dass sich jenes Scheinwesen 
verhalte’, scil. si ista via esset omnino ingredienda. minus placent coniecturae velut  εἶναι, θεῖναι meae vel κρῖναι 
Karstenii, σ’ ἰέναι Cobeti διὰ παντὸς πάντα Heraclitum, quem hic potissimum petit, imitatus rhetorice cf. Parm. p. 
60 περῶντα Simpl.(A): περ ὄντα (DEF) 33 = 7, 2, ~ 6, 3         34 σ’ ἔθος Sext.: σε θεὸς Laert.  
36 πολύδηριν Laert.: πολύπειρον Sext. (ex 34): intellege pugnantium opinionum disquisitionem 37 ῥηθέντα] cf. 
31. 22      θυμὸς sic Sext., quod si verum sit, explicetur  vivida vis Rationis i.e., ἀτρεμὲς ἦτορ Ἀληθείης (29); 
vulgo μῦθος ὁδοῖο secundum 8,1. 
 
Points of note: 
* lines 31-32 added to Sextus’ text from Simplicius’ commentary on Aristotle’s de Caelo. 
* εὐκυκλέος in line 29 adopted from the same, and εὐφεγγέος from Proclus noted. 
* πολύδηριν (and κρῖναι, not noted in the app. crit.) in line 36 adopted from Diogenes Laertius. 
* θυμὸς retained in line 37 (cf. μῦθος in DK 7.6/8.1) . 
* In DK, lines 33-38 will be moved, by Kranz, to become DK 7.2-8.2. DK 1 ends at line 32.  
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Texts: B. The Proem: Sextus Empiricus, adv. Math. VII.111  
(Mutschmann’s text, with alterations as noted) ≈ DK 1.1-30 + DK 7.2-7 
 
 ἵπποι ταί με φέρουσιν, ὅσον τ’ ἐπὶ θυμὸς ἱκάνοι,  
 πέμπον, ἐπεί μ’ ἐς ὁδὸν βῆσαν πολύφημον ἄγουσαι  
 δαίμονος, ἣ κατὰ πάντ’ ἄτῃ φέρει εἰδότα φῶτα·  
 τῇ φερόμην· τῇ γάρ με πολύφραστοι φέρον ἵπποι  
 ἅρμα τιταίνουσαι, κοῦραι δ’ ὁδὸν ἡγεμόνευον.    5 
 ἄξων δ’ ἐν χνοίῃσιν ἵ<ει> σύριγγος ἀυτήν  
 αἰθόμενος  (δοιοῖς γὰρ ἐπείγετο δινωτοῖσιν  
 κύκλοις ἀμφοτέρωθεν), ὅτε σπερχοίατο πέμπειν  
 Ἡλιάδες κοῦραι, προλιποῦσαι δώματα Νυκτός,  
 εἰς φάος, ὠσάμεναι κράτων ἄπο χερσὶ καλύπτρας.    10 
 ἔνθα πύλαι Νυκτός τε καὶ Ἤματός εἰσι κελεύθων,  
 καί σφας ὑπέρθυρον ἀμφὶς ἔχει καὶ λάινος οὐδός·  
 αὐταὶ δ’ αἰθέριαι πλῆνται μεγάλοισι θυρέτροις·  
 τῶν δὲ Δίκη πολύποινος ἔχει κληῖδας ἀμοιϐούς.  
 τὴν δὴ παρφάμεναι κοῦραι μαλακοῖσι λόγοισιν    15 
 πεῖσαν ἐπιφραδέως, ὥς σφιν βαλανωτὸν ὀχῆα  
 ἀπτερέως ὤσειε πυλέων ἄπο. ταὶ δὲ θυρέτρων  
 χάσμ’ ἀχανὲς ποίησαν ἀναπτάμεναι πολυχάλκους  
 ἄξονας ἐν σύριγξιν ἀμοιϐαδὸν εἰλίξασαι,  
 γόμφοις καὶ περόνῃσιν ἀρηρότε· τῇ ῥα δι’ αὐτέων    20 
 ἰθὺς ἔχον κοῦραι κατ’ ἀμαξιτὸν ἅρμα καὶ ἵππους.  
 καί με θεὰ πρόφρων ὑπεδέξατο, χεῖρα δὲ χειρί  
 δεξιτερὴν ἕλεν, ὧδε δ' ἔπος φάτο καί με προσηύδα·  
 ὦ κοῦρ’ ἀθανάτοισι συνάορος ἡνιόχοισιν,  
 ἵπποις ταί σε φέρουσιν ἱκάνων ἡμέτερον δῶ,    25 
 χαῖρ’, ἐπεὶ οὔτι σε μοῖρα κακὴ προὔπεμπε νέεσθαι  
 τήνδ' ὁδόν (ἦ γὰρ ἀπ’ ἀνθρώπων ἐκτὸς πάτου ἐστίν),  
 ἀλλὰ θέμις τε δίκη τε. χρεὼ δέ σε πάντα πυθέσθαι  
 ἠμὲν Ἀληθείης εὐπειθέος ἀτρεμὲς ἦτορ  
 ἠδὲ βροτῶν δόξας, ταῖς οὐκ ἔνι πίστις ἀληθής.    30 
 ἀλλὰ σὺ τῆσδ’ ἀφ’ ὁδοῦ διζήσιος εἶργε νόημα, 
 μηδέ σ’ ἔθος πολύπειρον ὁδὸν κατὰ τήνδε βιάσθω  
 νωμᾶν ἄσκοπον ὄμμα καὶ ἠχήεσσαν ἀκουήν 
 καὶ γλῶσσαν, κρῖναι δὲ λόγῳ πολύδηριν ἔλεγχον  
 ἐξ ἐμέθεν ῥηθέντα. μόνος δ’ ἔτι θυμὸς ὁδοῖο    35 
 λείπεται. 
 
Departures from Sextus’ text:  
3 πάντ’ ἄτῃ is Newell’s punctuation, following Tarrant (1976), of παντατη, the sequence of letters 
common to all mss. (Mutschmann’s attribution of ἄστη to N is an error, as pointed out in Coxon (1968a)).     
 
6  ἵ<ει> Diels       14 Δίκη edd. : δίκην mss.  
34 κρῖναι (for mss. κρίνε) and πολύδηριν (for mss. πολύπειρον) are adopted from D.L. Vitae IX.22.  
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Texts: C. Lines identical or similar to DK B 1.29-30 in authors other than Sextus Empiricus 
(differences from Sextus’ text in bold) 
 
1. Plutarch, adv. Colot. 1114 d-e (188.21-23 Pohlenz-Westman) 
ἡ μὲν Ἀληθείης εὐπειθέος ἀτρεκ<ὲς ἦτορ > 
... 
ἡ δὲ βροτῶν δόξας, αἷς οὐκ ἔνι πίστις ἀληθής. 
  
2. Diogenes Laertius, Vitae IX.22 (646.10-11, 647.1-3 Marcovich) 
  …χρεὼ δέ σε πάντα πυθέσθαι  
ἠμὲν Ἀληθείης εὐπειθέος ἀτρεκὲς ἦτορ  
ἠδὲ βροτῶν δόξας, τῆς οὐκέτι πίστις ἀληθής. 
 
2 εὐπειθέος PFD:  εὐτίθεος B 
 
followed shortly by (without quoting the 31st line of Sextus’ longer quotation at adv. Math. VII.111, 
which is also omitted in adv. Math. vii.114): 
 
μηδέ σε θεὸς πολύπειρον ὁδὸν κατὰ τήνδε βιάσθω,  
νωμᾶν ἄσκοπον ὄμμα καὶ ἠχήεσσαν ἀκουήν 
καὶ γλῶσσαν, κρῖναι δὲ λόγῳ πολύδηριν ἔλεγχον.  
 
 
3. Clement, Strom. V.59.21-22 (Le Boulleuc)      
ἡ μὲν Ἀληθείης εὐπειθέος ἀτρεμὲς ἦτορ  
ἡ δὲ βροτῶν δόξαις, ταῖς οὐκ ἔνι πίστις ἀληθής. 
 
 
4. Proclus, in Tim. II.105 b (I.345.15-16 Diehl) 
τῶ μὲν Ἀληθείης εὐφεγγέος ἀτρεμὲς ἦτορ     X.1 
ἠδὲ βροτῶν δόξαι, αἷς οὐκ ἔνι πίστις ἀληθής.   X.2 
 
1 τῶ μὲν CN: τὸ μὲν P   2 ἠδὲ NP: ἡ δὲ C   δόξαι C: δόξαις NP 
 
 
5. Simplicius, in Cael. 557.25-558.2 (Heiberg)   
….χρεὼ δέ σε πάντα πυθέσθαι   Y.1 
ἠμὲν Ἀληθείης εὐκυκλέος ἀτρεμὲς ἦτορ     Y.2 
ἠδὲ βροτῶν δόξας, ταῖς οὐκ ἔνι πίστις ἀληθής.   Y.3  
ἀλλ΄ ἔμπης καὶ ταῦτα μαθήσεαι, ὡς τὰ δοκοῦντα   Y.4 
χρῆν δοκίμως εἶναι διὰ παντὸς πάντα περῶντα.    Y.5 
 
2 ἠμὲν D: εἰ μὲν AE     εὐκυκλέος DE : εὐκύκλιος A         3 ἠδὲ] ἡ δὲ E: εἰ δὲ E2 
4 μαθήσεαι DE: μαθήσεται A: μυθήσομαι Fc  5 περῶντα A : περ ὄντα DEF 
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Texts: D. Alleged overlaps between the end of Sextus’ proem and lines cited in Simplicius’ 
in Phys. 
 
1. Sextus’ text (incorporating alterations from D.L. Vitae IX.22) 
     
 ἠδὲ βροτῶν δόξας, ταῖς οὐκ ἔνι πίστις ἀληθής.   30 
 ἀλλὰ σὺ τῆσδ’ ἀφ’ ὁδοῦ διζήσιος εἶργε νόημα, 
 μηδέ σ’ ἔθος πολύπειρον ὁδὸν κατὰ τήνδε βιάσθω  
 νωμᾶν ἄσκοπον ὄμμα καὶ ἠχήεσσαν ἀκουήν 
 καὶ γλῶσσαν, κρῖναι δὲ λόγῳ πολύδηριν ἔλεγχον  
 ἐξ ἐμέθεν ῥηθέντα. μόνος δ’ ἔτι θυμὸς ὁδοῖο    35 
 λείπεται. 
 
2. In Phys. 135.21-22 (part of a quotation of Plato’s Sophist 258c-259b) 
 οὐ γὰρ μήποτε τοῦτο δαμῇ εἶναι μὴ ὄντα,     
 ἀλλὰ σὺ τῆσδ’ ἀφ’ ὁδοῦ διζήσιος εἶργε νόημα.   
 
3. In Phys. 244.1-2 (also apparently drawn from Sophist 258d) 
 οὐ γὰρ μήποτε τοῦτο δαμῇ εἶναι μὴ ἐόντα,      
 ἀλλὰ σὺ τῆσδ’ ἀφ’ ὁδοῦ διζήσιος εἶργε νόημα·    
 
4. In Phys. 143.31-144.1 (perhaps drawn from Sophist 258d rather than a copy of the poem) 
 οὐ γὰρ μήποτε τοῦτο δαμῇ εἶναι μὴ ὄντα,      
 ἀλλὰ σὺ τῆσδ’ ἀφ’ ὁδοῦ διζήσιος εἶργε νόημα.    
 
5. In Phys. 78.6 (preceded by DK 6.8-9, followed by entry 9 below) 
 ἀλλὰ σὺ τῆσδ’ ἀφ’ ὁδοῦ διζήσιος εἶργε νόημα,    
 
6. In Phys. 650.13 (a comment on non-being, from “the great Parmenides”; cf. Sophist 237a) 
 ἀλλὰ σὺ τῆσδ’ ἀφ’ ὁδοῦ διζήσιος εἶργε νόημα,    
 
7. In Phys. 145.1-3 (beginning a 52-line quotation = DK 8.1-52) 
  …μοῦνος δ’ ἔτι μῦθος ὁδοῖο    μοῦνος: DE μόνος: F  
 λείπεται, ὡς ἔστιν. ταύτῃ δ’ ἐπὶ σήματ’ ἔασι  
 πολλὰ μάλ’, ὡς ἀγένητον ἐὸν καὶ ἀνώλεθρόν ἐστιν,     
 
8. In Phys. 142.34-36 (partial quotation of Parmenides’ “signs” of the “One Being”)  
  … μόνος δ’ ἔτι μῦθος ὁδοῖο    μοῦνος:  μόνος: DEF 
 λείπεται ὡς ἔστιν. ταύτῃ δ’ ἐπὶ σήματ’ ἔασι  
 πολλὰ μάλ’, ὡς ἀγένητον ἐὸν καὶ ἀνώλεθρόν ἐστιν.      
 
9. In Phys. 78.8-10 (preceded by entry 5 above, followed, after a brief remark, by DK 8.3b-14) 
  …μοῦνος δ’ ἔτι μῦθος ὁδοῖο    μοῦνος: DE μόνος: aF 
 λείπεται, ὡς ἔστι. ταύτῃ δ’ ἐπὶ σήματ’ ἔασι  
 πολλὰ μάλα· 
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CHAPTER TWO – EXAMINING THE SOURCES 
 
The foregoing has been a defense of the integrity of Sextus Empiricus’ quotation of Parmenides’ 
proem on structural grounds, independent, for the most part, of the content expressed. We have 
proceeded in this manner in order to avoid imposing on our assessment undue presuppositions 
about Parmenides’ intent or compositional method, and to allow us to follow, as far as possible, 
the lead of the text itself. 79 This procedure has revealed that, whatever misgivings modern 
readers and writers may have about repetition, Parmenides seems either not to have shared them, 
or to have had other reasons for running the risk of irking his later editors. What exactly those 
reasons may have been has not concerned us thus far, nor shall I presently offer a full-scale 
interpretation of the proem. That is a task better carried out with an eye toward what can be 
discerned of the poem as a whole, and for a proper reconstruction of that, a fresh look at the 
sources of the other fragments is needed, in full consciousness of Parmenides’ habits of 
repetition and with due regard for the guidance those sources provide about the shape of the 
poem. Prior to such a review, however, it will be opportune to examine two of the passages in 
which the proem is quoted: that of Sextus himself, and Diogenes Laertius’ chapter on 
Parmenides. We will be better able to judge the reliability of Sextus’ quotation of the proem 
following a close reading of the context in which he does so, and the Laertian chapter provides 
vital information for that assessment.80 Moreover, by comparing the two in light of the preceding 
79 Naturally, certain changes must be allowed where the text itself seems faulty and/or other texts suggest better 
readings, but in general this study is intended to be  more textually conservative than most. 
80 I will not here treat in detail the passages of Plutarch and Clement that our earlier analysis suggested are also (that 
is, in addition to Sextus and Diogenes Laertius, and in contrast with Proclus and Simplicius) quoting lines from the 
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analysis of the structure of the proem, a hitherto unappreciated alternative for reading the lines 
generally regarded as part of DK 7 will present itself.  
 
Unreliable Sextus? 
 We shall consider Sextus’ text first. In the midst of a long survey of opinions held by various 
thinkers on the question of the criterion of truth, Sextus turns from the Pythagoreans to 
Xenophanes:81 
 These things,82 then, the Pythagorikoi [regard as criteria], while Xenophanes, according to 
those who explain him so differently,83 when he says, 
 
  καὶ τὸ μὲν οὖν σαφὲς οὔ τις ἀνὴρ ἴδεν, οὐδέ τις ἔσται  
      εἰδὼς ἀμφὶ θεῶν τε καὶ ἅσσα λέγω περὶ πάντων· 
     εἰ γὰρ καὶ τὰ μάλιστα τύχοι τετελεσμένον εἰπών,  
      αὐτὸς ὅμως οὐκ οἶδε, δόκος δ’ ἐπὶ πᾶσι τέτυκται,  
 
proem. It is well worth noting, however, that Plutarch, like both Sextus and Diogenes Laertius, quotes lines 29-30 in 
connection with the question of the criterion of truth (see adv. Colot. 13, 1114d-e; cf. DK A 34). In Clement’s case, 
the context of the quotation is a discussion about the use of symbolism in veiled presentations of truth. The whole of 
the reference to Parmenides, following a quotation from Heraclitus (DK 22 B 29), is as follows: “and the Eleatic, 
Parmenides the great, introduces a teaching of double ways, writing somehow so: the one [way], persuasive Truth’s 
untrembling heart, / the other, by mortals’ opinions, in which true trust is not.” [ὅ τ’ Ἐλεάτης Παρμενίδης ὁ μέγας 
διττῶν εἰσηγεῖται διδασκαλίαν ὁδῶν ὧδέ πως γράφων· ἡ μὲν Ἀληθείης εὐπειθέος ἀτρεμὲς ἦτορ, / ἡ δὲ βροτῶν 
δόξαις, ταῖς οὐκ ἔνι πίστις ἀληθής. Strom. V.59.21-22.]  
81 Adv. Math. VII.110-114 (text: Mustchmann (1914)). Note that we begin with the transition to Xenophanes. The 
phrase that opens section 111,  ὁ δὲ γνώριμος αὐτοῦ Παρμενίδης, is picking up on the opening of 110, Ταῦτα μὲν οἱ 
Πυθαγορικοί· Ξενοφάνης δὲ κατὰ τοὺς ὡς ἑτέρως αὐτὸν ἐξηγουμένους. The passages on Xenophanes and 
Parmenides are continuous, and, it appears, due to the same source. 
82 That is, logos (specifically, mathematical logos) and number. 
83 So differently, that is, from those who regard the lines about to be quoted as denying the existence of any criterion 
of truth. Sextus reported this view earlier (adv. Math. VII.49-52; cf. VIII.326). It is important to be aware that, 
throughout this portion of the work (§§ 39-260), Sextus is reporting others’ claims about what earlier thinkers 
regarded as the criterion of truth, and not, in the main, giving his own estimations of the commitments of those 
thinkers. Sometimes Sextus identifies his sources explicitly, sometimes refers to them elliptically, as here, and at 
other times makes no mention of the particular source for the account he is relating. (Tarán, in his belief that the 
allegorical interpretation of Parmenides’ proem was Sextus’ invention, seems to overlook this.) Nonetheless, Sextus 
is not quite, as David Sedley has claimed, “an entirely transparent figure” (1992, p. 24). Glimmers of Sextus’ own 
attitude are present, but expressed by slight touches, such as ὡς ἑτέρως here, where I take it that ὡς gives an 
additional stress to the difference between the views Sextus is reporting. Sextus’ overall strategy in this portion of 
the work is to undermine confidence in dogmatic views about the criterion (even the view that there is no criterion) 
by displaying the variety of equally plausible positions that different dogmatists have adopted. The ultimate 
skeptical aim is to suspend judgment, refraining from dogmatic pronouncement on matters understood to be 
inherently unclear. When a single text, such as Xenophanes’, serves as the basis for opposing interpretations, Sextus 
may be interested in stressing the fact.  
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  [And as for to saphes, not any man has seen it, nor will there be anyone 
  Witting what I say concerning gods and about all things; 
  For even if, at best, one actually happens to speak tetelesmenon, 
  Nevertheless he himself knows not; but dokos has been fashioned for all,] 
 
appears to abolish not all apprehension, but the epistemonic and infallible one, and to leave 
the doxastic one. For “but dokos has been fashioned for all” indicates this. And so, according 
to this man, the doxastic logos (that is, the one that keeps to what’s likely, not the one 
keeping to what’s fixed) becomes a criterion. His acquaintance, Parmenides, condemned the 
doxastic logos, I mean the one having weak suppositions, and assumed as a criterion the 
epistemonic one (that is, the infallible one), withdrawing even from the assurance of the 
senses.84 
 
It is important, though not always easy, to distinguish between the accounts about the various 
thinkers that Sextus is reporting and Sextus’ own intermittent remarks. In the preceding 
discussion about the Pythagoreans, Posidonius was specifically named as one source for the 
views reported,85 and the interpretation of Xenophanes reported here, at odds with one presented 
earlier, is explicitly attributed to others.86 It is his source, not Sextus himself, who claims that 
84 (110) Ταῦτα μὲν οἱ Πυθαγορικοί· Ξενοφάνης δὲ κατὰ τοὺς ὡς ἑτέρως αὐτὸν ἐξηγουμένους, ὅταν λέγῃ 
    καὶ τὸ μὲν οὖν σαφὲς οὔ τις ἀνὴρ ἴδεν, οὐδέ τις ἔσται  
     εἰδὼς ἀμφὶ θεῶν τε καὶ ἅσσα λέγω περὶ πάντων· 
      εἰ γὰρ καὶ τὰ μάλιστα τύχοι τετελεσμένον εἰπών,  
      αὐτὸς ὅμως οὐκ οἶδε, δόκος δ’ ἐπὶ πᾶσι τέτυκται, 
φαίνεται μὴ πᾶσαν κατάληψιν ἀναιρεῖν ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐπιστημονικὴν καὶ ἀδιάπτωτον, ἀπολείπειν δὲ τὴν 
δοξαστήν·  τοῦτο γὰρ ἐμφαίνει τὸ “δόκος δ’ ἐπὶ πᾶσι τέτυκται”.  ὥστε κριτήριον γίνεσθαι κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν 
δοξαστὸν λόγον, τουτέστι τὸν τοῦ εἰκότος ἀλλὰ μὴ τὸν τοῦ παγίου ἐχόμενον.  (111) ὁ δὲ γνώριμος αὐτοῦ 
Παρμενίδης τοῦ μὲν δοξαστοῦ λόγου κατέγνω, φημὶ δὲ τοῦ ἀσθενεῖς ἔχοντος ὑπολήψεις, τὸν δ’ ἐπιστημονικόν, 
τουτέστι τὸν ἀδιάπτωτον, ὑπέθετο κριτήριον, ἀποστὰς καὶ <αὐτὸς> τῆς τῶν αἰσθήσεων πίστεως. (I ignore the 
addition of αὐτὸς in the final sentence.) 
85 Adv. Math. VII. 93. The reference there is to a discussion of Plato’s Timaeus, but the nature of the work in which 
this discussion featured is uncertain. See Kidd (1988) p. 339. 
86 The reference may be to Posidonius himself. The naming of Posidonius just mentioned, combined with the report 
in Diogenes Laertius (Vitae VII.54) that Posidonius wrote a work On Criterion in which some early Stoics were said 
to have made “right reason” (orthos logos) a criterion, makes Posidonius a plausible source for much of this portion 
of the work (i.e., adv. Math. VII.89-140), where a logos of one kind or another is claimed to have been the criterion 
of some early thinker. Some (though suspicious of the value of Diogenes’ report) regard the whole portion of 
Sextus’ work as “a passage almost certainly of Posidonian origin.” (Long and Sedley (1987) [= “LS”] Vol. II, p. 
243 ; cf., in relation to Parmenides’ text, Kingsley (2003) p. 568, with references). I have no real dispute with this 
identification, provided that it is understood that recognition of its “Posidonian origin” does not entitle us to treat the 
entire section as though it were a quotation from Posidonius rather than as a passage of Sextus’ work. Sedley (1992), 
quoted earlier (see footnote 83), in making a case for Posidonius being not only the primary, but (it seems) the only 
source for adv. Math. VII.89-140, presents an overly simplified account, attributing to Posidonius material that 
appears to be drawn from elsewhere or Sextus’ own contributions. 
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Xenophanes’ verses affirm a doxastic logos as a criterion of truth. For a proper estimation of 
what Sextus relates about Parmenides, we must understand that this distinction carries over 
seamlessly into the discussion about him. The pairing of Xenophanes and “his acquaintance” 
comes from Sextus’ source, and it is that source that views them as committing to either a 
doxastic or an epistemonic logos as a criterion. 87 Sextus’ own contribution comes with the 
clarifications of these terms, presented in the clauses that I have set in parentheses in the 
translation above. A hint of Sextus’ reserve about the claim itself may be present in the remark 
that immediately follows, which introduces his quotation:  
  
At any rate (γοῦν), in beginning his On Nature, he writes in this manner:88  
 
 
Then follows the whole proem, from the opening word ἵπποι to λείπεται in the 36th line. In 
introducing the lines, Sextus not only very helpfully informs us that they come from the 
beginning of Parmenides’ poem, but with γοῦν (“at any rate”, “at least”) he may also signal that 
the lines being claimed as evidence for the interpretation he is reporting are less than fully 
convincing. 89 Sextus relates the manner in which his source read the opening of the poem 
immediately after the quotation: 
87 The talk of “epistemonic” and “doxastic” apprehensions (katalēpseis), as well as of “weak suppositions” as a type 
of doxa, suggests that source is Stoic, whether Posidonius or not (cf. LS 40 and 41, esp. 41C and 41G, with notes). 
Some of the same language also appears in the Didaskalikos of the middle Platonist Alcinous (see Dillon (1996) pp. 
273-276 with Afterword pp. 445-446), so is not exclusively Stoic. For convenience, but with the caveat that the label 
is more of a placeholder than a means of identification for the figure behind much (but not necessarily all) of adv. 
Math. VII 89-140, who is probably Stoic, and who may or may not be Posidonius, I will speak hereafter of Sextus’ 
“Stoic source”. 
88 ἐναρχόμενος γοῦν τοῦ Περὶ φύσεως γράφει τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον· 
89 Cf. the parallel uses of the expression ἐναρχόμενος γοῦν at adv. Math. VII.60 and (if the emendation of the 
manuscripts’ ἐναρχόμενος οὖν is accepted) VII.132, where Sextus quotes the openings of works by Protagoras and 
Heraclitus (quoting each, as with Parmenides’ proem, in the fullest form known to us) as offering possibly doubtful 
evidence for claims, advanced by other parties, about Protagoras’ and Heraclitus’ positions on the criterion. At 
VII.60-64, Sextus reports the view that Protagoras’ homo mensura statement abolished any criterion. Sextus’ own 
view on Protagoras’ commitments can be found at Outlines of Pyrrhonism I.216-219, where he interprets “man is 
the measure” as a positive assertion that a human being is, for Protagoras, a kind of criterion. Heraclitus is discussed 
in adv. Math. VII.126-134, where the source for the interpretation Sextus is reporting seems likely to be the same as 
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For in these [verses], Parmenides, in saying that “mares” bear him, is speaking of the 
irrational (alogos) impulses and desires of the soul, while progressing “down the polyphēmos 
way of the divinity” is the contemplation according to the philosophic logos,90 which logos, 
in the manner of an escorting divinity, leads the way toward the cognition of all things;91  
 
The explanatory particle “for” (γὰρ) here indicates that the equivalences being claimed between 
the features of the proem and the mental and perceptual faculties mentioned are offered in 
support of the earlier claim that Parmenides assumed an epistemonic logos as a criterion, 
“withdrawing even from the assurance of the senses”. This would seem so elementary a point 
that it hardly needs pointing out, but γὰρ goes untranslated in both the Loeb and Cambridge 
versions of the work,92 and the failure to see this connection can easily lead to the impression 
that these equivalences are Sextus’ own.93 What is happening, rather, is that after quoting the 
lines (introduced with a touch of skepticism, and fully enough that we might form some 
independent sense of what Parmenides might be saying) Sextus brings us back to the 
that for the Xenophanes-Parmenides passage (VII.110-114). On the view reported, Heraclitus is supposed to have 
rejected the senses, and adopted logos (specifically the “common and divine” logos) as his criterion. 
90 As this identification seems to rely in part on an ambiguity of the preposition κατά in the phrases κατὰ τὴν 
πολύφημον ὁδὸν (“down” or “along” the way) and κατὰ τὸν φιλόσοφον λόγον (“according to” the logos), it is worth 
noting that the preposition does not actually occur in the relevant phrase in the proem itself (the phrase ὁδὸν … 
πολύφημον in the third line is governed by ἐς). This is one of a number of apparent discrepancies between the text of 
the proem in Sextus’ full quotation of it and the text as the Stoic interpreter presents it. 
91 (112) ἐν τούτοις γὰρ ὁ Παρμενίδης ἵππους μέν φησιν αὐτὸν φέρειν τὰς ἀλόγους τῆς ψυχῆς ὁρμάς τε καὶ ὀρέξεις, 
κατὰ δὲ τὴν πολύφημον ὁδὸν τοῦ δαίμονος πορεύεσθαι τὴν κατὰ τὸν φιλόσοφον λόγον θεωρίαν, ὃς λόγος 
προπομποῦ δαίμονος τρόπον ἐπὶ τὴν ἁπάντων ὁδηγεῖ γνῶσιν. Mutschmann’s text has a full stop here, as does that of 
Bury, and for convenience I pause here, but it seems clear that what follows is part of the same sentence. The clause 
that begins with κατὰ δὲ τὴν … ὁδὸν … πορεύεσθαι is only the first of three δὲ clauses answering to ἵππους μέν. 
The other two are κούρας δ’ αὐτοῦ προάγειν … in section 112 and ἐπὶ δὲ τὴν “πολύποινον” ἐλθεῖν Δίκην … in 113, 
and we are to understand ὁ Παρμενίδης … φησιν … with each (see footnote 95 for the text). 
92 See Bury (1935) p. 61, and Bett (2005) p. 24. Following such an extended quotation, it is perhaps easy to overlook 
the force of the particle, but Sextus does not seem to let quotations or his own interjections derail the run of the 
argument. Cf. the sentence incorporating the shorter quotation of Xenophanes in the preceding section. 
93 It seems a common assumption that Sextus, even when it is recognized that he is dependent on another source, 
endorses the allegorical interpretation of the proem (although Tarán’s insistence that it is Sextus’ own creation may 
be a rarity). The allegorical interpretation is often disparaged and/or ignored in the literature (cf. Cornford (1939) p. 
30; Coxon (1986) p. 13; Mourelatos (1970) p. 39; Barnes (1982) p. 156). For a recent attempt to redeem it, see 
Latona (2008). Although tracing back the roots of the allegorical interpretation (rightly, I think) not only to Plato but 
to a broader Indo-European context, including the Kaṭha Upaniṣad, Latona does not question that Sextus endorses 
the view. In fact, he makes Sextus’ conviction on this score the motive for his supposedly distorted presentation of 
the proem: “Sextus appends six additional lines (DK Fr. 7.2-6, 8.1-2), which are now generally accepted to have 
originally appeared in a different context in the poem, but were moved by Sextus to reinforce his point about 
sensation and reason.” (2008, p. 201)  
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interpretation being reported. Points of tension between that interpretation and the proem as 
quoted soon begin to show themselves. 94  Other discrepancies appear as the allegorizing 
identification of phrases from the proem with psychological faculties continues: 95 
and [in saying] that “maidens” lead him forth, [Parmenides is speaking of] the senses, of 
which he refers riddlingly to acts of hearing in saying, “for by two whirling wheels it was led 
on” (that is, by those [wheels] of the ears, through which they receive the voice), while the 
acts of seeing he has called “Heliad maidens”, “having left behind the houses of Night”96 
<and> “pushing into light”97 (because, separated from light, there is no use of them);98  and 
coming to “much-punishing” Dike, who keeps “keys of requital”, is the reasoning that keeps 
the apprehensions of things unfaltering.  
 
At points in this list of equivalences it is difficult to determine whether the explanations of them 
belong to Sextus or to his source. I have placed parentheses as though Sextus is explaining the 
“riddling” identification of the wheels of the chariot with those of the ears, and the Heliades with 
vision, but it may be that these too belong to his source. In any case, the equivalences themselves 
clearly belong to the interpretation being reported, and it is in these that we note discrepancies 
with the continuous text.99 These discrepancies make all the more likely what is, given Sextus’ 
habit of quoting extensively from various authors discussed in this portion of his work, 100  
94 See footnote 90 above, and footnotes 96, 97 and 103 below. Also to be noted is the questionable assumption 
(which the Stoic source was hardly the last one to make) that the anonymous narrator is to be identified with 
Parmenides. This has become a quite common assumption, and scholars have even suggested dates for the 
composition of the poem based on the fact that the narrator is called a “youth” by the goddess. The assumption is not, 
of course, incompatible with the text as we have it, but it bears pointing out that it is an assumption. 
95 κούρας δ’ αὐτοῦ προάγειν τὰς αἰσθήσεις, ὧν τὰς μὲν ἀκοὰς αἰνίττεται ἐν τῷ λέγειν “δοιοῖς γὰρ ἐπείγετο δινωτοῖσι 
κύκλοις”, τουτέστι τοῖς τῶν ὤτων, τὴν φωνὴν δι’ ὧν καταδέχονται, (113) τὰς δὲ ὁράσεις Ἡλιάδας κούρας κέκληκε, 
δώματα μὲν Νυκτὸς ἀπολιπούσας, “ἐς φάος <δὲ> ὠσαμένας” διὰ τὸ μὴ χωρὶς φωτὸς γίνεσθαι τὴν χρῆσιν αὐτῶν. ἐπὶ 
δὲ τὴν “πολύποινον” ἐλθεῖν Δίκην καὶ ἔχουσαν “κληῖδας ἀμοιβούς”, τὴν διάνοιαν ἀσφαλεῖς ἔχουσαν τὰς τῶν 
πραγμάτων καταλήψεις. 
96 This paraphrase swaps prefixes on the participle. In the full quotation at VII.111, the Heliades were προλιποῦσαι, 
here they are ἀπολιπούσας. 
97 Note that the Stoic source’s construal of ἐς φάος with ὠσαμένας is at odds with the continuous text, where, in εἰς 
φάος, ὠσάμεναι, the participle goes with what follows, and εἰς φάος with what precedes (although whether with 
σπερχοίατο πέμπειν of line 8 or προλιποῦσαι of line 9 is not immediately certain, and perhaps deliberately 
ambiguous).  That the Stoic source uses ἐς instead of εἰς gives some support to Sider’s suggestion that we ought to 
print ἐς in the verse. Cf. footnotes 28 and 68. 
98 Again, the full stop of the editions interrupts the sentence (cf. footnote 91). 
99 See footnotes 90, 94, 96, 97 and 103. 
100 As noted earlier (see footnote 89), Sextus also preserves the opening passages, identifying them as such, of books 
by Heraclitus and Protagoras, in the fullest forms known to us. At VII.123-5, Sextus is also our best witness for two 
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already a plausible assumption: that Sextus’ quotation of the whole proem is independent of the 
source for the interpretation reported.101 
The next passage is of prime importance for judging Sextus as a witness to the proem and 
for our assessment of the sources for Parmenides’ poem more generally. Sextus’ text 
continues:102 
 
She, having received him, proposes to teach these two things: 
 
  ἠμὲν Ἀληθείης εὐπειθέος ἀτρεμὲς ἦτορ,  
  [Both persuasive Truth’s untrembling heart] 
 
which is the immovable basis of understanding (episteme), and, second, 
 
... βροτῶν δόξας, ταῖς οὐκ ἔνι πίστις ἀληθής, 
[... mortals’ opinions, in which true assurance is not] 
 
(that is, the “all” (to pan) lying in opinion (doxa), because it was unstable),103 and at the end 
she makes quite clear in addition that one must not attend to the senses but to the logos. For, 
μὴ  […] σε, she says, 
passages of Empedocles (DK 31 B 2 and 3, to be discussed in the next chapter), on whose relative proximity he 
comments in a manner which again suggests familiarity with the original work. Perhaps most impressively, he offers 
in VII.65-86 a rather full if not quite complete transcription of Gorgias’ On Non-Being. Note that the Gorgias 
passage precedes the beginning of the supposedly “Posidonian” portion of the work (see footnote 86), and thus the 
habit of quoting from the beginnings of the works of certain predecessors looks like Sextus’ own.   
101  This does not, of course, preclude readings from one patch of Sextus’ text finding their way into the other 
through scribal error or other mishaps of textual transmission. The presence of πολύπειρον in line 34 of the proem 
(where Diogenes Laertius gives the better πολύδηριν) in both the continuous quotation and in the report of the 
allegorical interpretation below is apparently one such instance. 
102 (114) ἥτις αὐτὸν ὑποδεξαμένη ἐπαγγέλλεται δύο ταῦτα διδάξειν,  
ἠμὲν Ἀληθείης εὐπειθέος ἀτρεμὲς ἦτορ,  
ὅπερ ἐστὶ τὸ τῆς ἐπιστήμης ἀμετακίνητον βῆμα, ἕτερον δὲ  
βροτῶν δόξας, ταῖς οὐκ ἔνι πίστις ἀληθής, 
τουτέστι τὸ ἐν δόξῃ κείμενον πᾶν, ὅτι ἦν ἀβέβαιον. καὶ ἐπὶ τέλει προσδιασαφεῖ τὸ μὴ δεῖν ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι προσέχειν 
ἀλλὰ τῷ λόγῳ· μὴ γάρ σε, φησίν,  
ἔθος πολύπειρον ὁδὸν κάτα τήνδε βιάσθω  
νωμᾶν ἄσκοπον ὄμμα καὶ ἠχήεσσαν ἀκουὴν  
καὶ γλῶσσαν, κρῖναι δὲ λόγῳ πολύπειρον ἔλεγχον  
ἐξ ἐμέθεν ῥηθέντα.  
[In the last full hexameter quoted, Mutschmann adopts κρῖναι from Diogenes, but keeps the repetition of πολύπειρον 
found in the manuscripts of Sextus.] 
103 Once more (cf. footnotes 91 and 98) I suspect that the editors have tried to end a sentence prematurely, mistaking 
the end of a parenthetical remark with the end of the overarching sentence. If καὶ simply continues the same 
sentence, ἥτις (i.e., the goddess, apparently identified by Sextus’ source with Dike – another questionable 
identification) remains the subject for both προσδιασαφεῖ and φησίν (thus the two appearances of “she” in the 
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          ... ἔθος πολύπειρον ὁδὸν κάτα τήνδε βιάσθω  
νωμᾶν ἄσκοπον ὄμμα καὶ ἠχήεσσαν ἀκουὴν  
καὶ γλῶσσαν, κρῖναι δὲ λόγῳ πολύπειρον ἔλεγχον  
ἐξ ἐμέθεν ῥηθέντα.  
 
Again, it is not immediately clear whether the remark in parentheses belongs to Sextus or to the 
Stoic source. The remark on the first verse quoted is surely the Stoic source’s, and intended to 
help connect Parmenides’ Truth to the epistemonic criterion, but the comment that follows the 
line about mortals’ opinions is harder to judge. On an initial reading, and with a reasonable 
expectation of balance or parallelism in the argument, one might suppose that the entire second 
remark also comes from the source. After some consideration, however, my own inclination is to 
attribute it (or at least its first part) to Sextus, and thus I place the remark in parentheses, for the 
following reasons. First, “that is” (τουτέστι) seems to be a marker of Sextus’ own comments, 
whereas the source (if Sextus is preserving the Stoic source’s language closely, or is simply 
keeping his own remarks stylistically distinct from commentary drawn from others) seems to be 
in the habit of starting clauses of clarification with a relative pronoun, as with ὅπερ ἐστὶ here.104 
Secondly, the remarks made on the lines are not perfectly parallel. Each remark does, it is true, 
identify something from Parmenides’ verses with one of the criteria he is supposed to be 
speaking about, and does so in such a way as to indicate something of Parmenides’ alleged 
attitude toward the criterion in question. Functionally, however, the remarks are slightly different. 
The first remark, glossing the “heart of truth” explicitly in terms of episteme, is needed to lend an 
air of plausibility to the claim of the Stoic source that Parmenides was affirming an epistemonic 
logos, as the word episteme does not appear in what remains of the poem. In the second verse, 
translation above where Bett, Bury and others all have “he”). As will be explained, the content of the parenthetical 
remark itself seems generally to be misread. 
104 In the entire passage we are presently considering, four other of Sextus’ clarifications begin with τουτέστι, while 
ὅπερ ἐστὶ is paralleled by the clause beginning ὃς λόγος in section 112 (see footnote 91). 
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since Parmenides himself uses the word doxa, the link to a “doxastic” criterion is fairly obvious, 
and there is little need for an additional remark making that connection. Indeed, the remark on 
the second verse seems to add little actual clarification, and may well be thought more obscure 
than Parmenides’ own verse. This obscurity is related to a third reason for seeing the remark as 
Sextus’, namely, that it is not quite saying what readers often take it to be saying. There appears 
to be a consensus among translators of this remark in rendering τὸ ἐν δόξῃ κείμενον πᾶν as 
“everything that rests on opinion” and in ignoring the tense of the verb of the clause ὅτι ἦν 
ἀβέβαιον (“because it was unstable”).105 However, if the sense were “everything that rests on 
opinion”, a better text would be πᾶν τὸ ἐν δόξῃ κείμενον. The expression τὸ ἐν δόξῃ κείμενον 
πᾶν, it seems to me, means rather “the All (to pan) that lies in doxa” or even “the All laid out in 
(the) Doxa”.106 That is, to pan here is the common scientific/philosophical expression “the All”, 
generally (though not always strictly) equivalent to “universe” or “cosmos”. In the additional 
clause, “because it [the All] was unstable”, the imperfect indicates that the instability of the All 
was a point previously recognized. This is appropriate if the causal clause is explaining 
Parmenides’ reasons, when he composed the poem, for placing the description of the All where 
he did.107 Taking the remark as Sextus’, the first part provides a bit of information perhaps not 
105 Bury (1935, p. 63): “that is to say everything that consists in opinion because all such things are unsure”; Gallop 
(1984, p. 96): “that is to say, everything which lies in the realm of belief, because all such things are uncertain”; Bett 
(2005, p. 25): “that is, everything that rests on opinion, because it is insecure”; McKirahan (in Coxon (2009) p. 182): 
“that is to say, everything that rests on opinion, because it is uncertain.” Despite minor changes in phrasing, I take it 
that all these renderings are in substantial agreement in their construal of the remark (and that in the last two 
translations, the antecedent of “it” is intended to be “everything”, not “opinion”). 
106 The use of ἐν δόξῃ as a way of referring to the part of the poem commonly known as the Doxa has a potential 
parallel in Proclus’ Platonic Theology I.9 (cf. Saffrey-Westerink (1968) p. 35.17 and testimonium 184, with 
McKirahan’s translation, in Coxon (2009) pp. 218-219). 
107 On the common construal, the first part of the remark seems pointless and confusing, at best merely repeating 
what is stated more directly in the verse itself. The causal clause would presumably be explaining that there is no 
real assurance to be had in mortal opinions because they are unstable. This is a sensible enough point to argue in 
making the case that Parmenides rejected a doxastic criterion, and I suspect that Sextus’ source did indeed make 
some such argument (the adjective ἀβέβαιος certainly has something in common with the phrase ἀμετακίνητον βῆμα, 
used in the remark on the preceding line), but having “mortals’ opinions” glossed as “everything that rests in 
opinion” does not seem to help advance that case. 
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given by the Stoic source, namely, that the teaching of “mortals’ opinions” takes the form of a 
description of the All given in the Doxa. Sextus then adds, probably using an adjective borrowed 
from his source, what is imagined to be one of Parmenides’ reasons for that arrangement.108 
Seeing the remark as Sextus’ parenthetical interjection also helps us not to lose track of the 
overarching sentence, which goes on to offer the lines that the Stoic source took as making 
“quite clear” Parmenides’ rejection of the senses.109 
 As they are introduced, those lines are explicitly stated to have been spoken “at the end”. 
It is Sextus himself, I think, who provides this information,110 and “at the end” does not mean “at 
the end of the poem” or “just before the arguments about the ‘signs’ of what-is” (i.e., before DK 
8, where Kranz will place the lines), but refers simply to the end of the passage he quoted less 
than a page ago. Sextus will similarly inform us later, following a quotation of the opening words 
of Heraclitus’ book, that a second quotation from Heraclitus (DK 22 B 2) was added “after he 
proceeded a little”.111 Of course, Sextus does not always indicate so clearly where the words he 
quotes originally stood in the texts from which they were drawn, but it seems an unnecessarily 
contorted reading of the available evidence to attempt to explain away the explicit indications 
that he does provide either by inventing ulterior motives for him or concluding that he had an 
incomplete text before him.112 Once more, then, with a better sense of what’s being said by 
whom, we read: 
108 Cf. the goddess’ words from the transition to the Doxa at DK 8.60-61: τόν σοι ἐγὼ διάκοσμον ἐοικότα πάντα 
φατίζω, / ὡς οὐ μή ποτέ τίς σε βροτῶν γνώμη παρελάσσῃ. 
109The verb προσδιασαφεῖ may come from the Stoic source, retained by Sextus with a touch of sarcasm. Cf. 
διασαφεῖ in the discussion of Empedocles seemingly drawn from the same source, at adv. Math. VII.124. These, it 
appears, are the only two instances of the verb in Sextus. 
110 As we shall see shortly, Diogenes Laertius, when quoting nearly the same lines as Sextus does here in support of 
the same argument, introduces the quotation with the words “as [Parmenides] says somewhere”. This may suggest 
that Diogenes could not confirm the location of the lines in the source that he appears to have shared with Sextus. 
111 ὀλίγα προδιελθὼν: adv. Math. VII.133. A similar case, Sextus’ quotations of two fragments of Empedocles (DK 
31 B 2 and 3) at adv. Math. VII. 123-125, will be considered in detail in the following chapter.  
112 Latona (as mentioned in footnote 93) is an example of the former, Coxon (see footnote 10) of the latter. 
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She, having received him, proposes to teach these two things:  
 
   ἠμὲν Ἀληθείης εὐπειθέος ἀτρεμὲς ἦτορ,  
   [Both persuasive Truth’s untrembling heart] 
    
which is the immovable basis of understanding (episteme), and, second, 
 
... βροτῶν δόξας, ταῖς οὐκ ἔνι πίστις ἀληθής, 
[… mortals’ opinions, in which true assurance is not] 
 
(that is, the All set out in Doxa, because it was unstable), and at the end she makes quite clear 
in addition that one must not attend to the senses but to the logos. For, μὴ […] σε, she says, 
  
          ... ἔθος πολύπειρον ὁδὸν κάτα τήνδε βιάσθω  
νωμᾶν ἄσκοπον ὄμμα καὶ ἠχήεσσαν ἀκουὴν  
καὶ γλῶσσαν, κρῖναι δὲ λόγῳ πολύπειρον ἔλεγχον  
ἐξ ἐμέθεν ῥηθέντα.  
 
The source for the allegorical interpretation that Sextus is relating cites the last four lines as 
indicating Parmenides’ rejection of the testimony of the senses in favor of the rule of (an 
epistemonic) logos. A translation in line with this reading would be: 
Let not polypeiron habit force you, along this way, 
To ply an aimless eye and echoing hearing 
And tongue, but judge by logos the polypeiron elenchos 
Spoken by me.113 
 
Though modern commentators differ over what, precisely, the phrases “aimless eye” and 
“echoing hearing and tongue” are meant to suggest,114 and just what an elenchos must be here,115 
113 Note that though the repetition of πολύπειρον is retained here, I regard this, as others do, as a mistake in the 
transmission of the text, and not a repetition in Parmenides’ poem. The advantages of the correct reading, preserved 
by Diogenes Laertius, will become apparent shortly. 
114 For instance, where Cornford saw a more general criticism (“Eye and ear have no real external object. The 
tongue may stand for taste or speech, which is sometimes ranked with the senses; Hippocr. π. διαίτης, I, 23, the 
seven αἰσθήσεις include στόμα διαλέκτου and respiration.” (1939, p. 32, n. 2)), Benjamin Farrington claimed that 
Parmenides “specifically attacks a method of research. Nor is it difficult to suggest the contemporary activities 
which he denounced.  The astronomical activities of the Ionian school were carried on at this time in an observatory 
on the island of Tenedos. This affords an outstanding example of the use of the ‘blind eye’ in the interpretation of 
the universe. The ‘echoing ear’ irresistibly suggests the acoustic experiments of the Pythagoreans. The tongue, no 
doubt, is to be understood, not as the organ of speech, as so many commentators strangely suppose, but as the organ 
of taste so accurately described by Alcmaeon.” (1944, p. 52) 
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there is a broad consensus on how to understand the words κρῖναι δὲ λόγῳ, and in this the 
modern commentators agree with the Stoic source. “Judge by reason” is a very common 
rendering of this phrase, and might well serve as the motto for most contemporary interpretations 
of Parmenides. For many scholars, these words mark a pivotal moment in the history of human 
thought. According to Guthrie, “Here for the first time sense and reason are contrasted, and we 
are told that the senses deceive and that reason alone is to be trusted. It is a decisive moment in 
the history of European philosophy, which can never be the same again.” 116  Similarly, 
Wheelwright describes the Eleatic school, beginning with Parmenides, as “the first all-out 
attempt in the western world to establish pure reason, with its demands of logical consistency 
and relatedness, as the sole criterion of truth.”117 As Wheelwright’s use of the Stoic source’s own 
idiom well shows, contemporary scholars, despite their widespread dismissal of the details of the 
allegorical interpretation of Parmenides’ proem, are by and large in agreement with the basic 
thrust of the interpretation. 
 Sextus, himself, however, gives additional hints of his skepticism in his last remarks on 
Parmenides, before moving on to reports about Empedocles: 
Well then, this very man too, as is obvious from the things mentioned, having proclaimed the 
epistemonic logos as a standard measure of the truth in the things that are, withdrew from the 
115 J. H. Lesher (1984) argues that an elenchos is a “testing” rather than “refutation”. David Furley (1987) defends 
“refutation”. 
116 Guthrie (1965) p. 25. This and similarly grandiose remarks (a sampling of which appear in the next footnote) 
seem intemperate considering how vast our ignorance of philosophy before Plato must be said to be. I do not mean 
to minimize Parmenides’ importance in the history of thought, but it should be noted that in claiming Parmenides as 
the inventor of rationalism, logic, or abstract thought, modern historians go beyond the claims of ancient thinkers 
about him, high though their opinion of him may have been.   
117 Wheelwright (1960) p. 90. Like remarks about the momentousness of the above utterance can be found from an 
array of scholars with widely divergent views on the nature and value of Parmenides’ real contribution to philosophy. 
Cf. the comments by Hegel and Nietzsche in the Introduction. More recently, Richard McKirahan has written, “It is 
universally recognized that Parmenides’ introduction of argument into philosophy was a move of paramount 
importance.” (Curd and Graham (2008) p. 189). James Warren, though stressing, “It is easy to overstate the 
discontinuities between Parmenides and what had come before”, sees with Parmenides “a new turn towards a self-
conscious application of principles of logical analysis and argumentation that has not previously been centre-stage.” 
(2007, pp. 77-78)  
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observation of the senses, while Empedocles the Acragantine, according to those seeming to 
explain him rather simply, hands down six criteria of truth.118 
 
 “Well then” (Ἀλλ’) and “obvious” (συμφανές) seem to convey a typically sarcastic reserve that 
Sextus exhibits toward the claims made by the sources he is reporting,119 present also in the 
characterization of those who have Empedocles handing down six criteria of truth as seeming to 
explain him “rather simply” (ἁπλούστερον).120 Sextus does not go on to elaborate his doubts, 
because his concern here is not with the interpretation of Parmenides per se, but with presenting 
the wide variety of views that people have been said to hold with regard to the criterion of truth. 
Sextus thus moves smoothly on to report differing claims made about Empedocles. Ever the 
good Pyrrhonist, Sextus has withheld his own judgment on Parmenides, but has nonetheless 
provided us with material vital to our own understanding of the poem. His quotation alone has 
allowed for our earlier observations on the structure of the proem, and, with the additional 
information provided by Diogenes Laertius, an alternative reading of its closing lines will come 
to light. 
 
Reliable Diogenes? 
The ten books of Diogenes Laertius’ Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers are rarely 
introduced without an apparently obligatory slight on the fitness of their author for the task he set 
118 Ἀλλ’ οὗτος μὲν καὶ αὐτός, ὡς ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων συμφανές, τὸν ἐπιστημονικὸν λόγον κανόνα τῆς ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν 
ἀληθείας ἀναγορεύσας ἀπέστη τῆς τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἐπιστάσεως· (115) Ἐμπεδοκλῆς δὲ ὁ Ἀκραγαντῖνος κατὰ μὲν 
τοὺς ἁπλούστερον δοκοῦντας αὐτὸν ἐξηγεῖσθαι ἓξ κριτήρια τῆς ἀληθείας παραδίδωσιν. 
119 For ἀλλά indicating reluctant acquiescence see Smyth § 2784b and Denniston (1950) p. 19; other examples in 
this portion of adv. Math. are to be found at VII.89, VII.119 and VII.126. Instances of sarcastic overstatement 
comparable to the use of συμφανές here are προφανὲς … κατὰ πολὺ διενήοχεν at VII.45, ῥητῶς at VII.133 (raised to 
ῥητότατα at VII.134), and προδήλως at VII.141. Cf. too the uses of (προς)διασαφεῖ noted in footnote 109. 
120 Bett appears not to take the comparative as sarcastic, translating ἁπλούστερον “more simply” and pointing out in 
a note the second interpretation of Empedocles to be reported at VII.122-125 (2005, p. 25, with n. 50). (Bury 
translates “most simply”; whether the superlative is intended to convey Sextus’ sarcasm I am unsure.) As the μὲν in 
κατὰ μὲν τοὺς ἁπλούστερον δοκοῦντας anticipates  the second interpretation (which begins with ἄλλοι δὲ ἦσαν at 
VII.122), Bett is certainly right that Sextus has in mind to compare the two ways of reading Empedocles, but that is 
not, I think, the reason for ἁπλούστερον. Cf. footnote 178 below.  
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himself, coupled with some remark about how considerable caution is required in dealing with 
the reports to be found therein. Such warnings are not entirely uncalled for, but, despite its faults, 
the work remains an indispensible source on many matters. Here, then, is the opening of 
Diogenes Laertius’ chapter on Parmenides:121 
 Parmenides, son of Pyres, of Elea, was an auditor of Xenophanes (Theophrastus in his 
Epitome claims that this one heard Anaximander), but, although indeed an auditor of 
Xenophanes, he did not follow him. He communed (so Sotion claims) also with Ameinias, 
Diochaitas’ son, the Pythagorean, a poor man, but a gentleman. It was him, rather, that he 
followed, and to whom, when he died, he dedicated a hero shrine, belonging to a luminary 
and wealthy family; and it was by Ameinias, and not by Xenophanes, that he was turned to 
quietude. 
 This man was the first to assert that the earth is ball-shaped and placed in the middle; that 
there are two elements, fire and earth, and the one (fire) holds the position of a craftsman, the 
other (earth) that of material; that the generation of human beings comes about first from the 
sun;122 and that the hot and the cold were really an “auton”123 out of which “all things” are 
constituted;124 and that the soul and the intellect are the same thing, as Theophrastus also 
mentions in his Physics, setting out the doctrines of just about everyone. 
 
There are points of biography and doctrine here that will call for more detailed treatment 
elsewhere, but for the present discussion, let us focus on Diogenes’ use of his sources.  He is 
somewhat more inclined than is Sextus to inform us where he found a particular item, but he is 
not always especially careful in how he does so. In reporting Theophrastus’ remark that “this 
121  Vitae IX.21-23. The text below is that of Long (1964), modified in a few places. Occasional references are also 
made to the text of Marcovich (1999). (21) Ξενοφάνους δὲ διήκουσε Παρμενίδης Πύρητος Ἐλεάτης —τοῦτον 
Θεόφραστος ἐν τῇ Ἐπιτομῇ Ἀναξιμάνδρου φησὶν ἀκοῦσαι—. ὅμως δ’ οὖν ἀκούσας καὶ Ξενοφάνους οὐκ 
ἠκολούθησεν αὐτῷ. ἐκοινώνησε δὲ καὶ Ἀμεινίᾳ Διοχαίτα τῷ Πυθαγορικῷ, ὡς ἔφη Σωτίων, ἀνδρὶ πένητι μέν, καλῷ 
δὲ καὶ ἀγαθῷ. ᾧ καὶ μᾶλλον ἠκολούθησε καὶ ἀποθανόντος ἡρῷον ἱδρύσατο γένους τε ὑπάρχων λαμπροῦ καὶ 
πλούτου, καὶ ὑπ’ Ἀμεινίου, ἀλλ’ οὐχ ὑπὸ Ξενοφάνους εἰς ἡσυχίαν προετράπη. 
     Πρῶτος δ’ οὗτος τὴν γῆν ἀπέφαινε σφαιροειδῆ καὶ ἐν μέσῳ κεῖσθαι. δύο τε εἶναι στοιχεῖα, πῦρ καὶ γῆν, καὶ τὸ 
μὲν δημιουργοῦ τάξιν ἔχειν, τὴν δ’ ὕλης. (22) γένεσίν τ’ ἀνθρώπων ἐξ ἡλίου πρῶτον γενέσθαι· αὐτὸν δὲ ὑπάρχειν τὸ 
θερμὸν καὶ τὸ ψυχρόν, ἐξ ὧν τὰ πάντα συνεστάναι. καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ τὸν νοῦν ταὐτὸν εἶναι, καθὰ μέμνηται καὶ 
Θεόφραστος ἐν τοῖς Φυσικοῖς, πάντων σχεδὸν ἐκτιθέμενος τὰ δόγματα. 
122 Reading, with Long, ἡλίου of the manuscripts, rather than, with Marcovich, ἰλύος of the early editions. G. Rocca-
Serra proposes reading ἐξ ἡλίου καὶ ἰλύος. (1987, p. 259, n. 32) 
123 Marcovich prints Diels’ conjecture αἴτια for the manuscripts’ αὐτὸν here. Untersteiner (1958, pp. 10-12) defends 
the manuscript reading, understanding αὐτὸν to refer to humankind. I favor preserving the reading, but regard this as 
an indication of Parmenides’ peculiar use of αὐτός, not unrelated to the use of ταὐτὸν in the next clause. For now I 
simply note this as an oddity to be treated elsewhere. 
124 There are indications in Parmenides’ poem and other Eleatic contexts that πάντα is something of a technical term. 
This, like the use of αὐτός, will call for discussion elsewhere. 
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one” heard Anaximander, for instance, the English translation makes clearer than does Diogenes’ 
Greek that the auditor in question was Xenophanes, not Parmenides.125 In the passage above, 
aside from Sotion’s account about Parmenides’ relationship with Ameinias, Diogenes’ 
biographical information on Parmenides is presented as drawn from Theophrastus.126 That is, 
Diogenes’ presentation thus far consists of a Peripatetic doxographical account, supplemented by 
a (Peripatetic?) biographical point. With his next remarks, he appears to shift from Peripatetic 
sources to the Stoic source shared by Sextus: 
He said his philosophy was twofold, According to Truth, on the one hand, and According 
to Opinion, on the other, wherefore he also says somewhere: 
 
… χρεὼ δέ σε πάντα πυθέσθαι 
        ἠμὲν Ἀληθείης εὐπειθέος ἀτρεκὲς ἦτορ, 
  ἠδὲ βροτῶν δόξας, ταῖς οὐκ ἔνι πίστις ἀληθής. 
 
  [… And you must needs hear all things, 
 Both persuasive Truth’s exacting heart, 
 And mortals’ opinions, in which true assurance is not.] 127 
 
The claim that Parmenides’ philosophy was twofold has a parallel in a remark by Theophrastus 
to the effect that Parmenides went along “both ways”, one κατ’ ἀλήθειαν, another κατὰ δόξαν,128 
but is also comparable to the remark in Sextus, just before the same lines are quoted (apart from 
125 Diogenes’ ambiguity is apparently behind the historically improbable claim found in the Suda entry on 
Parmenides (= DK 28 A 2) that he was not only a pupil of Xenophanes, but also, according to Theophrastus, a 
student of Anaximander. 
126 Elsewhere (Vitae VIII.48 = FHSG 227E) Diogenes explicitly credits Theophrastus for the claim about the shape 
of the earth, and it seems likely that the whole of the second paragraph above ultimately comes from Theophrastus. 
Cf. the parallel arrangement of doxographical excerpta de Parmenide in Diels (1879) pp. 141-142. On Sotion, see 
Diels (1879) pp. 147-148. It is of course quite possible that Diogenes consulted neither Theophrastus’ nor Sotion’s 
works directly, but relied on intermediary texts. For a survey of approaches to the question of the sources behind 
Diogenes’ work, a particular preoccupation of nineteenth-century scholars, see Hope (1930) pp. 36-97. 
127  δισσήν τε ἔφη τὴν φιλοσοφίαν, τὴν μὲν κατὰ ἀλήθειαν, τὴν δὲ κατὰ δόξαν. διὸ καὶ φησί που· 
   χρεὼ δέ σε πάντα πυθέσθαι  
  ἠμὲν Ἀληθείης εὐπειθέος ἀτρεμὲς ἦτορ,  
  ἠδὲ βροτῶν δόξας, ταῖς οὐκ ἔνι πίστις ἀληθής.   
I substitute εὐπειθέος ἀτρεκὲς for Long’s εὐκυκλέος ἀτρεμὲς, which reflected the more popular reading of 
Parmenides at the time, but has no manuscript authority for Diogenes’ text.  
128 See Alexander of Aphrodisias, in Metaphys. p. 31.7-14 Hayduck (= DK 28 A 7 = FHSG 227C), quoting from 
what he calls the first book of Theophrastus’ Περὶ τῶν Φυσικῶν. 
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the quotation of the proem as a whole), that the goddess proposed to teach “these two things”.129 
In the “wherefore” clause, the word “also” (καὶ) may indicate that Diogenes is now working 
from a new source, while “somewhere” (που) may imply that he is doing so without the poem 
itself before him. Though what follows is similar to Sextus’ report, there are differences which 
suggest that Diogenes was not using Sextus’ text. In Sextus, we will recall, the Stoic source 
identified the speaker of the lines above with Dike, and the closing lines of the proem were said 
(by Sextus) to come “at the end”.  Diogenes, though quoting the very same lines, attributes them 
simply to Parmenides, and, more significantly, indicates that he does not know quite where the 
lines were located. That the source for Diogenes’ text at this point was nonetheless closely 
related to, if not the same as, Sextus’ Stoic source seems assured by what follows: 130 
(He himself philosophizes in poetry too, just as Hesiod, Xenophanes and Empedocles did.) 
He said logos was a criterion, and that sense perceptions were not really precise. At any rate, 
he says:  
           μηδέ σε θεὸς πολύπειρον ὁδὸν κατὰ τήνδε βιάσθω 
        νωμᾶν ἄσκοπον ὄμμα καὶ ἠχήεσσαν ἀκουὴν 
        καὶ γλῶσσαν, κρῖναι δὲ λόγῳ πολύδηριν ἔλεγχον.  
 
Here, apart from the interjection on Parmenides’ choice of verse (a natural one for Diogenes to 
make upon first quoting him, since most of the philosophers he is dealing with wrote in prose), 
Diogenes presents the same argument as the one we saw in Sextus’ text. After mentioning the 
two “ways” of Truth and Doxa, and quoting lines 29 and 30 of the proem, (a non-doxastic) logos 
is proclaimed the Parmenidean criterion of truth, and the senses are characterized as faulty. Just 
129 Note also the remark in Clement, before the quotation of the same lines, that Parmenides introduced “a teaching 
of double ways” (see footnote 80). 
130 Καὶ αὐτὸς δὲ διὰ ποιημάτων φιλοσοφεῖ, καθάπερ Ἡσίοδός τε καὶ Ξενοφάνης καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς. κριτήριον δὲ τὸν 
λόγον εἶπε· τάς τε αἰσθήσεις μὴ ἀκριβεῖς ὑπάρχειν. φησὶ γοῦν·  
μηδέ σε θεὸς [sic Diogenes] πολύπειρον ὁδὸν κατὰ τήνδε βιάσθω 
        νωμᾶν ἄσκοπον ὄμμα καὶ ἠχήεσσαν ἀκουὴν 
        καὶ γλῶσσαν, κρῖναι δὲ λόγῳ πολύδηριν ἔλεγχον.  
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as in Sextus’ text, lines 32-34 (that is, of Sextus’ proem)131 are quoted in support of that claim. 
Although there are differences worth noting, some of which point to different versions of the 
source text, the likeness between the two strongly suggests the same ultimate source. One such 
difference is in their quotation of line 29, where, in Diogenes, Truth’s heart is ἀτρεκές rather 
than ἀτρεμές. Ἀτρεκές suits Diogenes’ subsequent description of the senses as μὴ ἀκριβεῖς, 
whereas ἀτρεμές matches the descriptions in Sextus’ text of Truth as an ἀμετακίνητον βῆμα and 
opinion as ἀβέβαιον. These are not stark differences, but very similar paraphrases with a slight 
shift in imagery. In Diogenes’ presentation, Truth’s superiority to opinion is expressed in terms 
of exactness and precision, while in Sextus the matter is put in terms of stability. Here Diogenes, 
or an intermediary source, conceiving the distinction slightly differently, might easily have read 
ἀτρεκὲς for ἀτρεμὲς. 132  The integrity of the argument, however, is nevertheless preserved. 
Among the other differences are those in the quotations of lines 32 and following, where each 
text helps to supplement or correct deficiencies of the other. Sextus quotes the beginning of line 
35, omitted by Diogenes, and he also preserves the correct reading σ’ ἔθος where Diogenes gives 
us the corrupt σε θεὸς. Diogenes, in turn, shows us that, in Sextus’ version of line 34 (in both the 
full quotation of the proem and the excerpt parallel to Diogenes’ quotation), the unmetrical κρίνε 
131 These are generally regarded as DK B 7.3-5, and are so identified in Long’s text. Note that in Sextus’ version of 
this argument, the first three words from the following line were also quoted.  The “at least” (γοῦν) with which 
Diogenes quotes these lines probably reflects (like που with the verses quoted just before) his uncertainty about the 
text, rather than doubt about the soundness of the argument (as with Sextus’ use of the particle when quoting the 
whole proem). 
132 Diogenes, however, is not alone in reading ἀτρεκὲς, which was evidently also in the version of these lines quoted 
by Plutarch (although there the line actually ends mid-word; see Texts: C in the Appendix to Chapter 1), who also 
quotes them in connection with the criterion of truth, and  in certain later manuscripts of Sextus at adv. Math. 
VII.114 (and all the manuscripts in the full quotation of the proem at VII.111, if the editors’ reports are accurate). 
This might seem reason to suppose an authentic line or lines featuring ἀτρεκές in place of ἀτρεμές, but ἀτρεκές does 
not appear as a variant in the repetitions of the lines quoted by Proclus and Simplicius (i.e., fragments “X” and “Y”), 
or in Clement, who also seems to be quoting from the proem, but not clearly dependent on the Stoic source that 
Plutarch, Diogenes, and Sextus seem to share. Thus ἀτρεκὲς appears to be a reading limited to a subgroup of those 
drawing on the Stoic source that quoted the lines to articulate Parmenides’ stance on the question of the criterion of 
truth, and in such a context, where precision and exactitude are a natural concern, reading ἀτρεκὲς for ἀτρεμὲς 
seems an easy substitution to make. 
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and the adjective πολύπειρον (repeated from line 32) should be read as κρῖναι and πολύδηριν 
respectively.  
 We will see shortly how the corrections from Diogenes here allow us to read these lines 
in a way that differs markedly from the manner in which the source on whom each of our authors 
is drawing takes them. As for the rest of Diogenes’ chapter, he continues: 133 
Wherefore Timon says about him too: 
  
  Παρμενίδου τε βίην μεγαλόφρονος οὐ πολύδοξον, 
       ὅς ῥ’ ἀπὸ φαντασίας ἀπάτης ἀνενείκατο νώσεις 
 
  [And great-minded Parmenides’ force, not many-opinioned, 
  Who bore thinkings away from imagination’s deception.] 
 
This transition I take to be Diogenes’ own.134 Here again, Diogenes adds an element to his 
portrait of the thinker by shifting to another of his sources.135 Quotation from Timon is a typical 
Laertian maneuver, but it is not without value for us. Timon’s phrasing οὐ πολύδοξον to describe 
Parmenides’ force is telling, for it picks up on Parmenides’ fondness for poly-compounds and 
associates them directly with doxa. One noteworthy result of undoing Kranz’s move is that 
nearly all of the known occurrences of poly-compounds are then encountered in the proem,136 
133 (23) διὸ καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ φησιν ὁ Τίμων· 
      Παρμενίδου τε βίην μεγαλόφρονος οὐ πολύδοξον, 
       ὅς ῥ’ ἀπὸ φαντασίας ἀπάτης ἀνενείκατο νώσεις. 
134 Contrast the view of Rocco-Serra (1987, pp. 261-264), who thinks that the lines from Timon are drawn from the 
same source as the immediately preceding material, a source which, due to the inclusion of Timon, he suggests was 
a Skeptic rather than a Stoic one. As it is a regular habit of Diogenes to round out his chapters with verses from 
Timon or some other poet (even quoting his own verses wherever possible), it seems to me that this is simply 
another instance of the same. Though both were Skeptics, there is no hint of Timon’s lines in the parallel passage in 
Sextus, and the connection of Timon’s verses with the preceding material does not seem particularly tight. What 
Timon’s lines share with the material presented also in Sextus are features that would probably have been familiar to 
anyone who had read the poem: a strong division between thinking (noein) and seeming (doxa),  an association of 
appearance or imagination with deception, and a fondness for compound words (particularly poly-compounds 
associated with doxa). 
135 Note the recurrence of διὸ καὶ ... φησιν, also above (see the text in footnote 127), marking in each instance 
Diogenes’ shift from one source to the next. Cf. III.13, VII.1 and VII.170. 
136 The exception to this is DK B 16, which is generally assigned to the Doxa, after multiplicity has re-entered the 
scene. This fragment will call for special consideration later, in light of the remarks in the first chapter about 
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prior to the goddess’ restriction of the discourse to the unchanging aspects of what is. The poly-
compounds thus seem to serve as markers of the multiplicity encountered in the domain of 
opinion, which will be inappropriate during the teaching about Truth’s heart. The snippet from 
Timon seems to confirm this. 
Finally, Diogenes completes his entry on Parmenides with a multiplicity of opinions about 
Parmenides’ activities and influence: 
Plato too has written his dialogue on this man, entitling it Parmenides, or On Ideas. 
 He was in his prime in the sixty-ninth Olympiad. He also seems to have been the first to 
detect that Hesperus and Phosphorus are the same (so Favorinus claims in the fifth book of 
Remembrances; some say Pythagoras, but Callimachus claims the poem isn’t his). He is also 
said to have given laws to his citizens (so claims Speusippus in his On Philosophers). He was 
also first to advance the Achilles argument (so Favorinus in his Miscellaneous History).  
 There was also another Parmenides, a rhetor and handbook writer.137 
 
“But Judge by Reason”? 
We noted earlier that while scholars have shown little hesitation in making drastic alterations to 
the text that Sextus preserves, and while they are generally dismissive and often gratuitously 
superior about aspects of the interpretation that he reports, they nevertheless tend to embrace the 
central point of that interpretation. We are now, however, nearly in a position to formulate an 
alternative reading of the lines almost universally regarded as Parmenides’ declaration of a 
commitment to “reason” or “argument”. To judge from the common elements of the 
presentations of both Sextus (at adv. Math. VII.114) and Diogenes,138 the source they shared 
repetition. DK B 16 is drawn from two principal sources, Aristotle and Theophrastus, each of whom reports a 
different poly-compound. 
137 εἰς τοῦτον καὶ Πλάτων τὸν διάλογον γέγραφε, “Παρμενίδην” ἐπιγράψας “ἢ Περὶ ἰδεῶν.”  
     Ἤκμαζε δὲ κατὰ τὴν ἐνάτην καὶ ἑξηκοστὴν Ὀλυμπιάδα. καὶ δοκεῖ πρῶτος πεφωρακέναι τὸν αὐτὸν εἶναι 
Ἕσπερον καὶ Φωσφόρον, ὥς φησι Φαβωρῖνος ἐν πέμπτῳ Ἀπομνημονευμάτων (οἱ δὲ Πυθαγόραν) Καλλίμαχος δέ 
φησι μὴ εἶναι αὐτοῦ τὸ ποίημα. λέγεται δὲ καὶ νόμους θεῖναι τοῖς πολίταις, ὥς φησι Σπεύσιππος ἐν τῷ Περὶ 
φιλοσόφων. καὶ πρῶτος ἐρωτῆσαι τὸν Ἀχιλλέα λόγον, ὡς Φαβωρῖνος ἐν Παντοδαπῇ ἱστορίᾳ. 
     Γέγονε δὲ καὶ ἕτερος Παρμενίδης, ῥήτωρ τεχνογράφος. 
138 See pages 69-70 above, with footnotes 127 and 130. 
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seems to have quoted the following lines in the following sequence (each omitting, as the space 
in the text below indicates, line 31 of Sextus’ continuous quotation at adv. Math. VII.111): 
… χρεὼ δέ σε πάντα πυθέσθαι  
 ἠμὲν Ἀληθείης εὐπειθέος ἀτρεμὲς ἦτορ  
 ἠδὲ βροτῶν δόξας, ταῖς οὐκ ἔνι πίστις ἀληθής.   
   
 μηδέ σ’ ἔθος πολύπειρον ὁδὸν κατὰ τήνδε βιάσθω  
 νωμᾶν ἄσκοπον ὄμμα καὶ ἠχήεσσαν ἀκουήν 
 καὶ γλῶσσαν, κρῖναι δὲ λόγῳ πολύδηριν ἔλεγχον  
 ἐξ ἐμέθεν ῥηθέντα139  
 
From the interpretation reported by our authors, it seems plain that that source wished us to 
understand these lines as saying something like the following: 
   ... And you must needs hear all things, 
  Both persuasive Truth’s untrembling heart 
  And mortals’ opinions, in which true trust is not. 
 
  Nor let the habit of much experience force you, along this way, 
  To ply an aimless eye and echoing hearing 
  And tongue, but judge by reason the much-contested elenchos 
  Spoken by me. 
 
As already mentioned, there are differences of opinion over the precise meaning of various 
phrases in these lines, but there is a widespread and almost unquestioned assumption that the 
final lines here quoted are a commandment to place one’s trust in reason rather than the 
senses.140 There is occasionally some apprehension voiced about anachronistically translating 
logos as “reason”, but almost as often this is carefully managed in order not to lose the substance 
139 As the final three words are not quoted by Diogenes Laertius, it may well be that the Stoic source, like Diogenes, 
ended his own quotation at ἔλεγχον. Sextus, when presenting the argument at adv. Math. VII.114, may have simply 
added the end of the sentence from his complete copy of the proem. 
140 As pointed out above, the dominant translation of κρῖναι δὲ λόγῳ has been “but judge by reason” or a close 
equivalent: “but judge by reasoning”, Cornford (1939) p. 32; “But judge by means of reason (Logos)”, Freeman 
(1948) p. 43;  “Let reason be your judge”, Wheelwright (1960) p. 96; “but judge with reason”, Tarán (1965) p. 73; 
“but do thou judge by reason”, KR p. 271;“but judge by reason (logōi)”, Hussey (1972) p. 86; “judge by reason”, 
KRS p. 248; “but judge by reasoning”, Gallop (1984) p. 63; “but judge by reason”, McKirahan (1994) p. 153; “But 
use reason to come to a decision”, Waterfield (2000) p. 59; “But judge by reason”, Palmer (2009) p. 367. 
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of the claim. In the fourth edition of his Early Greek Philosophy, for instance, Burnet, translated 
logos as “argument”, explaining, “This is the earliest instance of λόγος in the sense of 
(dialectical) argument which Sokrates made familiar. He got it, of course, from the Eleatics. The 
Herakleitean use is quite different.”141 Among the (relatively few) subsequent translators and 
commentators reluctant to translate logos as “reason” outright, there is the same tendency, given 
the dominant view of Parmenides as the father of logic or rational argumentation, towards 
similar renderings of logos along these lines.142 To judge from its use elsewhere in the poem, 
however, logos is simply “speech”.143   
141 Burnet (1930) p. 173, n. 1. One can trace the changes in Burnet’s views on this bit of text through the various 
editions of his work. In the first edition, Burnet proposed to read not λόγῳ πολύδηριν, but λόγων πολύδηνιν 
(πολύδηνιν being a proposal by Karsten, whose arrangement he followed), and translated the whole clause, “but do 
thou judge the subtle refutation of their discourse uttered by me”, noting, “Λόγος does not mean “reason” as 
opposed to sense.” (Burnet (1892) p. 185 and n. 12) The genitive (without Karsten’s πολύδηνιν) was adopted by 
Arthur Fairbanks, who translated, “but do thou weigh the much contested refutation of their words, which I have 
uttered.” (Fairbanks (1898b) pp. 92-93) With this genitive, the “discourse” or “words” refuted belong to the senses. 
This is awkward, but it avoids the anachronism of translating logos as “reason”. In the second edition, Burnet, now 
following Diels’ arrangement and text, dropped this suggestion and translated, without additional comment, “but 
judge by argument the much disputed proof uttered by me.” (Burnet (1908) p. 197) The note in the fourth edition, I 
take it, reveals some lingering concern that even rendering logos as “argument” (implicitly understood as 
“dialectical” argument) calls for qualification. 
142 As already mentioned (see above, page 66, with footnotes 116 and 117), Parmenides is regularly so regarded in 
most contemporary histories of philosophy, and at the heart of this portrait of him is the supposed command to 
“judge by reason”. Scholars shy of rendering logos simply as “reason” tend to settle on an alternative with strong 
rational or logical overtones. Verdenius seems to combine elements of Burnet’s various attempts (see the preceding 
footnote), but with dubious success, claiming, “the term λόγος does not mean ‘thinking’, ‘understanding’, or 
‘reason’, according to the familiar translations, but ‘reasoning’, ‘argument’.” (1942, p. 64) Verdenius appears to 
differ from Burnet’s first position in wishing to qualify the assertion that the clause in question “does not deal with 
the distinction between sense-perception and thinking”. Verdenius goes on to say (with what justification I cannot 
determine) that Parmenides does not “appear to have been aware of thinking as of a particular mental faculty. From 
the fact that he could not conceive of thinking as a psychological phenomenon it should, however, not be inferred 
that he was not able to grasp its methodical function, reasoning.” (1942, pp. 64-65) Fränkel’s rendering was “judge 
rather by thought”, “thought” being understood as “the logic of pure thought”, thus leaving it unclear whether he 
intended for there to be any difference between “thought” and “reason”. (1973, p. 355) Coxon gives “but decide by 
discourse” (1986, p. 58), but speaks in his commentary of “the judgement of reason (κρῖναι δὲ λόγῳ, l.5)” (1986, p. 
192). Lesher (1998, p. 38) glosses the phrase “judge by the account”, adding, “Λόγος is often translated here as  
‘reason’, but this is probably a later use of the term”, referring to Guthrie (1965) pp. 419-424 for a review of fifth-
century uses of logos. Curd, in translating the verse, wisely sidesteps the problem by rendering “but judge by logos”, 
but later adds that logos is “here understood as “thought”, “reckoning,” or “discourse””, also noting Guthrie’s 
discussion. (Curd (1998) pp. 61 and 63, with n. 109) 
143 The two other uses come in line 15 of the proem and DK 8.50. Cordero, who deserves credit for acknowledging 
the anachronism in translating logos as “reason” and for taking account of occurrences of the word elsewhere in the 
poem, does not make  a convincing case for an alternative by claiming that  logos in the singular means “reasoning” 
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This widespread reading, which takes the words κρῖναι δὲ λόγῳ as a repudiation of the 
senses and a command to judge by reason or (rational) argument, appears to be, generally 
without appreciating the fact, following the lead of the Stoic source (for whom logos did mean 
“reason”, and much else besides). While the anachronistic understanding of logos is a major 
component of that reading, the influence of the Stoic source on how these lines have been read 
extends further. Not only is translating logos as “reason” or “argument” suspect, but the 
construal of κρῖναι as an imperative is also problematic once it is read (as Sextus’ fuller 
quotation allows us to do) in the context of the passage as a whole. The Stoic source intends for 
us, of course, to understand κρῖναι as an imperative (and such a construal led, presumably, to the 
form κρίνε preserved in Sextus), but it seems as though he manages this by carefully selective 
quotation.144 
Because the two portions of text cited by the source have generally, in the scholarship of 
the last century or so, been thought to come from different places in the poem, it has gone 
unnoticed, or else been thought unremarkable that, compared to the proem as Sextus quotes it in 
full, the Stoic source omits line 31. I think that the omission is indeed remarkable, and that the 
line was intentionally omitted because it was inconvenient for the Stoic reading of the lines that 
follow. In a sentence that has begun ἀλλὰ σὺ τῆσδ’ ἀφ’ ὁδοῦ διζήσιος εἶργε νόημα, “But do you 
bar (your) thought from this way of seeking”, the strong adversative ἀλλά is going to exercise an 
influence over the remainder of the sentence such that the weaker particle δέ in the phrase κρῖναι 
δὲ λόγῳ is unlikely to be felt as adversative, especially in the absence of any preceding μέν. It 
reads, instead, as a connective particle, making the infinitive κρῖναι parallel with νωμᾶν in the 
(2004, pp. 134-138). What makes the logos of 8.50 “trustworthy” is not that it is in the singular but that it is 
modified by the adjective πιστός. 
144 This is not to say that the Stoic source was the first to read the lines this way. There are a number of earlier 
examples of understanding the Eleatic message as a commitment to logos, which is not surprising given the 
thoroughgoing use of ambiguity already observed in the proem.  
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preceding line. Both infinitives are thus complementary with βιάσθω. This alters the sense of the 
whole considerably. We now understand the lines as follows: 
 But do you bar thought from this way of seeking, 
 And let not habit of much experience force you, along this way, 
 To ply an aimless eye and echoing hearing 
 And tongue, and to judge, by means of speech, the elenchos 
 Spoken by me (to be) much-contending. 
 
On this alternative construal, δὲ is connective, κρῖναι a complementary infinitive, and with the 
dative λόγῳ, “by speech”, Parmenides is not making a monumental statement marking the advent 
of rational discourse into human history, but the more modest (though curious) claim that, just as 
one should be wary, along this way, of what the senses may present (though we regularly do 
depend upon them), so too speech (as regularly employed) is not going to be a fully reliable 
instrument for comprehending the teaching which the goddess has to impart. An additional 
grammatical shift in this reading is that πολύδηριν is now understood as a predicate accusative. 
The goddess is thus not claiming that her elenchos is “much-contesting”, but warning the youth 
against judging it to be so, due to a mistaken application of linguistic habit.145 That is, while the 
elenchos might appear contentious to those too preoccupied with the way it is expressed, from 
the perspective that the goddess is revealing, that would be an error. Read thus, these lines 
become the first of a number of places in the poem where the goddess points out the potentially 
deceptive nature of mortal speech and naming.146  
This new construal presents us with the prospect of a Parmenides who may be starkly at 
odds with the “mainstream” interpretation of Parmenides as the father of logic, and more akin to 
145 On this construal of the sentence, the Furley/Lesher debate over whether the word elenchos in the phrase 
polydēris elenchos means “testing” or “refutation” has been preoccupied with the wrong word. The point of the 
goddess’ command is that she not be judged to be offering a polydēris account (or refutation, or testing). I 
understand polydēris, as used here, to be a poetic precursor of what would later be called “eristic”.  
146 Cf., e.g., DK 8.38-41, 50-61; DK 9; and DK 19. 
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the portrait of Parmenides as a mystic proposed by Kingsley.147 Stanley Lombardo, in a verse 
translation of Parmenides and Empedocles that appears to have received little attention from 
specialists, suggested something similar three decades ago. Taking seriously the parallels 
sometimes noted, but often neglected, by earlier generations of scholars between Parmenides’ 
proem and reports of shamanic spiritual journeys, Lombardo pointed out that the resemblance 
extends beyond the proem, existing “both in the details of the journey recounted in the prologue, 
and in the substance of what the goddess tells him, which is that the universe and our minds form 
a mutually committed whole.”148 On this view, “Parmenides’ poem is concerned with a unique 
inner experience, the encounter of one’s mind with Being and the realization that they are one 
and the same. The road that leads to this experience is therefore a “Way,” a spiritual path rather 
than a logical route or an analytical method.”149 Of course, to those who regard Parmenides as 
the father of rationalism, the command to “judge by reason” seems to directly contradict such a 
proposal, and Lombardo’s translation of the critical clause, “but use your mind to respond to my 
challenge”,150 may be regarded as an evasion of the potential problem it presents. In promoting a 
similar portrait of Parmenides, Kingsley addresses this question at length, noting, as we have 
here, the dependence of Sextus’ and Diogenes’ reports on a Stoic source (whom he takes to be 
Posidonius) and the Stoic habit of accommodation.151 Kingsley’s solution is to propose that 
Posidonius’ reading involves not only an anachronistic understanding of logos, but textual 
corruption as well.152 Maintaining that logos at this stage of its history, as yet untainted with 
147 See page 37 above, with footnote 57. 
148 Lombardo (1982) p. vii. 
149 Lombardo (1982) pp. 3-4. “The effect of the shamanistic style,” Lombardo goes on, “is to lead us to regard as a 
spiritual path the road to Being that the Goddess points out in the subsequent fragments and not to misconstrue her 
teaching as a method of logical argument.” (p. 5) This, he suggests, is the mistake in understanding Parmenides to 
which Socrates alludes in the passage of the Theaetetus (183b) touched on in the Introduction. 
150 Lombardo (1982) p. 14. 
151 For Stoic “accommodation”, see Burnet (1930) p. 32, with n.1. 
152 See Kingsley (2003) pp. 136-140 and 556-569. 
78 
 
                                               
  
rational overtones, means simply “what is spoken”, and arguing that no good sense can be made, 
in the context (which he takes to be DK 7), of a command to “judge by talk”, Kingsley claims 
that Parmenides’ text did not have the dative λόγῳ but read κρῖναι δὲ λόγου, with a genitive, and 
suggests that the resulting lines can then be translated “but judge in favor of the highly 
contentious demonstration of the truth contained in the words as spoken by me.”153 The textual 
change from the dative to the genitive is not an extreme one, and Kingsley’s emendation has won 
some support,154 but the sentence that results seems less natural to me than the use of the 
instrumental dative, and the emendation, in light of the alternative offered above, seems 
unnecessary, at least for countering the rationalist interpretation of the lines.155  
Whether Parmenides was in fact more of a mystic or shaman than a logician is a question 
we may be better prepared to address following a full review of the sources for the rest of the 
poem. The new reading of the lines that I have proposed does, I think, introduce good grounds 
for doubting an exclusively rationalistic portrayal of Parmenides, certain advocates for which 
attempt, by appeal to DK B 7.5, to downplay or dismiss outright the significance of any mystical, 
religious, or non-Greek influences detected in the poem. 156  It is, however, well worth 
153 Cf. Burnet’s proposal of λόγων, mentioned above (see footnote 141). Burnet’s λόγων would be an objective 
genitive, dependent on ἔλεγχον, so that the command would be construed “judge my refutation of the accounts (of 
the senses),” but runs into the difficulty that without something in Greek to correspond to “(of the senses)” it is 
difficult to know that the logoi in question belong to the senses. On the other hand, Kingsley’s λόγου, as I 
understand it, is a subjective genitive, so that we read, “judge (my) speech’s polydēris elenchos, spoken by me”. 
Kingsley’s suggestion avoids the odd leap of understanding the logos, without any modifiers, as belonging to 
someone other than the present speaker, but given that the goddess goes on explicitly to identify the elenchos as her 
own, λόγου seems otiose. 
154 See Gemelli Marciano (2008) p. 40, n. 55. 
155 Inasmuch as the reading I am proposing eliminates any positive command to judge at all, it seems a stronger 
counter to the rationalist interpretation that Kingsley opposes. On Kingsley’s own reading, even if logos on its own 
does not carry strong rational overtones, the goddess is still commanding the youth to judge her elenchos, which 
means, presumably, to subject it to some form of critical assessment. Cf. the remarks of Furley (1989) p. 38 and 
Cordero (2004) p. 134 (for the latter, see the following footnote).   
156 Thus Gregory Vlastos objected to Cornford’s connection of the proem with shamanism in Cornford (1952) by 
saying, “though Parmenides does present his doctrine in the guise of revelation, he does not rest his claim to its truth 
on supernatural inspiration. His goddess does not say, “Believe,” but κρῖναι λόγῳ (B7.5), appealing to an austerely 
logical demonstration, whose cogency is wholly rational; this is the exact opposite of shamanism.” (1955, p. 65) 
Guthrie, though willing to tolerate some discussion of mystical or shamanic elements in the proem (1965, pp. 11-13), 
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underscoring that this does not mean that something we might be inclined to call “reason” is not 
an important element in Parmenides’ teaching. I am not denying that Parmenides had and indeed 
valued some such notion, but it seems doubtful that he would have called it logos. Without 
wishing to enter into that debate here, I suggest that, ultimately, the division between the logical 
and the mystical, and the rationalist/empiricist dichotomy, may simply be unhelpful for an 
accurate understanding of Parmenides’ thought.157 What is attractive, at this stage, about the new 
construal of the lines commonly placed in fragment DK 7 is how well they fit with what we’ve 
seen of the proem so far and thus confirm the integrity of Sextus’ quotation. 
The specific adjectives employed in this passage are generally given little attention 
beyond a remark about whether or not ἠχήεσσαν modifies γλῶσσαν as well as ἀκουήν.158 In 
particular, it is underappreciated by those who would regard this passage as “the first explicit 
statement of the contrast between reason and the senses”159 that the goddess, in warning against 
an aimless eye and echoing hearing, is not necessarily objecting to the senses per se, but rather, it 
seems, to senses which are not being used as they ought to be.160 It is perfectly possible that the 
goddess does endorse some special form of focused gaze, or a manner of listening that hears past 
the din of everyday experience to something else worth attending to. Even in the place assigned 
to them in DK, then, these lines need not be an outright rejection of the senses, but appear 
instead to direct our attention to particular potential weaknesses in them. However, when the 
dismisses in a footnote the notion that there can be profitable comparison between Parmenides and Indian thought, 
alleging, “In fact . . . India and Parmenides are poles apart” because “Parmenides makes and tests his hard-and-fast 
distinctions by sheer intellectual reasoning (logos).” (1965 p. 53, n. 1) For Cordero, the “request” of the goddess 
(described as a “professor of philosophy”!) that the kouros judge her speech “definitively refutes any interpretation 
that claims to find a sort of “revelation” in the Poem.” (2004, p. 134) 
157 Cf. Gemelli Marciano (2008) and the response of Granger (2010). 
158 An exception is the discussion in Curd (1998/2004) pp. 61-62 with n. 104. 
159 McKirahan (1994) p. 165. 
160 It is possible, particularly if one believes that Parmenides indeed had “little facility in diction”, to understand the 
adjectives as fairly dull pejoratives applying to any and all uses of the senses spoken of, so that the warning against 
plying an aimless eye amounts to a judgment that all vision is misleading, but to those less convinced of 
Parmenides’ shortcomings such a reading seems an acutely ironic instance of the point the goddess is making. 
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lines are restored to the proem and read as proposed, Parmenides’ choice of adjectives appears 
more inspired. Logos is then no longer contrasted to, but grouped with the (other) senses as the 
products of the “habit of much experience”: the “aimless eye”, the “echoing hearing”, and the 
(also echoing) “tongue”, with which it may well be identical.161 These descriptions are especially 
apt in light of the observations made in the previous chapter on Parmenides’ use of repetition, for 
throughout the proem, the reader’s ear and tongue (at least if one has been reading aloud) have 
been echoing the same words and sounds—featuring familiar phrasing, in a well-known meter —
but the effect, as we have repeatedly noted, is disorienting. Again, while we have been able to 
see numerous patterns in those repetitions, they were consistently slightly askew, and no clear, 
central focus ever quite emerged; that is to say, just as our ears have echoed with the words 
repeated, our eye has been aimless. And, though we may strain to make sense of the multiplicity 
of sounds and images, unless we remain open to the possibility of something unfamiliar or 
unexpected emerging, the impression that one may take from the manner of expression (that is, 
the logos) in the proem as well as the subsequent account (that is, the logos) of “what is”, is that 
Parmenides (or his goddess) is simply engaged in so much eristic word-splitting. Accordingly, 
the goddess, in her own inimitable and enigmatic way, warns the youth against this very thing.   
161 It was not, it seems, unusual for speech to be considered one of the senses before Aristotle (and later the Stoics) 
canonized the list of senses at five. As noted above (footnote 114), Cornford refers to a list of seven senses found in 
Regimen, a work in the Hippocratic corpus probably dating from the second half of the fifth century B.C.E. That list 
included the mouth as an organ of conversation, and passages outward and inward for warm or cold breath, as well 
as the more familiar hearing, vision, nose, tongue (for pleasant and unpleasant taste) and body (for touch). Other 
theorists seem to have considered the capacity for pleasure (and pain) as a distinct sense (cf. Theophrastus, de 
Sensibus §§ 9 and 16, in connection with Empedocles and perhaps other “like by like” theorists). Stobaeus reports 
Democritus as claiming that the gods, the wise, and the irrational animals have extra senses, but does not report what 
those senses were (see DK 67 A 116). In the survey of earlier thinkers in his de Sensibus, Theophrastus remarks that 
Parmenides and Empedocles each treated phronēsis as the same as aisthēsis or as something close to it (§§ 3 and 10), 
and that Plato defined hearing through phōnē, “voice” (rather than  just psophos, “sound”?). Even Aristotle, before 
he argues for there being only five senses at de Anima 3.1, sees fit to treat voice as part of his discussion of hearing 
in 2.8, and at the close of the work, in the list of senses other than touch, which contribute not only to mere living 
but to living well, accounts for the tongue and hearing in terms of their communicative functions. Cf. also Aristotle, 
de Sensu 437a3-17. 
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The mention of the senses (including logos) in lines 32-35 thus reflects the experience of 
the audience in reading (or listening to) the proem, which is equivalent to the disorienting 
journey the youth has undergone. When preceded by the 31st line, and read accordingly, those 
lines constitute the goddess’s cautionary note before the full exposition of her teaching, pointing 
out some ways not to mistake her account. Like the senses, language too has its limitations. 
When handled carelessly, or perhaps simply when used by mortals, it can appear contentious and 
invites misunderstanding in manifold other ways. The goddess is calling attention to these risks, 
but this does not entail an outright rejection of these faculties. Despite its (perhaps inevitable) 
dangers, logos is still the goddess’ instrument for instructing the youth and it is Parmenides’ tool 
for teaching us. Thus, while it is, I claim, a misreading of the lines to claim that Parmenides or 
the goddess is here rejecting the senses and establishing logos as the criterion of truth, neither is 
it appropriate for the goddess to be read as promoting misology.162 It falls to the youth to attend 
to the words of the goddess, and, alerted to possible pitfalls, to cope somehow with whatever it is 
that her speech discloses, employing eye, ear and tongue in whatever manner might be 
appropriate.  
Doubtless, this is a demanding encounter for the youth. It is thus important to note that, at 
least here, the goddess does not provide him with any more positive expressions of just how to 
understand the coming account. There is no promise of clarity in it, no guarantee that reason 
vouchsafes understanding it, and no helpful guidance given on how it is that one can look and 
listen, speak or judge, in a way that avoids the aimless, echoing and contentious states that mark 
habitual mortal behavior. With the second half of line 35 (where δ’ ἔτι marks the transition from 
162 I borrow this term from the language of Socrates at 89d of Plato’s Phaedo, coined on the model of “misanthropy”. 
In a passage more indebted, I think, to Parmenides than is commonly realized, and highlighted dramatically by a 
break in the dialogue’s narrative frame (88c-89b), Socrates warns his interlocutors, whose pistis in logos has been 
shaken by the insufficiency of the preceding accounts to furnish a proof of the immortality of the soul, against 
allowing that experience to turn them into haters of logos, and believing that there is nothing sound in it. 
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the sentence begun with ἀλλά in line 31) the goddess appears to introduce a more appropriate 
“spirit” in which to proceed, but it is there, unfortunately, that our text runs out: “Still, a solitary 
spirit of a way is left. …” As with so much of the proem so far, this is suggestive and evocative, 
but not as informative as a listener might like it to be. If what followed gave any clearer 
expression of the value of logos, one imagines that the Stoic source would have referred to it to 
make his point. It is unsound, then, to assume that this other “spirit of a way” was any easier to 
follow, any more transparent or straightforward, than the proem. It seems that the cultivated air 
of confusion remained dominant, despite the goddess’ reassurance that the journey on which the 
youth finds himself is a right and just one. 
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CHAPTER THREE – PARMENIDES’ PROGENY: EMPEDOCLES 
 
While I hope that the preceding chapters have provided an adequate case, based upon the text 
itself and the sources that quote it, for the basic arrangement of the proem as preserved by Sextus 
Empiricus, it might not be amiss, before leaving the proem, to present some supporting evidence, 
from an author nearer Parmenides’ own time, for both the general character of the proem 
presented above and for the particular notion that a misuse of logos, no less than of the senses, 
can be an impediment to grasping the goddess’ teaching. It would indeed be good grounds for 
doubting the reading of the proem and the construal of κρῖναι δὲ λόγῳ proposed in the last 
chapter were there no indication that readers closer in time to Parmenides than we are, with 
access to the entire poem, read the proem along the lines suggested. Of course, given his 
apparently deliberate attempts to disorient and unsettle his audience, it is to be expected that, 
even among Parmenides’ near-contemporaries, some readers will simply not have known what to 
make of the poem, while others will have, intentionally or not, exploited points of uncertainty in 
order to present an image of Parmenides tailored to suit their own purposes. Still, one would 
hope to find indications that at least some of Parmenides’ ancient readers read the lines in a way 
compatible with that proposed. In this chapter, I focus on one particularly important early reader 
of Parmenides’ poem: Empedocles of Acragas.163 
163 Empedocles provides an especially instructive example, but the lines of inquiry in the present chapter could be 
pursued with a number of other figures whose works show sensitivity to the aspects of the proem we have been 
discussing. Although in different ways, Gorgias’ On Non-Being, Aristophanes’ Clouds, many of Plato’s dialogues 
and Aristotle’s Physics have something to teach us about Parmenides’ repetitiousness, the language and imagery of 
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 Empedocles’ own philosophical poetry provides valuable testimony to repetitiousness as 
a mark of Parmenidean style, echoes other elements of the proem presented above, and reflects 
the goddess’ specific warning to the youth against misapplying logos in the encounter with Truth. 
Though there are many examples of one or another of these traits in what survives of 
Empedocles’ work, we shall examine two fragments particularly closely, along with the context 
of the principal source in which they are quoted. Those fragments are DK 31 B 2 and B 3, which 
are quoted most fully, like Parmenides’ proem, by Sextus Empiricus in the survey of opinions 
about the criterion of truth in book VII of his adversus Mathematicos. In the course of our 
examination of Sextus’ passage, we shall find further support for the reliability of his quotations 
in some instances where doubt has been cast upon them. As in the preceding chapters, I shall try 
to avoid assuming too much about Empedocles’ doctrinal commitments, and concentrate on 
verbal and structural features that reflect his reading of Parmenides. 
 
Empedocles’ Poem(s) 
The arrangement of the fragments of Empedocles is in certain ways a more involved and 
disputed problem than in the case of Parmenides. To begin with, there are many more fragments, 
and scholars are at odds over whether the extant fragments belong to one or to two (or more) 
poems, some dividing the bulk of the fragments between two works, an On Nature and a 
Purifications, other scholars arguing that the two titles are simply different ways of referring to 
the same poem. For some time, it was common to assume two separate poems, On Nature being 
regarded as philosophic or scientific in character, the Purifications being considered a religious 
work. In more recent decades, that dichotomy has come to seem facile to many, more reflective 
the proem, or the status of logos in the poem. Even in the case of Empedocles, the treatment that follows could 
easily be augmented. 
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of the preoccupations of the scholars responsible for the arrangements of the fragments than of 
Empedocles’ own outlook. Some of those who reject that dichotomy still believe Empedocles to 
have written more than one poem, distinguishing between them on some other basis. With the 
recent publication of the Strasbourg papyrus, 164 the only known representative of the direct 
transmission of Empedocles’ work, the range of interpretations of our scientist-poet-philosopher-
healer-prophet has only widened. However these matters may stand, it is, I think, readily 
admitted on all sides that Parmenides’ verse served as a model for Empedocles’ own philosophic 
poetry.165 It is therefore telling that, in addition to including obvious echoes of Parmenides’ own 
phrasing,166 Empedocles’ verse provides a host of examples of the sort of repetition that I am 
claiming was a significant feature of Parmenides’ poem.167 As this is a recognized if perhaps 
underappreciated feature of Empedocles’ poetry, there is no need to detail it here. 168  Such 
repetition in an acknowledged imitator of Parmenides should help us to accept the possibility of 
the same in Parmenides where our sources suggest it. 
164 In Martin and Primavesi (1999). 
165 Diogenes Laertius (Vitae VII.55) records that Theophrastus said Empedocles was an emulator (ζηλοτής) of 
Parmenides and imitated him in his poetry. 
166 Standard examples include the description of the moon as an ἀλλότριον φῶς at DK 31 B 45 (repeating 
Parmenides’ phrasing in DK 14, on which cf. footnotes 64, 68 and 69 above) and the command σὺ δ’ ἄκουε λόγου 
στόλον οὐκ ἀπατηλόν at DK 31 B 17.26 (typically taken as a response to Parmenides’ μάνθανε κόσμον ἐμῶν ἐπέων 
ἀπατηλὸν ἀκούων at  DK 8.52). 
167 Fragment DK 31 B 17 is an especially good example of this, where lines 1-2 are repeated word for word at lines 
16-17; line 6 is echoed in line 12 of the same fragment, as well as 26.11; lines 7-8 and 10-13 are repeated, with 
variations, in 26.5-6 and 9-12 (17.9 is actually a supplement, reproducing 26.8, on the basis of the parallelism); line 
7 alone is repeated at 20.2; line 29 is echoed by 26.1; and lines 34-35a  are echoed closely at 21.13-14a and 26.3-4a. 
This fragment is now augmented by the material in Martin and Primavesi (1999). The extended passage shows 
additional signs of repetition; see the apparatus to their ensemble a, pp. 131-139. 
168 See, e.g., Guthrie (1965) pp. 136-137 and Wright (1981) pp. 21 and 184-187. The only attempt of which I am 
aware to explain away this patent feature of Empedocles’ verses was Fairbanks (1898a).  While allowing certain 
repetitions as acceptable instances of “the epic style which Empedokles affects” or “the literary devices appropriate 
to philosophic poetry”, Fairbanks sought to purge those due, as he claimed, “to a wrong reconstruction of the text”. 
Prominent members of the last class were the repetitions of DK 31 B 17.7-8 and 17.34 mentioned in the previous 
footnote. That fragment is quoted by Simplicius in its entirety (but for the missing line 17.9) as a continuous run of 
34 lines at in Phys. 158.1-159.4, and thus calls for little “reconstruction”. Fairbanks’ attempt to eliminate the 
offending repetitions, on the other hand, involves much rearranging of the transmitted texts and seems not to have 
been adopted in any editions of Empedocles’ text besides Fairbanks’ own (1898b). Moreover, his proposed sequence 
of DK 31 B 17.31-33, 26.1-2, 17.34-35 is now contradicted by the traces of 17.31-35 preserved in the Strasbourg 
papyrus (see Martin and Primavesi (1999) pp. 130-131). 
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Καὶ δὶς γάρ, ὃ δεῖ, καλόν ἐστιν ἐνισπεῖν: Unreliable Sextus Again  
In connection with the structure of Parmenides’ proem argued for above, two fragments of 
Empedocles are worth special attention here: DK 31 B 2 and 3, which not only exhibit 
Parmenides’ influence on Empedocles but bear directly on the question of Sextus’ reliability. 
These fragments, generally agreed by editors to belong to a proem (on either a single-work or a 
two-work hypothesis),169 are quoted by Sextus Empiricus not long after he gives us Parmenides’ 
proem.170 While Sextus does not, as with Parmenides and Heraclitus, quote the very beginning of 
Empedocles’ work,171 he is nonetheless quite explicit about the sequence of the verses that he 
does quote. Both fragments are quoted as part of Sextus’ report of an interpretation according to 
which Empedocles’ criterion was “right” or “correct” logos (ὀρθὸς λόγος). After reporting the 
“rather simple” interpretation of Empedocles to which he transitioned at the end of the report on 
Parmenides, 172 Sextus introduces the orthos logos interpretation, very likely drawn from the 
same Stoic source responsible for the preceding accounts of Xenophanes and Parmenides. There 
are numerous problematic points in the text of the fragments themselves to which we will have to 
169 Cf. Trépanier (2004) p. 52: “The probable location of B 2 and 3 in the proem of either the Physics or the single 
work is something upon which all modern editions agree, and needs no defense. Indeed the content of both passages, 
including an analysis of the shortcomings of normal mortal understanding (B 2), the address to the Muse, and the 
injunctions directed to the disciple (B 3) makes their most natural location a position before the doctrinal sections of 
the poem.”  
170 At adv. Math. VII.123-125. These are the fragments in connection with which Trépanier appeals to Sextus’ 
supposedly faulty quotation of Parmenides (see pages 20-21 above, with footnote 11). Following the lead of Wright 
(see Wright (1981) pp. 157-158 and 160-163, and cf. Inwood (2001) pp. 214-219), Trépanier doubts Sextus’ 
reliability here and proposes dividing DK 31 B 3 into at least two fragments, the principal break occurring after the 
fifth verse quoted. Showing still greater suspicion of Sextus’ testimony than Wright does, Trépanier also suggests 
dividing DK 31 B 2 into two separate fragments, placing lines 2.8-9 before lines 2.1-7, and locating both 2.8-9 and 
2.1-7 between separated portions of DK 3.  
171 The opening is preserved by Diogenes Laertius (Vitae XIII.54 and 61-62 = DK 31 B 112), if those who maintain 
that the On Nature and the Purifications are the same poem are correct. 
172 See pages 66-67 above, with text in footnote 118.  On that interpretation, each of Empedocles’ four elements or 
“roots”, as well as Philia and Neikos, are all considered criteria.  
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return, but for an initial orientation to Sextus’ presentation of the verses, I quote the entire 
passage, as translated by Bett: 173 
(122) But there have been others saying that according to Empedocles the criterion of truth 
is not the senses but correct reason [τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον], and that of correct reason one sort is 
divine and the other human; and of these the divine one is inexpressible [ἀνέξοιστον], while 
the human one is expressible [ἐξοιστόν]. (123) On the fact that the judgment of what is true 
does not belong to the senses he speaks thus: 
 
 Narrow are the devices [παλάμαι, literally “palms”] scattered over our limbs, 
 Many are the wretched sudden things that blunt our thoughts. 
 Seeing a small part of their own life  
 Lifted up like smoke they fly off to a swift fate 
 Persuaded only of that which each has met with 
 While being driven in all directions, but everyone boasts that he has found  
  the whole. 
  These things are not thus to be seen by men nor to be heard  
  Nor to be grasped by the intellect. [= DK 31B 2.1-8a] 
 
(124) On the fact that the truth is not completely ungraspable, but is graspable as far as 
human reason [logos] reaches, he provides clarification when he adds to the preceding lines 
[διασαφεῖ τοῖς προκειμένοις ἐπιφέρων] 
 
   […]But you, since you have strayed hither,  
  Will learn; mortal wit [μῆτις] has not stirred itself further.  [= DK 31 B 2.8b-9] 
 
 And in the next lines [καὶ διὰ τῶν ἑξῆς], after criticizing those who profess to know more, 
he establishes that what is grasped through each sense is trustworthy when reason [logos] is 
in charge of them, despite earlier running down the assurance [pistis] gained from them. 
(125) For he says 
 
  But gods, turn away these people’s madness from my tongue, 
  And from holy mouths make flow a pure stream. 
  And you, white-armed virgin Muse who remembers much [πολυμνήστη], 
  I entreat: what it is right for creatures of a day to hear, 
  Send to me, driving your well-reined [εὐήνιον] chariot from Piety’s place. 
  Nor will the blooms of well-reputed [εὐδόξοιο] honor from mortals 
  Force you to take them up, on condition that you have the audacity to say 
  More than is holy, and then sit upon the heights of wisdom. 
  But come, observe with every device [παλάμῃ], in the way each thing is clear, 
  Not holding any sight in trust [πίστει] more than by way of hearing, 
173 Bett (2005) pp. 26-27, with italics and material in square brackets (including the ellipsis before DK 31 B 2.8b, to 
indicate that the line begins mid-verse) added. 
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  Or any loud-sounding hearing above the things made plain by the tongue, 
  Nor by any means hold back trust [pistis] from the other limbs, 
  As many ways as there is a path for thinking, but think in the way  
   each thing is clear. [= DK 31 B 3] 
 
 (126) Such are the things Empedocles said. 
 
 
In the italicized portions of the two remarks that straddle DK 31 B 2.8b-9, Sextus appears to 
inform us, in a fairly straightforward manner, that B 2.8b-9 was continuous with B 2.1-8a (with 
which it meshes metrically) and that DK 31 B 3 followed it, perhaps after some unquoted lines 
directed against “those who profess to know more”. Indications of placement in the sources for 
Presocratic fragments are seldom more explicit than this. Nonetheless, in a note keyed to “Piety’s 
place” at the end (in the translation) of DK 31 B 3.5, Bett adds, “As commentators have noticed, 
these first five lines seem quite separate from those that follow; “you” up to this point refers to 
the Muse, but in the following lines to the addressee of the poem (Pausanias). Either some lines 
have dropped out of the text or Sextus is combining passages from different places (cf. 111).”174 
Here again, as with VII.111 (that is, the quotation of Parmenides’ proem), the conjectures of 
Presocratic scholarship have been overly influential in Bett’s characterization of Sextus’ 
quotation.175 Bett’s first sentence, pointing out the shift in addressee that takes place over the 
174 Bett (2005) p. 27, n. 54. As noted above (see footnotes 11 and 170), Wright had split DK 31 B 3 into two 
separate fragments, placing DK 31 B 131 and B 1 between the two halves, explaining as follows: “The fragment has 
been divided after the fifth line, for the person addressed changes from the Muse to Pausanias, and a transitional  
passage is needed. That Sextus does omit a considerable number of lines from his quotations without indicating that 
he does so is supported by his citation of Parmenides earlier at 7.111.” (1981, p. 157) Richard McKirahan follows 
suit, breaking the quotation after the fifth line and noting, “I divide DK fr. 3 into two fragments, since it is 
implausible to identify the addressee of lines 6 ff. as the Muse.” (McKirahan (1994) p. 234, n. 4.) Trépanier more 
cautiously observes that 3.6-8 may be directed to either the Muse or the disciple, and that it is really with lines 9-13 
that it becomes difficult to imagine an addressee other than the disciple (see Trépanier (2004) pp. 56-57, 59-65). 
175 See above, page 21. I hope that the intervening pages have provided enough of a corrective to the prevailing doxa 
about Sextus’ reliability in quoting Parmenides’ proem at VII.111 that appeals to Sextus’ “clear” errors there by 
those wishing to cast doubt on the quotations in the Empedocles report will be met with skepticism. Other reasons 
given for doubting the report of Empedocles’ lines will be the focus of the following few pages. Doubts about 
Sextus’ quotation of DK 31 B 3 seem to go hand in hand with the acceptance of “Kranz’s move”, which supplies the 
appearance of a parallel example of Sextus’ unreliability. For an instance of this before Kranz’s own time, cf. the 
treatment of the lines in Karsten (1838). Having earlier introduced drastic alterations to Sextus’ quotation of 
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course of the lines, is an observation worth making, but it is mistaken, I believe, to conclude 
from this that there is something missing from Sextus’ quotation. As with the Parmenides 
passage, a proper estimation of Sextus’ reliability in the present case requires reading it in the 
context of the general plan of the work and distinguishing between Sextus’ views and the 
opinions that he is reporting. 
 
Sextus’ Strategy in adv. Math. VII.122-124 
A nuanced treatment of Sextus’ passage is provided by Simon Trépanier as part of his argument 
for reading the extant fragments of Empedocles as belonging to a single work. Trépanier’s 
discussion makes more explicit what is often assumed or implied in other criticisms of Sextus’ 
report, so it will be worth examining in some detail. As has been noted, Trépanier follows other 
scholars in questioning the unity of Sextus’ quotation of DK 31 B 3, and goes even further to 
suggest that, against Sextus’ explicit statements about the relative positioning of the fragments, 
DK 31 B 2 should also be divided, with its parts (their own order rearranged) following parts of 
B 3, which, he claims, may mistakenly conflate not just two, but as many as four fragments.176  
On the whole, Trépanier presents a compelling case for the single-work hypothesis, and his 
Parmenides’ proem (including what amounted to “Kranz’s move”) in Karsten (1835), Karsten printed his version of 
DK 31 B 3 (lines 41-53 in his arrangement of On Nature) with rows of points after the fifth, seventh, and eighth 
verses, noting the shift in addressee and suspecting omissions by Sextus (see Karsten (1838) pp. 90 and 176-179). 
176 See footnotes 11, 170, and 174. Trépanier’s divisions of DK 31 B 3 coincide with those of Karsten (see previous 
footnote), but their treatments differ significantly in that Trépanier introduces material both between 3.1-5 and 3.6-8 
(in this following Wright and Inwood) and between 3.6-8 and 3.9-13 (without precedent, as far as I am aware). 
Though Karsten indicates possible omissions, he does not introduce other fragments between the divided portions of 
Sextus’ continuous quotation. 
 As for DK 31 B 2, Trépanier, discounting Sextus’ remarks and the metrical fit, not only doubts the 
continuity of the lines, but places 2.8b-9 before 2.1-8a. He cites Wright and Inwood as having anticipated him in 
dividing the fragment (2004, p. 54), but I find no evidence for this in Wright, while Inwood seems non-committal. 
Wright prints Sextus’ full text, including the intervening remark between the halves of line 8, but does not in 
translating the fragment (her own fragment 1) mark a lacuna or express any doubt about the fragment’s unity in her 
commentary. Inwood does print the fragment (fragment 8 in his ordering) with a lacuna (2001, p. 214), and remarks 
in a textual note that “Sextus breaks his quotation at this point” (2001, p. 276), but it is not clear from this that 
Inwood means to indicate anything more than the possibility of missing lines. 
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proposed reconstruction for the beginning of the work is an admirably careful presentation of the 
evidence, but the exceptional degree of skepticism that he shows towards Sextus’ testimony is, I 
think, unwarranted, and seems to involve a misreading of Sextus’ strategy in the passage.  
Specifically, Trépanier appears to think that the “rather simple” interpretation that credits 
Empedocles with six criteria is Sextus’ own view,177 and, perhaps because of this, believes that 
Sextus’ attitude in the discussion of the orthos logos interpretation is polemical.178 Neither of 
these, in my estimation, is accurate. Trépanier rightly recognizes that the orthos logos 
interpretation is not Sextus’ own, but comes from what, in the absence of more specific evidence, 
177 Trépanier does not dwell on the first interpretation, so I am unsure just whether, and if so, how strongly, he really 
believes that Sextus endorses the “rather simple” view of Empedocles, but this seems to be what is suggested in the 
following: “Sextus first mentions Empedocles in paragraph 115, one part of a longer section devoted to the thinkers 
who assume that all cognition is through the senses, on the principle that “like perceives like.” There Sextus tells us 
that, since Empedocles postulated six first principles, and assumed that like perceives like, he must have thought 
there were six criteria.” (Trépanier (2004) p. 53) Though Trépanier points to VII.115 as the first mention of 
Empedocles, verses of Empedocles (DK 31 B 109) were actually quoted earlier as an illustration of the “like by 
like” principle at VII.92. Empedocles was not named there, but the digression in VII.116-119 makes it clear that 
Sextus is recalling the earlier discussion.  
The earlier “mention” of Empedocles is obscured by the fact that both editions and translations of the text 
at VII.92 misleadingly present the material immediately preceding Empedocles’ lines as a quotation from Philolaus. 
This seems wrong. Rather, the words καθάπερ ἔλεγε καί ὁ Φιλόλαυς are a parenthetical remark in the passage, 
which should be read, “And so, while Anaxagoras claimed that logos generally is a criterion, the Pythagoreans say 
that logos, not generally, but the one that comes about from ta mathēmata (just the way Philolaus also said), being 
contemplative of the nature of wholes, has a certain kinship to that, if indeed what is similar is of a nature to be 
apprehended by its similar:” [ὥστε ὁ μὲν Ἀναξαγόρας κοινῶς τὸν λόγον ἔφη κριτήριον εἶναι· (92) οἱ δὲ 
Πυθαγορικοὶ τὸν λόγον μέν φασιν, οὐ κοινῶς δέ, τὸν δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν μαθημάτων περιγινόμενον, καθάπερ ἔλεγε καὶ ὁ 
Φιλόλαος, θεωρητικόν τε ὄντα τῆς τῶν ὅλων φύσεως ἔχειν τινὰ συγγένειαν πρὸς ταύτην, ἐπείπερ ὑπὸ τοῦ ὁμοίου τὸ 
ὅμοιον καταλαμβάνεσθαι πέφυκεν·] Cf. Mutschmann, Bury, and Bett ad loc. Huffman (1993) pp. 199-201 is better 
on this passage, recognizing that the mention of Philolaus is only an aside and that Empedocles is quoted as a 
Pythagorean example of the “like by like” principle, but does not distinguish between Sextus and the source of the 
interpretation, and refers to points of the interpretation as “Sextus’ assertions”. 
178 Reading Sextus as a partisan of the “rather simple” six-criteria interpretation of Empedocles might provide a 
motive for his attacking the second approach as a rival interpretation, but that is not quite how Trépanier seems to 
read the treatment of the orthos logos view. On Trépanier’s reading, Sextus seems not to be making a direct attack 
on the orthos logos interpretation, but exploiting the materials provided by the source of that interpretation in order 
to expose a contradiction in Empedocles’ own epistemology. As I shall discuss presently, however, there seem to be 
no sure signs of this being Sextus’ intent. 
Why Sextus is taken to endorse the “rather simple” view, if indeed he is, is not spelled out. If one does not 
read ἁπλούστερον in VII.115 as sarcastic (cf. above, with footnote 120 ), it might seem an indication that Sextus 
endorses  the view as the more straightforward of the interpretations of Empedocles under consideration, although 
how six criteria are simpler than one will take some explaining. In the larger context, particularly given the 
complexity of the Pythagorean logos /number criterion with which the lines of DK 31 B 109 are linked (Sextus’ 
exposition of the Pythagorean view runs from VII.93 to the shift to Xenophanes at VII.110), it is hard to take 
ἁπλούστερον at face value. 
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Trépanier terms “the Stoic source”. This is a convenient designation, since the source here seems 
to be the same as that responsible for the interpretation of Parmenides’ proem reported earlier in 
Sextus, and discussed in the preceding chapter. As we saw there, distinguishing clearly between 
the material Sextus is reporting and his own additions can be difficult. According to Trépanier, 
Sextus quotes DK 31 B 2 and B 3, drawing on the Stoic source, in order to expose a 
contradiction in Empedocles’ thought about the senses.179 The notion that Sextus is looking to 
catch Empedocles in a contradiction leads to the impression that the Stoic source is somehow 
more reliable:  
As for the sources of B 2 and B 3, it appears that the earlier, possibly Stoic, source was 
closer to the truth than Sextus. Against the more sympathetic, if anachronistic, treatment of 
Empedocles’ epistemology by the first source, Sextus thought that Empedocles’ views on 
the status of human knowledge—and its dependence on sense-perception—were open to a 
charge of contradiction. 180 
 
That contradiction, Trépanier claims, was “predicated on a misreading of B 2.7-8, where 
Empedocles does not reject either the senses or reason completely, but merely the status of either 
as final and authoritative, to the exclusion of the other.”181 It would indeed be a misreading of 
the lines to take them as a complete rejection of the senses, but there do not seem to be any signs 
that Sextus actually misunderstood the lines in this way. Sextus does not obviously allege any 
contradiction on Empedocles’ part. The remark with which DK 31 B 2.1-8 are introduced does 
179 “Sextus’ source … quoted them [i.e., fragments DK 31 B 2 and 3] to support an interpretation according to the 
epistemology of “right reason,” while Sextus himself makes use of that later interpretation, apparently because he 
wants to see in it a contradiction between B 2 and 3 on the issue of the validity of the senses. In arguing for this 
alleged inconsistency Sextus is engaging in a polemical refashioning of the material to his own skeptical ends.” 
(Trépanier (2004) p. 53) 
180 Trépanier (2004) p. 56. 
181 Trépanier (2004) p. 56. In an endnote, Trépanier articulates what he takes to be Sextus’ argument more fully: 
“Sextus first quotes B 2.8-9 as involving a denial of the possibility of knowledge, i.e. thesis (A) knowledge is 
impossible for men. He then quotes B 2.8-9 to support the idea that “truth is not altogether unattainable, but is 
attainable as far as mortal thought can reach”; note in particular B 2.9 you will learn. This would be thesis (B): some 
knowledge is attainable by men. In (A), Sextus says that Empedocles claims that knowledge is impossible for men, 
but in lines 8-9 he implies (B). The point of B 3, for Sextus, is to reinforce (B), especially “come, see, etc.” where 
Empedocles endorses the cognitive value of sense-perception.” (Trépanier (2004) p. 213, n. 74)  
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not suggest that Empedocles rejected the senses completely, but only that the “judgment of the 
truth” does not lie in them.182 Similarly, the remark before the quotation of DK 31 B 3, with its 
mention of the earlier running down of the senses, does not appear to be a claim to have caught 
Empedocles in a contradiction, but an appreciation of the point that the senses, despite their 
limitations, do still promise some assurance (insofar as it is available to human beings) when 
governed by logos. The interpretative content of both remarks, in any event, would seem to 
belong to the Stoic source. If Sextus is contributing anything of his own to the account, it would 
seem to be the information about where the lines quoted were situated in the poem. 
If we rein in our speculation about Sextus’ intent, a less complicated reading of the 
passage is possible, even if Empedocles’ lines are themselves somewhat difficult. Sextus’ 
skeptical aims being well enough served simply by having conflicting views about Empedocles’ 
criterion to report, he need not be committed to any particular interpretation. He appears neither 
to be promoting the six criteria view nor intent on refuting anything in his presentation of the 
orthos logos view. In the passage quoted above (i.e., adv. Math. VII.122-125), he is simply 
paraphrasing the latter, with the addition, perhaps, of some helpful information about 
Empedocles’ text. According to the interpretation that Sextus is reporting, Empedocles’ criterion 
is, like Xenophanes’ and Parmenides’, a variety of logos. But while Xenophanes’ was a doxastic 
logos (because likelihood is the best that human beings can hope for) and Parmenides’ was an 
epistemonic one (because Parmenides allegedly rejected the senses outright), Empedocles’ 
criterion is “correct” or “right” logos. This, claims the Stoic interpreter, comes in two forms, one 
divine, one human. The former, it is noted (whether by the Stoic source or by Sextus is not quite 
182 Thus neither Sextus nor the Stoic source should be understood as claiming that Empedocles asserts “thesis (A)” 
in Trépanier’s analysis of the argument in the preceding footnote.  Thesis (B) is a fair (if vague) description of the 
point made in connection with 2.8b-9, elaborated on in DK 31 B 3. 
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clear), is inexpressible, the latter expressible.183 Fragments from Empedocles are then quoted to 
illustrate the interpretation. As the remarks that frame the quotations make clear, DK 31 B 2.1-8a 
are taken to indicate Empedocles’ awareness of the inadequacy of the senses (thus implying a 
commitment to a criterion of logos rather than the senses), while DK 31 B 2.8b-9 are understood 
to assure us that learning is nonetheless possible for humans (thus eliminating the possibility that 
there is no humanly attainable criterion of truth at all).184 Next DK 31 B 3 is taken to establish 
the special role of (human) “correct” logos, which appears to consist in how it controls the senses 
so as to make them trustworthy. Once those lines have been quoted, the report is complete and 
Sextus makes no further comment on the interpretation. As there is no interpretative remark over 
and above the report of the orthos logos view which is clearly attributable to Sextus, it is hard to 
argue that the Stoic source is “closer to the truth than Sextus”.  If, as Trépanier claims,  the 
verses quoted offer only weak support for the points they are intended to establish,185 that failure 
must be attributed to the Stoic source rather than Sextus, absent other evidence to show that 
Sextus is misrepresenting his source.  
As for the remarks that frame Empedocles’ verses, then, provided we keep the 
contributions of Sextus and the Stoic source distinct, Sextus’ manner of quotation shows nothing 
worthy of suspicion. Still, as Trépanier observes, it is not obvious whether Sextus is quoting 
directly from a copy of the poem or relying on excerpts that may have appeared in the Stoic 
183 The terms for “expressible” and “inexpressible”, ἐξοιστός and ἀνέξοιστος, otherwise appear in Sextus only in his 
report about (Empedocles’ pupil) Gorgias at adv. Math. VII.65 and 83, in passages that may preserve Gorgias’ own 
language. The text of Gorgias at issue is the Eleatic-style On Non-Being, of which Sextus gives a lengthy account. 
How close Sextus’ paraphrase (as well as that in another source, the Pseudo-Aristotelian de Melisso, Xenophane, 
Gorgia) is to Gorgias’ original wording is a matter of scholarly dispute. 
184 The μὲν… δέ construction in the remarks introducing the parts of DK 31 B 2 should be noted. The fragment is 
treated as a whole making two correlated (but not contradictory) claims.   
185 “Whatever its ultimate origin, Sextus’ interpretation of Empedocles’ epistemological presuppositions is at best 
partial, for the passages quoted in its support do not fit very closely the general scheme it proposes.” (Trépanier 
(2004) p. 53) At this point in Trépanier’s argument, “Sextus’ interpretation” is not, I think, to be regarded as distinct 
from the Stoic orthos logos interpretation. For similar complaints (with that distinction in mind) that the texts quoted 
are not very well suited to the points they are intended to support, see Trépanier (2004) pp. 56-57. 
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source (or elsewhere). 186 Trépanier allows that “the former would be a natural assumption, 
except that in B 3 Sextus mistakenly strings together an address to the Muse (3.1-5) and an 
address to the disciple (3.6-13), so that he is more likely depending upon an intermediary.”187 
But are we so sure that Sextus is mistaken here? Trépanier refers to Wright’s remarks, already 
noted, on this point, which again appeal to Sextus’ supposedly faulty quotation of Parmenides’ 
proem.188 Having seen reason to doubt that assumption, the question reverts to being one of how 
we read the fragment itself. Is the change of addressee a sign that something is wrong with 
Sextus’ quotation? 
 
Empedocles’ Addressees and the Integrity of DK 31 B 3 
I think it is not. Again, as with Parmenides’ proem, the manuscripts of Sextus do not preserve the 
lines so perfectly that we do not benefit from comparing other sources’ quotations of the lines, 
but the lines are not as incoherent as is sometimes claimed. There are, indeed, multiple (and not 
simply two) addressees over the course of the thirteen consecutive lines that Sextus gives us, and 
it is true that the transition from the lines spoken to the “white-armed virgin Muse” to the last 
lines, apparently addressed to a disciple, could be more explicit, but this need not mean that the 
186 “It is unclear if Sextus is excerpting the fragments directly from Empedocles, or perhaps from a longer quotation 
in his source.” (Trépanier (2004) p. 53) It seems to be stacking the deck against Sextus to assume that the source 
would have given a longer quotation, and that Sextus would merely be “excerpting” fragments from it. To judge 
from the case of Parmenides’ proem earlier, where we have the additional evidence from Diogenes Laertius for the 
manner in which the Stoic source presented the material, Sextus may well be presenting fuller extracts than the Stoic 
source did. If so, that may explain why, as Trépanier points out, only some of the lines of each fragment quoted 
seem to bear directly on the points at issue. 
187 Trépanier (2004) p. 53. This “more likely” scenario is taken for granted in the rest of Trépanier’s argument, 
becoming “most likely” at the bottom of the same page, and “probable” on the next. Discounting the alleged parallel 
of Parmenides’ proem, however, the only substantial evidence for dividing the fragments remains the perceived 
problem of the multiple addressees within the fragment itself. 
188 For references, see footnotes 11 and 172. Cf. Karsten (1838) p. 177, justifying reading DK 31 B 3.8 as an 
independent statement: “Etiam haec sententia nec cum praecedentibus nec cum sequentibus satis bene cohaeret. 
Nam quale illud est, quod uno velut tenore nunc modestia in philosophando et religio inculcator, nunc ad audendum 
impellitur, nunc sensuum fides redarguitur? Haec si non contraria, diversa tamen; ideo sejunxi, praesertim quum 
Sextus pari confusione alios quoque veterum locos perturbaverit, ut jam in Parmenid. Carm. princ. vidimus.” 
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quotation is bad. If it is unclear whether it is the Muse or disciple being addressed in lines DK 31 
B 3.6-8, I propose that this is because Empedocles intended it to be so. Why, after all, should we 
feel entitled to expect a clear transition? One gets the impression from various sources that 
Empedocles sometimes left it to his readers to determine for themselves the precise identity of 
certain figures mentioned in his verses. Diogenes Laertius informs us that the first two lines of 
DK 31 B 129 (“And there was someone among those, a man surpassingly witting, / who, indeed, 
acquired the farthest wealth of prapides”) were taken by some to refer to Pythagoras, by others 
to Parmenides.189 More famously, there was in antiquity (and there remains today) debate over 
which of the four Empedoclean elements is referred to by which of the divine names in the list of 
four “roots” (ῥιζώματα) in DK 31 B 6 (“For hear first the four roots of all things: / bright Zeus 
and life-bearing Hera, and Aidoneus / and Nestis, who wets with tears the mortal spring”).190 
Given this habit, the lack of a clear transitional passage from one addressee to another in DK 31 
B 3 does not seem sufficient reason to doubt the integrity of Sextus’ quotation.  
 In fact, a certain vagueness about the identity of the addressees appears to be one of 
several ways in which this fragment echoes elements of Parmenides’ proem. This will become 
189 Vitae VIII.54 (Long): Ἀκοῦσαι δ’ αὐτὸν [sc. Empedocles] Πυθαγόρου Τίμαιος διὰ τῆς ἐνάτης ἱστορεῖ … 
μεμνῆσθαι δὲ καὶ αὐτὸν Πυθαγόρου λέγοντα· 
 ἦν δέ τις ἐν κείνοισιν ἀνὴρ περιώσια εἰδώς, 
  ὃς δὴ μήκιστον πραπίδων ἐκτήσατο πλοῦτον. 
  οἱ δὲ τοῦτο εἰς Παρμενίδην αὐτὸν λέγειν ἀναφέροντα. 
The fragment is quoted in fuller form (six lines) by Porphyry (Vit. Pythag. 30) and Iamblichus (Vit. Pythag. 15), the 
latter remarking on the riddling character of the verses. For discussion, see van der Ben (1975) pp. 178-187. 
190 For a list of sources for the fragment and their doxographical affiliations as Diels saw them, see Diels (1901) p. 
108. For recent critical discussion of the doxography, see Osborne (1987) pp. 89-92, Kingsley (1994), and Mansfeld 
(1995b).  For summaries of, and contributions to, the debate over the allocation of the divine names to the elements, 
see Guthrie (1965) pp. 144-146, Wright (1981) pp. 22-30 and 165-166, and Kingsley (1995) pp. 14-68. The present 
chapter is not the place to make the detailed case for it, but DK 31 B 6 is one fragment where the lessons learned in 
the first chapter may be fruitfully applied to Empedocles’ text. As repetition is generally more tolerated in 
Empedocles than Parmenides, editors have been more apt to recognize similar but differently attested quotations as 
independent fragments (see, e.g., Wright (1981) pp. 184, 187 and Inwood (2001) p. 281). Nonetheless, a number of 
fragments may still remain hidden. In this case, the most telling source text is Clement, Strom. VI.17.4, where lines 
close or identical to DK 31 B 6.1, 17.18 and 21.9 are quoted as three consecutive verses and Empedocles is accused 
of plagiarizing his “roots” from the Pythagorean Athamas. 
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more evident as we reread the fragment, part by part, paying closer attention to Empedocles’ 
Greek. Here are the first five lines: 
  ἀλλὰ θεοὶ τῶν μὲν μανίην ἀποτρέψατε γλώσσης,  
      ἐκ δ’ ὁσίων στομάτων καθαρὴν ὀχετεύσατε πηγήν. 
      καὶ σέ, πολυμνήστη λευκώλενε παρθένε Μοῦσα, 
      ἄντομαι, ὧν θέμις ἐστὶν ἐφημερίοισιν ἀκούειν, 
     πέμπε παρ’ Εὐσεβίης ἐλάουσ’ εὐήνιον ἅρμα·191  
      
 Which we may read, in a slightly retouched version of Bett’s translation: 
   
  But gods, turn away the madness of these (people?) from (my?) tongue, 
  And from holy mouths make flow a pure stream.  
  And you, white-armed virgin Muse who remembers much, 
  I entreat: what it is right for creatures of a day to hear, 
  Send (to me), driving (your?) well-reined chariot from Piety’s place. 
  
In the first five lines there are already multiple addressees, since, before the Muse is singled out, 
unnamed plural gods are asked (or ordered) to avert the madness belonging to some also 
unidentified “these”. This transition does not seem to bother readers, since the Muse is a god, 
and the transition is marked well enough by “and you” (καὶ σέ) in line 3. The Muse is generally, 
with the help of DK 31 B 131, identified with confidence as Calliope, and different readers have 
more or less definite ideas about who the “they” of “their madness” might be,192 but it seems 
significant that, aside from Piety (if it is right to personify her), none of the personalities in the 
passage, not even the Muse, is actually named. The lines alone do not tell us which gods the 
speaker has in mind, who (or perhaps what things) the madness mentioned belongs to, or even, 
as my alterations to Bett’s translation are meant to highlight, just whose are the tongue and 
mouths in question. Indeed, it is not entirely plain from the passage that it is Empedocles 
191 This is Mutschmann’s text, which Bett is translating. 
192 Diels, with an eye on the remark introducing the fragment, thought Parmenides might be one of “those who 
profess to know more”. Burnet was confident in this identification (1930, p. 227: “No doubt he is thinking of 
Parmenides”), but Wright regards this as “unlikely” and thinks it “in keeping with the Presocratic tradition” to read 
Empedocles’ attack as “a general one on all who put forward rash and ill-considered opinions.” (1981, p. 158). 
Trépanier would disregard the introductory remark and understand the madness in question as blood sacrifice and 
cannibalism. (2004, p. 58) 
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(assuming that the narrative voice is Empedocles’) who is speaking these lines, and that they are 
not put in the mouth of another character.193 In the rest of the fragment, this studied under-
determination will continue, and this all seems rather similar to the state of things in Parmenides’ 
proem, where our unnamed narrator is borne through an obscure topography in an otherworldly 
chariot, led by vaguely identified maidens to an anonymous goddess. The use of the verb “send” 
(πέμπε) here also seems to recall Parmenides’ proem, where, we will remember, the reader had 
to supply the implied object for the verb at the beginning of line 2 and the end of line 8.194 The 
epithets given the Muse and the chariot, “much-remembering” (πολυμνήστη) and “well-reined” 
(εὐήνιον; note too εὐδόξοιο … τιμῆς in the following line), likewise call to mind the curious use 
of compounds beginning with poly- and eu- in Parmenides’ proem. The adjective πολυμνήστη is 
a special puzzle, for while it may mean “much-remembering” (the translation preferred by those 
who wish to divide the fragment), 195  “much-wooed” is another possibility, and one which 
obviously bears on how we read the next part of the fragment.  If our Muse has many suitors, it is 
not so implausible, as some have suggested, to read DK 31B 3.6-8, which carry on with the call 
for holy speech, as addressed to her: 
  μηδέ σέ γ’ εὐδόξοιο βιήσεται ἄνθεα τιμῆς 
      πρὸς θνατῶν ἀνελέσθαι ἐφ’ ᾧ θ’ ὁσίης πλέον εἰπεῖν 
      θάρσεϊ, καὶ τότε δὴ σοφίης ἐπ’ ἄκροισι θοάζειν.196 
193 Karsten, at least, thought that he detected not only multiple addressees but multiple speakers in this fragment, the 
poet addressing the Muse early on, the Muse addressing the poet in lines 6-7 (and 8-13?); see Karsten (1838) pp. 
176-177.  Other sources for the fragment, particularly Proclus (see in Tim. I, 351 Diehl), seem to regard Empedocles 
as the speaker, so the attribution is certainly not an unjustified one, but it is worth pointing out that the common 
assumptions that it is Empedocles speaking in DK 31 B 3, and that the final lines, apparently addressed to a disciple, 
are addressed to Pausanias, are in fact assumptions. Again, even if those assumptions are correct, we cannot be sure 
that, where these lines originally appeared in Empedocles’ poem, the identities of the poem’s narrator and dedicatee 
had already been made explicit. Diels’ placement of DK 31 B 1 (Παυσανίη, σὺ δὲ κλῦθι δαΐφρονος Ἀγχίτου υἱέ, 
“Pausanias, do yourself hearken, son of fiery-minded (?) Anchites”) at the head of the poem, and the insertion, by 
Wright, Inwood and Trépanier, of the line between the separated portions of B 3 in their arrangements, presume this, 
but Diogenes Laertius, who records the line at Vitae VIII.61, gives no indication of where it stood.  
194 See Wright (1981) p. 158 for different approaches to dealing with the verb in Empedocles’ fragment. 
195 So Karsten, Wright, Inwood, McKirahan, and Trépanier. 
196 Again, this is (with the addition of the comma after θάρσεϊ) Mutschmann’s text, which in these lines incorporates 
corrections from quotations of the fragment in sources other than Sextus. Clement provides ἐφ’ ᾧ θ’ ὁσίης for 
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In Bett’s translation (again, slightly retouched):  
   
  Nor will the blooms of well-reputed honor from mortals 
  Force you to take them up, on condition that you have the audacity to say 
  More than is holy, and then to sit upon (hasten to?) the heights of wisdom.197 
 
Without the italics or some such modification, the translation mutes the clear stress that 
Empedocles puts on the pronoun “you” (σέ γ’), which is placed early in the sentence and 
followed by the particle. This emphasis is a significant feature of these lines, calling attention at 
the outset to the person addressed. But just who is “you” here? We may read μηδέ σέ γ’ as 
transitional, like καὶ σέ in the third line, marking the speaker’s shift to another addressee, whom, 
in light of the remainder of the fragment, we might fairly describe as a disciple. In this case we 
do not really lack a transition; it simply happens that the speaker’s switch from what is requested 
of the Muse to what is demanded of the disciple is a bit abrupt. Just as easily, however, “you” 
may refer to the “much-wooed” Muse, the emphasis placed on the pronoun indicating the 
speaker’s conviction that she, surely, will not be swayed by merely mortal suitors, many though 
they be. The final clause, in either case, stresses the incompatibility of saying more than is holy 
and thereafter attaining (or returning to, perhaps, in the case of the Muse) the heights of wisdom. 
Either figure is a possible addressee and neither calls for supposing any break in Sextus’ text. If 
Sextus’ ἐφωθοείς, while θοάζειν is an emendation  (by Fabricius, according to Mutschmann’s apparatus; by G. 
Hermann, according to Diels’ and Wright’s) of the manuscripts’ θοάζει (also in Proclus, who has τάδε τοι rather 
than τότε δὴ earlier in the line) based on the infinitive in Plutarch’s partial quotation, σοφίας ἐπ’ ἄκροισι θαμίζειν. 
197 I modify Bett’s rendering here by italicizing the first “you” in the second of the three lines printed (which 
translates  σέ γ’ towards the beginning of Empedocles’ sentence) and “then” in the third, on both of which 
Empedocles places some stress, and by adding “to” before “sit” in order to better convey the syntax of the infinitive 
θοάζειν (the meaning  of which, as Trépanier points out (2004, pp. 64-65), is perhaps more plausibly translated 
“hurry” or “hasten” than “sit”). Trépanier, reading DK 31 B 3.8 as syntactically independent from the rest of the 
fragment, departs from Mutschmann’s text by reading θάρσει not as a dative (i.e., as θάρσεϊ) but as an imperative, 
by replacing Sextus’ τότε δὴ with Proclus’ τάδε τοι, and by emending θοάζει to θοάζε, read as another imperative, 
with the τάδε supplied from Proclus as its direct object. As to the meaning of  θοάζειν, I am inclined to follow 
Trépanier, but (since I am less inclined to make the other changes – taking θάρσει as dative and adding the ν to 
θοάζει seem unobjectionable, given that Proclus’ quotation, καὶ τάδε τοι σοφίης ἐπ’ ἄκροισι θοάζει, even if a 
doublet, supports a verse structure with a break after the first foot, and Plutarch’s quotation, even if  θαμίζειν has 
been substituted for θοάζειν, is some corroboration for an infinitive) I understand the verb as intransitive here.  
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this ambiguity is deliberate, the stress placed on the pronoun here and in line 3 (and cf. σὺ <δ’> 
οὖν in DK 31 B 2.8b), in addition to focusing attention on the addressee, also calls our attention 
to the fact that we are not quite sure who that is.  
 Trépanier, rightly noting the difficulty in deciding on an addressee for lines 6-8,198 and, 
more questionably, supposing that we are without a context to help guide us, looks to 
Parmenides to cast light on lines 6-7.199 The comparison is illuminating; all the more so, in fact, 
when we compare the texts without presupposing errors on Sextus’ part. Trépanier finds help in 
what he considers to be two passages of Parmenides’ poem. First, he points to the goddess’ 
words to the kouros at DK 28 B 7.3-5 (i.e., verses 32-34 of Parmenides’ proem as quoted by 
Sextus) as “[o]ne apparent inspiration” for DK 31 B 3.6-7. That the lines are related seems clear: 
“The opening words and the main verb are the same in both passages (the verb in Empedocles is 
a future indicative, an imperative in Parmenides) and in both passages we find a dependent 
infinitive clause in the following line. In terms of syntax, this seems undoubtedly to have been 
Empedocles’ model.”200 This parallelism might incline us to think that the addressee of DK 31 B 
3.6-7 is the disciple. But, Trépanier remarks, “a second Parmenidean passage, while further from 
B 3.6-8 in grammatical form, is closer to it in spirit.” That passage is DK 28 B 1.24-28, where 
the goddess, according to Trépanier,  
is at pains to assure Parmenides that his extraordinary voyage is not a transgression, a 
violation of divine prerogatives, for which he would be punished like the great criminals of 
myth, perhaps more specifically Phaethon, who stole the chariot of his father the Sun, and 
had to be killed by Zeus. She explains that it is right and just for him to be received by her. 
His access to her home, after all, through mighty aitherial gates, was won thanks to soft 
words and cunning persuasion (B 1.14-15), not stealth or violence.201 
198 See Trépanier (2004) pp. 59-65 (esp. pp. 60-61, with p. 214, n. 94). 
199 See Trépanier (2004) p. 61. The supposition that we have no context to help us stems from his suspicion of 
Sextus’ testimony and his consequent division of the fragment into multiple parts. 
200 Trépanier (2004) p. 61. 
201 Trépanier (2004) p. 62, where it is assumed that Parmenides is the kouros of his poem. I suspect that the situation 
in Parmenides’ proem is indeed meant to bring Phaethon (among other associations) to the mind of his audience, but 
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Given this “second” Parmenidean text, wherein the goddess reassures the kouros of the rightness 
of his journey, Trépanier suggests, “In Empedocles, if we posit that the addressee is the Muse, 
we can see that the passage amounts to an indirect formulation of the same assertion. 
Empedocles is saying: But you at least, μηδέ σέ γ’, the blooms of fair-seeming honor will not 
force you to take <them> up from mortals, and for that to say more than is holy.”202 That is, 
each passage indicates some form of divine sanction for the teaching to be given. This 
consideration seems to tip the balance in favor of reading the addressee as the Muse, and 
Trepanier arranges the lines accordingly.  
 Though I read the shared “spirit” of the passages somewhat differently than he does, 
Trépanier is entirely right, I think, to compare DK 31 B 3.6-7 with DK 28 B 1.24-28, and no less 
right that DK 28 B 7.3-5 served as the grammatical model for Empedocles’ lines. What is 
mistaken, if the argument of the earlier chapters is correct, is the assumption that these are two 
different passages of Parmenides. Once we disallow the misguided changes that Diels and Kranz 
have made to the proem, both the syntax and the spirit of Empedocles’ lines point to a single 
Parmenidean passage: lines 24-34 of Sextus’ quotation of the proem. That passage is perhaps not 
decisive for determining the addressee of the lines of Empedocles in question, but the parallels 
Trépanier points out are yet more evidence in favor of reading Sextus’ quotation as an intact 
presentation of Parmenides’ proem. 
I doubt that the contrast would be as stark as Trépanier suggests. Grouping Phaethon among the “great criminals of 
myth” (such as Tantalus and Sisyphus, I suppose) and suggesting that he “stole” the Sun’s chariot risk 
mischaracterizing the situation in the Phaethon myth. As for Parmenides’ kouros, the “soft words” and “cunning 
persuasion” which permit him access to the goddess, while not violence, may not be far from “stealth”. Cf. footnote 
75 above. 
202 Trépanier (2004) p. 62. Trépanier’s translation reflects his preference for taking ἐφ’ ᾧ θ’, rendered “and for that”, 
as expressing “the motivation of the verb εἰπεῖν, not as introducing a condition” (2004, p. 63).  In either case, the 
Muse will be refusing to say more than is holy in exchange for mortal honors. 
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 Indeed, when Empedocles’ verses are compared with the lines of the proem as Sextus 
preserves it, we can see that the parallelism extends even farther than Trépanier supposes. The 
grammatical parallelism, moreover, provides support for the reading of κρῖναι δὲ λόγῳ proposed 
in the preceding chapter as well as additional evidence for the integrity of Sextus’ quotation of 
DK 31 B 3.  Let us remind ourselves of Parmenides’ passage. Lines 24-35a of Sextus’ proem 
(incorporating the corrections from Diogenes Laertius) run as follows: 
  ὦ κοῦρ’ ἀθανάτοισι συνάορος ἡνιόχοισιν,  
  ἵπποις ταί σε φέρουσιν ἱκάνων ἡμέτερον δῶ,    25 
  χαῖρ’, ἐπεὶ οὔτι σε μοῖρα κακὴ προὔπεμπε νέεσθαι  
  τήνδ' ὁδόν (ἦ γὰρ ἀπ’ ἀνθρώπων ἐκτὸς πάτου ἐστίν),  
  ἀλλὰ θέμις τε δίκη τε. χρεὼ δέ σε πάντα πυθέσθαι  
  ἠμὲν Ἀληθείης εὐπειθέος ἀτρεμὲς ἦτορ  
  ἠδὲ βροτῶν δόξας, ταῖς οὐκ ἔνι πίστις ἀληθής.    30 
  ἀλλὰ σὺ τῆσδ’ ἀφ’ ὁδοῦ διζήσιος εἶργε νόημα,   
  μηδέ σ’ ἔθος πολύπειρον ὁδὸν κατὰ τήνδε βιάσθω  
  νωμᾶν ἄσκοπον ὄμμα καὶ ἠχήεσσαν ἀκουήν 
  καὶ γλῶσσαν, κρῖναι δὲ λόγῳ πολύδηριν ἔλεγχον  
  ἐξ ἐμέθεν ῥηθέντα.        35 
 
Trépanier, treating DK 31 B 3.6-7 in isolation from the other lines of the fragment as quoted by 
Sextus, and comparing them with lines of Parmenides which, following DK, he refers to as B 
7.3-5 (i.e., lines 32-34 of Sextus’ quotation), points out that the first line in each selection begins 
with the words μηδέ σ(ε) and has a form of βιάω as the main verb, which governs a dependent 
infinitive in the following verse. This is, to be sure, good evidence that Empedocles was 
imitating Parmenides’ verses. This parallelism is strengthened, however, when we show a little 
more confidence in Sextus’ testimony. If we refrain from separating DK 31 B 3.6-7 from the 
lines that precede them in Sextus, the earlier lines in each author can also be seen to correspond. 
The preceding lines of Parmenides’ proem provide reassurance, on the one hand, that the youth 
was sent on “this way” (far from the path of humans) by Dike and Themis (lines 26-28), and, on 
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the other hand, call on the youth to bar thought from another “this way”, now one of “mortals’ 
opinions” (lines 30-31). The preceding lines in Empedocles’ passage, in turn, offer the 
reassurance “you will learn” to the disciple who has stepped aside at the limits of mortal metis 
(DK 31 B 2.8b-9), and call for the gods to avert “their” (apparently mortals’) madness and to 
channel speech that is themis from holy mouths (DK 31 B 3.1-5). The spirit common to both 
passages is equal parts assurance and warning, neither of which is made in unambiguous 
tones.203 In each case, in an ostensible call for “pure” speech, the poet’s ambiguous language 
serves to highlight the limitations of mortal logos. 
 The lines that follow reinforce the parallelism even more. DK 31 B 3.8, provided that the 
fragment is left intact and we read Parmenides’ lines as suggested above, carries on the 
grammatical parallelism to which Trépanier draws our attention. I argued in the second chapter 
that, in Parmenides’ sentence, we would do better to read the particle δὲ of κρῖναι δὲ λόγῳ as 
connective, not adversative, and κρῖναι as a complementary infinitive with βιάσθω, like νωμᾶν in 
the preceding line. On the standard reading of DK 31 B 3.8, 204  that is just the way that 
Empedocles’ sentence is structured: 
  μηδέ σέ γ’ εὐδόξοιο βιήσεται ἄνθεα τιμῆς 
      πρὸς θνατῶν ἀνελέσθαι ἐφ’ ᾧ θ’ ὁσίης πλέον εἰπεῖν 
      θάρσεϊ, καὶ τότε δὴ σοφίης ἐπ’ ἄκροισι θοάζειν. 
 
Here, as in Parmenides, the line opening with μηδέ σ(ε) provides the main verb, βιήσεται 
(βιάσθω in Parmenides), which governs not only one complementary infinitive, ἀνελέσθαι 
(νωμᾶν in Parmenides), in the following verse, but also a second, θοάζειν (κρῖναι in Parmenides), 
linked by a connective, καὶ (δὲ in Parmenides), in the verse after that, which  is, moreover, a 
203 Note too how Empedocles’ emphasis on the second person pronoun, observed above,  recalls Parmenides’  
repetitions of the second person pronoun, interestingly paired, as pointed out in the first chapter, with instances of 
the phrase “(this) way” (see above, pages 44-45). As was just indicated, the referent of the latter phrase, like that of 
the pronoun in Empedocles’ fragment, seems to shift uncertainly over the course of the lines in which it appears. 
204 Trépanier, treating the line in isolation, construes it differently. See above, footnote 197. 
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verse marked by enjambment and an early line break after θάρσεϊ (cf. καὶ γλῶσσαν in 
Parmenides). Parmenides’ passage indeed “seems undoubtedly to have been Empedocles’ 
model”, and one Empedocles followed even more closely than Trépanier suggests. 
 Further (and perhaps the most obvious) echoes of the same Parmenidean verses are found 
in the remaining lines of Empedocles’ fragment. Despite the apparent change in addressee, the 
rest of the fragment wrings yet more out of the goddess’ words to the kouros, providing 
additional evidence that suspicion of Sextus’ quotation(s) is ill-founded. In Mutschmann’s 
edition, the lines that the Stoic source read as articulating the criterion of “correct” logos (DK 31 
B 3.9-13) are printed as follows: 
  ἀλλ’ ἄγ’ ἄθρει πάσῃ παλάμῃ, πῇ δῆλον ἕκαστον,  
      μήτε τιν’ ὄψιν ἔχων πίστει πλέον ἢ κατ’ ἀκουήν  
      ἢ ἀκοὴν ἐρίδουπον ὑπὲρ τρανώματα γλώσσης,  
      μήτε τι τῶν ἄλλων, ὁπόσῃ πόρος ἐστὶ νοῆσαι, 
      γυίων πίστιν ἔρυκε, νόει θ’ ᾗ δῆλον ἕκαστον.205 
 
Let us (departing rather more from Bett’s rendering this time) translate: 
 
205Establishing the text of these lines, not cited by other authors, is less troublesome than for the preceding lines 
(though actually construing the lines is a different matter, and editors have, as will be noted, sometimes made 
problems for themselves). In DK, the only difference from Mutschmann’s text is the unnecessary substitution, in the 
final line, of δ’ for the manuscripts’ θ’. This was an emendation by Karsten, who had placed a full stop after νοῆσαι 
at the end of the preceding verse. Diels (1901) prints θ’, noting Karsten’s suggestion. DK, de Vogel, Wright, KRS, 
Inwood, and Graham, though they do not follow Karsten’s punctuation, adopt the emendation without explaining the 
preference (only Wright among them recording the manuscript reading). One possible reason for the preference 
might be that Parmenides’ κρῖναι δὲ λόγῳ, understood as “but judge by reason”, looks like a parallel. As argued 
above, however, δὲ in Parmenides’ text is not adversative.  In Empedocles, where a contrast is being drawn, the 
contrast is achieved by the structure μήτε … μήτε … τέ (see Smyth § 2945), so the emendation to δέ is gratuitous. 
 A number of scholars prefer to read πιστὴν, as predicate adjective with ὄψιν, in place of πίστει in the second 
line quoted (i.e., DK 31 B 3.10), the dative use (meaning “in trust”, “for an assurance”) apparently being without 
parallel (Diels compares Iliad 2.30 for the construction, but the word πίστις itself does not appear there). I have no 
very strong opinion on the matter, but keep to the manuscript reading for two reasons (beyond the fact that it is the 
unanimous manuscript reading): (i) even if unparalleled, that does not mean that Empedocles, who is hardly aiming 
for everyday speech here, did not write it (the noun τρανώματα in the next line is also unique, and ὁπόσῃ in the 
following line is very rare); (ii) Empedocles does seem to be aiming for some special effect by repeating a number 
of words, πίστις among them. In keeping with the passage’s instructional aim of establishing a balance among the 
senses, a notable number of expressions in these lines come in pairs: πῇ δῆλον ἕκαστον (9), ᾗ δῆλον ἕκαστον (13); 
μήτε τιν’ (10), μήτε τι (12); πίστει (10), πίστιν (13); ἢ κατ’ ἀκουήν (10), ἢ ἀκοὴν (11); νοῆσαι (12), νόει (13). One 
may perhaps see here a skewed chiasmus in the Parmenidean style, with the phrase τρανώματα γλώσσης (on which, 
see below, with footnote 208) at the center. It would perhaps not be too jarring to substitute πιστὴν for πίστει in this 
pattern, but as the other pairings listed all match grammatically like items, the noun seems preferable. 
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  But come, observe with every palm in what way each thing (is) evident, 
  Neither holding any sight in assurance too much more than hearing,206 
  Or booming hearing above the piercing clarities of the tongue, 
  Nor check at all, insomuch as207 there is a passage for being aware,  
  The other limbs’ assurance, but be aware in which way each thing (is) evident.  
 
That Empedocles had Parmenides in mind in these lines is regularly recognized by commentators.  
The mention, in sequence, of sight, hearing, and the tongue is an obvious echo of the goddess’ 
criticism of the habitual use of the senses in Parmenides’ poem.208 Generally, however, it is 
206 On ἢ κατά w/ acc. in (dis)proportional comparisons (cf., e.g., Plato, Apology 20e1), see Smyth § 1079, and 
Cooper (1997) 49.4.0 and (2002) 2.49.4.0. The element that this adds to the comparison, of exceeding the bounds of 
what is proportional or commensurate, reflected above by the addition of “too much”, is regularly overlooked in 
translations of the line. Cf., e.g., Burnet (1930) p. 205 (“Hold not thy sight in greater credit as compared with thy 
hearing”); KR p. 325 (“neither holding sight in greater trust as compared with hearing”); Wheelwright (1960) p. 127 
(“trusting no more to sight than hearing”); Wright (1981) p. 160 (“without holding any seeing as more reliable 
compared with hearing”); Inwood (2001) p. 217 (“not holding any vision as more reliable than what you hear”); 
Graham (2010) p. 343 (“not holding any view more reliable than hearing”). 
207 Related to the sense of proportionality pointed out in the preceding footnote is, I think, Empedocles’ use of 
ὁπόσῃ, which seems not to have been fully understood. Early editors sought to do away with some of the 
awkwardness of the expression by emendation. Karsten suggested ὅππῃ, Stein ὁπόσων, i.e., “in whatever way” or 
“of however many [limbs] as”, respectively. Fairbanks, following Stein’s reading, translated “nor keep from trusting 
any of the other members in which there lies means of knowledge” (1898b, p. 161). Diels glossed ὁπόσῃ as quot viis, 
“by however many ways”, and this seems to have granted subsequent translators license to give the word the sense 
that Stein or Karsten wanted without feeling the need to emend the text. Thus Burnet has “do not withhold thy 
confidence in any of the other bodily parts by which there is an opening for understanding” (1930, p. 205); Bury, 
“Nor from the rest of the parts wherein are the channels of knowledge / Hold thou back thy trust” (1935, p. 69); 
Guthrie, “by whatever way there is a channel” (1965, p. 139); Wright, “by which there is a channel” (1981, p. 160), 
without remark on the word in her commentary; KRS, “by whatever way there is a channel” (p. 285); McKirahan, 
“whatever way there is a channel” (1994, p. 235); Inwood, “by which there is a passage” (2001, p. 219); Graham, 
“by which” (2010, p. 343); Lesher, in a grammatical note on the text, provides the gloss: “ὁπόσῃ: Rel. Adj., ‘by or in 
whatever way’” (1998, p. 46). In one way or another, these translations, like the emendations of  Karsten and Stein, 
either eliminate the quantitative character of the adjective or smooth over the fact that  ὁπόσῃ does not agree in 
number or gender with τῶν ἄλλων, if not both.  
 Though an understandable compromise of the sort involved in any translation, the loss of the quantitative 
element is particularly unfortunate, for here, as with the immediately preceding instruction not to put too much more 
assurance in any sight than in hearing, the notion of proportionality is important.  Empedocles (or whoever is 
speaking) is not quite, as is sometimes claimed, declaring that all the senses are equal and should be given equal 
standing, but that no single sense should be given a disproportionate authority over the others. I will touch upon the 
significance of this point in the next section. An overly explicit rendering of ὁπόσῃ, attentive to each of its 
component parts, would be “by (or in) howsoever much of a way”, for which “insomuch as” seems to serve as a 
readable alternative.  
208  What is less obvious to those who assume that the tongue, here or in Parmenides, is simply the organ of taste (or 
of speech alone, if there are such today) is that Empedocles preserves Parmenides’ ambiguous use of “tongue” to 
refer to both taste and speech. There was debate on this at one point (cf. Karsten (1838) p. 179: “τρανώματα 
γλώσσης Sturzius ad vocem et orationem refert; melius Schneiderus Lex. Gr. gustum intelligit”) and Fairbanks’ 
rendering of the phrase, “clear assertions of the tongue” (1898b, p. 161), might have been an attempt to retain the 
ambiguity. If so, it does not seem to have been particularly influential, and in the wake of a brief note in favor of 
taste by Burnet (1892, p. 219, n. 34: “The sense of taste, not speech. So already Karsten, after Schneider, Lex. Gr.”; 
made briefer still by the deletion of the second sentence in later editions) the notion that Empedocles might be 
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neither believed that that criticism takes place in the proem, nor that it might be something short 
of a wholesale denunciation of the senses. Consequently, Empedocles’ lines are typically 
understood as a departure from Parmenides’ supposed rejection of the senses. For instance, while 
observing that, elsewhere, most of Empedocles’ “deliberate echoes of Parmenides … are used to 
emphasize points of agreement”, Guthrie understood the echoes in DK 31 B 3 as highlighting a 
marked contradiction: “Parmenides’s outright condemnation of the senses is countered by the 
claim that all alike are aids to knowledge and none is to be preferred.”209 Alternatively, however, 
just as we need not follow the Stoic source in understanding Parmenides as rejecting the senses 
wholesale, neither need we follow the Stoic source’s modern counterparts in reading 
Empedocles’ lines as making a radical break from Parmenides. As we have seen earlier, the 
warning of Parmenides’ goddess is more specific than is often appreciated: it is the aimless eye, 
and the echoing ear and tongue that are problematic. Rather than contradicting Parmenides, 
referring to speech seems largely to have been forgotten. Some have even translated τρανώματα as though it means 
“tastes” (see, e.g., Leonard (1908) p. 17: “tasting tongue”; Wheelwright (1960) p. 127: “tongue’s taste”). Typically, 
the phrase is explained (if at all) as a reference to taste without the question of speech being raised (cf. e.g., Freeman 
(1948) p. 52; de Vogel (1963) p. 53; Lesher (1998) p. 46).  
 Bett’s translation of τρανώματα, “things made plain”, like that of many others, follows the sense of the LSJ 
entry for τράνωμα (“that which is made clear”), but Wright (1981, pp.160-162), connecting the word with the verb 
τετραίνω ‘bore, pierce’ (which appears in DK 31 B 84.9 and 100.3,  two famous similes illustrating the action of the 
pores involved in vision and respiration, respectively) rather than the later τρανόω ‘make clear’, suggests 
“piercings”, taking the word as an expression for the pores of the tongue. A number of translators since have taken 
up the suggestion. Thus, in place of “the clear evidence of thy tongue” in KR (p. 325), KRS has “the passages of the 
tongue” (p. 285); Johnstone glosses, “ὁπόσῃ: “piercings of the tongue”, i.e., taste.” (1985, p. 17); Waterfield 
translates “pores of the tongue” (2000, p. 143); Kingsley, “the sharp tastes on your tongue” (2003, p. 507).  Wright’s 
observation seems a valuable one, but it does not, I think, preclude the possibility that Empedocles wrote τρανώματα 
precisely because it conjured up associations of both clarity and porosity.  My translation, “piercing clarities of the 
tongue”, is intended to be suitable both for tastes made clear to us by way of the pores of our tongues and linguistic 
utterances which manage clear expression of penetrating insights. Lombardo’s “the probes of your tongue” 
(Lombardo (1982) p. 32) is perhaps another attempt to capture Empedocles’ rich ambiguity. 
209 Guthrie (1965) pp. 138-139. For comparable contrasts, see Burnet (1930) p. 227 (“we must not, like Parmenides, 
reject the assistance of the senses”); KR p. 325 (under the section title “Empedocles’ Defense of the Senses”); 
Wright (1981) p. 162 (“picking up on the Eleatic distinction between perception and reason (cf. Parmenides frs. 7.4-
5 and 6.6-7) and contradicting it”); KRS pp. 284-285 (“he promises that an intelligent use of all the sensory evidence 
available to mortals, aided by his own instruction, will (contrary to Parmenides’ claims) make each thing clear to 
us”); McKirahan (1994) p. 269; Lesher (1998) p. 46 (“Empedocles’ choice of words here would have reminded his 
audience of Parmenides’ indictment of the sensory faculties in his Fr. 7, and alerted them to the fact that this was his 
response to it”); Trépanier (2004) p. 72 (“[DK 31 B 3.9-13] amplify a similar statement at DK 2.7-8, and the intent 
in both is quite likely a polemical response to Parmenides’ choice of nous to the exclusion of the senses”; cf. too p. 
56). 
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Empedocles may simply be elaborating on the same point. We shall pursue this question further 
shortly. Before doing so, however, it is worth stressing once again that, regardless of whether 
Empedocles is refuting or reaffirming Parmenides’ point, it should be clear by now that DK 31 B 
3, both piece by piece and  as a whole, is modeled on the closing lines of Parmenides’ proem as 
faithfully preserved by Sextus. Though we may be unsure at times about the identity of the 
addressee(s), the extensive parallelism with Parmenides’ lines provides strong reasons to resist 
any temptation we may feel to divide the fragment. Indeed, on my reading, even the uncertainty 
about the addressee(s), far from being evidence of Sextus’ unreliability, is an indication of 
Empedocles’ attentive imitation of Parmenides. 
 
The Orthos Logos Interpretation and the Unity of DK 31 B 2 and 3 
Assuming that Sextus’ quotation of the thirteen lines of DK 31 B 3 is reasonably reliable, do they 
say what the Stoic source claims they do? The various Stoic interpretations of the Presocratics, 
assigning each thinker a position in the Hellenistic debate over the criterion of truth, obviously 
involve some anachronistic categorizing, but that does not necessarily make them invalid. 
Nevertheless, I have suggested that in the case of Parmenides, the attempt (shared by many of 
Parmenides’ readers today) to read κρῖναι δὲ λόγῳ as a declaration of commitment to an 
epistemonic criterion not only involves the use of labels which Parmenides would not have 
recognized, but, by reading into logos a sense it would not have borne in Parmenides’ time and 
by ignoring or suppressing elements of the passage where that declaration is supposedly found, 
does indeed get the central point that Parmenides is making wrong, and is therefore a serious 
interpretative error. What about the orthos logos view of Empedocles?  
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 To answer this question in a satisfactory manner would lead us far afield from our central 
concern with Parmenides, so I will not really attempt that here. Even if we cannot answer it 
satisfactorily, however, this is a question worth posing, for we are immediately confronted with 
the task of explaining what it would mean to say that Empedocles made orthos logos a criterion 
of truth. This is a more difficult task than explaining how a doxastic or an epistemonic logos is a 
criterion, for these seem to be familiar technical terms in Hellenistic epistemology, as well as 
direct descendants of earlier efforts to articulate something of the nature of knowledge.210 Orthos 
logos or “right reason”, by contrast, seems to belong rather to Stoic and earlier ethical 
discussions.211  Whether or how those discussions are related to the present one I will not venture 
to say here, where I shall concentrate simply on how Sextus presents the matter. 
  With Xenophanes and Parmenides, the attribution of a doxastic and an epistemonic logos 
respectively had some (if on inspection dubious) grounding in the texts given along with the 
Stoic source’s interpretations. Xenophanes’ declaration that to saphes was beyond men’s grasp, 
“but dokos has been fashioned for all,” provided something of a textual basis for portraying him 
as an advocate for a doxastic logos. Parmenides’ proem, meanwhile, when edited to suit the point, 
could offer what looked like a commandment to steer clear of doxai and the senses and to “judge 
by logos” (which, granted a standard doxa/episteme dichotomy, is easily understood as an 
epistemonic logos) instead. When we come to Empedocles’ text, is there something distinctively 
“correct” about the logos he supposedly champions?  
210 See, e.g., the selections in LS and Alcinous’ Didaskalikos mentioned above (in footnote 87). Cf also Ptolemy, On 
the Criterion, in Huby and Neal (1989). 
211 The phrase orthos logos occurs in Plato (e.g., Phaedo 73a10 and 94a1), becoming more of a technical term in 
ethics with Aristotle (cf. Nichomachean Ethics II.2 1103b32 and VI.13 1144b26-28). For the phrase in discussions 
of Stoic ethics, see LS 59M, 61G, and 63C; on the question of orthos logos as a criterion in the Stoa in particular, 
see Kidd (1989). 
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 The signs of adopting orthos logos as a criterion are supposed to be found in DK 31 B 3. 
After the two portions of DK 31 B 2 have been quoted as evidence of the fallibility of the senses, 
on the one hand, and a promise, on the other hand, that the disciple will nevertheless learn 
(something; just what is to be learned is perhaps unclear), we read (in our evolving version of 
Bett’s rendering): 
 And in the next lines, after criticizing those who profess to know more, he establishes that 
what is grasped through each sense is trustworthy [piston] when reason [logos] is in charge 
of them, despite earlier running down the assurance [pistis] gained from them. For he says 
  
  But gods, turn away their madness from (my?) tongue, 
  And from holy mouths make flow a pure stream.  
  And you, white-armed virgin Muse who remembers much and is wooed by many, 
  I entreat: what it is right for creatures of a day to hear, 
[B 3.5]  Send (to me?), driving a well-reined chariot from Piety’s place. 
  Nor will the blooms of well-reputed honor from mortals 
  Force you to take them up, on condition that you say more than is holy 
  In boldness, and then to hasten to the heights of wisdom.     
  But come, observe with every palm in what way each thing is evident, 
[B 3.10] Neither holding any sight in assurance too much more than hearing, 
  Or booming hearing above the piercing clarities of the tongue, 
  Nor check at all, insomuch as there is a passage for being aware,  
  The other limbs’ assurance, but be aware in which way each thing is evident. 
 
Compared to the treatments of Xenophanes and Parmenides, where there was an effort to 
connect “doxastic” with dokos and to explain the relation of Parmenides’ logos to episteme, it is 
notable that orthos does not feature in Empedocles’ verses themselves or in the remarks 
preceding them. Also notable is the absence of logos in Empedocles’ lines, although this ought 
not surprise us, given that logos elsewhere in Empedocles, as in Parmenides (and Xenophanes), 
principally means “speech” or “(spoken) account”.212 Of course, something must have suggested 
the notion of an orthos logos to the Stoic interpreter. What was it?  
212 Cf. DK 31 B 4.3, 17.26, 35.2 (twice), 131.4. In Xenophanes, see DK 21 B 1.14 and 7.1. 
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 As I indicated in the last section just before our first rereading of them, the relevant 
material seems to be in lines 9-13.213 The most obvious lexical connection between the Stoic 
paraphrase and Empedocles’ verses is pistis, “assurance” or “trust”. Perhaps, then, an orthos 
logos is one which is trustworthy or produces trustworthy evidence through some kind of control 
over the senses. But this is not really to say anything more than that it is a criterion of truth. 
Empedocles’ verses warn against trusting too much in one sense over another or rejecting the 
assurance of any sense that might prove helpful, but they do not, as the Stoic paraphrase might 
lead us to expect, appear to describe how it is that reason is supposed to control the senses. That 
is, Empedocles seems to be speaking more about misuse of the senses than he is “establishing” 
their trustworthiness when reason is in charge of them. Focusing on pistis, then, does not reveal 
very much.  
 Another possibility is that the Stoic source read the final clause of the fragment, “but be 
aware (νόει) in which way each thing is evident” as a parallel to the way he (mis)read 
Parmenides’ statement to mean “but judge by reason”. To the ears of a Hellenistic philosopher, 
“be aware” would perhaps seem a weak translation of νόει, and Bett’s “think”,214 suggesting the 
intellectual more than the perceptual aspects of nous, might represent well how Sextus’ 
contemporaries would have read Empedocles’ lines. The claim, related earlier in Sextus’ work, 
that Anaxagoras made a criterion of “logos generally”, is very likely related to the central role of 
213 See above, pages 103-104. As already mentioned (see page 94 above, with footnote 185), Trépanier had noted 
that “B 3 itself is only in part concerned with that question [i.e., of the criterion], namely B 3.9-13, and it is difficult 
to see how B 3.1-8 bear on it” (2004, p. 56), considering this as evidence against the integrity of the fragment. While 
I agree that it is lines 9-13 that the interpreter has in view, lines 1-8 are perhaps not so out of place in a discussion of 
the criterion as “correct logos”, given that they may be said to be concerned with correct logos in that they call for 
pure and holy speech. 
214 KR and Barnes also translate “think”, and “understand”, used by Wright, Inwood, McKirahan, and Graham, 
seems equivalent. Earlier translators seem to have favored renderings that preserved something of the perceptual 
dimension as well (“know each thing”, Fairbanks; “Note each thing”, Leonard; “Consider” Burnet; “Use whatever 
way of perception makes each thing clear”, Freeman); “grasp” in Guthrie (and KRS) runs counter to the trend in 
later translations towards the more exclusively cognitive.   
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nous (Mind or Reason with a capital letter) in his system,215 so perhaps νόει here suggested to 
the Stoic the “correct” exercise of logos in the sense of “rational faculty”. However, in these 
lines νόει seems to retain something of the perceptual and intuitive as well as the mental 
character of the early uses of the verb. If a defense of the less “rationalized” rendering “be 
aware” is needed, it can be pointed out that, according to both Aristotle and Theophrastus,216 
Empedocles did not distinguish sharply between sensing and thinking. At any rate, the 
distinction being drawn in DK 31 B 2 and 3 seems rather to be one between mortal and immortal 
modes of awareness or consciousness (whether thinking or sensing).217 
 Perhaps it is wisest to admit that presenting Empedocles as committed to a criterion of 
orthos logos probably entails making some questionable interpretative leaps in any event, and 
one therefore ought not to spend too much effort inspecting the reasoning in what may ultimately 
be not only a biased interpretation but a hopelessly confused one. Nonetheless, there is, I think, 
an overlooked possibility for what orthos logos might mean in this case, namely, “correct 
proportion”. Rather than looking to pistis or νόει, I submit that a proper understanding of the 
Stoic claim lies with the expressions that I noted earlier, πλέον ἢ κατά and ὁπόσῃ.218  There is a 
precision to Empedocles’ statements here that easily escapes notice. Trépanier again expresses 
clearly what seems to be a common assumption when he writes of DK 31 B 3.9-13, “Empedocles 
specifies that the disciple must not exclude any one means, but must trust them all equally.”219 
215 See adv. Math. VII. 90-91 and cf. footnote 177 above. For Anaxagoras’ description of nous, see esp. DK 59 B 12. 
In its only appearance in the B fragments of Anaxagoras, logos is again used for “speech”. See DK 59 B 7, where 
logos replaces epos in the epic phrase “in word and deed”.  
216 Cf. Aristotle, de Anima III.3 427a21-29 with Theophrastus, de Sensibus 10 (and see footnote 161 for related 
texts). 
217 Note in particular that in DK 31 B 2.7-8 the vision, hearing and noos of men are all incapable of grasping “these 
things”: οὕτως οὔτ’ ἐπιδερκτὰ τάδ’ ἀνδράσιν οὔτ’ ἐπακουστά / οὔτε νόῳ περιληπτά. 
218 See footnotes 206 and 207. 
219 Trépanier (2004) p. 72.  Cf. the remark of Guthrie quoted above (with footnote 209) and see footnote 206 for 
translations of DK 31 B 3.10 in line with the idea of a general equality of the senses. Cf. too Lesher, who, though 
noting that ἢ κατά w/ acc. following a comparative “denotes either too high or too low a degree” (his reference to 
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This is perhaps an improvement over Guthrie’s statement that Empedocles countered Parmenides 
with “the claim that all alike are aids to knowledge and none is to be preferred” (it is, at any rate, 
closer to what Empedocles said to say that we must not exclude any one means than to say that 
none is to be preferred), but it still does not, I think, quite capture what Empedocles is saying. 
The phrases πλέον ἢ κατ’ ἀκουήν and ὁπόσῃ πόρος ἐστὶ νοῆσαι add important qualifications to 
Empedocles’ apparently democratic attitude towards the senses. The senses are not all created 
equal, nor are we (in these lines, at least) forbidden to prefer one over another. What is wrong is 
to put a disproportionate trust in sight over hearing, or to ignore the assurance of any of the other 
“limbs” wherever (and insomuch as) it supplies a passageway for understanding. That is, the 
means to whatever kind of awareness or thinking Empedocles is promoting might come from any 
of the senses, and all of them, it seems, may be required to attain it fully. At least, every “palm” 
is to be used to observe in what way each thing becomes clear, and each “palm” or sense is to be 
given its due. From DK 31 B 2, it seems that the common mortal condition is one in which our 
“palms” are “straitened” and many worthless things serve to blunt our “cares” or 
“meditations”. 220 This may well mean that some senses (the less straitened ones) are to be 
preferred over others. What is needed, Empedocles appears to be claiming, is a proper sense of 
“Smyth § 1078” involves a misprint; the correct section number is 1079), goes on to write, “Sight would naturally be 
considered the most trustworthy form of sense perception, but Empedocles urges that we not place a greater degree 
of trust in sight than in hearing, perhaps because he wants his own (spoken) message to the world to be accorded a 
high degree of credibility.” (1998, p. 46) Putting aside the supposed naturalness of sight being considered the most 
trustworthy of the senses and the speculation about Empedocles’ motives (which involves a questionable chain of 
equivalences connecting the comprehension of Empedocles’ (in fact written) message with the sense of hearing), the 
clause “Empedocles urges that we not place a greater degree of trust in sight than in hearing” eliminates the element 
of proportionality from the statement and reverts to a direct comparison. Whether sight is naturally the most 
trustworthy sense or not, the construction does imply some standard proportion of trustworthiness in sight compared 
to hearing, but what Empedocles urges is not to put more trust in sight than it deserves. It is conceivable that 
Empedocles believes that the standard proportion should be one of equality, but he is not quite saying that here. The 
audience is being urged not to grant sight so much more trust that they miss out on what hearing has to offer. They 
are not (as it appears Lesher reads it) to accord hearing a greater degree of credibility than is natural. 
220 This is Wright’s translation of merimnas in DK 31 B 2.2; Inwood follows Wright; Burnet had translated “careful 
thoughts”; McKirahan and Graham, like Bett, translate “thoughts”; Kingsley, “cares”. Merimnai also appear at DK 
31 B 11.1 and 110.7. 
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how much trust to place in a given sense in a given situation, which is to say, a sense of what is 
proportionate. Empedocles is not, alas, particularly forthcoming on what the proper proportion is, 
but this is, presumably, only the beginning of the work.  
It was, I suggest, with attention to Empedocles’ expressions of proportionality that the 
Stoic source identified his criterion as an orthos logos, where logos is best understood in the 
sense of “ratio” or “proportion”. Whatever value this identification may or may not have within 
the boundaries of the Hellenistic debates about the criterion of truth, the connection of 
Empedocles with orthos logos thus understood, i.e., as “correct proportion”, highlights a 
significant though perhaps underappreciated feature of Empedocles’ writing and thought. It has 
become increasingly apparent that Empedocles’ warnings about the limitations of mortal 
awareness (in speech as well as sensation) closely follow those of Parmenides’ goddess. She, we 
have observed, tells the kouros not to misapply his eye, ear and tongue in the coming encounter 
with Truth, but offers little positive guidance on just how, exactly, he ought to see, hear and 
speak of what is to be revealed. Empedocles’ lines do much the same, but they offer a hint more 
of what is required. It may be something of an overstatement to say that lines 9-13 “consist of a 
set of positive instructions to the disciple on how to maximize the openness to the teachings that 
will follow,”221 since Empedocles’ lines, like the goddess’ words to the kouros, are dominated by 
prohibitions, while what is positive in them (“observe in what way each thing is evident”, “be 
aware in which way each thing is evident”) is rather cryptically put. Nonetheless, those 
prohibitions, expressed (though subtly) in terms of proportionality, are marked with a 
distinctively Empedoclean stamp, for throughout what remains of Empedocles’ poem(s) today, 
we find him repeatedly engaged in one form or another of overtly analogical thinking. Time and 
again, the lessons that Empedocles teaches employ novel and instructive analogies, often drawn 
221 Trépanier (2004) p. 72, italics added. 
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between items that few, it seems, were in the habit of comparing before Empedocles’ influence 
began to be felt. The range of forms such analogies take is vast. There are “chemical” 
descriptions of the composition of bone, blood and flesh in terms of numerical ratios of the four 
elements (see DK 31 B 96 and 98); there are elaborate similes drawn from different spheres of 
human craft used to illustrate the workings of various bodily processes (e.g., DK 31 B 100, using 
the clepsydra to illustrate respiration, and DK 31 B 84, using a lantern’s structure to describe the 
eye; cf. DK 31 B 23); there are biological correspondences made between one domain of nature 
and another (e.g., DK 31 B 79, where olive trees are spoken of as “egg-laying”, and DK 31 B 82, 
where  the equivalence of hair, feathers, the scales of fish and the leaves of trees may provide 
Aristotle his paradigm example of analogical sameness);222 and there are remarkable metaphors 
(e.g., DK 31 B 55: “earth’s sweat, sea”), a number of which  (DK 31 B 138, 143 and 152) 
Aristotle used to explain the analogical structure of metaphor in his Poetics, despite his seeming 
ambivalence about the value of Empedocles’ verse.223 The common element in all of these is an 
uncommon capacity for seeing likenessnesses in apparently unrelated forms. This ability is 
perhaps the kernel of all real learning, and is certainly not unique to Empedocles, but it seems to 
receive a special emphasis in his writing and to be exploited as a tool for uncovering hidden 
features of nature in a more conscious manner than we find in many other authors.  
 To return to the passage at hand, however, and the obscure command to “observe, with 
every palm, in what way each thing is evident”, let us take a closer look at the lines we have 
222 See de Partibus Animalium I.4 644a16-22 and Historia Animalium I .1 486b17-21. Aristotle’s standard example 
of analogical sameness is feather : bird :: scale : fish; he does not follow Empedocles in extending the comparison to 
the leaves of trees.  
223 See Poetics 21 1457b6-33. Although Aristotle reserves the name “analogical” for a particular variety of metaphor, 
his general classification reveals the analogical structure of all metaphor. Earlier in the Poetics, Aristotle appears 
dismissive of Empedocles’ poetic gifts, claiming that Empedocles and Homer “have nothing in common but the 
meter” and that the former is more rightly called a physiologos than a poet (1447b16-20). On this Lombardo remarks, 
“Aristotle is quibbling, dissembling, or both. In a less celebrated passage (On Poets, fr.70) he gives credit to 
Empedocles’ sense of metaphor, powerful phrasing, and poetic technique in general.” (1982, p. 23) 
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largely neglected thus far. Despite the various attempts to segment and/or separate them, DK 31 
B 2 is a natural companion to B 3. Trépanier’s characterization of the positive instructions of 3.9-
13 as concerned with maximizing “openness” to the teachings ahead picks up on Empedocles’ 
bold description of mortal awareness in the opening lines of B 2: “For straitened palms have 
been poured over their limbs, / But many the wretched things that crash in and blunt merimnas.” 
(στεινωποὶ μὲν γὰρ παλάμαι κατὰ γυῖα κέχυνται, / πολλὰ δὲ δείλ’ ἔμπαια, τά τ’ ἀμβλύνουσι 
μερίμνας.) Whatever merimnai are precisely, we presumably do not want them blunted by many 
wretched things, and proper attention to the lesson, it seems, will involve an opening of the 
normally narrowed “palms”.  The rest of the fragment also contains other connections to DK 31 
B 3. Lines 3-8a of DK 31 B 2 appear as follows in Sextus:      
    παῦρον δὲ ζωῆσι βίου μέρος ἀθρήσαντες   [B 2.3]    
      ὠκύμοροι καπνοῖο δίκην ἀρθέντες ἀπέπταν     
     αὐτὸ μόνον πεισθέντες, ὅτῳ προσέκυρσεν ἕκαστος  [B 2.5]  
      πάντοσ’ ἐλαυνόμενοι, τὸ δ’ ὅλον <πᾶς> εὔχεται εὑρεῖν.   
      οὕτως οὔτ’ ἐπιδερκτὰ τάδ’ ἀνδράσιν οὔτ’ ἐπακουστά 
     οὔτε νόῳ περιληπτά.224       [B 2.8a] 
 
These lines are soon capped by: 
 
    σὺ <δ’> οὖν ἐπεὶ ὧδ’ ἐλιάσθης,   [B 2.8b] 
      πεύσεαι, οὐ πλεῖόν γε βροτείη μῆτις ὄρωρεν.225   [B 2.9] 
224 In line 3, Mutschman prints ζωῆς ἰδίου, a conjecture of Diels for the manuscript reading printed above. The 
supplement <πᾶς> is Bergk’s, where some emendation is needed to fix the meter. Stein’s proposal <μὰψ> (not 
reported in Mutschmann’s apparatus) is favored by Kingsley (2002, pp. 360-361, n. 62), as yielding “the same basic 
sense although with a finer nuance” and “neatly anticipat[ing] ματαίως in B39.2”. Kingsley devotes a section (§ 7, 
pp. 360-369) of his article to DK 31 B 2, discussing the sense in the imagery of “palms” being “poured over” limbs, 
defending the manuscript reading in line 3 and explaining it as an expression of the doctrine of reincarnation, 
comparing the description of human boasting while being “driven” in all directions to a similar one in the Kaṭha 
Upaniṣad, and  relating the uses of  στεινωπός, προσκυρεῖν, and ἐλαύνειν, which echo language from the chariot 
race of Iliad 23, to the use of μῆτις in the final line of the fragment, which Kingsley sees as the key to a proper 
understanding of Empedocles’ poem. 
225 Bett notes (2005, p. 27, n. 53) that he translates the manuscript reading πλεῖόν γε rather than the emendation 
πλέον ἠὲ, printed by Mutschmann. Wright, giving the manuscript reading in cruxes, and translating “But you, since 
you have come aside to this place, will learn within the reach of human understanding”, takes this as an expression 
of modesty: Empedocles’ disciple will learn whatever it is possible for humans to learn (see Wright (1981) pp. 93-94 
and 155-157). Kingsley, also preferring the manuscript reading, understands  “no more” to refer not to learning, but 
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Once more, Bett’s translation (again, modified):226 
 Observing in their lives (ζωῆσι) a small part of life (βίου)  
 Lifted up like smoke they fly off to a swift fate 
5 Persuaded only of that which each has bumped into 
 While being driven in all directions, but everyone boasts that he has found  
  the whole. 
  Not thus are these things to be seen by men nor to be heard  
  Nor to be grasped by the awareness. But you, since you have strayed hither,  
  Will learn; mortal cunning manages no more.  
 
In addition to the “palms” that feature in each fragment, the “each thing” repeated in the phrases 
that end lines 9 and 13 of DK 31 B 3 is anticipated with ἕκαστος in B 2.5, while the chariot 
“driven” from Piety’s place at DK 31 B 3.5 is foreshadowed by the description of mortals as 
“driven in all directions” in DK 31 B 2.6. The verb for the meager “observing” that those mortals 
do in B 2.3 is the same as that with which the disciple is told to use every palm in 3.9. That 
disciple is first singled out (but not named) with the nominative pronoun σὺ (you) in DK 31 B 
2.8, which, whatever it is that the stepping aside means and the learning will amount to, matches 
the stress on the second person pronouns in B 3. Even the “no more” in DK 31 B 2.9, whose 
reference may well puzzle us, has a match in the Muse or the disciple not saying more than is 
holy in DK 31 B 3.7. 
 I do not have an interpretation to offer that clarifies everything in these lines, but the 
correlations just mentioned can be pushed further to provide a more secure sense about the 
relation of these two fragments. Let us recall that Sextus moved from quoting the final line and a 
half of DK 31 B 2 to quoting the whole of DK 31 B 3 by saying, “And in the next lines, having 
to the stepping aside expressed in ἐπεὶ ὧδ’ ἐλιάσθης; that is, the most that mortal cunning can manage is to lead a 
human being to “step aside” from the chaos of the mortal sphere and to place him- or herself before a divine teacher 
(see Kingsley (2002) pp. 365-368). 
226 Many of the modifications are in the direction of Kingsley’s sensitive reading of the text in the discussion 
referred to in the preceding footnotes. The reading and interpretation presented there are taken up and elaborated on 
in Kingsley (2003), pp. 326-341 focusing on DK 31 B 2 in particular. 
116 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
  
criticized those who profess to know more, he establishes that […].”227 As already noted, various 
scholars have taken the reference to “those who profess to know more” in various ways, and 
different arrangements have placed different portions of text between DK 31 B 2 and 3 (or their 
parts) depending upon what form the criticism of those people is imagined to have taken.228 I 
suggest a simpler solution. I propose that Sextus’ reference to “those who profess to know more” 
is to those in DK 31 B 2 who, while “observing a small part of life”, boast of having “found the 
whole”. When Sextus says “in the next lines” he means precisely that, and we need imagine no 
break between DK 31 B 2 and 3. Not only is each fragment quoted as an intact whole, but the 
two together form a continous passage. We are not missing anything between them. 
 How can we can be sure about this? Apart from appealing to Sextus’ general reliability 
(which I hope to have gone some way  toward rehabilitating), some sense of security comes from 
a careful look at the passage when printed as a continuous run of text, paying attention to the 
repetitions that our comparision of the two fragments has brought out. Behold: 
 
 1 στεινωποὶ μὲν γὰρ παλάμαι κατὰ γυῖα κέχυνται,   DK 31 B 2.1 
      πολλὰ δὲ δείλ’ ἔμπαια, τά τ’ ἀμβλύνουσι μερίμνας.      
      παῦρον δὲ ζωῆσι βίου μέρος ἀθρήσαντες    
      ὠκύμοροι καπνοῖο δίκην ἀρθέντες ἀπέπταν     
    5 αὐτὸ μόνον πεισθέντες, ὅτῳ προσέκυρσεν ἕκαστος  B 2.5 
      πάντοσ’ ἐλαυνόμενοι, τὸ δ’ ὅλον <πᾶς> εὔχεται εὑρεῖν.   
      οὕτως οὔτ’ ἐπιδερκτὰ τάδ’ ἀνδράσιν οὔτ’ ἐπακουστά 
      οὔτε νόῳ περιληπτά. σὺ <δ’> οὖν ἐπεὶ ὧδ’ ἐλιάσθης, 
      πεύσεαι, οὐ πλεῖόν γε βροτείη μῆτις ὄρωρεν.    B 2.9 
 10 ἀλλὰ θεοὶ τῶν μὲν μανίην ἀποτρέψατε γλώσσης ,   B 3.1 
      ἐκ δ’ ὁσίων στομάτων καθαρὴν ὀχετεύσατε πηγήν. 
      καὶ σέ, πολυμνήστη λευκώλενε παρθένε Μοῦσα, 
      ἄντομαι, ὧν θέμις ἐστὶν ἐφημερίοισιν ἀκούειν, 
227 καὶ διὰ τῶν ἑξῆς ἐπιπλήξας τοῖς πλέον ἐπαγγελλομένοις γιγνώσκειν παρίστησιν, ὅτι […]. I have tweaked Bett’s 
translation once more by altering the translation of ἐπιπλήξας from “after criticizing” to “having criticized”. 
228 Diels (1901) placed DK 31 B 5 between the two fragments; Wright places DK 31 B 131 and 1 between portions 
of DK 31B 3; Inwood follows Wright in this and adds DK 31 B 115 and 6 between 131 and 1; Trépanier’s proposed 
arrangement would have DK 31 B 3.1-5, B 131, B 3.6-8, B 1, B 2.8-9, B 2.1-7, followed by DK 31 B 111, 110, 11, 
15, 4, 12, 13, and 14, all before 3.9-13.   
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     πέμπε παρ’ Εὐσεβίης ἐλάουσ’ εὐήνιον ἅρμα·    B.3.5 
    15 μηδέ σέ γ’ εὐδόξοιο βιήσεται ἄνθεα τιμῆς 
      πρὸς θνατῶν ἀνελέσθαι ἐφ’ ᾧ θ’ ὁσίης πλέον εἰπεῖν 
      θάρσεϊ, καὶ τότε δὴ σοφίης ἐπ’ ἄκροισι θοάζειν. 
     18a ἀλλ’ ἄγ’ ἄθρει πάσῃ παλάμῃ      B3.9a 
 18b     πῇ δῆλον ἕκαστον,   B 3.9b 
      μήτε τιν’ ὄψιν ἔχων πίστει πλέον ἢ κατ’ ἀκουήν   B 3.10 
     20 ἢ ἀκοὴν ἐρίδουπον ὑπὲρ τρανώματα γλώσσης ,  
      μήτε τι τῶν ἄλλων, ὁπόσῃ πόρος ἐστὶ νοῆσαι, 
      γυίων πίστιν ἔρυκε, νόει θ’ ᾗ δῆλον ἕκαστον. 
 
For convenience, I break line 18 into two halves, but this is in no way intended to suggest a 
lacuna in the text. I break the text between παλάμῃ and πῇ δῆλον ἕκαστον because it is with the 
former that the first of two extended chiasmi around which the passage is structured ends and 
with the latter that a second one begins. Just as careful attention to the repetitions in Parmenides’ 
proem revealed a series of overlapping chiastic structures serving as a sort of skeleton to the 
whole proem, so with the above text (which we have already seen imitates Parmenides’ proem in 
other ways) a pair of complex chiasms confirm the unity of the Empodoclean passage quoted by 
Sextus generally taken as two fragments, sometimes broken into many more. 
 The second of the two chiasms was already noted in passing when we were considering 
the closing lines of DK 31 B 3.229 It is only in comparison with the first, as we shall see, that we 
can appreciate its structure fully. The first, whose outer edges are set by instances of παλάμη, 
stretches from the beginning of first line of DK 31 B 2 to the middle of the ninth of DK 31 B 3. 
To facilitate their comparison, I present a schema for each of these structures, the parallelism of 
which should be immediately apparent (the component words of the chiasmi are those in bold in 
the passage above; the line numbers beside the words refer to the continous numeration of the 
passage as presented above): 
 
229 See page 104, footnote 205. 
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Empedoclean Chiasmus I (DK 31 B 2.1-3.9a): 
  
 A. παλάμαι (1) 
  B. ἀθρήσαντες (3) 
   C. ἐλαυνόμενοι (6) 
    D. ἐπακουστά (7) 
     E. σὺ (8) 
      F. πλεῖον … γλώσσης  (9-10)  
         G. ὁσίων (11) 
     Eʹ. σέ (12) 
    Dʹ. ἀκούειν (13) 
   Cʹ. ἐλάουσ’ (14) 
         Gʹ. ὁσίης πλέον (16) 
  Bʹ. ἄθρει (18) 
 Aʹ. παλάμῃ (18) 
  
Empedoclean Chiasmus II (DK 31 B 3.9b-3.13):230  
 
 Aʹ. πῇ δῆλον ἕκαστον (18) 
  Cʹ. μήτε τιν’ (19) 
         Gʹ. πίστει πλέον (19)231 
   Dʹ. ἢ κατ’ ἀκουήν (19) 
    D. ἢ ἀκοὴν (20) 
      F. πλέον  . . .  γλώσσης (19-20)  
    C. μήτε τι (21) 
   Bʹ. νοῆσαι (21)      
         G. πίστιν (22) 
   B. νόει (22) 
 A. ᾗ δῆλον ἕκαστον (22)  
230 The labels applied to the components of the second chiasmus are assigned in what might seem to be reverse order 
(Aʹ, e.g., being assigned to the first element, A to the final one), or worse, a random one (if the reader is wondering 
why Cʹ seems to correspond to B). Both apparent oddities are due to the fact that the labels for both chiasms are 
assigned from the outside of the passage in. For the second chiasm, this means beginning with ᾗ δῆλον ἕκαστον in 
line 22, then moving on to ᾗ δῆλον ἕκαστον, etc. In order to help see through the (deliberate) displacement of certain 
elements in the second chiasmus, the letters assigned to the components pair related words, while their placement in 
the schema reflects their position within the chiastic structure. 
231 Note that a single instance of πλέον in line 19 is shared by F and Gʹ in the schema for the second chiasmus. 
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The basic structure of the first chiasmus is quite clear. Spanning eighteen verses, forms of 
παλάμη, ἀθρεῖν, ἐλαύνειν and ἀκούειν converge towards a middle where the two separate 
fragments meet. Initially, there is no obvious central item. The second person pronouns in lines 8 
and 12 narrow the range somewhat, but πλεῖον in line 9 and ὁσίων in line 11 each has a mate in 
ὁσίης πλέον in line 16.232 The equal distances at which the corresponding of forms in lines 6 and 
14, 7 and 13, and 8 and 12, lie from line 10 suggests that the center of the structure is at or near 
line 10, but it may be difficult to pick a single key theme from among the nearby candidates of 
mortal metis, madness, and gods.  “Tongue” perhaps does not seem the most attention-grabbing 
of the words in these central lines, but, as comparison with the second chiasmus will show, it 
does seem to be Empedocles’ focus.  
 The second chiasm, as already noted, recalls Parmenides’ habits in developing his 
chiastic structures. Presenting a basic outline similar to that of the preceding structure in a shorter 
span of lines, Empedocles also skews the pattern by shifting the placement of various parts of the 
figure. Despite this skewing, the parallelism with the first structure is unmistakable. The phrases 
“in which way each thing is evident” (which might be equivalent to saying “with every palm”) 
function as do the “palms” of the first chiasmus, establishing the outer frame (A and Aʹ in each 
structure).Within them are pairs of expressions for “being aware” (B and Bʹ) and “hearing” (D 
and Dʹ), each grouping corresponding semantically to the similarly labeled items in the first 
chiasmus, but placed so that both items in each pair fall on one side of the center of the present 
chiasm, B and Bʹ both following the center, D and Dʹ both coming before it. The placement is 
skewed further by having both B and Bʹ outside of C, but D and Dʹ inside of Cʹ. At the center (in 
232 There is also a third instance of the second person prounoun (the emphatic but ambiguous σέ γ’ of DK 31 B 6) in 
line 15. 
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line 20) is again γλώσσης, preceded by πλέον (in line 19), as πλεῖον in line 9 preceded γλώσσης 
in line 10 (F). In this chiasmus, πλέον plays a secondary role of echoing πλέον in line 16 of the 
first chiasmus, thus replicating the feature wherein πλέον is paired once in each chiasmus with a 
word that, though repeated, seems to sit outside of the chiastic structure (G and Gʹ).233  
 Once again it is perhaps easier to note the chiasmi than to give the reasons for why we 
should do so. At any rate, it is enough for now to have seen their structures clearly, which seem 
to have gone unnoticed by scholars. The first chiasmus is quite crisply structured, displaying a 
remarkable balance of its corresponding elements, particularly towards the center of the structure. 
As it is at precisely the center of this chiasm that the conventional break between DK 31 B 2 and 
3 comes, we can be confident in abandoning that convention and refusing to accept 
interpolations of material from elsewhere at that point. The structure of the chiasm, spanning all 
of the breaks that various scholars have tried to introduce in these lines, confirms the unity of the 
passage that Sextus provides in three parts. 
 Each of Empedocles’ chiasms shows a more finely balanced structure than was the case 
with those in Parmenides’ proem and, despite the skewing of certain elements in the second 
chiasmus, the parallelism between the two Empedoclean chiasmi is striking. I will venture to 
suggest at least one reason for this. This doubling of the particular chiastic scheme is a perfect 
example of the overt proportionality that I have suggested is characteristic of Empedocles’ 
writing and thought. The repetition in the second chiasm of the same general structure and of 
many of the same components of the first is designed to encourage the comparision of the 
elements of the passage in analogical terms. We are invited, for example, to consider whether the 
233 The dedicated reader will note that the schema for the second chiasmus lacks an E and Eʹ. As the labels are 
assigned to facilitate the comparison of like items in the two structures, I have taken the liberty of skipping E and 
labeling the center of the second chiasmus F. Those concerned with the lack of a parallel for the personal pronouns 
in the first chiasmus may be consoled somewhat to have it pointed out that a pair of indefinite pronouns is lurking 
(without a separate label) in C and Cʹ. 
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relationship in the first structure of the “straitened palms” to the “tongue” from which madness is 
to be averted is equivalent to the relationship between “in which way each thing is evident” and 
the “tongue” the “piercing clarities” of which are apparently favored in the second structure. It 
would be premature to judge what lesson we are to learn from such a comparison or to declare 
that this preoccupation with proportionality is at the heart of Empedocles’ teaching, but it is 
undeniably, I maintain, something which we are meant to confront in reading the poem(s). An 
appreciation of the importance of analogical or proportional thinking is, I think, needed to get far 
in understanding why Empedocles is so interested in telling a “twofold tale”.234 Of course, there 
are positive and negative aspects to this sort of doublespeak. As instructive as analogies can be, 
and as vital to proper conduct as a sense of proportion is, false analogies and illusory likenesses 
are at least as commonly encountered. We have not, in all of this, strayed too far from 
Parmenides’ own ambivalent attitude towards logos. Empedocles (or whoever is speaking in 
these lines) certainly leaves enough obscure in these lines that the disciple here is faced with 
much the same problem as the kouros of Parmenides’ proem. 
234 The famous fragment DK 31 B 17 opens with δίπλ’ ἐρέω in its first line, and the phrase recurs at the beginning of 
17.16. 
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PART TWO 
 
 
CHAPTER FOUR - THE TRUTH ABOUT “PARMENIDES’ DOXA” 
 
 
The relationship between the two major parts of Parmenides’ poem, the Aletheia or “Way of 
Truth” and the “Way of Opinion” or Doxa, is one of the central questions of Parmenidean 
scholarship. But while it is a much discussed matter, treatments of the topic commonly take the 
established arrangement of the fragments for granted. Recently, however, Néstor-Luis Cordero 
has been arguing that a proper understanding of the difference between the two parts of the poem 
entails a radically different arrangement of the material generally assigned to the Doxa.1 In his 
2010 article “The ‘Doxa of Parmenides’ Dismantled”, Cordero offers an interesting account of 
how scholars may have been misreading Parmenides’ poem for centuries, as well as some 
provocative suggestions on how to correct that misreading. He calls into question the typical 
notion of the Doxa as a section of Parmenides’ poem providing an account of the phenomenal 
world, and he challenges the standard arrangement of the fragments which assigns lines featuring 
“physical” topics to that portion of the poem. The “Doxa of Parmenides”, if that phrase is 
understood to imply that Parmenides himself embraced doxa of any kind, is, Cordero insists, an 
imaginary fusion, like Centaurs or Sirens, of two independently legitimate notions. There was a 
Parmenides, and there are doxai presented in the poem, but to speak of Parmenidean doxai, 
1 See, e.g., the “Postscriptum 2007” in Cordero (2008) pp. 78-80, Cordero (2010) and Cordero (2011b).  In what 
follows, I focus primarily on the presentation in Cordero (2010), from which the more recent paper (2011b) does not 
appear to differ substantially.  References to Cordero (2010) in the main body of the text are by page number(s) 
alone, given in parentheses. References in the footnotes are in longer form. The abbreviation “DK” refers to the 5th 
and later editions (edited by Walther Kranz) of Hermann Diels’ Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, while “FdV” 
refers to the earlier (pre-Kranz) editions of that work. Items such as “DK 10” or “DK 7.5” are shorthand for 
referring to the “B” fragments (and line numbers, if given) in the chapter in DK on Parmenides. 
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Cordero maintains, is an error. As Cordero sees it, it is a mistake to regard what the poem speaks 
of as doxai as Parmenides’ own views (because all doxai must be false) and it is wrong to place 
the surviving fragments of a “physical” character (or at least many of them) under the heading of 
Doxa. In the new arrangement that Cordero proposes, only a few of the fragments generally 
included in the Doxa (specifically, DK 8.52-61, and DK 9, 12 and 19) would remain there, while 
the rest (DK 10, 11, and 13-18) are to be placed earlier in the poem, as part of the Aletheia, 
where they may be regarded as endorsed truths of Parmenidean natural science.   
Cordero’s essay is a valuable reminder that the arrangements of the fragments that we 
encounter today are reconstructions by modern editors, a fact too easily and too frequently 
overlooked. However, his account of the history of the scholarship on the Doxa calls for 
correction on a number of points, and his own proposed reconstruction of the poem seems to me 
as chimerical a production as the more familiar presentation that Cordero likens to the fantastic 
creatures of Greek myth. Thus, while I share with Cordero a conviction that the “orthodoxy” 
about the Doxa (if there can be said to be such a thing) is incorrect, my own view of where it 
goes wrong is rather different. In this essay, I address a number of points, either raised in or 
touched upon by Cordero’s article, about the ways the Doxa has been or should be read. 
Although I treat these issues in connection with Cordero’s account, the discussion should be 
pertinent to any attempt to understand this curious material.  
Parmenides’ Doxa Dismembered? 
There are several stages to Cordero’s dismantling of the allegedly mistaken tradition. The first 
seeks to expose faults in the modern reconstruction of the text, which Cordero presents as the 
haphazard result of developments in which chance has played too dominant a part. The second 
stage traces elements of the current misunderstanding further back, into antiquity, placing the 
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blame for the widespread confusion (as Cordero sees it) of doxai with “appearances” or 
“physics” on the Platonizing bias of Simplicius and others. A third stage highlights the 
characteristic traits of “mortal opinions” when viewed from a perspective that does not 
presuppose their association with physical phenomena. Finally, with that association (one 
ultimately traced back to Aristotle) having been exposed, Cordero proposes to rescue fragments 
featuring Parmenides’ own physical doctrines from the Doxa and restore them to the Aletheia. I 
will address each of these stages in turn, though without devoting equal attention to all aspects of 
Cordero’s treatment. While an adequate account of the material requires going into detail on 
many matters, I shall concentrate less on the more idiosyncratic features of Cordero’s reading of 
Parmenides than on the wider implications of his claims for a faithful reading of the surviving 
fragments. The principal aim will be to clarify which assumptions involved in the standard 
reconstruction are supported by the source texts for the poem, and which are not. 2 
 
 Stage One: The Modern Reconstructions Reconsidered 
Cordero begins with a story of how the contemporary view of the “Doxa of Parmenides” arose, 
the moral of which lies in the salutary reminder that Parmenides’ text as we typically read it is a 
modern arrangement, several centuries in the making, of quotations collected from an array of 
sources spanning the millennium following Parmenides’ own lifetime. Our prejudices, Cordero 
warns us, can often conceal what is otherwise obvious. Should we overlook the fact that what we 
are reading is a reconstruction, there is greater risk of accidentally and anachronistically reading 
our own expectations and interests back into Parmenides’ poem. The familiar notion of 
2 The stages as presented above are not explicitly delineated as such by Cordero, but reflect my own understanding 
of the way the argument of his essay develops, and should also serve as a helpful frame for discussing the broader 
questions raised by his paper. I hope that this has not meant misrepresenting his views. Criticisms of the specific 
solutions he proposes as answers, where these bear less directly on the general issues, will generally be confined to 
the footnotes. 
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“Parmenides’ Doxa” is, Cordero claims, in no small part the product of just such misreading. 
Indeed, Cordero alleges that the use of the heading Doxa for “texts that mainly concerned 
‘physical questions’ […] was only an accident in the reconstruction of the poem.” (p. 234) 
According to Cordero, it just so happened that, in the early attempts of Henri Estienne (1573) 
and Joseph Scaliger (c. 1600), in which lines drawn from the same source were grouped together, 
fragments of a more “physical” character were placed at the end of their collections. (p. 233) In 
time, this chance concatenation received the misleading title Doxa, a designation which Cordero 
dates to G. G. Fülleborn’s 1795 Fragmente des Parmenides. That presentation would prove 
decisive for how Parmenides would be read thereafter: “the poem was divided into three parts: A 
Prologue (fragment 1); a section Fülleborn titled περὶ τοῦ νοητοῦ ἢ τὰ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν; and one he 
titled τὰ πρὸς δόξαν (fragment 8.52 to fragment 18; fragment 19 was unknown at the time). Here 
we have the birth certificate of Parmenidean Doxa.”3 For Cordero, this birth was a fateful one, 
with dire consequences for our understanding of Parmenides: “The French like to say that ‘le 
destin fait bien les choses’ […] but, in the case of the reconstruction of the Poem, destiny played 
a tragic role.” (pp. 233-234)  
 From these remarks, it might seem as though we are invited to think that the familiar 
division of the poem into a Proem, a Way of Truth, and a Way of Seeming was Fülleborn’s 
invention. Cordero acknowledges, however, that the division between an Aletheia and a Doxa is 
an ancient and a genuine one.4 What he disputes is that fragments which appear to be concerned 
3 Cordero (2010) p. 233 (correcting the misprint of ἀλὴθειαν for ἀλήθειαν – on the accentuation in the edition of 
Fülleborn, see footnote 7 below). Cordero guesses at Fülleborn’s reasoning in what follows: “The rather ‘physical’ 
character of this whole [i.e., the fragments allegedly grouped together by chance at the end of the earlier collections] 
probably invited Fülleborn (1795) to constitute a ‘doxastic’ whole […] placed under the title […] τὰ πρὸς δόξαν.” 
(2010, p. 234) 
4 See Cordero (2010) p. 232.  As evidence that “Doxa” is a legitimate label for some portion of Parmenides’ poem, 
Cordero points to the goddess’ transition, at DK 8.50-52, from her faithful account about truth to the verses about 
doxai, as well as the occurrence of the phrase κατὰ δόξαν in DK 19.  For the terminological point, cf.: “There is no 
doubt that Parmenides […] had also taken care to expound the ‘doxai of mortals’ (indeed, we can verify this today, 
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with “physics” or natural science belong in the Doxa, claiming about the distribution of 
fragments between the two parts, “we simply do not know today which verses belong to which 
section.” (p. 233) Still, Cordero’s description might be thought misleading, for neither did 
Fülleborn invent the names that serve as titles for the sections in his edition, nor were the earlier 
editors, in their arrangements, simply grouping together fragments preserved by the same author. 
In fact, both Fülleborn, in applying the titles, and the earlier editors, in arranging the fragments 
as they did, were guided by the evidence they found in the authors who quoted the fragments. It 
appears that Cordero overlooks this because he himself significantly undervalues the information 
those sources provide.5 In the reconstruction of the poem as a whole, Cordero claims that “the 
only certitude” is that the proem, preserved by Sextus Empiricus, ought to be placed before any 
of the other fragments. As for the rest, he says, “Most of the remaining eighteen quotations of the 
poem can actually be placed in any order.”6 Both of these general claims reveal some inattention 
because the word ‘doxa’ appears on three occasions in the preserved texts).” (2010, p. 233) While I think Cordero is 
right to admit the Doxa as a genuine portion of the poem, it seems odd, given his strong skepticism of the way the 
Doxa has traditionally been conceived, that he regards three occurrences of the word ‘doxa’ as indubitable evidence 
of a portion of the poem dedicated to it. 
5 Cordero undervalues the sources’ testimony throughout his article, though his own remarks on this point are not 
perfectly consistent. His early claim (2010, p. 232) that there is but a single certitude about the reconstruction 
(provided by Sextus Empiricus, who quotes the beginning of the poem) is contradicted in the following paragraph 
by his granting that DK 9 and 12 must have followed DK 8 (on the authority of Simplicius). Later (2010, pp. 242-3), 
in order to make the placement of “physical” fragments within the Aletheia seem plausible, Cordero returns to the 
claim that “the haphazard origin (with the exception of fr. 1) of the present arrangement […] allows us total liberty 
to place the ‘physical texts’ […] anywhere (subject to one constraint […])”. On my own view of the matter, Cordero 
is claiming more liberty than we are entitled to, and misrepresenting the constitution of the DK text by calling it 
“haphazard”.  
6 Cordero (2010) p. 232. Cordero qualifies this in what immediately follows: “It is true that the rigorous method of 
Parmenides suggests, for the first time in a philosophical text, a certain organization”, and then outlines how he 
thinks the present arrangement follows a certain logical order. For what seems the same point, cf. Cordero (2004) p. 
16: “It is impossible to know (except in one case) what place in the Poem each of these quotations should occupy. 
Since the first attempts at reconstruction, they have been arranged in accordance with the conceptual content of each 
fragment.” The “one case” here is the proem (though not as Sextus Empiricus actually quotes it, but as presented in 
DK, where lines from Sextus are removed and incorporated into DK B 7). In both passages Cordero implies that it 
was not the testimony of the sources, but the expectation of a logical course of exposition on Parmenides’ part, that 
determined the DK order of the fragments. Not only does this ignore the fact that much of the DK order was 
determined by the explicit testimony of the sources (cf. footnote 45 below), but it assumes that the organization of 
the material in the poem was determined by Parmenides’ “rigorous method”, as though it were obvious just what 
that is. While I do not deny that Parmenides had his own methods of composition, or that they were rigorous, to 
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to the source material, as we discover when we consider Cordero’s account of the early phases of 
the reconstruction in detail. 
Fülleborn’s Titles. To begin with, in employing the phrases περὶ τοῦ νοητοῦ, τὰ πρὸς ἀληθείαν 
(sic),7 and τὰ πρὸς δόξαν as titles or headings, it should be pointed out that Fülleborn was not 
making them up, but borrowing Simplicius’ ways of referring to portions of the poem from 
which he quotes.8 The writings of Simplicius (6th century C.E.), it should be emphasized, are by 
far the most important resource available for the reconstruction of Parmenides’ poem, as for 
much else in matters Presocratic. His commentaries on Aristotle’s Physics (hereafter “in Phys.”) 
and the de Caelo (hereafter “in Cael.”) supply more than half of all the verses of Parmenides 
known to us. He was in possession of a complete copy of the poem (which many of our earlier 
sources may not have been), and he repeatedly quotes from it to clarify his discussions of 
Aristotle’s texts and to substantiate the claims he makes.9 The phrases τὰ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν and τὰ 
assume at the outset that they match our own expectations of a logical exposition seems unjustified, and dangerously 
close to the kind of anachronistic reading Cordero warns us against. 
7 This is the form found in Fülleborn (as well as in Brandis and, later, Stein). Exactly why the word is so written, 
rather than ἀλήθειαν or ἀληθείην, I am unsure. LSJ reports it as an epic form (but without citing any instances) or an 
early Attic one (citing Herodian). 
8 See Fülleborn (1795) p. 54. Simplicius contrasts Parmenides’ account περὶ τοῦ νοητοῦ with his account about τὰ 
αἰσθητὰ when he quotes the transition in the goddess’ speech (DK 8.50-52) at in Cael. 557-558 (in Heiberg’s edition) 
and in Phys. 38-39 (in the edition of Diels). Simplicius often describes the subject matter of what precedes in DK 8 
as “the intelligible”, but not in such a way as to suggest that he understood περὶ τοῦ νοητοῦ as a title. Indeed, in a 
third passage where Simplicius quotes the verses of the transition, he speaks of Parmenides μετελθὼν ... ἀπὸ τῶν 
νοητῶν ἐπὶ τὰ αἰσθητὰ …, ἤτοι ἀπὸ ἀληθείας ὡς αὐτός φησιν ἐπὶ δόξαν (in Phys. 30.14-16). Simplicius thus 
indicates that what he will sometimes speak of as a move from the intelligible to the sensible is, in Parmenides’ own 
terms, a transition from reality or truth to seeming or opinion. Where the phrases πρὸς ἀλήθειαν and πρὸς δόξαν 
occur, they, unlike περὶ τοῦ νοητοῦ, sometimes can be read as titles. This seems to reflect a common way of 
referring to major portions of the poem, even if they were not found as headings in copies of the text itself. See, e.g., 
in Cael. 556.13-14, in Phys. 38.19 (where πρὸς ἀλήθειαν may preserve the phrasing of Alexander of Aphrodisias), 
and in Phys.179.31. 
9 For a study of Simplicius’ methodology generally (with some specific discussion on Simplicius’ treatment of 
Parmenides), see Baltussen (2008). For a full study of Simplicius as a source for Parmenides, see Perry (1982). That 
Simplicius possessed a complete copy of the poem can be inferred not only from his extensive quotations, 
sometimes accompanied by a remark about the relative proximity of different quotations or the portion of the work 
from which a quotation is drawn, but also from passages where he remarks that something or other was not 
mentioned or said in Parmenides’ poem.  See, e.g., in Phys. 140.23:  οὔτε γὰρ ἐν τοῖς Παρμενιδείοις λέγεταί τι 
τοιοῦτο (about the “argument from dichotomy”). 
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πρὸς δόξαν were regarded as titles by Simplicius’ contemporary Philoponus, 10 by Proclus a 
century earlier,11 and perhaps by Alexander of Aphrodisias around the beginning of the third 
century C.E.12 Earlier still, commentators seem to have expressed the same division with the 
phrases κατ’ ἀλήθειαν and κατὰ δόξαν.13 Both sets of phrases seem related to the image of 
“ways” of inquiry, πρός apparently replacing κατά at some point as the preposition to best 
convey that notion.14 Sometimes writers speak about a point made ἐν τοῖς περὶ δόξης or simply 
ἐν δόξῃ.15 The variability in usage suggests that these were all labels employed by those who 
discussed the poem rather than headings found in the text itself, but I know of nothing in the 
testimonia to support the view that these labels gave the impression of a division in the poem that 
was not otherwise there. Fülleborn’s titles, then, were hardly without precedent. Granted, we 
may doubt whether every fragment in Fülleborn’s Doxa was correctly placed, but Cordero’s 
claim that he was applying that label to an entirely chance collection of sayings holds good only 
if the modern collection was indeed a random one. It is certainly not unreasonable to claim that 
affixing titles to the reconstructed sections has played a role in how we have read the poem since 
10 See Philoponus’ own in Phys. 21.22-22.15. Cf. Osborne (2006) p. 42. Osborne renders the titles as “Towards 
Truth” and “Towards Opinion”, translating “pros as ‘towards’ to capture the metaphor of paths of travel in 
Parmenides’ poem.” (p. 111, n. 85).  
11 Proclus, in Tim. vol. I., p. 252 Diehl. Only Πρὸς δόξαν appears here, but it is clearly regarded as a title for a 
portion of the poem treating sensible things. 
12 Ap. Simplicius, in Phys. 38.19. See footnote 8. 
13 See Theophrastus ap. Alexander, in Metaph. 31(Hayduck) (= DK 28 A 7 = Coxon  t. 40 [i.e., testimonium number 
40 in Coxon (1986/2009)] = FHSG 227C) and Diogenes Laertius, Vitae IX.22 (= DK 28 A 1 = t. 140), the source for 
which appears to have been the same as that Clement of Alexandria draws on for his comment at the end of Strom.  
V.9 (= t. 129). A distinct branch of the doxographical tradition connects the first part of the poem (though with only 
a hint of the κατά phrasing) with Xenophanes: see Aetius, I.3 (= t. 55) and Pseudo-Plutarch, Strom. 5 (= DK A 22  =  
t. 87).  
14 Theophrastus links the κατά phrases with the two “ways” taken by Parmenides, while Diogenes Laertius and 
Clement connect Parmenides’ “ways” and the κατά phrases, respectively, to his “twofold” teaching or philosophy. 
For the πρός phrasing as expressing “ways”, cf. Osborne, cited in footnote 10 above. 
15 For ἐν τοῖς περὶ δόξης, see Asclepius, in Metaph. 42.26 (= t. 189); for ἐν δόξῃ, see Proclus, Platonic Theology, I.9, 
p. 35.17 Saffrey-Westerink (= t. 184) and cf. Sextus Empiricus, adv. Math. VII.114 (= t. 136), discussed in chapter 
two (pages 63-64) above. 
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Fülleborn’s time, but the charge that it was actually misleading needs some argument to support 
it. 
Estienne’s Collection. As for the purportedly accidental grouping of “physical” texts at the end 
of early collections of fragments, Cordero’s account involves some sleight of hand. The 
arrangements of Estienne and Scaliger, which Cordero adduces as supposedly influencing 
Fülleborn’s “naming” of the Doxa, are starkly different presentations of the poem.16 Cordero 
pairs the two, presenting each of them as (i) an early collection grouping fragments simply 
according to their source, which (ii) gives the accidental impression, because of its arrangement, 
of a section of a “rather ‘physical’ character” toward the end of the poem. Cordero first lists the 
ordering for Estienne’s collection, providing the source for each fragment in parentheses, as 
follows: “1 (Sextus), 7 (Sextus), 10 (Clement), 4 (Clement), 8.3-4 (Clement and Plutarch), 8.43-
45 (Plato), 13 (Plato), 15 (Plutarch), 14 (Plutarch), 2 (Proclus version) and 16 (Theophrastus 
version).”17 Initially, this looks like good evidence for a grouping exclusively by author: two 
fragments from Sextus Empiricus (who informs us he is quoting from the beginning of the poem) 
16 One might wonder here, given Cordero’s report that Scaliger’s reconstruction went unpublished and ignored, 
exactly how it was supposed to have contributed to Fülleborn’s opinion about the character of the Doxa. Cordero in 
fact stops short of claiming a direct influence, and only gestures at the connection (see footnote 3).  This leaves open 
the possibility, I take it, that some other allegedly accidental grouping of “physical” fragments was the actual 
historical source for the impression made on Fülleborn, but such hypothesizing is, I think, ultimately a distraction. 
Fülleborn is in fact quite forthcoming about the chief influence on his presentation of the fragments: it was 
Simplicius. See Fülleborn (1813) pp. 31-32 (partially quoted below; see footnote 38). 
17 In an earlier publication, “L’histoire du texte de Parménide”, Cordero reports Estienne’s text as drawn from 
Sextus, Clement, Plutarch, Proclus and Theophrastus (Plato is not listed) and including the following lines: DK 1.1-
30 (1.29-30 twice [the second instance presumably the lines quoted by Proclus at in Tim. I. 345], 2.1-8, 4.1-4 [in the 
original article this is given as “II.1-4”, with “II” evidently a misprint for “IV”], 7.2-6, 8.1-2a, 8.3-4, 8.43-45, 10.1-4, 
13.1, 14.1, 15.1, and 16.1-4 (see Cordero (1987) p. 8).  Given the attribution of DK 8.43-45 and DK 13 to Plato in 
the 2010 article, as well as a footnote in the 1987 article which adds that Estienne included as a Parmenidean verse a 
Platonic phrase from the passage in the Sophist in which 8.43-45 were cited (1987, p. 8, n. 27), it looks as though the 
absence of Plato from the 1987 listing was accidental. If this is the case, it is surprising that DK 7.1, quoted twice in 
the Sophist (at 237a8-9 and 258d2-3, paired with slightly different versions of 7.2 on the two different occasions), is 
not included in Estienne’s collection. The line numbers given in the earlier article are helpful, as they make it clear 
that the lines represented above by “1 (Sextus), 7 (Sextus)” did not include DK 1.31-32 or 7.1. This confirms that 
Estienne did not group multiple fragments from Sextus at the beginning of his collection, but simply gave as a single 
passage the proem as Sextus quoted it (which closes with the lines reported  as “8.1-2a”  in the 1987 article). The 
more recent article does not inform us where the second quotation of “1.29-30” (which I assume comes from Proclus) 
appeared in Estienne’s collection. 
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are followed, now in (Latin) alphabetical order, by three from Clement, two from Plato, two 
from Plutarch, and one each from Proclus and Theophrastus. However, Sextus doesn’t quote DK 
1 and 7 as two separate fragments, but as a single continuous one, so it is illegitimate to count 
this as an instance of grouping fragments together. The other fragments, absent any clear 
indication on where they were to be placed, do appear to have been grouped together and listed 
alphabetically by the quoting author’s name, but this is not necessarily the only justification for 
so grouping them.18 Clearly, Sextus’ testimony that his quotation comes from the beginning of 
the poem determines its placement at the start of the collection while the alphabetical grouping 
by author is secondary. As for the fragments “toward the end of the poem”, it is theoretically 
possible that any sense of a progression from more metaphysical or philosophical matters to 
physical questions could well be regarded as an accident due to the arrangement of the material, 
but in entertaining this notion we must pause for a moment and see how little of the poem there 
was in Estienne’s arrangement after Sextus’ proem. Following the 35 or so lines from Sextus, the 
remaining fragments together total less than 31 lines.19 Nearly all of what we today might think 
of as the “middle” of the poem, the “Way of Truth”, was missing, and it is hard to believe that 
the fragments that Cordero counts as the “end of the poem” in this instance (i.e., 13, 15, 14, 2, 
and 16) give the impression of any “whole” at all, let alone that of a group “mainly concerned 
with ‘physical questions’.”20 Estienne’s collection does not appear to pretend to, nor indeed does 
it provide, much sense of the shape of the poem beyond the first fragment. Pairing it with 
Scaliger’s version allows Cordero to gloss over how little a sense of the poem Estienne’s text 
18 The two lines credited to Plutarch alone (i.e., DK 15 and 14) are quite naturally grouped together because both are 
descriptions of the moon. 
19 I am calculating here based on the information Cordero provides, not having seen Estienne’s text, and leaving out 
of the account the lines from Proclus that roughly match DK 1.29-30, reported in Cordero (1987) – see footnote 17– 
but not mentioned in the 2010 article.  
20 Not that quantity is solely or even primarily determinative in such matters, it is still striking that, in this collection 
of lines, fragment 2 – which Cordero recognizes does not fit the “physical” character of the supposed section –
outweighs, at just over seven lines, all five of the “physical” texts put together (seven lines in total). 
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really gives us, while allowing us to imagine that the arrangement of Scaliger’s text was no more 
complicated than was Estienne’s alphabetical order.  
Scaliger’s Arrangement. Scaliger’s text of the poem is considerably more involved, and more 
coherent, than Estienne’s. Unfortunately, Cordero’s report of it, “1 (Sextus), 7 (Sextus), 8 
(Simplicius), 2 (Proclus and Simplicius), 6 (Simplicius), 13 (Plutarch and Simplicius), 15 
(Plutarch), 14 (Plutarch), 7.1-2 (Plato), 17 (Galen), 4 (Clement), 10 (Clement), 16 (Aristotle 
version) and 18 (Caelius Aurelianus)”, inadvertently leaves out DK 9 and 12.21 Fragments 9 and 
12 (both from Simplicius) should also be included, in that order, between fragments 8 and 2.22 
Again, the fragments appear neatly grouped by quoting author, inviting the reader to assume that, 
apart from placing Sextus’ quotation first, the only principle of ordering in both collections was 
the grouping together of fragments from the same source. The situation is not so simple, however, 
and the differences from Estienne’s arrangement merit mention. First of all, the material added 
from Simplicius (the entirety of DK 8, along with fragments 9, 12, and 6) amounts to an addition 
of over 74 new lines. This more than doubles the text of Estienne’s collection, and substantially 
alters our sense of the whole. Next, while there is indeed some clustering according to quoting 
21 Cordero (2010) p. 233. At first glance, it even appears as though Cordero is mysteriously giving the order of 
Brandis’ 1813 edition rather than Scaliger’s. In praise of Scaliger’s accomplishment, Cordero introduces Brandis’ 
book as the first work, after about two centuries during which Scaliger’s work was unknown or ignored, “to return to 
the level of Scaliger’s work”.  (This too might be slightly misleading, since Fülleborn, whose work preceded 
Brandis’ by almost 20 years, gives a comparably full collection of fragments (though without DK 17). It would be 
more accurate to say that it was not until Brandis’ work, which included additional material from Simplicius’ in 
Cael., that the completeness of Scaliger’s work was surpassed.)  Next, Cordero recounts the order quoted above, in a 
sentence beginning, “Brandis’ book followed this order:”, from which the reader might easily conclude that the 
order that follows is that found in Brandis’ work, and may or may not be repeating the order of Scaliger. In fact, the 
list given does not match the order in Brandis’ edition, and Brandis’ arrangement differs markedly from Scaliger’s. 
In an earlier article bringing attention to Scaliger’s work, Cordero listed the order of his arrangement as follows: DK 
1 (1-30), 7 (2-6), 8, 9, 12, 2, 6, 13, 15, 14, 7 (1-2), 17, 4, 10, 16, 18 (see Cordero (1982) p. 398). The order in the 
2010 article, quoted above, thus appears to omit fragments 9 and 12.  The order in Brandis’ edition, according to the 
numeration of DK, is: 1, 7.2-7a, 2, 6, 7.1-2, 8.1-15, 4, 8.16-61, 9, 12, 13, 10, 11, 15, 14, 16, 18, 22, 19 (see Brandis 
(1813)). The most significant difference from Scaliger, in addition to the material added from Simplicius’ de Caelo 
commentary, is the placement of fragment 8 after 2 and 6, which reflects an improved appreciation of the testimony 
of Simplicius about the placement of the fragments, as shall be discussed later. 
22 See the preceding footnote. An overview of the different early arrangements of the fragments is given in the 
appendix to this chapter, Synopsis A, page 190 below. 
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author (DK 8, 9, 12, 2, 6 and 13 are all quoted (at least in part)23 by Simplicius; 13, 15 and 14 by 
Plutarch;24 and 4 and 10 by Clement), the arrangement is more complex than was Estienne’s. 
Cordero has omitted the names of sources that would complicate the picture,25 but differences 
are evident nonetheless. Most conspicuously, the alphabetical order for the fragments following 
Sextus’ quotation has been abandoned. Surely there was some reason for this, and careful 
attention to the order of the fragments drawn from Simplicius helps us to see it.  The sequence of 
fragments 8, 9, 12, 2, 6 is not, I think, the correct order in which to place those fragments, but it 
does reveal something about what guided Scaliger in arranging the fragments as he did. 
 Pace Cordero, the order is not the arbitrary outcome of accident, chance or misfortune. 
To paraphrase Parmenides’ goddess, it was not any bad fate that set Scaliger on this way, but the 
just and right guidance of Simplicius. Cordero actually follows the same lead himself when he 
allows that Simplicius’ remarks about fragments 9, 12, and 19 confirm their placement after 
fragment 8.26 These fragments would thus be exceptions to his complaint that the sources give us 
little information to guide a reconstruction: 
Except for the prologue (fragment 1, today) we do not know in which order the other 
eighteen passages actually were in the original text. The ancient quotations’ sources are not 
precise, and in most cases their authors limit themselves to affirming, before each purported 
quotation, that ‘then Parmenides said X’, or that ‘in another place he said Y’, but they never 
point out any kind of ‘parts’ in the Poem. (p. 233) 
 
23 Simplicius provides only six of the eight lines of DK 2, which Proclus gives in full.  
24 Note that here Cordero attributes DK 13 to Simplicius and Plutarch, but leaves out Plato (to whom the fragment 
was assigned in the Estienne listing), Aristotle and others, including whom would complicate the tidy arrangement 
Cordero wants to present. 
25 In addition to listing DK 2, better preserved in Proclus than Simplicius, under the latter, and changing the 
attribution for 13 from Plato to Plutarch and Simplicius, neither Simplicius nor Aristotle are mentioned as sources 
for 7.1-2. 
26 See Cordero (2010) pp. 232, 234, 240, and 243 (citing in Phys. 180 for DK 9, in Phys. 39 for DK 12, and in Cael. 
559 for DK 19) and cf. footnote 5 above. In the arrangement Cordero proposes, these are the only known fragments 
allowed to follow DK 8.50-61. 
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The claim that the sources “never point out any kinds of ‘parts’ in the Poem” is, as the 
consideration of the phrase τὰ πρὸς δόξαν has shown, in error,27 although it remains possible that 
the parts mentioned by the sources might reflect their own manner of dividing the poem rather 
than Parmenides’. The assessment of our ignorance about the placement of fragments, likewise, 
is an exaggeration arising from too exacting a demand for information. Even if “in most cases” 
the authors who quote from the poem do not do us the courtesy of providing precise citations, a 
remark such as “then Parmenides said X” is still informative, if we can determine where “then” 
places us in the poem, which often enough we can. 
 Bearing these points in mind, let us consider the order of the fragments with which 
Scaliger’s arrangement begins: 1.1-30, 7.2-6, 8, 9, 12, 2, 6, 13.28 As already mentioned, the first 
two items, despite the appearance of the citation, are quoted as a continuous passage by Sextus. 
Moreover, the final clause of Sextus’ quotation, μόνος δ’ ἔτι θυμὸς ὁδοῖο / λείπεται, is a close 
match with the beginning of DK 8 as quoted by Simplicius: μοῦνος δ’ ἔτι μῦθος ὁδοῖο / λείπεται 
ὡς ἔστιν. This similarity has led many editors to believe that the quotations overlap. This is 
assumed, for instance, in DK, where Sextus’ quotation is divided between two fragments, with 
the result that the closing lines of Sextus’ quotation are cited as DK 7.2-5 and DK 8.1-2.29 
Examining Scaliger’s arrangement, it appears that he shared this assumption, and combined 
Sextus’ and Simplicius’ quotations accordingly. Next comes 9, then 12, and I venture to claim 
that Scaliger put them in this order not by mere chance, but because he was, like Cordero, aware 
of Simplicius’ testimony that these two fragments followed the end of DK 8. Similarly, the 
27 For references, see footnotes 8 and 10-12. 
28 Again, I supply the fragments (DK 9 and 12) inadvertently omitted in the list at Cordero (2010) p. 233 on the 
basis of the listing given at Cordero (1982) p. 398. 
29 Because of the assumed overlap, what is printed as one and the same line in DK may be cited as either 8.1, or, in 
the interest of emphasizing that one has in mind the words from Sextus, as 7.6. Likewise, the final word of Sextus’ 
quotation (λείπεται) will sometimes be cited as DK 7.7a  (e.g., in Synopsis A). 
134 
 
                                               
  
relative position of the next two fragments, with 2 before 6, also reflects the order in which 
Simplicius reports them. Simplicius’ report is not as explicit as with 9 and 12, each of which are 
said to come “a little after” (μετ’ ὀλίγα) 8.59 and 8.61 respectively,30 but in the passage where he 
quotes from both DK 2 and DK 6,31 the latter follows the former, and nothing on the other 
occasions when either fragment is quoted conflicts with the natural assumption that Simplicius 
was giving the lines in the order in which they appeared in the poem. Admittedly, this is not 
particularly precise, but it is more than nothing. Scaliger’s placing DK 2 and 6 in that order 
reflects Simplicius’ text, and his placing of these two fragments after DK 8, 9 and 12, whose 
original locations are more precisely reported, may well indicate a lesser degree of confidence in 
where to place the pair. Later editors, including Fülleborn, Brandis, and others, would rightly 
place both of these fragments before DK 8, but always with 2 preceding 6, as given by 
Simplicius.32 That they were right to place them before DK 8 is shown by additional evidence 
from Simplicius, either overlooked or discounted by Scaliger, that DK 6, 7.2, and 8 occurred in 
that order.33  
 DK 13 is the last of the fragments in Scaliger’s collection quoted by Simplicius. With it 
begins the run of fragments (13, 15, 14, 17, 4, 10, 16, 18) whose accidental but generally 
“physical” character, claims Cordero, helped Fülleborn fantasize a “‘doxastic’ whole”. It is here 
that Cordero’s characterization of the arrangement as arbitrary looks most accurate, and it must 
be admitted that it becomes more difficult to divine the motives behind it. What deserves noting, 
however, is that things in Scaliger’s arrangement get particularly messy once the hints from 
30 See in Phys. 180.8 and 39.12.   
31 See in Phys. 116-117. 
32 Cf. Synopsis A. 
33 At in Phys. 78, Simplicius indicates clearly that DK 6.8-9 preceded DK 7.2, which in turn preceded DK 8.1-14. 
Scaliger may have overlooked this passage, but more likely, I imagine, is that he discounted it because he was 
(mistakenly) convinced that DK 8 continued seamlessly the lines from Sextus Empiricus. 
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Simplicius give out. This is no accident. If my account of Scaliger’s thinking is correct, the 
process up to this point was a fairly straightforward one: he began with what appeared to him to 
be a continuous passage, partly preserved by Sextus (DK 1.1-30, 7.2-6), partly by Simplicius 
(DK 8), followed by two passages known to have followed shortly after the end of 8, DK 9 and 
12. Next he added two groups of lines (DK 2 and 6) quoted by Simplicius in connection with DK 
8, but whose precise placement was in doubt. 34  Then, as the last of the fragments from 
Simplicius, he placed DK 13. In doing so Scaliger probably had in mind the indication from 
Simplicius, apparently overlooked by Cordero himself, that DK 13 follows DK 12.35 From that 
point on, what we get is something of a mishmash: two more fragments (DK 15 and 14, each one 
line) from Plutarch (also a source for DK 13) about the moon; a pair of lines from Plato 
forbidding the thought of the being of non-beings (DK 7.1-2); an embryological hexameter 
drawn from Galen (DK 17); two quotations from Clement of seemingly different character (DK 
4, about the integrity of being, and DK 10, listing celestial matters to be learned); DK 16 (four 
lines on the blend of human noos) as quoted by Aristotle; and, finally, six lines of Latin 
hexameter, again embryological (DK 18). This does seem a rather arbitrary collection of material. 
But, while the case might be made that the “end matter” here constitutes a “physical whole” 
better than did that of Estienne’s collection, that is not saying much. Cordero notes that DK 4 
would seem to be an “intruder”, and so too would the lines from Plato (DK 7.1-2), which 
34 See the preceding footnote. The other passages from Simplicius and Proclus in which DK 2 and 6 are quoted also 
suggest that these fragments were drawn from a part of the poem concerned with “being” or “the intelligible”. If 
Scaliger, in addition to assuming that DK 8 followed Sextus’ proem without break and that DK 9 and 12 followed a 
few lines later, also took DK 13 as belonging to the portion of the poem “concerning the sensible things” 
(justification for which we will encounter soon), there may have seemed no other place for DK 2 and 6 than between 
DK 12 and 13.   
35 Cordero, while having DK 12 follow DK 8, would place DK 13 well before DK 8. This ignores that in the very 
passage which Cordero cites as evidence for placing DK 12 after DK 8 (in Phys. 39) Simplicius continues by 
quoting DK 13, understanding the δαίμων of 12.3 as the subject of the verb μητίσατο in DK 13. Simplicius does not 
indicate (even vaguely) the distance by which DK 13 followed the lines from DK 12, but Scaliger’s placement of 
DK 2 and 6 between them certainly yields an awkward result. Later editors generally place DK 13 immediately after 
12.  
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Cordero omits when he specifically lists the material “toward the end of the poem”. (p. 234) The 
embryological fragments (DK 17 and 18) add a new element, so the collection is a bit fuller, but 
they are not even grouped together. This, together with the fact that DK 10 is placed after DK 15 
and 14, likely indicate that Scaliger did not intend to present any kind of “whole” at this point 
either.36 Thus, while the apparent randomness of the arrangement here supports one aspect of 
Cordero’s characterization (that it is arbitrary), the suggestion that the “physical” character of 
Scaliger’s “Doxa” (or another like it) influenced Fülleborn’s titling the section τὰ πρὸς δόξαν is 
doubtful. In the first place, Fülleborn’s arrangement of the fragments generally, and of the Doxa 
in particular, differ considerably from Scaliger’s. 37  More decisively still, Fülleborn makes 
perfectly clear that his own arrangement is not due to chance, but follows the lead of 
Simplicius. 38  As with Scaliger, behind what might have looked like mere fortune was 
Simplicius’ good guidance.  
Simplicius’ Significance. As already touched upon, Cordero’s account generally neglects this 
guidance, placing the responsibility for the arrangement of the fragments, when it is not simply a 
matter of fate, on editors’ assumptions about what makes for a logical ordering of the fragments’ 
“conceptual content”.39 Cordero does not provide the details of the early editions that followed 
Scaliger’s work, but appears to assume that, the fortuitous nature of the earliest arrangements 
36 Presumably DK 18 is placed last because it survives only in Latin translation. More telling is that the descriptions 
of the moon (DK 15, 14) appear before the fragment (DK 10) which lists the moon among the topics to be learned. 
37 See Synopsis A. Most importantly, DK 8 is no longer connected to Sextus’ proem. This makes space for DK 2, 6, 
and 7.2 to appear before DK 8, and allows the beginning of the “physical” section of the poem to coincide with the 
transition from Aletheia to Doxa at 8.53. In turn, DK 9 and 12 (not among the quotations included by Cordero in 
Scaliger’s collection of “physical” fragments) become portions of the Doxa. Moreover, DK 10, freed from 4 (the 
other fragment from Clement), is fittingly placed before 15 and 14. 
38 “Die Zusammenstellung der Fragmente ist nicht auf gutes Glück geschehen: sondern beruht grossentheils auf dem 
Ansehn des Simplicius. […] Diese nahm ich mir zum Leitfaden.” (Fülleborn (1795) p. 31) 
39 See footnotes 5 and 6 above. Cordero accounts for the DK order in the Aletheia by appealing not to the indications 
provided by Simplicius but to Parmenides’ “rigorous method”.  Thus fragments 2, 6, 7, and 8 are said to be arranged 
in that order because “[t]he two possibilities of research presented in what we now call fragment 2 complete 
themselves in a text considered today as ‘fragment 6’, which seems to continue with another text placed as 
‘fragment 7’. The latter, ostensibly without any interruption, appears continuous with the long fragment, called 
‘fragment 8’.” (2010, p. 232)  
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having been demonstrated, the subsequent arrangements can likewise be treated as arbitrary and 
haphazard. For instance, when Cordero remarks that, after Fülleborn’s edition, Peyron (1810) 
provided still more material for the reconstruction of the Doxa from Simplicius’ in Cael. (most 
notably DK 19), this additional contribution seems to be mentioned only to suggest that it added 
a false impression of completeness to the illusion of Fülleborn’s “physical” Doxa. This leaves a 
major gap in the story of the reconstruction, for, by omitting the details of the other early 
arrangements, Cordero’s presentation obscures the fact that with each major leap forward in the 
reconstruction, from Estienne to Scaliger, from Scaliger to Fülleborn, and from Fülleborn to 
Brandis, the perceptible gain in each instance is principally due to an improved appreciation of 
the evidence that Simplicius provides about the shape of the poem. 40  The importance of 
Simplicius’ in Phys. for both the content and ordering of Scaliger’s arrangement has already 
been sketched in some detail, and it has been noted that the chief improvements over Scaliger’s 
work by Fülleborn and Brandis are likewise due to a better grasp of the clues that Simplicius’ 
text gives.41 Brandis, with the added benefit of the material drawn from Simplicius’ in Cael.,42 
was able to add not only DK 19 as the closing passage of the Doxa, but also DK 11.43 Though 
the latter is among the fragments which Cordero suggests moving into the Aletheia, Brandis, in 
placing it in the Doxa, was here too following the lead of Simplicius’ text.44 No less influenced 
by Simplicius’ hints were Hermann Diels’ arrangements, which have become, in modified form, 
the standard text that Cordero considers haphazard.45  
40 The developments described in what follows may be traced in Synopsis A. 
41 See above, footnote 37. Specifically, Fülleborn followed Simplicius, against Scaliger, in placing DK 2 and 6 
before DK 7.2 and 8, and in linking DK 12 closely with DK 13. 
42 Relevant selections from this commentary were made available by Amadeo Peyron in Peyron (1810). 
43 Brandis also breaks from Simplicius (and Fülleborn) in inserting DK 4, from Clement, into DK 8. As Cordero 
observes, DK 4 is the most variously placed of the fragments. 
44 This point will be discussed below.  
45 Diels, who had edited Simplicius’ in Phys. in Diels (1882) and (1895), records these debts in the brief annotations 
to the fragments in his Poetarum Philosophorum Fragmenta (1901). The omission of these brief notes in the various 
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 Despite the oversights we have noted, Cordero’s reminder about our text being a 
reconstruction is an important point, and well worth emphasizing. Diels’ success in collecting 
and making accessible the fragmentary texts of Presocratic philosophy scattered throughout 
Greek and Latin literature has made the DK arrangement of the fragments virtually canonical. 
An unintended consequence of this is that the fragments can be read and studied without 
adequate attention being given to the contexts from which they are drawn. Overly trusting 
readers may then suppose that the arrangement in which the isolated fragments are presented in 
DK is somehow definitive, while overly suspicious ones may imagine that the DK arrangement 
is essentially arbitrary. Cordero’s own account of Parmenides’ poem may include both 
excesses, 46 but that does not invalidate the key point. Moreover, his characterization of the 
arrangement as arbitrary may still be more or less valid for the material assigned to the Doxa 
(which is, after all, his central concern in the article), most of which is drawn from sources less 
helpful for reconstructing the poem than Simplicius. Few students of the poem will dispute that 
the reconstruction of the Doxa (in DK or comparable arrangements) is less secure than that of the 
Aletheia.47 Even to those uninitiated into the mysteries of the modern attempts at reconstructing 
the poem, the material that makes up the Doxa, compared with that of the proem or the Aletheia, 
appears plainly as a meager sampling of stray bits. Is it, then, as capriciously constituted as 
Cordero claims? 
 
editions of Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker (where the scope of the work demanded as concise a presentation of 
each figure as possible) has helped to contribute to the widespread impression that contemporary arrangements of 
the fragments are less dependent on ancient evidence than they are. 
46 Cordero is inordinately suspicious in statements about our uncertainty as to the original order of the fragments, 
repeatedly suggesting that within the limits of the organization called for by Parmenides’ “rigorous method”, we are 
free to arrange the fragments at will. At the same time, he is too trusting, I would claim, in adopting the division of 
Sextus’ proem by Kranz (and Karsten before him) into two separate fragments, DK 1.1-30 and DK 7.2-7a. In the 
latter supposition Cordero shares the company of nearly all the scholars to have treated the poem since Kranz (re-
)introduced the change. 
47 As Fülleborn himself was well aware. See Fülleborn (1795) pp. 84ff. for his annotations to these fragments. 
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Stage Two: The Ancient Accounts Examined 
In the second stage of his argument, Cordero argues that not only is what survives of the Doxa 
woefully incomplete, but that most of the bits generally believed to belong to the Doxa actually 
do not. He maintains that the texts commonly grouped together as the Doxa exhibit 
inconsistencies of style and content which tell against assigning them all to the same portion of 
the poem, and he links the failure of modern scholars to see this with a confusion perpetuated 
among their ancient antecedents. In antiquity too, Cordero claims, there was widespread 
confusion over what Parmenides meant to say about doxai. Interestingly, he singles out 
Simplicius for special blame. Simplicius, as the “stronger paradigm of the ‘Platonization’ of 
Parmenides”, is said to have denied the full force of the negative valuation of doxai in the poem 
and to have committed so many interpretative anachronisms as to make him a rarity among the 
ancient commentators!48 Our sole source for so much that survives of the poem, has, according 
to Cordero, communicated it with an overlay alien to Parmenides’ own thinking, so that modern 
interpreters have failed to recognize the difference, for Parmenides, between “physics” or 
“appearances” on the one hand and “mortal opinions” on the other. How persuasive a case does 
Cordero make for all of this? 
“Internal Anomalies of the Doxa”. As regards the alleged inconsistencies of style and content in 
the conventional Doxa, Cordero’s case is unconvincing. While it will be readily admitted that the 
Doxa is far from complete, there does seem to be a general coherence to it: the end of DK 8 and 
48 See Cordero (2010) pp. 234-237. Although dismissive remarks about Simplicius’ (Neo-)Platonism and/or his 
endeavor to harmonize the views of early Greek philosophers are not uncommon in the scholarly literature, this 
accusation seems an extreme one, and likely to give a grossly distorted impression of the relative merits of the 
ancient commentators.  Platonist though Simplicius may have been, he seems as conscientious a scholar as anyone 
in the commentarial tradition.  If there is any truth in the claim, “Indeed, one rarely finds in the ancient tradition of 
commentary anachronisms as numerous as are found in Simplicius with reference to Parmenides”(2010, p. 236), it is 
only because, compared to what Simplicius provides, others in the commentarial tradition tell us so very little about 
Parmenides.  
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DK 9 lead us to expect a discussion of “all things” in terms of heavy night and aitherial light; 
DK 10 adds that the addressee will know “all the signs” of the aither and the works of the sun 
and the moon; DK 11 numbers the sun and moon among a list of other celestial lights that come 
to be (to which the mentions of the moon in DK 14 and 15 certainly seem related), while DK 12 
associates bands of fire and night with a divinity directing male-female pairings (to which DK 13, 
which speaks of Eros, and the embryological fragments 17 and 18, would all seem linked); 
finally, in what is possibly the conclusion of the Doxa, DK 19 seems to be a summarizing 
statement that “these things” have grown, and now are, and will in time meet their end, all κατὰ 
δόξαν. DK 16, seemingly more concerned with human noos than the generation of the cosmos, 
seems like the only possibly odd fit, but, given the recurrent pairing of doxa with mortals in the 
poem, it is far from being obviously out of place.49 If these are loose connections, the content 
here nonetheless seems distinct from the material that runs from DK 2 through most of DK 8, 
over the course of which we hear little hint of celestial objects, or night and light, and where any 
talk of generation appears to deny its existence. Cordero dismisses such connections among the 
fragments of the standard Doxa as mere “family likenesses”, insisting that, actually, the Doxa so 
composed presents patent “internal anomalies”.50 Even “a very superficial reading” of this Doxa, 
he claims, reveals both undeniable truths and obvious falsehoods: 
Nothing truer, for example, than to affirm that the moon does not have its own light, and 
that she revolves around the earth (fr.14); that if the kosmos is a kosmos this is because the 
Necessity governs the whole (fr. 10). And yet a likewise superficial reading of the same set 
shows that there are also false affirmations, for example, that there is nothing outside light 
49 As Cordero notes, Loenen (1959) and Hershbell (1970) presented cases for placing DK 16 in the Way of Truth, 
but neither has won widespread approval. Cf. Patricia Curd’s  recent remark about DK 16 (which she would keep in 
the Doxa): “I have long taken this to be one of the most confounding passages in Presocratic thought; I might add 
that I find most attempts to translate and explain it (including my own) equally perplexing.” (Curd (2011) p. 129) 
50 These phrases belong to assertions made at Cordero (2010) pp. 235-236. By p. 241 it is taken as proven that “the 
whole of what traditionally passes as ‘the Doxa’ […] is marred by a notorious imbalance—in style, as well as in 
content.” 
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and night (fr. 9), or that what ensures the coherence of the cosmos is the action of a goddess 
(fr. 12). (p. 236) 
 
It is not explained quite how he draws the lessons he does from the fragments in question, but for 
supposedly evident examples of truths and falsehoods, these seem weak ones. While it may be 
second nature to us to think that the moon reflects the light of the sun, this may have been a 
novelty in Parmenides’ own day, and it does not inspire confidence that Cordero’s own 
formulations of the lessons of fragments 10 and 12 are almost interchangeable, given that 
Necessity might well be described as a goddess in the poem.51 The distinction Cordero claims to 
find is one between “physical” truths and false doxai, and his solution to the problem this poses 
to the unity of the Doxa will be to place the “physical” fragments earlier in the poem. Without 
further elaboration, however, the “notorious imbalance” of style and content that Cordero claims 
to detect in these fragments seems to be one uncomfortably forced upon the text, not one arising 
freely from an unbiased reading.52 
51 Cordero offers a slightly different list of “anomalies” in Cordero (2011b): “even a superficial reading of the set of 
texts that are supposed to constitute the δόξα shows that the critical judgment of Parmenides [i.e., the goddess’ 
descriptions of doxai as without true trust and deceptive, which Cordero treats as spoken in Parmenides’ own voice] 
is justified only on certain occasions (e.g., in the case of fr. 9, which affirms that there is nothing outside of light and 
night, an idea that is evidently absurd). But in other passages a negative judgment is not relevant: why would it be 
deceptive to affirm that the Moon lacks a proper light, or that it turns around the Earth, or that Eros was one of the 
first (or the very first) of the gods (Hesiod dixit), or that opposite sexes mixed “the seeds of love”?” (Cordero (2011b) 
pp. 101-102). These examples are no better than those in the earlier paper. “Hesiod dixit” is surely shaky ground for 
the self-evident primacy of Eros “affirmed” in DK 13. Not only is it unclear why Hesiod should be regarded as an 
authority for Parmenides in this matter, but it mistakes what Hesiod actually said. In Hesiod, it is Chaos, not Eros, 
that comes to be “firstmost” (see Theogony 116). Again, while it may be plain that the opposite sexes mix “the seeds 
of love” (the phrase in quotation marks being a reference, I take it, to the first line of DK 17, femina virque simul 
Veneriscum germina miscent), this is hardly an observation that Parmenides could claim as his own discovery, and is 
a dubious paraphrase of whatever it is that the whole of DK 17 might actually be affirming. Moreover, the same 
notion seems implied in DK 12, which Cordero assigns to the Doxa. 
52 Where Cordero does directly address the fragments, his claims are often problematic. He claims, e.g., that in the 
“physical” fragments, the goddess speaks of celestial objects as things to be learned or known, language which is 
allegedly not used in connection with doxai (2010, pp. 240-241). Given how little of the Doxa is left (especially in 
Cordero’s arrangement), such a claim, even if true, would not amount to much.  As it happens, it is not quite true: 
the very first occurrence of the word in the poem, δόξας at B 1.30, is a direct object of πυθέσθαι in 1.28 (cf. πεύσῃ 
at 10.4, which Cordero (2010, p. 240) seems to include among the verbs for knowing physical realities) while δόξας 
at 8.51 is the object of μάνθανε in the following verse. Similarly dubious is the remark that DK 16, which “describes 
the formation of the intellect in the case of men (ἀνθρώποισιν, 16.3) [...] has hardly any sense in a context that 
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 Doxai and “Appearances”. Cordero’s other claim against Simplicius and others who align the 
Doxa with the physical and/or phenomenal world has two principal components. One is the 
claim that to do so weakens the poem’s strongly negative valuation of doxai. This valuation finds 
expression in the distinction drawn between “persuasive Truth’s (Ἀληθείης εὐπειθέος) intrepid 
heart”, on the one hand, and the “doxai of mortals, in which true trust (πίστις ἀληθής) is not”, on 
the other, as well as in the goddess’ remark, at the transition from the Aletheia to the Doxa, that, 
with her trusty speech (πιστὸν λόγον) at an end, the youth will henceforth learn mortal doxai, 
“hearing the deceptive order of my verses” (κόσμον ἐμῶν ἐπέων ἀπατηλὸν ἀκούων).53 No reader 
of these lines will fail to recognize that, in the distinction drawn here, the doxai are marked as 
deficient in some important way. Against interpreters who might want to minimize that 
deficiency in order to grant mortal opinions some degree of validity, Cordero demands that “it is 
untenable to affirm that Parmenides can propose to any extent to share in or to tolerate the δόξαι 
βροτῶν”. 54   Cordero draws particular attention to the second of the two passages. “It is 
necessary”, he insists, “to respect the strong negative sense—especially in Parmenides—of the 
word ἀπατηλόν. The poem is eminently didactic, and a teacher should not ‘deceive’ his 
disciples.” (p. 235) Respecting the full force of the adjective apatēlos entails, according to 
Cordero, strictly aligning anything persuasive with truth and anything deceptive with falsehood, 
with no possibility of any middle ground, for this would violate Parmenides’ “bivalent logic”. (p. 
235) For Simplicius, however, the beings that populate Parmenides’ Doxa occupy just such a 
presents the opinions of men.” (2010, p. 241.) Whatever the differences between human intellect and mortal opinion 
may be, it seems rash to insist that discussion of one cannot sensibly involve the mention of the other.  
53 DK 1.29-30 and 8.50-52. The translations above are my own, but do not, I think, differ in substance from 
Cordero’s reading of the lines. 
54 Cordero (2010) p. 235. Among the attempts to suggest that the Doxa was a presentation of reliable knowledge, the 
first part of Giorgio de Santillana’s 1964 essay, “Prologue to Parmenides”, makes an interesting companion to 
Cordero’s, using similar tactics to trace a nearly parallel path to precisely contrary conclusions about the Doxa. In  
his own answer to the riddle posed by the “Sphinx of Metaphysics”,  Santillana claims that the preconceptions of 
generations of modern scholars, the misappropriations of centuries of ancient authors, and the misreading of the 
such terms doxa and apatēlos has obscured the “obvious fact” that the Doxa is a physics (Santillana (1968) p. 89). 
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middle ground. They possess “seeming being”: they fall short of the fullest reality, but are still 
something more than utter non-being.55 They are “appearances”, with the full ambiguity that that 
term (or phainomena in Greek) has in ordinary speech, occupying a spectrum ranging from 
things that may merely appear to be of a certain sort (while not really being so) to things that it is 
apparent are so (i.e., things that manifestly, obviously, patently, are so). 
 Since deception generally involves precisely the confusion of truth and falsehood, and the 
exploitation of the ambiguity often present in “appearances”, Cordero’s supposedly Parmenidean 
sense of apatēlos seems suspiciously ad hoc, and his appeals to the didactic character of the 
poem or its bivalent logic in order to justify such a sense look question-begging. Cordero grants 
that in Gorgias’ Encomium of Helen, persuasion and deception are paired as capacities of logos, 
but he claims that this is a contra naturam coupling, post-dating Parmenides, and suggests that in 
doing so Gorgias was writing as an “anti-Parmenidean philosopher”. (p. 235) I hope it will not be 
embarrassing to those who played a role in my moral development if I admit that persuasion and 
deception do not seem to me to be an entirely unnatural pairing. At any rate, Gorgias, innovative 
figure though he was, was not the first to connect the two notions, which are paired together 
often enough from the earliest Greek literature onward, particularly in contexts where eros is 
involved.56 And, while he certainly wrote some things in response to Parmenides, it is far from 
clear that Gorgias was “anti-Parmenidean” in suggesting that persuasive logos is not always 
perfectly forthright and truthful. When the maidens of Parmenides’ proem persuade Dike to open 
the gates of Night and Day by “beguiling her with soft speeches, cunningly” (DK 1.15-16: τὴν 
55 See, e.g., in Cael. 557.19-24 and in Phys. 39.10-12. 
56 In Hesiod, Pandora provides a good illustration of this. Devised by Zeus in answer to Prometheus’ attempts to 
deceive him, Pandora, portrayed as deception incarnate, is outfitted for the task of beguiling mankind by a number 
of gods, Peitho (“Persuasion”) among them (see Works and Days 47-105, and cf. 373-375). In the Iliad, the episode 
in book 14 known as the Apate of Zeus springs readily to mind, but an example of this appears as early as book 1. At 
1.130ff., Agamemnon insists that Achilles, with his appeal to return Chryseis to her father, will not deceive him and 
persuade him  to give up his prize. From the Odyssey, I imagine the reader can supply for him- or herself one or two 
examples of figures to whom persuasion and deception are at least second nature.   
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δὴ παρφάμεναι κοῦραι μαλακοῖσι λόγοισιν / πεῖσαν ἐπιφραδέως), this is only one of several 
Parmenidean expressions that echo episodes of deceit or disguise in the epics. The phrasing 
kosmon epeōn, too, is traditionally employed in contexts where the “arrangement of words” is 
used to somehow mediate, rather than to reinforce, a hard-and-fast, either/or dichotomy of the 
sort that Cordero sees Parmenides drawing.57 Without presupposing Parmenides’ commitment to 
57 On the epic expressions, see Floyd (1991) and (1992). Cordero’s stance in his recent papers reflects his earlier 
thesis, developed at length elsewhere, that there is no “third way” in the poem. In Cordero (2004), he speaks of the 
“third way” as “hypothetical”, and claims that “for twenty-one centuries nobody ever found three ways, routes, or 
paths in Parmenides’ thought.” (2004, p. 138) The textual issue at the core of his insistence on only two ways is the 
lacuna at the end of DK 6.3. For DK 6.3-5, Diels printed: πρώτης γάρ σ’ ἀφ’ ὁδοῦ ταύτης διζήσιος <εἴργω>, / αὐτὰρ 
ἔπειτ’ ἀπὸ τῆς, ἣν δὴ βροτοὶ εἰδότες οὐδὲν /πλάττονται, δίκρανοι· (“For <I keep> you from this first way of seeking, 
but then from that one, which indeed mortals, knowing nothing, two-headed, fashion for themselves”). In place of 
Diels’ supplement εἴργω, Cordero proposes ἄρξει, and also reads τ’ rather than σ’ earlier in the line, translating, “… 
since you will begin with this first way of investigation, but then with that made by mortals who know nothing, two-
headed…” (2004, pp. 187, 192). In “On Parmenides’ Three Ways of Inquiry” (reprinted in Nehamas (1999)), 
Alexander Nehamas independently proposed a similar alternative for eliminating a third way from Parmenides’ 
poem. As Cordero’s defense of his emendation is intricately interwoven with his interpretation of the whole of the 
poem, I cannot attempt a detailed treatment here, but it is worth pointing out that his discussions of the matter (see, 
e.g., Cordero (2004) pp. 112-117 and 138-149) seem to overlook two significant facts which tell against his 
alternative: (i) in support of some form of  the verb εἴργω, Diels had not only the examples of the Aldine edition and 
other modern scholars (whose influence Cordero stresses), but the parallel expressions of at least two other lines of 
the poem: both 1.33 and 7.2 in the early arrangements of Diels read ἀλλὰ σὺ τῆσδ’ ἀφ’ ὁδοῦ διζήσιος εἶργε νόημα, 
not only 7.2, as Cordero reports (see Cordero (2004) p. 116, but note the potentially confusing misprints: after 
correctly citing 7.2, the text twice reads 7.1 where 7.2 is meant). Though the later editions of Die Fragmente der 
Vorsokratiker edited by Kranz reduce these to a single line, I think Diels was right to regard them as independent (in 
fact, Plato’s Sophist may provide evidence of yet another nearly identical line), and, if that is so, the case for Diels’ 
supplement is considerably strengthened (Cordero’s remarks about the parallelism being “deceptive” (p.116) 
notwithstanding); (ii) in his conviction that the notion of “three ways” is a modern “hypothesis”, Cordero does  not 
address (nor does Nehamas in his essay) an important passage from Simplicius, in Phys. 78.2-23, where the same 
“hypothesis” seems present. There Simplicius, having said that we would do well to attend to what Parmenides 
himself says about “what-is”, goes on to quote several sequences of verses, framed by the following remarks: “For, 
having found fault with those who bring what is and what is not together in the intelligible, ‘for whom to be and not 
to be are considered the same / and not the same’ [= DK 6.7-8], and having turned away from the way that seeks 
what-is-not, ‘But do you keep your thought from this way of inquiry’ [= DK 7.2], he continues, ‘Still, a solitary 
story of a way / is left, that it is, and on this there are signs / very many [= DK 8.1-3]’ and finally he transmits the 
signs of what is in the proper sense, ‘that, being ungenerated, it is also undestroyed / whole, …[the quotation 
continues through DK 8.14]”.  [μεμψάμενος γὰρ τοῖς τὸ ὂν καὶ τὸ μὴ ὂν συμφέρουσιν ἐν τῷ νοητῷ, “οἷς τὸ πέλειν τε 
καὶ οὐκ εἶναι ταὐτὸν νενόμισται / κοὐ ταὐτόν,” καὶ ἀποστρέψας τῆς ὁδοῦ τῆς τὸ μὴ ὂν ζητούσης, “ ἀλλὰ σὺ τῆσδ’ 
ἀφ’ ὁδοῦ διζήσιος εἶργε νόημα,” ἐπάγει, “μοῦνος δ’ ἔτι μῦθος ὁδοῖο / λείπεται, ὡς ἔστι. ταύτῃ δ’ ἐπὶ σήματ’ ἔασι 
/πολλὰ μάλα·” καὶ παραδίδωσι λοιπὸν τὰ τοῦ κυρίως ὄντος σημεῖα· “ὡς ἀγένητον ἐὸν καὶ ἀνώλεθρόν ἐστιν, / 
οὖλον …”] Here Simplicius himself seems to be marking off  three distinct attitudes, each accompanied by a 
quotation characterizing it, differentiated by their seeking (i) a combination of being and non-being “in the 
intelligible”; (ii) non-being (alone?); (iii) being “in the proper sense” (i.e., without non-being), and indicating that 
Parmenides rejected the first two before elaborating on the third in DK 8. That Simplicius intends a distinction 
between the first and second attitudes is suggested by the discussion that precedes the quotations, and the distinction 
perhaps appears later in the commentary when, at in Phys. 116-117, Simplicius quotes DK 2.3-8 as lines expressing 
the notion that “what is apart from what is is non-being and nothing” and most of DK 6 as “finding fault with those 
who lead the contradictories into the same”. Of course, the suggestion that the idea of multiple “ways” in 
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some such rigid dualism, Simplicius’ view of doxa as an intermediate between the highest 
condition of being and its utter privation seems more in accord with the language to which 
Cordero draws our attention. 
 Behind Simplicius’ and others’ alleged failure to appreciate the negative valuation of 
doxa lurks the other component of Cordero’s criticism: Platonism. The ease with which a reader 
may associate Parmenides’ Aletheia with the intelligible or the Doxa with the sensible betrays, 
according to Cordero, a tendency to employ anachronistic, Platonizing categories in reading the 
poem. This is, at least potentially, a separate point from the preceding claim, and its merit should 
be measured independently. The charge comes first in a general, then in a more specific form. 
“First,” Cordero claims, “such dichotomies as sensible/intelligible, being/appearance, do not 
exist in Greek thought before the Sophistic period.” (pp. 236-237) It is unclear to me what 
Cordero thinks justifies this assertion, 58  or how it could be true without the addition of 
qualifications that vitiate its validity in charging Simplicius with anachronism. The vagueness 
introduced by the wording “such dichotomies as…” makes the charge ambiguous. “Such … as” 
suggests that Cordero has in mind a class of conceptual contrasts which includes those 
specifically named (i.e., sensible/intelligible, being/appearance) but he does not indicate what the 
boundaries or defining features of that grouping might be. If “such … as” is meant to cover 
divisions that are generally or broadly similar to those given, Simplicius can respond that these 
distinctions or similar ones seem to be part of the common property of human experience, as 
Parmenides’ poem is not a modern invention does not mean that the conventional understanding of the three ways in 
the poem is correct. How well Simplicius’ divisions match the contemporary division(s) of three “ways” is an open 
question, which I must leave unaddressed here. 
58 The sentence quoted is immediately followed by: “Atomism is a paradigmatic example. When the mortals fail in 
the quest of truth, Parmenides finds fault both with the senses as well as with the intellect. In addition, the 
consequence of this failure is the production of ‘opinions’.” Since Cordero explains neither of what, precisely, nor 
how, atomism is supposed to serve as a paradigmatic example, I will not venture to interpret his remark.  As to 
Parmenides finding fault with both senses and intellect, that hardly seems a point against the existence of the 
distinction between the two.  
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pervasive as the use of language itself. Naturally, we encounter these distinctions in more and 
less sophisticated forms, and in different inflections in various cultures, but surely, from 
millennia before recorded history began, children the world over, as they have learned to play 
tricks, to make-believe, or have come to find that what looked a certain way from one 
perspective was actually otherwise, have done so with some fairly explicit recognition of the 
difference between being and appearance, or between what is perceived and what is understood 
to be the case. Cordero is presumably making the less sweeping claim that it was not until some 
point well into the fifth century B.C.E. that Greek thinkers framed this distinction in a theoretical 
way, too late for Parmenides himself to have employed it. Even this much, however, is 
historically questionable. While it is safe to say that Parmenides was active before Protagoras or 
Gorgias, we are not, given the state of the chronological record for these figures, in a position to 
say with real confidence precisely how much before.59 The argument ex silentio for the absence 
of ideas from an intellectual scene for which the available evidence is so meager is a risky one. 
The attempt to articulate the fixed being that underlies the various appearances of the world is 
often regarded as the defining feature of the whole of early Greek philosophy from Thales 
forward. Moreover, specific, pre-Parmenidean (or at any rate pre-Sophistic) expressions 
articulating the difference between genuine understanding and mere seeming to know are to be 
found in Xenophanes and Heraclitus,60 and Alcmaeon of Croton, while echoing that division, 
59 Elsewhere (Cordero (2004) pp. 5-8), Cordero expresses a preference for dating Parmenides’ birth to the late 540s, 
with Diogenes Laertius, rather than circa 515, as suggested by the dramatic setting of Plato’s Parmenides. I do not 
find the reasons there given for doubting the Platonic dating compelling, and incline for other reasons towards the 
later date, but that is separate point. That the discrepancy exists at all is an indication of how unsure our basis for 
judgment is.  
60 Xenophanes (anticipating, it appears, Parmenides’ own usage) consistently distinguished human or mortal 
“seeming” or “opinion” (dokos and dokein) from the thinking (expressed by noeein and its cognates) of his divinity 
(cf.  DK 21 B 14, 23, 24, 25, 34, and 35). Heraclitus shows a similarly low regard for dokein (in DK 22 B 17 and 
28a), a higher estimation for phronein or noos (in DK 22 B 40, 104, 113,  and 114), and an apparent preference for 
the hidden over the “apparent” (in DK 22 B 45 and 123). While it is less than obvious just how Heraclitus valued the 
testimony of the senses, he does appear to have a special attitude toward them, plainly different from his view of 
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also clearly distinguished sensation from intelligent thought.61 If Cordero’s point is more limited 
still, and he is only claiming that it was not until the Sophists’ time that the distinctions 
being/appearance and sensible/intelligible were regarded as dichotomies in a stricter sense, 
entailing that a given thing must belong to one and only one side of the division, then the 
criticism of Simplicius founders, for Simplicius, in paraphrasing the Aletheia as concerned with 
the intelligible and the Doxa as concerned with the sensible, did not view the split as 
unbridgeable. 
 This brings us to the more specific complaint: Simplicius’ notion of a “doxastic” level of 
being, claims Cordero, “does not have anything to do with the Parmenidean alternative ‘is or is 
not’ (8.16). Simplicius interprets Parmenides as if he provided an antecedent of the Divided Line 
of the Republic.” (p. 237) While Cordero is right to say that Simplicius sees Parmenides as 
providing an antecedent of Plato’s divisions, that does not seem to me as obviously unreasonable 
as Cordero assumes it to be, nor does he does develop much of an argument that it is.62 Rather 
noos (cf. DK 22 B 55, 101a and 107). In Cordero (2011b), Cordero remarks that it “is evident that among the so-
called pre-Socratic philosophers one can find “polar” schemes of thought”, citing the Pythagorean table of 
oppositions and Heraclitus, DK 22 B 45 as examples, but he insists, “in all of these cases, both parts of the 
dichotomy have a real existence. It is not that one is “being” and the other is “appearance”. The whole thing is 
different from Plato, to whom, in order to reject sophistry, everything that belongs to the realm of sensation (i.e., all 
“physical” realities) belong [sic] to the realm of “appearances,” which can only be grasped through sensations and 
therefore are the object of “opinions”.” (Cordero (2011b) p. 103) This statement helps one get a sense of what may 
lie behind Cordero’s claim that “such dichotomies […] do not exist in Greek thought before the Sophistic period”, 
but the implication that “appearances”, in Plato’s view, lack any reality, seems mistaken. It is true for both the pre-
Socratics and Plato that the objects of nous and the objects of the senses have a real existence. Plato is more clearly 
insistent that the objects of intellectual cognition are more real than sense objects, but he does not deny that a tree, 
say, really exists, and is appreciably more real than its reflection in a nearby pond. It would be misleading, likewise, 
to suggest that, in the case of Xenophanes or Heraclitus, the conceptions involved in the dokein associated with 
mortals were regarded as equally real as the thinking pointed to when they say that god thinks (noei) as a whole or 
that polymathy does not teach noos.  
61 Alcmaeon appears to echo Xenophanes’ distinction between divine and mortal modes of cognition in the opening 
of his book (DK 24 B 1), before marking off  human beings from other animals by stating that while both possess 
perception, animals do not have intelligent thought (DK  24 B 1a). His fellow Crotonian Philolaus will situate these 
faculties in separate bodily organs, making the brain the seat for nous, and locating aisthēsis in the heart (DK 44 B 
13). 
62 Something of the thinking behind the accusation may be provided in Cordero (2011b) pp. 106-107, where Cordero 
says, “it is not fair to interpret the δόξα of Parmenides in an anachronistic way, in the sense of “appearances.” ” To 
do so, Cordero claims, is to forget “that in the so-called pre-Socratic philosophy, at least until the atomists, δόξα was 
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than detailing the numerous anachronisms of which Simplicius is allegedly guilty, Cordero 
briefly sketches what he takes to be the Simplician correspondences between Parmenides and the 
Divided Line, and repeats the assertion that “Parmenides has nothing in common with these 
patterns of thought.” It ought to be pointed out, however, that the correspondences Cordero 
presents are not to be found in Simplicius, but are Cordero’s own.63 Cordero does make one 
direct reference to Simplicius’ text, saying, “Simplicius speaks explicitly: when he arrives at the 
end of the true logos (fr. 8.50), he says that Parmenides passes now from the intelligible (τὸ 
νοητόν) to the sensible (τὰ αἰσθητά), that means, from the alētheia to the doxa. (In Phys. 30, 15-
16)”.64 This distorts the point Simplicius is making if it leaves the impression that Simplicius did 
not appreciate the potential for anachronism in that identification. As we have already seen,65 in 
describing Parmenides’ move as “from the intelligible things to the sensibles, or rather, as he 
himself says, from truth to opinion”, Simplicius is displaying a clear awareness that what he, 
using Platonic terminology, is describing as the shift from ta noēta to ta aisthēta, is properly, in 
the poem’s own words, a shift from alētheia to doxa. That is, Simplicius has the historical and 
critical sense to differentiate between the terms and concepts involved. It simply happens that he 
always related to knowledge and never meant “appearance”. Y. Lafrance, who in his work on Plato’s δόξα resented 
[sic; lege “presented”?] a complete status quaestionis, wrote that, “in pre-Socratic thought the use of the terms δόξα, 
δοκεῖν and δοξάζειν appear in a context of criticism to human knowledge,” which can already be observed in 
Xenophanes (fr. 34) and in Heraclitus (fr. 28).” Not having seen Lafrance’s work, I can only point out that the 
remark quoted may be perfectly correct without supporting Cordero’s claim that connecting doxa with 
“appearances” is illegitimate. As already noted (in footnote 60), Xenophanes and Heraclitus do indeed use doxa and 
its cognates in contexts that criticize human knowing. Moreover, the former links “appearing” with mortals (DK 21 
B 35) while the latter connects the “hidden harmony” with the gods (DK 22 B 45). 
 63 Simplicius himself does not explicitly correlate conceptions from Parmenides’ poem with the portions of the 
Divided Line. The general framework within which Simplicius aims to harmonize the various views of the ancients 
is the Neoplatonic schema of grades of being. Of course, since the Neoplatonists viewed the Divided Line as an 
early expression of this framework, Cordero’s claim that Simplicius viewed Parmenides as anticipating the Divided 
Line is not necessarily misleading, but it ought to be noted that the particular correspondences that Cordero draws 
(correlating the Aletheia with the larger epistēmē portion of the Divided Line, the Doxa to the doxa portion, and, 
more doubtfully, the diakosmon eoikota of DK 8.60 with the eikasia subsection within the doxa section of the Line) 
are not actually taken from Simplicius.  
64 Cordero (2010) p. 237. The clause “when he arrives … true logos (fr. 8.50),” would be better placed after 
“Parmenides” to avoid the suggestion that “he” refers to Simplicius. 
65 See footnote 8. 
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disagrees with those who would want to claim that Parmenides and Platonists have nothing in 
common.  
 It is possible that a detailed account of the particulars of Simplicius’ interpretation might 
bring to light serious anachronisms that undermine his testimony on one or another point of 
Parmenides’ thought, and those might be numerous enough, in sum, to call his entire account 
into question, but Cordero does not provide such a critique. Instead, he summarizes his own take 
on Parmenides’ teaching, as follows: Parmenides, trying to explain the reality of ta onta, finds it 
necessary to admit that “Being is in the ὄντα”. Next, “ὄντα are not ‘appearances’ of a hidden 
being”, but “realizations of Being, because Being is not ‘elsewhere’, but ‘in’ the ὄντα: ‘you will 
not cut what is, so that to be connected to what is’ (fr. 4.2), because ‘that which is-being [now] 
touches that which is-being [now]’ (fr.8.25).”66 I am not confident that I follow the train of 
thought perfectly here, but the distinction between “appearances” as opposed to “realizations” of 
being seems to be one of the points where Cordero’s view of Parmenides differs from 
Simplicius’. According to Cordero, ὄντα are (or at least include) “physical realities”, which are 
misunderstood by Simplicius and others suffering from the “Platonic prejudice” as mere 
appearances, and thus regarded as doxai. It is this prejudice, on Cordero’s view, that leads to 
fragments about “physical realities” being included in the Doxa.67 However, as Cordero provides 
no detailed illustration of this prejudice at work, this general claim is left without real 
substantiation. Thus, while Cordero articulates something of an alternative to Simplicius’ 
interpretation of Parmenides’ ontology, his account does not amount to a refutation of 
Simplicius’ view, nor are the grounds for the charge of anachronism compelling, unless one is 
66  Cordero (2010) p. 237. The two instances of “[now]” are part of Cordero’s text. 
67 Cf. Cordero (2010) p. 240: “Only Platonizing prejudices would and do motivate and invite researchers […] to 
place everything concerning ‘physical topics’ in the section dedicated to the Doxa”. 
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already inclined to accept Cordero’s dualistic application of the “is or is not” alternative, drawn 
from the Aletheia, to the Doxa or the poem as a whole.68 
 Fortunately, detailed analyses of the differing views about Parmenides’ metaphysical 
commitments are not a prerequisite for gaining some important information about the 
composition of the Doxa from the texts of Simplicius and others, and I will happily forego such 
analyses here. In many cases, the charges of anachronism or bias are simply not pertinent to the 
evidence presented by the texts. However Simplicius viewed “physical” things, whether as onta 
in Cordero’s sense, as mere “appearances” (as Cordero claims of Simplicius), or in yet some 
other way, the question of where he found a given fragment in his text of the poem is often an 
independent one.69  
 As for Cordero’s complaints that the Doxa as constituted by our modern editors is 
incoherent, and that Simplicius and others responsible for what remains of the poem overlooked 
the strongly negative valuation of doxa or otherwise perverted the text because of Platonic 
68 As it unfolds in the paper, Cordero’s alternative view of the Doxa looks more and more problematic. A variety of 
formulations, increasingly contorted, are given of what doxai amount to on his view. First we read, “doxa consists in 
assigning some names to things, and to believe, as a consequence of this naming, that these words correspond to a 
certain reality.” (2010, p. 239) This seems a reasonably sound statement, and something with which Simplicius 
himself might well agree. The nature of the correspondence of names to reality is made more specific in what 
follows: “The error of humans consists principally in assigning real existence to opposite principles (τἀντία, 8.55), 
because one of which ‘is not the same as the other’ (8.58): fire is ‘in itself the opposite of the dark night’ (8.59).” 
(2010, p. 239) That opposites are crucial to the naming that humans do also seems right. Why these are to be called 
“principles”, however, is not clear, and what follows “because” in the sentence is opaque to me, but we soon get 
another expression of mortals’ mistake: “they do not realize that both viewpoints must partake of the fact of Being. 
If they accept the existence of both fire and night it is because both ‘are’. This duality of criteria leads them to grant 
absolute existence to these ‘forms’, because outside of them, there is nothing.” (2010, p. 240) By this point the text 
of Parmenides seems to have been overshadowed by idiosyncratic jargon that needs more explanation than it gets. 
The suggestion appears to be that mortals, ignoring the “fact of Being”, are nonetheless invested in claiming that fire 
and night are the only things endowed with “absolute” existence. If this seems quite unlike the day-to-day musings 
of most people, this is, it turns out, because Parmenides had a particular group of mortals in view. We are to imagine 
that some unknown predecessors of Parmenides “pretended to explain reality by two principles, day and night, […] 
without realizing they are contraries, and as such they are ‘absolute’ (a principle is always absolute), therefore they 
mutually revoke themselves.” (p. 240) Not only are these unhappy theoreticians ignorant of the “fact of Being”, but 
now they do not even realize that day and night are contraries!  On this understanding of the poem, the point of view 
that the Doxa allegedly aims to refute ultimately seems so unlikely that one wonders why Parmenides would bother 
combating it. 
69 I assume that Cordero does not think Simplicius’ prejudice extended so far that he willfully misinforms us about 
the text before him.   
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prejudice, his arguments in each case are less than convincing. On balance, it looks instead as 
though Cordero’s own prior convictions about Parmenides have led him to ignore important bits 
of evidence when they tell against his own view. There is, in fact, a general consensus among our 
ancient sources, who had better access to the poem than we do, aligning the Aletheia with an 
intelligible, ungenerated unity and the Doxa with a sensible multitude of generated things. 
Cordero may perhaps view the entire tradition as operating under the spell of Platonism, but this 
suspicion itself seems suspect without a more convincing story of his own to tell.  
 
Stage Three: Features of a “Physics”-free Doxa 
Although neither of the two major points of Cordero’s second stage (i.e., neither the claim of 
anomalies in the conventional Doxa, nor the allegation that Platonizing prejudice has blinded 
readers to a distinction in the poem between “physical realities” and doxai) seem to bear scrutiny 
particularly well, there are elements of the third stage of Cordero’s account, his characterization 
of what doxai look like dissociated from “physics”, that are worth heeding. As just noted,70 I 
have difficulty following Cordero very far into this characterization, but I wish to emphasize that 
his points of departure are important observations on the text as we have it. Cordero’s separation 
of “physical” truths from doxai puts into greater relief certain features of the poem’s presentation 
of the latter which might not always get the attention they deserve when the Doxa is regarded as 
a cosmology. Specifically, Cordero stresses two points: (i) where the word doxa appears in what 
is left of the poem, it is regularly mentioned in conjunction with mortals; 71 (ii) an activity 
repeatedly associated with these mortals is naming.72 Cordero insists that these points must be 
70 See footnote 68. 
71 The noun appears at DK 1.30 (which, I have argued elsewhere, represents three independent lines of the original 
poem), 8.51 and 19.1. One of the instances of “DK 1.30”, preserved by Simplicius, is followed by two additional 
lines (DK 1.31-32), including the participle dokounta and the adverb dokimōs. 
72 Cf. DK 8.38-39, 8.51-53, 8.61 with 9.1, and DK 19.  
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taken into account in any attempt to explain the Doxa. I think he is right to do so, even without 
sharing his view that doxai have nothing to do with “appearances”. 
 As Cordero interprets them, the first point, the linking of doxa with mortals, establishes 
that the “copyright” of anything the poem speaks of as doxai belongs to human beings, not to the 
goddess or to Parmenides himself.73 The second point, the association of mortals or humans with 
naming, provides a sense of what really constitutes doxa: it is something to do with mortals’ use 
or misuse of language. More specifically, “doxa consists in assigning some names to the things, 
and to believe, as a consequence of this naming, that these words correspond to a certain reality.” 
(p. 239) For Cordero, however, this naming and believing has nothing to do with “physics” or 
“appearances”.74  
While the poem certainly links doxai with mortals, it is not so obvious that Parmenides’ 
aim in repeatedly so characterizing doxai is to disclaim any involvement in doxai on his own part. 
That is not to say that we must understand Parmenides as promoting some particular set of doxai 
(which is what Cordero appears to object to when he speaks of the phrase “Doxa of Parmenides” 
as an imaginary being), but that some acquaintance with doxai, far from the truth though they 
may be, might well be part, and perhaps an important one, of the teaching that the goddess is 
73 Cordero also suggests that the mention of doxai at several places in the poem reinforces his earlier claim about the 
arbitrariness of the current reconstructions: “Contrary to what is usually said, Parmenides’ account of the doxa 
begins well before the section arbitrarily named ‘the Doxa’ (which shows once more the uncertain character of the 
present arrangement of the fragments).” (2010, p. 238) I don’t know who those are who “usually” deny that doxai 
are a concern of the poem prior to the transition to the section often called Doxa, but, granting that they are wrong to 
do so, that does not seem to amount to evidence of any uncertainty in the arrangement of text. 
74 Thus the understanding of doxa in the poem is, according to Cordero, distinctly different from the later, Platonic 
understanding of doxa: “a conjectural knowledge of the appearances, the cognitive state that ranges over ‘the 
“opinable”’ (δοξαστόν) of Plato.” I am prepared to agree with the description of “Parmenidean doxa” as quoted, but 
do not see precisely why it must be at odds with the Platonic one. 
 Cordero appears to think that the first point also tells against the association of doxai with “appearances”. 
At least, in explicating mortals’ “copyright” over doxai, he claims that “human viewpoints” offer a mistaken account 
of ta onta, doomed to fail “because it follows an erroneous method, guided by a wandering intellect and by empty 
sensations,” adding, “‘Appearances’ have nothing to do in this context.” (2010, p. 238) Again, it seems odd that 
“appearances” are supposed to be out of place in an account of human error in terms of a “wandering intellect” and 
“empty sensations”. Is it not to the intellect and the senses that appearances appear?   
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giving. After all, are not the youth, Parmenides, and his audience themselves mortal? Perhaps it 
is precisely mortals who need to hear this teaching, which amounts in some sense to a corrective 
or remedy for what is a peculiarly mortal condition. The criticisms leveled by the goddess are not 
uncommonly understood to be directed at some more or less specific targets among Parmenides’ 
predecessors or contemporaries, rival philosophers or cosmologists, but the term “mortal” 
suggests a rather wider range.75 And, while naming does indeed appear to be a conspicuous 
feature of the Doxa, not to be overlooked or dismissed lightly, the textual basis for Cordero’s 
development of this point is less evident. He connects naming, reasonably enough, with the 
dualism that the verses point to as typical of mortal speech. Detailing what that dualism entails, 
Cordero claims that “mortals” not only assign “real existence” to the opposites “fire” and “night”, 
but, not realizing the “fact of Being”, “grant absolute existence to the ‘forms’, because outside of 
them, there is nothing”. (pp. 239-240) This seems far less obvious, and to make matters worse, 
Cordero claims that (despite their supposition that there is nothing outside of those “forms”) they 
also suppose that there is, “beyond the presence of night and fire, the activity of an anonymous 
goddess responsible for ‘government’.” (p. 240) Ultimately, Cordero grants the “copyright” over 
mortal doxai to a hypothetical group of theoreticians who—otherwise unknown to us— 
“pretended to explain reality by two principles, day and night […] without realizing that they are 
contraries” (p. 240).76 The purely hypothetical status of the group and the implausibility of the 
position imputed to them make this seem like a strained attempt to maintain the supposed 
75 Cf. e.g., Burnet (1930) pp. 182-185, where the “mortals” are identified as Pythagoreans.  Coxon, while noting 
numerous instances of what he regards as references to earlier philosophers, remarks that “the subject of κατέθεντο 
[at DK 8.53] is not merely Pythagoreans but (as in [8.39]) human beings in general” (1986, p. 218). According to 
Curd, while there is no predecessor who fits the bill precisely, the goddess uses “beliefs of mortals” not to refer to 
“any belief held by a mortal human being” but as shorthand for “some particular set of beliefs or philosophic 
views.” (1998, p. 124). Jean Frère (2011), against what is claimed to be the “common opinion” that by “mortals” 
Parmenides refers to all human beings, argues for Heraclitus and the Pythagoreans as specific targets. 
76  According to Cordero, it seems that only DK 8, 9, 12, and 19 preserve traces of those views. Cf. Cordero (2011b) 
pp. 104-106.  
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separation between the Parmenidean and Platonic notions of doxa, and thus the distinction 
between “non-doxastic physical texts” and “doxastic” ones. 
 Aside from these points, it remains unclear why the Doxa would be a part of the poem 
and what it amounted to. The changes Cordero proposes would remove most of the fragments 
generally placed there, leaving only DK 9, 12, and 19 after the end of DK 8. Given that all these 
come from Simplicius, who Cordero says was so grossly mistaken in his understanding of the 
poem, our prospects for recovering the authentic Doxa seem even dimmer than on the standard 
reconstruction. 
 
Stage Four: Restored “Physical Truths” 
Even if some of the motivation for Cordero’s alternative to the standard arrangement seems to 
have been undercut in the foregoing, it may still be worthwhile to consider his proposed changes 
briefly. As already mentioned, most of the fragments concerned are those from sources that 
provide relatively little information about their placement in the poem. Might some of the 
material in Diels-Kranz’s Doxa belong to the Aletheia?  
Of the fragments normally included in the Doxa, Cordero departs from the DK 
arrangement by placing DK 10 and 11, 13-15, and 17 and 18, in that order, before DK 6, and in 
placing DK 16 either after DK 6 or before DK 4.77 As already mentioned, for at least one of 
these fragments (DK 13), Simplicius’ text tells directly against this arrangement.78 For the most 
part, however, the sources for these fragments give no very clear indication of where the lines 
77 Cordero does not mention DK 15a, so it is not clear what he intends to do with this one-word fragment. In 
addition to the changes to the material from the standard Doxa, he also places DK 4 after DK 5, although he seems 
uncommitted to a precise location for DK 5 itself (see p. 244). The placement of DK 16 is unclear. In the main body 
of the paper (pp. 243-244), Cordero seems to settle on a placement before DK 4, but the presentation in the appendix 
(p. 245) gives DK 16 between DK 6 and DK 7. In Cordero (2011b) DK 6 and 16 are placed, in that order, before DK 
4 and the texts relocated from the Doxa. 
78 See page 136 with footnote 35, above.  I have also said (in footnote 44) that Brandis’ placement of DK 11 in the 
Doxa also reflects Simplicius’ text. I will justify that claim presently, with more to say in the following sections. 
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quoted stood in the poem. This state of affairs is the basis for Cordero’s claim that we are 
allowed “total liberty to place the ‘physical texts’ that are non-doxastic […] anywhere (subject to 
one constraint […])”. (pp. 242-243) Although this must be said to be an oversimplification, it is 
an understandable reaction to the evidence, particularly as one generally encounters it in the form 
of extracts presented in DK. Nevertheless, a brief survey of the sources for the fragments in 
question will show that such evidence as there is lends its support to the standard arrangement 
rather than to Cordero’s.  
Constraints on the Reconstruction. The “one constraint” mentioned is inferred from the verses 
of the poem themselves rather than the testimony of the quoting sources. Cordero’s account of it 
unfortunately relies on several questionable assumptions, and is, I think, ultimately mistaken, but 
the error is an instructive one if we consider it carefully. The argument is this: because DK 8.51 
marks a transition from a discussion of realities to mere doxai, the texts presenting “physical 
truths” must have preceded that transition. Further, since Cordero (like many others) takes DK 7 
and 8 as an uninterrupted stretch of text, they must have preceded DK 7 also. Cordero’s 
collection of non-doxastic, physical texts is therefore placed between DK 4 and DK 6,79 before 
DK 7-8. Cordero finds confirmation of this placement in the goddess’ mention of a “much-
contending elenchos” in DK 7.5-6: “It is precisely the narration before the present fr. 7 of the 
physical events that is alluded to in the phrase πολύδηριν ἔλεγχον (7.5), that ‘has been 
announced’ (ῥηθέντα). […] We must note that in the present state of the reconstruction of the 
text, there is not any ἔλεγχος (controversial or not) before fr. 7. This ἔλεγχος, surely, must be 
placed before fr. 7.” (p. 243)  
 There are problems at each step of this argument. In the first place, even if we grant that 
the texts at issue are obvious examples of “non-doxastic” truths, we are not provided any reason 
79 In Cordero (2011b), they are placed between DK 4 and 7 (with DK 6 and 16 preceding DK 4). 
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for believing that each and every mention of such truths must have happened before the 
transition at DK 8.51. On any reconstruction, our ignorance about what the poem looked like 
following that transition is vast, and our grounds for excluding material from that portion of the 
poem virtually non-existent. Next, the common assumption that DK 7 and 8 constitute an 
unbroken stretch of text may very well be, as noted earlier, an unfortunate accident in the modern 
history of the reconstruction of the text. The ancient sources preserve the bulk of DK 7 as part of 
the opening of the poem, not as a text continuous with DK 8. This bears repeating, given how 
unquestioned the DK reading has become. Part of the case in favor of the DK arrangement 
(against Diels’ earlier—and better—judgment to keep Sextus Empiricus’ proem more or less 
intact and to print only two lines, equivalent to DK 7.1-2, as fragment 7) has been an appeal, 
much like that Cordero makes in confirmation of his arrangement, to the supposed “fact” that the 
elenchos mentioned by the goddess has already been “uttered” (rhēthenta). In DK 7.5-6, which 
are lines 34-35 of the beginning of the poem as Sextus quotes it, the goddess appears to invite the 
youth narrating the poem to “judge, by logos, the contentious elenchos spoken by me.”80 It 
seemed to earlier generations of scholars that such a reference was out of place in the proem, 
which contains no such elenchos in the preceding lines. Accordingly, they argued for the 
relocation of the final lines of Sextus’ proem to DK 7. Cordero’s suggestion to provide some of 
the “missing” elenchos with the “physical” fragments is an ingenious attempt to fill the 
imaginary lacuna, but it is necessary, in judging both his claims and those of earlier scholars, to 
appreciate that the tense of the participle rhēthenta does not, as they suggest, establish an 
absolute time by which the “proof” has been spoken, but simply indicates that it will have been 
80 κρῖναι δὲ λόγῳ πολύδηριν ἔλεγχον / ἐξ ἐμέθεν ῥηθέντα. In fact, as Sextus actually quotes it, the elenchos is 
πολύπειρον (“of much-experience”; “much-trying”) rather than πολύδηριν (“much-contending, “controversial”). 
πολύδηριν is a correction made from Diogenes Laertius. For an alternative construal of these lines, see Kurfess 
(forthcoming).  
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spoken by the goddess by the time the youth might judge it. We are not, from the participle alone, 
in a position to conclude anything more about the timing of the elenchos. It thus cannot confirm 
the placement of the lines which Cordero thinks constitute that elenchos, nor provide 
straightforward guidance on where to place them in our reconstruction.81 
Beyond showing that the text at this point provides no real constraint on the placement of 
the fragments in question, consideration of this example helps to highlight a problem with using 
the verses themselves as a guide to ordering the fragments. Any ambiguity in what is a 
notoriously problematic poem provides an opportunity to slip into reading one’s own 
presuppositions into the poem. Flattering though it may be to think that we have better insight 
into Parmenides’ thought than did Simplicius, Theophrastus, Proclus or other figures in the 
ancient tradition, it behooves us to remember that, even for the worst readers and thinkers of the 
lot, their access to the poem was superior to our own. When their text or interpretation appears to 
conflict with ours, we ought to reconsider the bases for our own reading before dismissing theirs 
as mistaken. It is all too easy to avoid inconvenient readings by invoking a source’s habit of 
quoting from memory, tendency to rely on second-hand information, or bent for being too 
blinded by doctrinal prejudices to see what seems to us clearly stated in the text. Granted, all of 
these complications, as well as scribal corruption and even deliberate tampering or 
misrepresentation, may be met with in our readings of the sources for Presocratic philosophy, but 
the various alternatives ought to be considered carefully before we draw our conclusions. In 
piecing together Parmenides’ text, it is helpful to differentiate between suggestions about 
placement drawn from the verses themselves and other indications provided by the authors who 
quote the fragments. Both sorts of information are needed, but the second, though not without its 
81 Cordero’s additional claim, that the “physical truths” of his reconstruction fit the goddess’ description of her 
speech as a “controversial proof” because “it is a polemic against what one says, ‘the opinions’” (2010, p. 243) 
seems truer, on Cordero’s view, of the fragments he considers parts of the Doxa than the fragments he relocates.   
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potential problems, generally provides more straightforward guidance. Cordero’s “constraint” is 
an example of the former type, and of the problems that come with it. Simplicius’ references, by 
contrast, are often helpful instances of the second type. We need not be committed to Simplicius’ 
interpretation to admit that, when he says that the lines of DK 12 followed “a little after” DK 
8.61, we have decisive evidence on the relative placement of two of the fragments. It is a sounder 
strategy for reconstructing the poem to limit ourselves, initially, to evidence of the second type. 
This is apt to provide a guide for the layout of the text less influenced by whatever prejudices or 
shortcomings the quoting authors had, or we ourselves may have, as readers. Little evidence of 
this type will be as clear as Simplicius’, but the distinction is a useful one. Since Cordero’s 
placement of what he regards as “physical truths” within the Aletheia relies on indications of the 
first sort, the result often appears unpersuasive if one is not already inclined to share his views on 
a number of highly controversial points of interpretation.    
Survey of the Sources. I have already let on that, even absent the supposed “one constraint” that 
Cordero mentions, we are not entitled to quite the liberty that he claims we are when it comes to 
placing the fragments in question. Closer attention to the sources of those fragments reveals a 
few fairly clear indications of placement overlooked by Cordero, as well as other material which, 
if not absolutely decisive on the matter, seems to support the more traditional arrangement. 
Cordero, on Simplicius’ testimony (of the second sort), includes DK 9, 12 and 19 in the 
Doxa. We have also seen that Simplicius clearly links DK 13 with DK 12, treating the divinity of 
12.3 as the one who devises Eros first of all the gods.82 Among the other sources for DK 13, 
Plato has Phaedrus quote the line in the Symposium as what Parmenides says about genesis,83 
82 See footnote 35. 
83 Plato, Symposium 178b9-11. Coxon’s claims (1986, p. 243) that Plato regards Genesis (capitalized and personified) 
as the subject of μητίσατο and that Aristotle ignores the personification, seem overconfident, despite the parallels 
that he adduces for the construction. Cf. Dover (1980) p. 91.  
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while in Plutarch’s Amatorius the verse is quoted as what Parmenides wrote “in the 
cosmogony”.84 Cordero’s placement of DK 13 among his “physical truths” seems a mistake, and, 
unless we imagine this to be one of the lines repeated in Parmenides’ poem (and I know of no 
particular reason to do so), it does not look good for Cordero’s thesis of a “physics” within the 
Aletheia that a line known from Simplicius to be in the Doxa is cited in Plutarch as from “the 
cosmogony”.  
Simplicius is also the source for DK 11, which Cordero regards as “completing” the 
enumeration of the topics of Parmenidean physics begun in DK 10. (p. 241) The fragment is 
quoted at in Cael. 559, introduced by the remark, “Parmenides, having begun to speak about the 
perceptibles, says: ‘how earth and sun and moon […].”85 While Simplicius does not directly 
connect the lines of DK 11 with other lines from the poem, since we have seen elsewhere that 
Simplicius considers DK 8.50-51 as marking the transition from the intelligible (to noēton) to the 
sensibles or perceptibles (ta aisthēta),86 this comment is a clear enough indication that DK 11 
comes from somewhere towards the beginning of the Doxa. Immediately following the quotation, 
Simplicius adds, “And he sets out the coming to be of things that come to be and perish up to the 
parts of animals.”87 This seems more or less in line with Plutarch’s reference to a “cosmogony”, 
again suggesting that the common placement of the “physical” texts in the Doxa is correct. 
DK 10, which does cover very similar ground to DK 11, comes from Clement of 
Alexandria. He provides almost no context, but there might be a hint about placement in the little 
84 Plutarch, Amatorius 756E. Eros is there spoken of as the oldest of “Aphrodite’s works”, but that need not be taken, 
as Coxon and others do, to mean that Plutarch regarded Aphrodite as the subject of the verb. In the context in which 
the line is quoted, it is clear that Plutarch (as a character in the dialogue) is taking interpretative liberties with the 
texts he is quoting.  
85 Mueller (2009) p. 33. Mueller’s translation here adopts an emendation to Simplicius’ text, but the textual 
difficulty involved does not affect the point at issue here.   
86 See footnote 8 and page 149 above.  
87 Mueller (2009) p. 33. “As far as the parts of the animals” (μέχρι τῶν μορίων τῶν ζῴων) is an interesting detail, to 
which we will return below. 
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that he does say. Clement begins his quotation by saying, “Having come, then, to the true study, 
let him who wishes hear Parmenides the Eleatic, promising: ‘You will know…”88 While the 
“true study” (alēthēs mathēsis) that Clement has in mind as a proper propaedeutic to Parmenides’ 
promises is Christian doctrine, I suspect that he also intends an allusion to Parmenides’ Aletheia, 
only after which came the topics that DK 10 goes on to mention. This is of course not in itself 
decisive evidence on where to place the lines of DK 10, but it fits well with the other evidence 
about the major parts of the poem, and is supported by the close ties in content between DK 10 
and 11 (which Simplicius, we have just observed, took from the Doxa).  
Plutarch, who is the sole source for both DK 14 and 15, makes still more problems for 
Cordero’s arrangement, which takes for granted that “nothing suggests that in the case of the 
isolated verses 13, 14, 15 we are being offered mere doxai.” (p. 241) In making this claim, 
Cordero appears to have in mind only the verses themselves, not the contexts in which they are 
quoted. Trying at present to keep to evidence of the second type, we may consider whether the 
verses themselves show signs characteristic of the Doxa separately. With respect to the contexts, 
not only is Cordero’s claim untrue for DK 13, but Plutarch quotes DK 14 while speaking of the 
moonlight as an example of things that exist by way of participation in something more enduring, 
having just referred to such entities as doxastic. 89 DK 15 is quoted twice in other works of 
Plutarch’s corpus, once directly connected with the phrase allotrion phos of DK 14, and it is 
understood on both occasions as an expression of the moon’s subordinate or derivative status.90 
88 Clement, Strom. V.14.138.  
89 See adv. Colot. 1115c -1116a, noting particularly doxaston at 1115d. In this passage, Plutarch’s principal point of 
contention with the Epicurean Colotes (who had written against Parmenides, and all other non-Epicurean 
philosophers, claiming that they made it impossible to live) is that viewing the moon, say, as of a different order 
than Being itself does not entail an outright rejection of the of the sensible world. 
90 See Quaestiones Romanae 282 a-b and de facie quae in orbe lunae apparet 929a-b.  
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Though this is all indirect evidence for their placement in the poem, it does associate these 
fragments with one another and with doxai.  
Perhaps nothing very certain can be gleaned from the four sources that quote DK 16, 
which, as Cordero points out, other scholars have also argued belongs to the Aletheia rather than 
the Doxa.91 The fragment appears in book Γ of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, in Theophrastus’ de 
Sensibus, and in two commentaries on Aristotle’s work, one by Alexander of Aphrodisias (c. 200 
C.E.), the other by the Neoplatonist Asclepius (6th century C.E.). Neither of the two commentators 
appears to have looked at Parmenides’ lines independently of Aristotle’s quotation of them. We 
will return to Theophrastus’ passage in the following section, so for the moment it will be 
sufficient to say that it provides no explicit information on where the lines were found in the 
poem, but mentions them as the place in Parmenides’ poem that provides the closest thing to an 
account of how sensation occurs, suggesting that sensation varies according to the predominance 
of one or the other element in a blend of the two opposites hot and cold.92 The blending of 
opposites, until we discover some actual evidence for such a topic within the Aletheia, seems on 
balance to favor placing the lines in the Doxa, as does Theophrastus’ additional remark that a 
corpse, lacking the hot, perceives only cold and silence, in light of the connection that Cordero 
rightly emphasizes between mentions of doxai and mortality.93 Aristotle’s passage, sometimes 
91 Cordero refers specifically (2010, p. 231) to Loenen (1959) and Hershbell (1970).   
92 Most of Theophrastus’ passage is printed as DK 28 A 46. While Theophrastus does not refer directly to the 
location of the lines in the poem, it is implausible to suggest, as Hershbell does, that this or Theophrastus’ “repeated 
complaint about Parmenides, ὅλως οὐδὲν ἀφώρικεν and οὐδὲν ἔτι διώρικεν, may be based on lack of information 
about Parmenides’ poem.” (1970, pp. 6-7)  
93 This perhaps surprising bit of information should be compared with Simplicius’ remarks following his quotation 
of B 13 (making reference to the divinity of DK 12.3): “He claims she is the cause of the gods, too, saying, 
‘Firstmost she devised Eros of all the gods’ and what follows. He also claims that she sends the souls at one time 
from the manifest to the unseen, at another time back again.  I am compelled to go on about these things at length on 
account of the widespread current ignorance of the ancient writings.”[καὶ τὰς ψυχὰς πέμπειν ποτὲ μὲν ἐκ τοῦ 
ἐμφανοῦς εἰς τὸ ἀειδές, ποτὲ δὲ ἀνάπαλίν φησιν. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν διὰ τὴν πολλὴν νῦν ἄγνοιαν τῶν παλαιῶν 
γραμμάτων μηκύνειν ἀναγκάζομαι.] (in Phys  39.17-21) The student of the Doxa wishes that Simplicius had felt 
inclined to go on at least a little longer. Though ἀειδής is generally “formless” rather than “invisible” (for which 
reason Coxon presumably prints ἀιδές where ἀειδές appears in Diels’ text), Simplicius may be preserving 
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regarded as the source for Theophrastus’ quotation of the fragment, actually presents a different 
text at several points.94 Aristotle quotes the lines to show that Parmenides, like others, including 
Democritus, Empedocles, Anaxagoras and Homer, assumed that knowledge was sense-
perception. He gives no indication of the lines’ location in the poem, making no further reference 
to Parmenides’ views specifically.95 
Finally, there are two embryological fragments, DK 17 and 18. DK 17 is a single verse 
found in Galen, from a context which specifies only that in “boys on the right, girls on the left”, 
the right and left in question are the sides of the womb on which the male and female offspring 
are conceived or develop. DK 18 is a six-line fragment in Latin that the context presents, not 
particularly convincingly, as a description of the circumstances at conception that lead to 
homosexual or effeminate male offspring.96 The source, On Chronic Diseases, is an adaptation, 
in large part a translation, by Caelius Aurelianus of a Greek medical work by the physician 
Soranus of Ephesus. While Aurelianus has been good enough to translate the fragment into Latin 
Parmenides’ usage, which could antedate the lexical distinction. If Parmenides used ἀειδής to mean “unseen”, this 
might explain the appearance of the form in Plato at Phaedo 79a4 (where Burnet prefers to read ἀιδῆ rather than 
ἀειδῆ; see Burnet (1911) p. 68 of his “Notes”).   
94 Among other variants, the first line in Aristotle’s quotation has the phrase μελέων πολυκάμπτων, while the text in 
Theophrastus is μελέων πολυπλάγκτων. Coxon comments that Theophrastus “clearly has his master’s argument and 
citation before him, but quotes the lines for a different purpose and from an independent text.” (1986, p. 247) The 
general tendency is to view Theophrastus’ quotation as the more accurate (see, e.g., Tarán (1965) pp. 169-170; 
Coxon (1986) p. 4; Palmer (2009) pp. 386-387; and Kahn (1994) pp.17-24 on the relation generally). I agree with 
the general assessment of their accuracy, but I am not quite convinced that Theophrastus had Aristotle’s text before 
him.  
 One alternative, given that the different adjectives paired with μελέων looks like a possible instance of the 
sort of repetition with variation that I think Parmenides engages in conspicuously elsewhere (see Part One, and 
footnotes  57 and 71  above), may be that Theophrastus and Aristotle were quoting different lines of the original 
poem. Another alternative (which, for reasons that will require a lengthy treatment elsewhere, I believe is closer to 
the truth) is that Aristotle had Theophrastus’ book before him. There is, I suspect, much material of Theophrastan 
origin hidden unacknowledged in Aristotle’s surveys of earlier thinkers. Scholars tend to take for granted that the 
commonalities between the two authors are due to Theophrastus’ reception of the “master’s” thought, generally 
ignoring the possibility that Theophrastus may have influenced Aristotle as well. 
95 It is difficult therefore to sympathize with Hershbell’s claim, “Mansfeld’s contention that Aristotle quoted B16 
from memory, whereas Theophrastus had a copy of the whole poem, is difficult to understand.  Given the evidence, 
one can as convincingly maintain that Theophrastus quoted B16 from memory whereas Aristotle had a full copy of 
the poem.” (Hershbell (1970) p. 7)   
96 Diels took the lines as referring to hermaphroditism instead. In his edition of Caelius’ work, Drabkin (1950, p. 903, 
n. 9) refers to Wilamowitz’s argument against Diels in Sappho u. Simonides, p. 72.  
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hexameters approximating Parmenides’ style,97 there is no indication of where the lines featured 
in the original poem, which he describes as Parmenides’ “books on nature”. That he refers to the 
fragment itself as an “epigram” may be a sign that he knew the lines only from Soranus’ work. 
These contexts offer no definitive suggestions about placement, but Galen does inform us of the 
embryological import of DK 17, which might otherwise have escaped us. It is simplest, absent 
better guidance from the sources, to suppose that these fragments are related to the pairings of 
male and female mentioned in DK 12, and thus to consider them part of the Doxa.98  
While in some cases the evidence for placing these fragments in the Doxa is certainly 
slimmer than others, in none of the sources is there any positive hint for placing any of them 
within the Aletheia. There seems to be nothing, then, to support Cordero’s hypothesis of a 
“physical” section within the “Way of Truth”, and it seems sounder to keep the material in the 
Doxa.  
 
An Opinion about Parmenides’ Doxa 
I mentioned at the beginning of this essay that I shared with Cordero a conviction that something 
in the standard presentation of the Doxa was incorrect. In what remains I will indicate what I 
think a couple of the mistakes are, and what this might mean for how we ought to read 
Parmenides’ poem.  
Something Else We Owe to Simplicius. Like Cordero, I believe that DK has inherited from its 
antecedents a number of errors in the reconstruction of the poem and that a second look at the 
97 “cuius quia graecum est epigramma, et hoc versibus intimabo.  latinos enim ut potui simili modo composui ne 
linguarum ratio misceretur.” (Drabkin (1950) p. 902)  
98 I do not know that either fragment presents claims that Cordero would want to insist upon as “physical truths”. 
Those who aim to promote Parmenides’ positive contributions to natural science are more likely to cite his reputed 
astronomical discoveries than his embryological speculations. 
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sources for the fragments is required to correct them. Contrary to Cordero, however, I do not find 
fault with the placement of DK 10, 11, or any of the other fragments generally assigned to the 
Doxa (including DK 16). The totality of the ancient evidence supports the placement of these 
fragments in the latter part of the poem, and it does not seem to me that Cordero has provided 
persuasive reasons to reconsider their placement. Where DK and other arrangements go astray, I 
suggest, is in what they leave out of the Doxa.99  
 Since the publications of Peyron and Brandis in the early nineteenth century, editions of 
the fragments have made use of material from not only Simplicius’ in Phys. but his in Cael. as 
well. As already mentioned, DK 11 and 19 are known from the in Cael. alone. The same passage 
99 This is perhaps the point to register a disagreement with another proposal for moving material from one part of the 
poem to the other. John Palmer has recently praised Theodor Ebert’s revival (in Ebert (1989)) of a suggestion by 
Guido Calogero for the relocation of DK 8.34-41 from the Aletheia to the Doxa, following DK 8.52. Palmer calls the 
emendation “the most important advance in Parmenidean textual criticism in recent years” (2009, p. 352) and scolds 
scholars for not having taken sufficient notice of it. Ebert argues that relocating the lines eliminates the strangeness 
of finding remarks about mortal opinions in the middle of the series of arguments of DK 8 and that it resolves a 
number of  supposed problems with the transition from DK 8.52 to 8.53. Such arguments are in my view only 
persuasive if we can assure ourselves that Parmenides did not intend for his audience to find something strange 
about his verses. Unassured as I am that Parmenides was seeking to arrange everything as unproblematically as 
possible, I do not find those arguments convincing. There are however, other considerations (evidence of the second 
sort according to the distinction made above) which supposedly support the relocation. For those disinclined to 
doubt the standard ordering based on Simplicius’ text, Palmer adds, “We know, however, from the end of Sextus 
Empiricus’ long quotation of the opening of Parmenides’ poem (S.E. M. 7.111) that in later antiquity the text of 
Parmenides was capable of falling into serious disorder. It is crucially telling, moreover, that in none of the many 
quotations from Parmenides fr. 8 by other ancient authors does v. 34 follow v. 33, v. 42 follow v. 41, or v. 53 follow 
52. Ebert’s effort to make scholars recognize that vv. 34-41 have suffered transposition within fr. 8 should not be 
allowed to pass into oblivion like Calogero’s original proposal. Unfortunately, editions appearing since the 
publication of Ebert’s study have inexcusably failed to take account of it.” (2009, p. 354) 
  Since in these points Palmer touches on our present concern with taking a proper account of the ancient 
evidence for the poem, it is worth addressing them briefly here. As to the first point, while errors in transmission are 
always a possibility, the “serious disorder” of Sextus’ text is, as I have argued elsewhere and shall touch on 
immediately below, an example of the hazards of meddling by overconfident editors rather than the errors of scribes, 
and the lines of the proem should be kept in the order in which Sextus gives them. In any case, a problem with 
Sextus’ text would not tell us anything about the quality of Simplicius’. Palmer’s other point, that “in none of the 
many quotations from Parmenides fr. 8 by other ancient authors does v. 34 follow v. 33, v. 42 follow v. 41, or v. 53 
follow 52”, deserves some scrutiny. Since some portion or other of DK 8 is quoted on dozens of occasions by 
perhaps as many as fifteen authors, this initially sounds like weighty evidence indeed. If all of the other authors who 
quote from the fragment are in agreement against Simplicius, then we may have to allow that his text was faulty here. 
What Palmer neglects to mention, however, is that of those “many quotations” from DK 8 from authors other than 
Simplicius, not only is it true that in none of them does DK 8.34 follow 8.33, or 8.42 follow 8.41, or 8.53 follow 
8.52, but in fact none of them quotes either DK 8.33 or DK 8.34, none of them quotes DK 8.42 or 8.41, and none of 
them quotes DK 8.52 or 8.53. That is, Simplicius is the only source for any of the relevant lines. The “crucially 
telling” evidence against the order of the lines in Simplicius’ text, it turns out, is at most the absence, in texts that we 
do not have, of evidence confirming his ordering.  
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from which those fragments come also provides four and a half lines which editors have 
universally, as far as I am aware, taken as lines 28-32 of the proem. This is understandable, given 
that the first two and a half lines of Simplicius’ quotation are a close match for lines 28b-30 of 
the proem preserved by Sextus. Nevertheless, I think that the identification is an error. The lines 
are a close match, but not an exact one: in what are imagined to be two versions of DK 1.29 (that 
is, the twenty-ninth line of the proem), Simplicius and Sextus give different adjectives modifying 
the noun Ἀληθείης.100 Moreover, the two additional lines that follow in Simplicius’ text do not 
feature in Sextus’ proem, and editors are wrong to add them.101 The proper place for the lines 
quoted by Simplicius is, I submit, in the Doxa, as part of a second proem there. The assumption 
that Simplicius’ quotation is from Sextus’ proem, that is, from toward the beginning of the entire 
poem, adds difficult and unnecessary problems to what is already a puzzling enough text. Both 
the text and meaning of the two unparalleled lines in Simplicius are intensely debated, as is the 
question of the proper reading of the adjective modifying “Truth” in the lines that precede them. 
Placing Simplicius’ quotation in the Doxa instantly resolves the latter impasse (for when we no 
longer assume that Simplicius’ and Sextus’ quotations come from the same place in the poem, 
the conflict over which source preserves the right reading vanishes), and may provide us a better 
foundation on which to discuss the former. 
 But why place them in the Doxa? Simply put, because it is the Doxa that Simplicius 
seems to have in mind in the passage that supplies us those lines, along with DK 11 and 19. Let 
us consider his text. The passage comes from early in Simplicius’ commentary on the third book 
100 Ἀληθείης is εὐπειθέος, “persuasive”, in Sextus’ proem (and in a few other authors), but εὐκυκλέος, “well-
wheeled”, in Simplicius’ lines. Proclus in his commentary on the Timaeus provides a couplet with yet another 
adjective, εὐφεγγέος (“brilliant”), among other variants. The identification of Proclus’ couplet with DK 1.29-30 is, I 
believe, also mistaken. Cf. footnote 71. 
101 This intrusive addition to the proem helps to contribute to the widespread acceptance, mentioned earlier, of the 
division of Sextus’ quotation into two parts, with the lines of the second part transferred into DK 7. See above, 
footnotes 46 and 71. 
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of Aristotle’s de Caelo. Aristotle, having discussed in the prior books of his treatise the nature of 
the eternal, unaltering material of the heavenly bodies, and turning now to the sublunary simple 
bodies that are subject to change, observes that treating the elements involved in coming-to-be 
assumes the existence of such change. On this point, Aristotle says, some of those who “earlier 
philosophized about the truth” expressed opposing views, and “those about Parmenides and 
Melissus” are named as examples of thinkers who generally abolished coming-to-be, saying that 
nothing that is comes to be or passes away, but only seems (dokein) to us to do so. Aristotle 
deftly avoids dealing with these figures in detail by saying that, even if they speak well in other 
respects, they must not be considered to be speaking physikōs, that is, in a manner suitable to the 
study of nature. Their concerns properly belong to a different and prior study. 102   In his 
commentary on Aristotle’s remarks, Simplicius explains the views of Parmenides and Melissus 
as follows:103  
 those men hypothesised a double reality (hupostasis), one consisting of what really is, the 
intelligible, the other of what comes to be, the perceptible, something which they did not 
think it right to call being without qualification, but only apparent being [δοκοῦν ὄν]. And 
so Parmenides says [φησι] that truth concerns being, and opinion [δόξαν] what comes to be. 
For he says [λέγει γοῦν ὁ Παρμενίδης]: 
 
    You should learn all things,  
          both the unshaken heart of well-rounded truth   
102 Aristotle continues, “Those men, because they did not, on the one hand, suppose that anything existed apart from 
the substance (ousia) of perceptible things, and were, on the other hand, the first to intuit any natures of that sort [i.e., 
natures that do not come to be or pass away], if in fact there will be cognition (gnosis) or being mindful (phronein), 
thus transferred the arguments from there [i.e., the higher study] to these things [i.e., perceptible things].” (de Caelo 
III. 1298b21-24) Simplicius is uncomfortable with the suggestion that Parmenides and Melissus supposed that only 
the substance of perceptible things existed and addresses this point in his commentary. Since it is not essential to 
understanding the arrangement of the fragments, I will not dwell on this curious point here, but an awareness of this 
concern is needed to make some sense of Simplicius’ remarks in the final paragraph in the passage quoted below. 
103 Simplicius, in Cael. 557.21–558.17, as translated in Mueller (2009) pp. 31-32, with material in brackets added. In 
order to follow Simplicius’ train of thought adequately, we must recognize that he is quoting texts that feature 
Parmenides’ use of doxa and related words in order to illustrate Aristotle’s reference to the distinction Parmenides 
and Melissus drew between being and seeming (dokein). Mueller’s translation obscures Simplicius’ illustration by 
using too wide a range of translations for those terms for the English reader to see the connection between them, and 
further confuses things by using “belief” to translate both doxa and pistis in Parmenides’ verses, despite the repeated 
rejections of the combination of those terms in the poem.  To mitigate this, the Greek for these and other expressions 
which deserve attention is provided in brackets. 
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          and the opinions [δόξας] of mortals in which there is no true belief [πίστις]. 
          But nevertheless you must also learn these things: how things which are  
   believed [τὰ δοκοῦντα] 
          should be acceptably [δοκίμως], since they permeate all things everywhere.  
             [DK 1.28-32] 
 
 But also [ἀλλὰ καὶ], having completed his account of what really is and being about to 
explain perceptibles, he says [ἀλλὰ καὶ συμπληρώσας τὸν περὶ τοῦ ὄντως ὄντος λόγον καὶ 
μέλλων περὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν διδάσκειν ἐπήγαγεν]: 
   
            Here I end my trustworthy account and thinking  
            about truth; hereafter learn the opinions [δόξας] of mortals,  
            listening to the deceptive ordering of my words. [DK 8.50-52] 
  
 And in setting out the ordering of perceptibles, he again says [παραδοὺς δὲ τὴν τῶν 
αἰσθητῶν διακόσμησιν ἐπήγαγε πάλιν]: 
   
           Indeed in this way, as belief has it [κατὰ δόξαν, according to doxa], these things 
  were born and now are 
            and hereafter they will grow and reach an end;  
           for them humans have laid down a name, a distinctive one for each. [DK 19.1-3] 
 
 So in what sense did Parmenides, who philosophized in this way about the intelligible, 
assume that only perceptible things exist – this is now an extraordinary charge to make. 
And how did he transfer things which fit intelligibles to perceptibles when he clearly sets 
out the unity of the intelligible, which really exists, and the ordering of the perceptibles, 
each separately, and does not think it right to apply the word ‘being’ to the perceptible? 
 
In this passage, Simplicius quotes three selections from the poem, typically identified as 
indicated in the bracketed references to DK. Mueller so identifies each of the fragments in his 
endnotes, duly remarking that DK 19, like the second sentence of the lines identified as “DK 
1.28-30”, is quoted only here. 104 DK 19 is typically placed at the end of the collection of 
fragments deemed authentic by Diels because of the comment with which Simplicius introduces 
the lines. 105  Similarly, Simplicius helpfully identifies his second selection (DK 8.50-52) as 
coming from the transition from the discussion of the intelligible to that of the sensibles, and, 
104 See Mueller (2009) p. 124, nn. 26, 27 and 29. 
105 A better translation, given the aorist tense of the participle παραδοὺς and the verb ἐπήγαγε, would be “after 
having handed down the ordering (diakosmesis) of the perceptibles, he again went on”. 
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thanks to his lengthy quotations of DK 8 in the Physics commentary, we have a comparatively 
good grasp on what the poem looked like at that point. As for the lines tagged as “DK 1.28-32”, 
it is worth stressing that Simplicius does not, as he is sometimes claimed to do, attribute these 
lines to the goddess, nor does he tell us that he took them from the proem, or otherwise make any 
sort of overt reference to where these lines were situated in Parmenides’ poem. 
 Even without an explicit reference to their location, however, one might easily imagine 
that we are justified in identifying the verses of the first quotation with the similar lines in 
Sextus’ proem. After all, Simplicius first quotes the lines in question, then goes on to quote from 
the end of Aletheia, and finishes up by quoting DK 19, generally taken as the end of the Doxa if 
not the whole poem. This is, I grant, a natural enough assumption, and, given that I am claiming 
that we ought to place the lines in the Doxa, my suggestion might seem at odds with the 
sequence in which the texts are quoted, since the second of the three texts that Simplicius quotes 
would have to have come from an earlier point in the poem than the first one. Were that so, 
Simplicius might have mentioned the fact.  
 Actually, while he is not very explicit about it, Simplicius does give a subtle indication of 
just such an ordering. Mueller’s translation unfortunately obscures it by rendering each of the 
verbs with which Simplicius introduces the three quotations with “he says”. It is actually only the 
first quotation, the lines that I would like to put in the Doxa, which Simplicius introduces with 
“he says”. Before each of the other two quotations, it is not λέγει that introduces them, but 
ἐπήγαγε(ν), “he continued” or “he went on”.106 The shift in tense between the verb introducing 
the first quotation and the verb introducing the second reflects, I propose, Simplicius’ turning 
back to an earlier point in the poem. The sentence introducing the third quotation then simply 
106 Cf. the translation of McKirahan (in Coxon (2009) p. 232) where each instance of ἐπήγαγε(ν) is translated 
“continues” (present tense).  
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carries on with the newly established tense. That is, for the main point about Parmenides’ dual 
attitude toward the two “hypostases”, Simplicius quotes lines that provide its clearest articulation, 
taken from somewhere near the beginning of the Doxa (where, in addition to echoing lines of the 
proem, Parmenides adds the two additional lines particularly concerned with doxai) with “At any 
rate, Parmenides says”. The use of the present tense “says” in relating the thought or words of an 
author (even a much earlier one) is very common, another such instance occurring in the 
previous sentence with φησι. Using a past tense for the same purpose is just as natural, but one 
does not generally want to alternate between them when making a series of points from a single 
source. The switch to a verb in the aorist tense in the introduction to the next quotation (“having 
completed the account of being and being about to teach the sensibles, he continued, [DK 8.50-
52]”) therefore stands out, and I suggest that what it indicates is that DK 8.50-52 were found 
earlier in the poem than the lines just quoted. The use of two participial phrases to pinpoint the 
location of the second set of lines would be particularly appropriate if Simplicius is not here, as 
he often does, quoting the lines in the order in which they appeared in the poem. The use of 
ἐπήγαγεν re-sets the sequence of tenses for the passage as a whole, so that when Simplicius 
moves forward to lines from the end of the Doxa (or a part of it), he retains the tense: “and 
having handed down the diakosmesis of the sensibles, he continued again, [DK 19]”.107 
 To repeat, this is far short of an explicit statement of where the lines were found. Still, the 
broader context of Simplicius’ quotations, that is, an explanation of Parmenides’ and Melissus’ 
attitude(s) towards sensible, generated objects, which includes not only DK 8.50-52 and DK 19 
but  the quotation of DK 11 less than a page later, makes the suggestion that the first quotation 
came from the Doxa a reasonable one. Moreover, there is an interesting feature of Simplicius’ 
107 While Simplicius reports these lines as coming at the end of a section, his words do not seem to suggest that the 
poem ended with them. The recurrence of ἐπήγαγε need not mean that the poem carried on for very long afterward, 
but if DK 19 were indeed the ending of the entire poem, it is perhaps a little odd to introduce the lines in this way. 
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reading of Aristotle’s text that might be explained by supposing a repetition in Parmenides’ 
poem of lines from the proem at the beginning of the Doxa. Just before the discussion of 
Parmenides and Melissus, in his comments on the opening of the third book of the de Caelo, 
Simplicius makes a special point of explaining that Aristotle himself has given a second 
introduction to his treatise at the beginning of his third book, echoing language from the opening 
of the first book. Simplicius comments on the beginning of Aristotle’s third book as follows: 
“That he discusses these topics as concerning simple, primary bodies, just as he did in discussing 
the heavens is made clear by the fact that he again uses the same proemium and shows that the 
subject of the study of nature is bodies. This will also be made clear by what will be said in 
<this> proemium.”108 Simplicius had forecast this repeated proem when discussing the beginning 
of the treatise, and mentions it again in the commentary on the third book.109  Simplicius seems 
fond of this observation, which he uses to criticize Alexander of Aphrodisias’ commentary on 
the treatise. Is it possible that Simplicius’ sensitivity to Aristotle’s repetition of his own proem 
was due in part to the observation that Parmenides had done the same thing when making a 
related transition in his poem? Simplicius does not come out and say so directly, but he may have 
left it for his readers to pick up on their own. To have to reveal the strategy outright might spoil 
108 In Cael. 551.21-23, as translated in Mueller (2009) p. 25. Mueller notes, “Simplicius compares the beginning of 
this chapter, 298a24-b8 with the beginning of the whole work, 268a1-6; see also his commentary on that passage at 
6,30-8,8.” (2009, p.123, n. 3) In the third book, it is only 298b1-6 that echo the opening of the treatise, and more 
interesting for this point than Simplicius’ commentary at 6.30 and following is an earlier remark at 4.4-13: “Against 
the other exegetes, it should be said that the discussion of the four elements in these texts does not appear merely 
adventitious, and nor do they seem to be treated for the sake of the study of the heavenly bodies in themselves, but 
rather he discusses them in their own right. For not to mention the fact that the account of them takes up almost half 
of the whole treatise, it is also the fact that after the exposition concerning the heavenly bodies which he offers in the 
first two books of the treatise, at the beginning of the third book he once again uses the prologue [προοιμίῳ] from 
the first, thus emphasizing the coherence of the work and showing that physical enquiry is concerned with the 
[simple] bodies, so that the final two books have the same subject as well.” (Simplicius, in Cael. 4.4-13, as 
translated in Hankinson  (2002) p. 21.) 
109 See the preceding footnote for the passage in the first book. In the commentary on the third book, Simplicius 
repeats the point at 552.22-24: “As I said, because he is going to again discuss other simple bodies, the sublunary 
ones, he again uses the same proemium which he used at the beginning of the treatise.” (Mueller (2009) p. 26) 
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his readers’ appreciation of his own arrangement when they see that Simplicius himself has done 
the same thing in his commentary.  
 Even if Simplicius’ concern with prooemia is no more than an interesting parallel, the 
lines of the first quotation of Parmenides are suggestive of a proem themselves. Moreover, the 
differences from the lines of Sextus’ proem all suit a proem belonging to the Doxa. Even better, 
the four and a half lines that Simplicius preserves can be combined seamlessly with those of DK 
10. This suggestion had essentially been made by P. J. Bicknell several decades ago, although he, 
believing for a variety of unsound reasons that DK 10 could not have come from the Doxa, 
proposed placing it immediately after DK 1.32 (that is, the last of Simplicius’ lines when fused 
with Sextus’ proem). Nonetheless, Bicknell well observed that, with DK 10 following 
immediately upon Simplicius’ quotation, “the goddess quite naturally goes on to give a brief 
synopsis of the topics which the opinions of men embrace.”110 Bicknell does not in that article 
indicate what variant adjective he prefers in DK 1.29, but it is worth noting that Simplicius’ 
εὐκυκλέος nicely anticipates the use of κύκλωπος in DK 10.4. While Bicknell was mistaken to 
believe that DK 10 could not have belonged to the Doxa, he is right that DK 10 makes a natural 
sequel to “DK 1.28-32”. If we resist identifying Simplicius’ lines with Sextus’, there is nothing 
to prevent us from adopting Bicknell’s suggestion of having DK 10 follow the final line of 
Simplicius’ quotation without break, and placing the combined fragments in the Doxa. To allay 
suspicion about such a placement based on any awkwardness the reader may feel with the 
goddess repeating the words χρεὼ δέ σε πάντα πυθέσθαι, I suggest borrowing the opening half-
line of Empedocles, DK 31 B 17.15 in order to repair that awkwardness and to complete the line. 
The composite fragment will read:  
 < ὡς γὰρ καὶ πρὶν ἔειπα,> χρεὼ δέ σε πάντα πυθέσθαι  Y.1 
110 Bicknell (1968b) p. 631.  
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  ἠμὲν Ἀληθείης εὐκυκλέος ἀτρεμὲς ἦτορ     Y.2 
  ἠδὲ βροτῶν δόξας, ταῖς οὐκ ἔνι πίστις ἀληθής.   Y.3  
  ἀλλ΄ ἔμπης καὶ ταῦτα μαθήσεαι, ὡς τὰ δοκοῦντα    Y.4 = B 1.31 
 5 χρῆν δοκίμως εἶναι διὰ παντὸς πάντα περῶντα.    Y.5 = B 1.32 
  εἴσῃ δ' αἰθερίαν τε φύσιν τά τ' ἐν αἰθέρι πάντα              B 10.1 
  σήματα καὶ καθαρᾶς εὐαγέος ἠελίοιο     B 10.2 
  λαμπάδος ἔργ' ἀίδηλα καὶ ὁππόθεν ἐξεγένοντο,    B 10.3 
  ἔργα τε κύκλωπος πεύσῃ περίφοιτα σελήνης    B 10.4 
 10 καὶ φύσιν, εἰδήσεις δὲ καὶ οὐρανὸν ἀμφὶς ἔχοντα    B 10.5 
  ἔνθεν ἔφυ τε καὶ ὥς μιν ἄγους΄ ἐπέδησεν Ἀνάγκη    B 10.6 
  πείρατ' ἔχειν ἄστρων.        B 10.7 
 
I would not insist on the wording of the opening half-line, but words to that effect do not seem 
unlikely, and given Empedocles’ many borrowings from Parmenides, this seems like a fair trade. 
In line 5, where there is some uncertainty over the reading at the end of the line, I print περῶντα 
rather περ ὄντα, but would not insist upon it at this stage either. Apart from the textual reading, 
there is considerable debate on how to understand the lines, and determining how best to 
interpret them is a task for another time. In any event, the two extra lines, where δοκοῦντα makes 
it look pretty certain that ταῦτα refers to the “doxai of mortals” in the preceding line and there is 
surely some play on words intended with δοκίμως,111 are clearly suited to the Doxa. I would 
insist that the adjective εὐκυκλέος here is right. Its appearance in a proem for the Doxa, that is, a 
point of transition from discussion of divine truth to mortal concerns, is entirely appropriate. As 
pointed out by Floyd, uses of eukuklos in Homer and Pindar and uses of the Sanskrit cognate 
sucakra in the Rig-Veda indicate that “well-wheeled” was a traditional Indo-European 
expression associated with transitions, particularly those between divine and mortal spheres.112 
111 Cf. the similar wordplay in Heraclitus, DK 22 B 28: δοκέοντα γὰρ ὁ δοκιμώτατος γινώσκει, φυλάσσει. 
112 See Floyd (1988) where this point is made (without reference to Parmenides) in relation to the uses of Sūryā in 
Rig-Veda 10.85. Floyd (1992) p. 263 refers to Durante (1976) for connections of Sūryā with Parmenides’ Heliades 
and chariot. 
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 Once again, Simplicius has helped us clarify matters where editors had muddled things 
unnecessarily and has provided us with “new” material from the Doxa which we can use in 
future attempts to determine whatever it was Parmenides was doing there.   
Doubts about Cosmology. While Cordero’s attempt to place a number of fragments generally 
(and rightly) regarded as belonging to the Doxa earlier in the poem mark a decided break with 
other presentations of Parmenides’ poem, some of his motivation for doing so is less unique. 
Cordero’s placement of what he takes to be Parmenidean physical truths in the Aletheia is in part 
an effort to present Parmenides as a respectable investigator of the natural world. A number of 
other interpreters share the aim of situating Parmenides squarely in the tradition of Presocratic 
physiologoi by stressing the positive contributions he is thought to have made to natural science. 
Those contributions may have included the discoveries of the sphericity of the earth, of the 
reflected nature of the moon’s light, and of the identity of the Morning and Evening Stars, as 
well as the division of the earth into tropical, temperate and polar “zones”.113 
 Santillana, whose remark on the obviousness of the Doxa being a “physics” was quoted 
earlier,114 remarked critically of the metaphysical approaches to Parmenides that he considered 
dominant in the mid-twentieth century,  
One should like to ask those bold modernizers: who would imagine Fichte, Hegel or 
Heidegger proceeding from cryptic statements on Being and Non-Being to a treatise 
concerning the  mechanism of the planets and the illumination of the moon, or the sterility 
of mules? For these are  the subjects in the second part of Parmenides’ poem. And if the 
inattention and the prejudice of  commentators had not left us with the pitiful shreds we 
have of it, no one would have entertained the idea that Parmenides’ physics was an 
insignificant appendix to his doctrine of Truth.115  
 
113  One or another source connects credits Parmenides with each of these discoveries, but one or another source also 
credits Pythagoras  (among others) with each of these. For both figures, the testimonies in question are late and 
suspect. Putting aside the question of discovery, that Parmenides was aware of these ideas and made use of them in 
his poem seems reasonably certain. 
114 See above, footnote 54. 
115 Santillana (1968) p. 83. 
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Santillana is cheating a bit. One will look through the testimonia in vain, I believe, for any report 
of Parmenides’ view on the sterility of mules.116 There is no doubting that Parmenides spoke of 
the illumination of the moon, but whether it is accurate to describe whatever he had to say as a 
“treatise” on celestial mechanics is another matter, about which I do have my doubts. This is not 
to say that the Doxa was an insignificant appendix, but simply to admit that, given the “pitiful 
shreds” that we have, it is rash to assume that anything about the general character of the Doxa 
as it appeared in Parmenides’ poem is obvious.  
 Variations on Santillana’s outlook are readily met with in the literature. One standard 
resource informs us, “The second half of the poem did not simply describe or analyse current 
opinions about the cosmos. It contained an elaborate and distinctive theogony and cosmology 
reminiscent in parts of Hesiod, in parts of Anaximander. Parmenides’ object, as we shall see, is 
to present mortal opinions not as they actually are, but as they might be at their best.”117 David 
Gallop dismisses the suggestion that the Doxa might have been an explanation of human illusion 
by claiming that such an aim “would hardly call for an elaborate cosmology of the sort that the 
Way of Seeming appears to have contained. Eight of the eleven extant fragments (10-15, 17-18) 
deal with astronomical, biological, or theological matters, whose bearing upon universal mortal 
illusions is, to say the least, remote.”118 For Panagiotis Thanassas, DK 10 and 11 are “central 
fragments of the poem […] which promise some insight into the nature of the –altogether real– 
world of phenomena.”119 Giovanni Cerri takes the cosmology to have been so extensive that he 
describes B 10 as coming from the “protasis” of “the astronomical section of the poem, or from 
116 A chapter in Aetius’ doxographical work (V.14) seems to have recorded views on this, but there is no trace of 
anything from Parmenides.  See Diels (1879) pp. 424-425. 
117 KRS p. 254. 
118 Gallop (1984) p. 22. Cf. p. 21, with p. 37, n. 63.   
119 Thanassas (2007) p. 20. On p. 61 DK 10 is described as an outline of “[t]he plan and content of Doxa, the second 
and longest part of the poem”, while DK 11 “promises to describe in detail” the various items listed in its verses.  
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one of its subsections”,120 finding in it “unmistakable” allusions to a “cosmogonic history” with 
a “double outlay, synchronic on the one hand, that is, a depiction of the structure of the starlit sky 
as it is or appears, diachronic on the other hand, that is, a tentative  reconstruction of the probable 
origin of the stars and their orbits.”121 Of DK 10 and 11, Cerri asks, 
Can one doubt that in these two fragments Parmenides is doing anything other than 
promising exactly an extensive and detailed astronomical treatment? Or that the facts 
followed the promise, that is, that the rest of the poem tallied with the protasis? If one 
cannot reasonably doubt either possibility, we are prompted to admit that, at least in large 
part, Parmenides’ poem had to belong to the same genre and to be quite similar to the 
later Phaenomena, Aratus’ didactic-astronomical poem; and further that, thanks to this 
section, Parmenides’ was the oldest astronomical poem of Greek literature, since it seems 
that in Xenophanes’ poem On nature there was not anything so full-fledged, rather just 
the dispersed cues of astronomical teaching.122  
 
In the end, in light of the evidence that he considers “objective and indubitable” Cerri finds it 
curious that “for the most part, modern scholars of Parmenides keep on discussing his 
philosophical thought and his poem as if it were bereft of a scientific-astronomical dimension, as 
if —literally—it had not a dense section set out as a sort of map of the heavens.”123   
 Some of these descriptions involve more outlandish claims than others, but the common 
element which I wish to question is the assumption that the Doxa presented an extensive, 
elaborate or detailed cosmology, an assumption often coupled with a claim about how the verses 
of the Doxa outnumbered those of the Aletheia. To answer Cerri’s rhetorical questions: one can 
indeed reasonably doubt that DK 10 and 11 are best read as Parmenides’ “promise” to provide an 
120 Cerri (2011) p. 83. 
121 Cerri (2001) p. 84. 
122 Cerri (2011) p. 86 
123 Cerri (2011) p. 93. The next sentence reads, “Hundreds, if not thousands of lines, as has already been shown, are 
similar in content to Aratus’ Phaenomena or Manilius’ Astronomica (just to mention poems which have reached us 
by means of direct tradition) and are much closer to these poems than to the first part of Parmenides’ poem itself, 
usually known by the name of ἡ Ἀλήθεια.” This appears to be claiming that the Doxa might have run to thousands 
of lines, and that it has  somehow been “shown” that at least hundreds of them  (which we do not have) are closer to 
Aratus’ and Manilius’ poems than to the Aletheia. I do not think that the comparison with Aratus and Manilius is not 
worthwhile, but it cannot be conceded that Cerri has “shown” anything at all about the number of lines in the Doxa, 
let alone their comparative closeness to the verses of Aratus and Manilius. 
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“extensive and detailed astronomical treatment” and that the other passages that survive from the 
Doxa are appropriately described as “facts” fulfilling the promise of those programmatic 
passages. It does not seem to me true that modern scholars treat the poem as though it were 
“bereft of a scientific-astronomical dimension”, but it should not be surprising if they do not 
always have a great deal to say about it. 
 The assumption I am calling into question is not without evidence to support it. The 
doxographical tradition does record tidbits about Parmenides’ supposed cosmological opinions, 
but this evidence is on the whole of a rather poor sort. We hear, for instance, that according to 
Parmenides, among others, the heaven is fiery (DK 28 A 38). So too are the stars (DK 28 A 39), 
the sun (DK 28 A 41), and the moon (DK 28 A 42). Even for twenty-five hundred years ago, this 
hardly seems like cutting-edge science. More informative, perhaps, is the claim that, according to 
Parmenides, the sun and moon were separated off from the circle of the Milky Way, with 
differing densities and degrees of heat and cold (DK 28 A 43). Nonetheless, it takes more than a 
few imaginative leaps to get from the testimonia to something that could be considered an 
elaborate and detailed cosmology, and most of the testimonia look suspiciously like attempts to 
extract physical opinions out of some extant but obscure portion of the surviving verses.124 Still, 
this is more evidence than there is to support the various estimates on the number of verses that 
the Doxa contained. Diels’ (qualified) estimate that we possess nine tenths of the Way of Truth 
but only one tenth of the Doxa (which would suggest a Doxa of four to five hundred lines) is not 
based on any ancient stichometric report. 125  Diogenes Laertius says that Parmenides, like 
124 The most extensive testimonium of this sort is DK 28 A 37, a report of Aetius (II.7.1) which reads something like 
an attempt to elucidate the passage to which DK 12 originally belonged. For a detailed recent analysis of the 
composition of this passage in light of the findings of an ongoing reevaluation of Diels’ work on the doxographical 
tradition, see Mansfeld and Runia (2009) pp. 394-408.    
125“Von der Ἀλήθεια sind etwa neun Zehntel erhalten, von der Δόξα nach einer weniger sicheren Abschätzung 
vielleicht ein Zehntel.” PL 25-26. 
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Melissus and Anaxagoras, left a single composition (DK 28 A 13), but gives no estimate of its 
length. From the fact that Simplicius does not ever mention the book or scroll from which a 
quotation of Parmenides comes (as he does do on occasion when quoting Empedocles), it may be 
safe to infer that Parmenides’ entire poem fit on a single scroll, but even this much cannot be 
counted as certain. 
 Those who would present the Doxa as a serious cosmology, however, have better 
evidence to adduce. The favorite item, to which most of the scholars mentioned in the earlier 
paragraph refer, is a passage from Plutarch’s Reply to Colotes.126 Colotes, an Epicurean who had 
written a polemical piece attacking all other philosophies, apparently claimed that Parmenides, in 
saying that “all is One”, effectively abolished the world as we know it. Plutarch makes a spirited 
rebuttal: 
But Parmenides for one has abolished neither ‘fire’ nor ‘water’, neither ‘a precipice’ nor 
‘cities lying in Europe and Asia’ in Colotes’ words, since he has actually made a cosmic 
order, and by blending as elements the light and the dark produces out of them and by 
their operation the whole world of sense. Thus he has much to say about earth, heaven, 
sun, moon, and stars, and has recounted the genesis of man; and for an ancient natural 
philosopher—who has put together a book of his own, and is not pulling apart the book 
of another—he has left nothing of real importance unsaid.127  
 
As is repeatedly pointed out by those who cite this passage as evidence for the extensiveness and 
detail of Parmenides’ cosmology, Plutarch shows signs of first-hand acquaintance with 
Parmenides’ poem (he implies elsewhere that Colotes’ book does not) and there is a clear 
correspondence between the topics Plutarch mentions and those listed in DK 10 and 11 (although 
the addition of “the genesis of man” is noteworthy). I agree that Plutarch’s testimony is 
trustworthy, but we must not press it too far.  We need to recognize that in his rebuttal he is 
126 Cf. Santillana (1968) p. 88; KRS p. 257; Thanassas (2007) pp. 15-16; and Cerri (2011) pp. 81-83. Cf. Gregory 
(2007) pp. 73-76, with p. 257, nn. 14 and 23. 
127 Plutarch, adv. Colot. 1114 B-C, as translated in Einarson and Lacy (1986) p. 231. 
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putting the best possible face on the argument and that there are qualifications on the claims 
about Parmenides’ production of “the whole world of sense”. In saying that Parmenides has 
made a “cosmic order” (διάκοσμον) and the “whole world of sense” (τὰ φαινόμενα πάντα, “all 
the appearances”), he is careful to use Parmenides’ own terms. It is not clear from the verses, 
however, just how extensive a range the words διάκοσμος and πάντα actually have there. While 
the close correspondence between Plutarch’s list and the items in DK 10 and 11 may assure us 
that Plutarch had the poem before him, there is a vagueness about Parmenides’ having “much” to 
say that makes it seem as though the poem itself may have been short on details (or perhaps short 
on details that Plutarch felt comfortable paraphrasing with any precision). This air of caution is 
reinforced by the way that Plutarch qualifies his final claim, shifting some of the attention away 
from Parmenides to Colotes himself (it is Colotes who is “pulling apart the book of another”) and 
suggesting that we must judge Parmenides by the standard of an early practitioner of natural 
science; it is on those terms that Parmenides “left none of the chief points unmentioned” (καὶ 
οὐδὲν ἄρρητον, ὡς ἀνὴρ ἀρχαῖος ἐν φυσιολογίᾳ καὶ συνθεὶς γραφὴν ἰδίαν οὐκ ἀλλοτρίαν 
διαφορῶν, τῶν κυρίων παρῆκεν).128 But that may have left many things without a detailed or 
elaborate treatment. There is a world of difference, so to speak, between mentioning all the main 
points and leaving nothing important undiscussed. Plutarch is careful to claim only the former of 
Parmenides. 
 Plutarch’s passage is often compared to Simplicius’ remarks from in Cael. just after his 
quotation of  DK 11. We looked at a part of this briefly above.129 The full remark is: 
128 It is insensitive to the meaning of ἄρρητος and gives Parmenides credit for more than Plutarch does to translate 
οὐδὲν ἄρρητον … τῶν κυρίων παρῆκεν by  “he has left nothing of real importance unsaid” (as above; cf. Gallop 
(1986) p. 101)). It is even more inaccurate to say he left nothing important “undiscussed” (as in KRS p. 257 and 
Coxon (2009) p. 168).  
129 See page 160, with footnote 87. 
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And he sets out the coming to be of things that come to be and perish up to the parts of 
the animals [καὶ τῶν γινομένων καὶ φθειρομένων μέχρι τῶν μορίων τῶν ζῴων τὴν 
γένεσιν παραδίδωσι]. And it is clear that Parmenides was not unaware that he himself 
came to be, just as he was not unaware that he had two feet, even though he said that 
being is one [δῆλον δέ, ὅτι οὐκ ἠγνόει Παρμενίδης, ὅτι γενητὸς αὐτὸς ἦν, ὥσπερ οὐδέ, 
ὅτι δύο πόδας εἶχεν, ἓν λέγων τὸ ὄν].130 
 
Given the correspondence between the celestial objects of DK 11 and the early items in 
Plutarch’s list of things about which Parmenides said “much”, it seems that we should perhaps 
associate Simplicius’ reference to “the parts of animals” with Plutarch’s mention of “the genesis 
of man”. Both authors also mention that Parmenides’ understanding of the oneness of being did 
not keep him from seeing the multiplicity of the everyday world. Like Plutarch, Simplicius 
gestures at the scope of what the Doxa covered, but offers nothing particularly helpful for 
determining just how extensive or detailed a treatment the topics mentioned received. Neither 
author provides quite the evidence that Cerri and others suggest they do when these authors are 
cited to support the notion that the Doxa presented an elaborate and lengthy cosmology that 
would have dwarfed the Aletheia. 
 Indeed, when one considers the paraphrases that each author offers along with the 
fragments as we have them, one may begin to wonder if the Doxa was not far less sweeping than 
is often supposed. Something on the scale of Lucretius’ and Manilius’ works would be ruled out 
if we are right to infer that Parmenides’ poem was contained on a single scroll, but even 
something like Aratus’ poem may be far longer than whatever the Doxa contained. I suspect it is 
significant that the accounts of Plutarch, when replying to Colotes’ attack, and of Simplicius, in 
what seems an almost off-hand remark about what followed DK 11, coincide as neatly as they do 
not only with one another but even with the extant material from the Doxa that happens to have 
survived in other authors. All of the fragments of the standard Doxa, with the possible exception 
130 Simplicius, in Cael. 559.26–560.1, as translated in Mueller (2009) p. 33, with material in brackets added. 
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of DK 16, fall readily into one of the two main categories in the paraphrases of each author. We 
have “astronomical” fragments (or better, fragments that talk about various heavenly lights) on 
the one hand (DK 9, 10, 11, 14, 15), and those to do with one or another aspect of human 
generation on the other (DK 12, 13, 17, 18, 19).131  Some of these might be assigned to both 
groups (most obviously DK 12), but this only reinforces the impression that the Doxa was 
curiously focused on these two domains. That we do not even possess significant testimonia that 
take us beyond the confines of these topics again suggests that the Doxa was both shorter and 
more focused than is generally supposed.  
 Additional, albeit indirect, evidence for a less extensive Doxa is the pervasiveness of the 
attitude towards Parmenides of which Colotes was but one representative. Even if Colotes’ 
criticism of Parmenides relied on a polemical mischaracterization of Parmenides’ views, it is 
reasonable to suppose that there was something about the poem that made it susceptible to the 
attack that in saying that what is is one, Parmenides effectively abolished “all things”. Colotes 
was not the first to think that Parmenides did away with nature in some manner. The suggestion 
was an early and a persistent one, present in Socrates’ explanation, in Plato’s Parmenides, that 
the aim of the writings of Zeno and Parmenides is to assert, “contrary to all the things that are 
said” (παρὰ πάντα τὰ λεγόμενα), that things are not many but one.132 Later Aristotle, evidently 
reacting to the rejection of nature entailed by their apparent denial of movement, reportedly 
called Parmenides and Melissus stasiōtai (“partisans of the standstill faction”) and aphysikoi 
(“unnaturalists”).133 Though also capable of prejudiced and distorted views of his predecessors, 
131 Though I do not assign DK 16 or the single-word DK 15a to either group here, these fragments are susceptible to 
readings on which they could be assigned to one or both of these groups. As spelling out those readings here would 
be getting ahead of ourselves, I simply set them aside with the justification that it seems that nobody knows quite 
what to do with them. Cf. footnote 49 above.  
132 Plato, Parm. 127e 
133 Sextus Empiricus, adv. Math. X.46 (= Aristotle, On Philosophy fr. 9 (Ross)). Aristotle’s pun on stasiōtēs seems 
to come from Plato, Theaetetus 181a6.  The evidence of this attitude towards Parmenides seems to be ignored by 
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Aristotle, like Colotes, must have had some reason for separating Parmenides and Melissus from 
the regular run of physikoi. These characterizations would probably not have been customary had 
the Doxa presented an elaborate and detailed “treatise” on the whole of the natural world. It is 
noteworthy that in the vast bulk of Aristotle’s works on nature Parmenides’ name appears only 
rarely. Where it does, it is generally in connection with his supposed rejection of the reality of 
change.134 On the very few occasions where Aristotle has something to report about Parmenides’ 
“physical” views, there is nothing to suggest that he treated a wider range of phenomena than is 
exhibited in the extant fragments.135 To judge, then, from the regrettably meager reports we have 
about it, it looks as though the Doxa included neither an elaborate cosmology including separate 
subsections for various astronomical topics nor so wide-ranging an account of more mundane 
topics as to allow for detailed speculations on the unhappy reproductive prospects of mules, but 
was a writing of a somewhat different sort.136 
  That the Doxa was short on satisfying details is a point made by Theophrastus. Let us, 
before concluding, revisit the passage in which he quotes DK 16. This will provide us with 
another important impression of the general character of the Doxa and will also help us 
formulate a guess as to why “astronomical” and “embryological” material might be so prominent 
among the the traces that remain of it. The source text is Theophrastus’ de Sensibus. That work is 
Giovanni Casertano when, in support of the assertion that “[t]he fact that Parmenides was a φυσιολόγος, that is, a 
scholar of nature, was well-known in ancient times”, he follows two rather dubious references to Iamblichus and 
Simplicius with: “even Aristotle himself, who […] is mainly responsible for the distortion of some aspects of the 
Elean’s philosophy, does not hesitate to place Parmenides inside what he saw as a trend shared by the whole line of 
research of the first Greek philosophers. Parmenides, philosopher of being, metaphysical thinker, “father of western 
metaphysics,” is thus not an idea stemming from ancient times, but rather a modern (from Hegel on) and 
contemporary (from Heidegger on) reading.” (Casertano (2011) pp. 23-24)   
134 See Physics I. 2-3, 5 and 8-9; de Gen. et Corr. I. 3 and 8; and de Caelo III.1. 
135 Aristotle’s brief report at de Gen. et Corr. II.3 330b13-15 is a vague reference to a mixing of fire and earth that 
seems to echo DK 8.52-60 and DK 9, and de Part. Animalium II.2 (with which cf. de Gen. Animalium IV.1) can be 
related to the embryological fragments. 
136 As for the scientific discoveries, mentioned earlier, in which Parmenides is sometimes said to have played a role, 
Aristotle again gives no indication of Parmenides as a pioneer in these researches, although discussions of the 
sphericity of the earth and its zones as well as of  the moon’s light are to be found in his corpus. 
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an extended survey of the views of various predecessors, from Alcmaeon to Plato, on the nature 
of the senses and sensible objects. Diels regarded the de Sensibus as a fragment of Theophrastus’ 
massive work on physical opinions, and saw that larger collection as the source for the entire 
later doxographical tradition. Those views are subject to doubt,137 but whether we ought to 
regard the de Sensibus as an independent work or not, and whether or not we hypothesize some 
doxographical tradition anterior to Theophrastus, the present passage is relevant for how we read 
not only the verses it preserves, but (and perhaps even more so) the bulk of the later, indirect 
reports about Parmenides as well. Theophrastus’ testimony here is as objective and well-
informed as any that we possess. It is not the most informative, to be sure, but Theophrastus is 
operating with less obvious bias (either doctrinal or as a result of the distortions that may be due 
to literary form) than any other major source, and was clearly familiar with the poem first-hand. 
It is unfortunate that in the broader context of the brief passage in question, Parmenides’ poem is 
something of a side issue.138 Nonetheless, there is value for us in what he does say. Particularly 
when we read the stray bits of information that make up most of the doxographical record on 
Parmenides, where one may suppose that the substance, if not the form, of Parmenides’ physical 
opnions is preserved in a matter-of-fact manner, it is good to bear in mind that the key source for 
that tradition had a hard time extracting definite doctrines from the poem. 
 Theophrastus’ remarks on Parmenides are introduced by way of contrast with 
Empedocles’ fuller treatment of the individual senses:139   
  Parmenides gives no definition whatsoever, saying merely that there are two 
elements, and that our knowledge depends upon the excess of one or the other. [ὅλως 
οὐδὲν ἀφώρικεν ἀλλὰ μόνον ὅτι δυοῖν ὄντοιν στοιχείοιν κατὰ τὸ ὑπερβάλλον ἐστὶν ἡ 
γνῶσις.] For according as the hot or the cold predominates does the understanding vary, 
137 See Baltussen (2000) pp. 239-245 for doubts on both points.  
138 Our passage (like the remarks on Plato that follow it) is more a digression at the beginning of Theophrastus’ 
treatment of Empedocles than a separate exposition on Parmenides’ views on the senses. 
139Stratton (1917) p. 69, material in brackets added. 
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there being a better and purer understanding derived from the hot; yet even such 
knowledge requires a certain proportion. 
 
 “For ever as it finds the blend in their far-wandering members,” he says, “so does 
 mind come to men; for that which has intelligence in men each and all is the 
 same,—the substance of their members; since what is there in greater measure is 
 their thought .” [DK 16] 
 
For to perceive by the senses and to have intelligence are treated by him as identical [τὸ 
γὰρ αἰσθάνεσθαι καὶ τὸ φρονεῖν ὡς ταὐτὸ λέγει]; consequently both remembering and 
forgetting arise, by the mixture <of the elements mentioned>. But if there should occur 
an exact equality in the mixture, he does not make it clear [οὐδὲν ἔτι διώρικεν] whether 
there would or would not be thought, nor what would be the general state <resulting>. 
But that he also attributes perception to the opposite <element> in its own right is evident 
[φανερόν] from the passage where he says that a dead man—since now the fire has left 
him—does not perceive light and warmth and sound, but does perceive cold and silence 
and the other contrasting qualities; and that absolutely all being possesses some power of 
knowing [καὶ ὅλως δὲ πᾶν τὸ ὂν ἔχειν τινὰ γνῶσιν]. Accordingly by this thesis he seems 
arbitrarily to preclude discussion of the difficulties attending to his position [οὕτω μὲν 
οὖν αὐτὸς ἔοικεν ἀποτέμνεσθαι τῇ φάσει τὰ συμβαίνοντα δυσχερῆ διὰ τὴν ὑπόληψιν]. 
 
Let us reserve the many special problems involved in trying to understand DK 16 for a later time, 
and concentrate on what the context tells us about Theophrastus’ more general impression of 
Parmenides’ poem. Theophrastus remarks repeatedly on the indefiniteness of Parmenides’ 
writing: “In general, Parmenides gives no definition”; “he speaks of perceiving (aisthanesthai) 
and thinking (phronein) as the same thing”; “he makes nothing further definite” than that 
memory and forgetting arise by blending. For anything specific, it seems, Theophrastus has to 
draw inferences from Parmenides’ indistinct and cryptic generalizations. What Theophrastus 
takes to be “apparent” or “evident” (that perception occurs by the contrary “in its own right”) is 
deduced from the curious statement that a corpse, deprived of fire, does not perceive light and 
warmth and sound but cold and silence, and Theophrastus complains that Parmenides seems to 
curtail dealing with the difficulties of his conception by assertion rather than offering 
explanations. It does not seem credible to chalk these complaints up to limited access to the 
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poem,140 nor in fact do Theophrastus’ complaints seem unfair reactions to DK 16 or to the other 
verbatim quotations that we have of the poem. 
 Indeed, the indefiniteness of which Theophrastus complains is a characteristic of 
Parmenides’ poem generally. Very little, at least, is firmly and determinately fixed in a way that 
readers can feel especially sure that they have grasped exactly what is being communicated. 
Where we are offered specifics, they tend to be exasperatingly ambiguous. In the Doxa, as 
Cordero stresses, the goddess specifically alerts the youth to the deceptive kosmos of her verses. 
It is worth lingering a moment, however, over just what that might mean. While this has been 
taken as a blanket rejection of anything that follows, there is a subtlety to these words that calls 
for careful attention. One aspect of this pregnant phrase is revealed by considering, quite literally, 
the order of the words in her verses. In DK 12.3, 
   ἐν δὲ μέσῳ τούτων δαίμων ἣ πάντα κυβερνᾷ 
  [in the middle of these, the divinity who steers all things] 
 
the word δαίμων, “divinity”, is placed precisely in the middle of the verse, reflecting her position 
in the middle of things.141 How this may be deceptive deserves fuller consideration elsewhere, 
but I suggest that if mortal opinion or seeming is something in which there is no true trust, the 
confirmation that impressive arrangements of words, that is to say, naming, can appear to 
provide beliefs in doxai may be misleading. There is something similar in the description of the 
moon in DK 14: 
  νυκτὶ φάος περὶ γαῖαν ἀλώμενον ἀλλότριον φῶς 
  [in night a light, around earth roaming, an alien light]. 
 
140 Cf. the remarks of Hershbell in footnotes 92 and 95 above. 
141 Cf. Empedocles’ borrowing of this at DK 31 B 35.4: δίνης, ἐν δὲ μέσῃ Φιλότης στροφάλιγγι γένηται. 
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Here “earth”, though not at the exact metrical center of the verse, is the central of the seven 
words in it, once we restore the opening of the line preserved in the manuscripts.142 On this 
fragment John Newell very perceptively points out: “At the start, we get a light where it does not 
belong (in the darkness of night) and at the end we are told that the light comes from elsewhere. 
The middle of the line reports that the moon wanders around the Earth, which sits at the line’s 
center. The line, therefore, models the geocentric orbit of the moon.”143 Another intriguing 
instance of the κόσμος ἀπατηλός of the verses in the Doxa is DK 17: 
  δεξιτεροῖσιν μὲν κούρους, λαιοῖσι δὲ κούρας 
  [on the right-hand side boys, on the left-hand side, girls].144 
 
Again I quote Newell: 
 The line is composed in a way that is typical of the whole poem. It begins by placing the 
word for ‘right’ in the position that is furthest to the left, and places the girls (who belong 
on the left) as far to the right as possible. The boys, who should be on the right, are in the 
left half of the line while the word for ‘left’ occupies the center. Everything is in the 
wrong place! […] What we have here would appear to be one of the worst possible 
arguments. Given what we have seen elsewhere in the poem, however, it would be a 
mistake to see this as faulty craftsmanship. Instead, what we have here is a deliberate 
structural confusion which allows the author to signal to the reader that the speaker does 
not know what she is talking about. 145 
 
I am not ready to say that the goddess does not know what she is talking about, but Newell is 
surely right that the line is deliberately constructed with each element out of order, and that this 
sort of wordplay is a recurrent feature of the poem, present, as the above examples illustrate, in 
the various phases of Parmenides’ supposedly scientific treatments. As such involved wordplay 
is a characteristic that would seem ill-suited to a detailed and elaborate “treatise” on natural 
142 The opening of the verse in the manuscripts is νυκτὶ φάος. DK prints νυκτιφαὲς, which is Scaliger’s emendation. 
143 Newell (2002) p. 717, n. 887.  
144 Galen does not quite preserve the verse intact, giving δεξιτεροῖσι μὲν κούρους, λαιοῖσι δ’ αὖ κούρας. The above 
is Karsten’s restoration, which serves well enough to illustrate the point. Gallop, following “most recent editors of 
Galen” prints δεξιτεροῖσι [μὲν] κούρους, λαιοῖσιν δ’ αὖ <κτίσε> κούρας. See Gallop (1986) p. 88. 
145 Newell (2002) p. 718, n. 890. Newell reads Gallop’s text, but the remarks quoted above apply equally well to 
either reading. 
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philosophy, again it seems desirable to entertain an alternative model for how to envision the 
Doxa. Theophrastus’ mention of corpses provides us a hint of an alternative “genre” which, if 
less “scientific”, is more consistent with the entirety of the evidence for the Doxa. Recalling 
Simplicius’ mention of the daimon sending souls from the visible to the invisible realm and back 
again,146 it appears that the Doxa contained some sort of description of the souls of the dead, the 
things that they saw or failed to see, and what they may have remembered or forgotten.  
 A moment’s reflection supplies a “genre” in which the souls of the dead, the basic 
elements of a cosmology, and an account of human generation would all be at home: the myth of 
Er in Plato’s Republic, the “Somnium Scipionis” of Cicero’s own Republic, and related stories 
such as the account of Timarchus’ vision in Plutarch’s de genio Socratis might provide a better 
model for imagining what the Doxa looked like. Each of those relatively brief episodes features 
the journey of some select figure beyond the sphere of everyday human affairs, where he hears 
of the fates of the departed, attains a unifying (but scarcely straightforward) vision of the cosmos, 
and learns about the (re)birth of souls into bodies, which is associated in some manner or other 
with the circular movements of the celestial lights.147 A central lesson to be learned in each 
episode is how the “true” life differs from that which is conventionally so called.  
 Taking these texts as a guide, the seemingly unrelated astronomical and embryological 
fragments of the Doxa can be bridged by Theophrastus’ and Simplicius’ references to the dead 
and to souls’ being sent to the “invisible” realm and back again by the divinity. The Doxa then 
begins to look like some sort of account (very likely a rather opaque one) of the fate of the 
reincarnated soul. The tales in Plato, Cicero, and Plutarch link the character of human births to 
146 See above, footnote 93. 
147 In line with his presenting the episode as a dream rather than a divine visitation or shamanic-style journey, Cicero 
mutes the element of reincarnation in his work, but in other ways echoes Parmenides more closely than does Plato. 
Consider, e.g., his description of the moon quae ultima a caelo, citima terris, luce lucebat aliena. (De Re Publica, 
VI. 20 [16]; 139.19-20 Powell). 
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the cycles of the heavenly bodies, and it is worth considering whether the same might have been 
true in Parmenides’ Doxa, which is, let us not forget, the Doxa, as Cordero rightly insists, of 
mortals. DK 12 appears to offer some such connection between the cosmic stephanai and male-
female pairings, and the earlier mention in the poem of unknowing mortals “wandering” a “back-
turning path”, confusedly borne between being and non-being, would not be an inapt description 
of the cycle of rebirth.148  
  While the Er narrative has been connected with Parmenides’ poem before,149 the point of 
comparison has typically been that of Parmenides’ stephanai and the “whorls” of the Spindle of 
Necessity in Plato’s story, with the aim of clarifying the arrangements of each author’s presumed 
cosmology. DK 17 and 18 are rarely if ever included in such discussions, but they clearly add to 
the comparison if we simply pay attention to what follows the cosmic vision in Er’s account. The 
emphasis in Plato’s dialogue is on the choice that precedes a soul’s next incarnation, but this 
ends in a departure towards its birth. Supposing that Parmenides’ poem provided a more graphic 
description of the stages involved in the soul’s assumption of its new identity in the womb, we 
would have a considerably more concrete scenario in which to place the fragments generally 
viewed as isolated bits of Parmenides’ otherwise lost “biology”. 
 Clearly, this suggestion is something that needs to be pursued more fully elsewhere. A 
compelling case for it can only be made through a close reading of the fragments, the relevant 
148 Tarán (1965) pp. 248-249, n. 51 declares that the connection of Simplicius’ remarks to “the Pythagorean doctrine 
of transmigration […] cannot be accepted” and that “there is nothing in the text of Simplicius to suggest that the 
souls which the goddess sends back to Hades and from Hades to life are the same, which is a necessary condition for 
metempsychosis.” Apart from the inaccuracy of Tarán’s paraphrase of the text (the souls are not sent back to Hades, 
but back to “life”, which is the crucial point for reincarnation), that they are sent “back” anywhere  suggests that the 
souls are in some sense the same souls. Exactly how they are the same is, I believe, a central question of the poem. 
 There is further evidence for reincarnation in Parmenides (and a connection with Plato’s myth of Er) in 
Porphyry’s essay, de Antro Nympharum, where it is reported (21.3) that Parmenides mentioned the celestial gates 
(identified by earlier commentators as the solstitial points on the tropics of Cancer and Capricorn) whereby souls 
descend into human births and return to the gods. On this, cf. Coxon (2009) p. 371. 
149 E.g., Morrison (1955); Tarán (1965) p. 233, nn. 10 and 11; Mourelatos (1970/2008) p. 28, n. 56; Popper (1998) 
pp. 123 and 126; Coxon (2009) p. 371.   
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testimonia, and the accounts with which I wish to compare them (which are by no means limited 
to the three examples mentioned). For the present, I simply submit that the hints from some of 
our best sources that the Doxa dealt with reincarnation should not be ignored. They offer a ready 
explanation for why the evidence for the “astronomical, biological and theological matters” in 
the Doxa seems to fall short of the “elaborate cosmology” that many commentators assume. 
Moreover, in an account of reincarnation, such matters will hardly seem remote from an 
explanation of “universal mortal illusions”.150 Indeed, this more focused conception of the Doxa 
not only gives a tighter coherence to the fragments there, but raises prospects for a more unified 
account of the whole poem. The otherworldy character of the journey in the proem has long been 
recognized (whether we regard it as a descent or an ascent may make little difference), and the 
ties between the Way of Truth and Way of Seeming might become clearer when we read the 
insistence in the Aletheia that what is is ungenerated and unperishing in light of the Doxa’s 
concern with the soul.     
150 Cf. the comments of Gallop quoted above, page 175. 
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Appendix to Chapter Four: Synopsis A: Early Arrangements of the Fragments of Parmenides’ Poem1 
Estienne (1573) Scaliger (c.1600)    Fülleborn (1795)   Brandis (1813)  Karsten (1835) Stein (1867) Diels (1897) 
DK 1.1-30 DK 1.1-30 (1-30)       DK 1.1-30 (1-30)   DK 1.1-32 (1-32) DK 1.1-32 (1-32)2  DK 1.1-32 (1-32)3 DK 1.1-32 
DK 7.2-7a DK 7.2-6 (31-35)       DK 7.2-7a (31-36)   DK 7.2-7a (33-38) [τὰ πρὸς ἀληθείαν] DK 7.3-6a (33-36) DK 7.2-7a4 
DK 10  DK 8.2-61(36-95)    [τὰ πρὸς ἀληθείαν]5      DK 2 (39-46) DK 2/3 (33-40) DK 4 (37-40) DK 4 
DK 4  DK 9 (96-99)           DK 2 (37-44)   DK 6 (47-55) DK 5 (41-42) DK 5 (41-42) DK 5 
DK 8.3-4     DK 12 (100-105)     DK 6 (45-53)   DK 7.1-2 (56-57) DK 6 (43-51) [τὰ πρὸς ἀληθείαν] DK 2/36 
DK 8.43-45  DK 2 (106-113)     DK 7.2 (54)    DK 8.1b-15 (58-72) DK.7.2 (52) DK 2/3 (43-50) DK 6 
DK 13 DK 6 (114-122)      DK 8.1b-52 (55-106)     DK 4 (73-76) DK 7.3-6 (53-56)  DK 6 (51-59) DK 7.1-2 
DK 15 DK 13 (123)  [τὰ πρὸς δόξαν]   DK 8.16-61 (77-122) DK 8.2-33 (57-88) DK 7.1-2 (60-61)  DK 8.1b-61 
DK 14 DK 15 (124)  DK 8.53-61 (107-115)   DK 9 (123-126) DK 4 (89-92) DK 8.1b-33a (62-94) DK 9 
DK 2 DK 14 (125)  DK 9 (116-119)   DK 12 (127-132) DK 8.34-61 (93- 111) DK 8.33b-49 (95-112) DK 10 
DK 16 DK 7.1-2 (126-7)     DK 12 (120-125)   DK 13 (133) [τὰ πρὸς δόξαν]  [τὰ πρὸς δόξαν]  DK 11 
DK 17 (128)  DK 13(126)    DK 10 (134-139) DK 8.53-61 (112-120) DK 8.50-61 (113-124) DK 12 
DK 4 (129-132)       DK 10 (127-133)   DK 11 (140-144) DK 9 (121-124) DK 9 (125-128) DK 13 
DK 10 (133-139)  DK 25 (134-5)   DK 15 (145)  DK 12 (125-130) DK 11 (129-132) DK 14 
DK 16 (140-143)  DK 15 (136)   DK 14 (146)  DK 13 (131) DK 12 (133-138) DK 15 
DK 18 (144-149)  DK 14 (137)   DK 16 (147-150) DK 10 (132-138) DK 13 (139) DK 16 
 DK 4 (138-141)   DK 18 (141-156) DK 11 (139-142) DK 14 (140) DK 17 
 DK 16 (142-145)   DK 22 (157)  DK 14 (143) DK 15 (141) DK 18 
 DK 18 (146-151)   DK 19 (158-160) DK 15 (144) DK 17 (142) DK 19 
  {DK 25 (161-162)} DK 16 (145-148) DK 18 (143-148) 
DK 17 (149) DK 16 (149-152) 
DK 18 (150-155) DK 19 (153-155) 
DK 19 (156-158) 
1 The consecutive line numbers of editions before Diels (1897) are given in parentheses. For information about the arrangements of Estienne and Scaliger, I rely 
on Cordero (1982), Cordero (1987), and Cordero (2010), occasionally using one to correct another. For the others, the editions themselves have been consulted. It 
should be noted that the report in DK of Karsten’s numeration for DK 19 (given as 157-159) is inaccurate, as is that of Stein’s for DK 7.3-6 (reported as 34-37). 
The text of Mullach (1845/1860), although influential on a number of textual matters, is not given, as it follows the arrangement of Karsten. 
2 In Karsten’s edition, lines from the proem have been rearranged, and appear in the following order: DK 1-5, DK 9-10, DK 6-8, DK 11-32.  
3 In Stein’s edition, lines from the proem have been rearranged, and appear in the following order: DK 1-3, DK 9-21, DK 4-8, DK 22-32. 
4 In Diels (1897), as in each of the earlier editions given except for Karsten’s, the first two portions of text listed were presented as a continuous passage.  
5 The full title Fülleborn gives to the section that follows is περὶ τοῦ νοητοῦ ἢ τὰ πρὸς ἀληθείαν. (ἀληθείαν is so accented by Fülleborn, Karsten and Stein.) 
6 Diels (1897) assigns separate numbers to DK 2 and DK 3, but considers it probable that (as in Stein and Karsten) 2.8 and 3 are two parts of the same line.  
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CONCLUSION 
  
As mentioned in the Introduction, “Conclusion” is not the most appropriate term for the 
following closing remarks.  After some preliminary exercises, we are better prepared to avoid a 
good number of missteps in subsequent attempts to read Parmenides’ poem, but we are still some 
way off from the ultimate aim of understanding what it said. For now, I will review some of the 
ground covered so far and point out a few signs of what lies ahead.   
 The simple supposition with which the first chapter began, namely, that despite the 
apparently unanimous opinion of modern scholarship on the matter, Sextus Empiricus may have 
preserved the proem of Parmenides’ poem intact, has yielded interesting results. Supposing that 
Sextus’ proem is sound has meant allowing Parmenides greater license than some would like for 
a purportedly irksome repetitiousness, but granting Parmenides that liberty has been worthwhile, 
providing a way to resolve multiple impasses in the scholarly literature and raising prospects for 
a better appreciation and a more accurate reconstruction of his poem. Diagnosis of the two major 
changes to Sextus’ text, “Diels’ addition” and “Kranz’s move”, found the causes for their 
widespread acceptance to be a general failure to appreciate the possibility of repeated verses and 
the related presumption that Parmenides’ writing ought to conform to modern editors’ own 
expectations of style and exposition. Doubful that such presumption is sound, and trying to 
attend carefully to the repetitions that Parmenides’ proem obviously presents, we have seen that, 
despite an undeniably cultivated obscurity of the proem, there is a strong internal coherence to it, 
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structured around the use of recurring words and sounds. The extended (and skewed) chiasmus 
has come to light as a particularly important structural feature of the proem. As many of these 
structures seem to have been entirely overlooked in earlier analyses of the proem, we may count 
it an advance in our grasp on the poem simply to have detected them, even if we cannot yet fully 
account for Parmenides’ motives in composing his proem in this way.  
 Acknowledging Parmenides’ repetitiousness also enabled us to recognize as independent 
two “new” fragments which previous editors have regarded as variants of DK 1.28-30,1 and 
raised the possibility that a reconsideration of the source texts for other fragments might well 
yield additional “new” fragments hitherto undetected.2 The “new” lines matching those from the 
proem afforded us a glimpse of how artfully Parmenides could employ his repeated lines: while 
the phrase “untrembling heart” at the end of the line in DK 1.29 and in the other verses that echo 
it serves, on the surface, as a bold image for the fixity of Truth, it also covertly directs attention 
to the variation that occurs at the very core of the line each time it occurs. This playful use of the 
placement of words within the line is a feature paralleled in other Parmenidean verses, including 
other “new” fragments that further scrutiny of the sources will bring to light.3 
 In the second chapter, a close reading of two of the contexts in which the proem is quoted, 
has also been instructive, allowing us to get a more nuanced sense of the texts of Sextus and 
Diogenes Laertius. These readings, particularly that of Sextus’ passage, serve to illustrate how 
important familiarity with the habits and outlook of a quoting author is for a proper assessment 
1 These “new” fragments are texts C.4 and C.5 in the appendix to the first chapter, for the time being referred to as 
fragments X and Y. The restoring of most of the lines from DK 7 has also entailed recognizing a fragment Z 
between DK 6 and 8 (see page 34, footnote 57). This is still less new than the other two texts, and really amounts to 
a return to the fr. 7 of Diels’ earlier arrangements. 
2 There are numerous instances of this to be found in the source material, and existing scholarly impasses are a good 
guide for where to look. Like the dispute over DK 1.29, that over the readings at DK 8.4 is also due to the failure of 
scholars to recognize that the various sources for it are quoting from at least three different points in the poem.  
3 Cf. pages 185-186 above. In the DK 8.4 and the “new” fragments referred to in the preceding footnote Parmenides 
adds a further twist to his ἀτρεμές wordplay. 
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of any fragments that they preserve, and, consequently, how much is regularly missed by reading 
fragments in isolation from their sources or with the minimal contexts provided in DK. Through 
careful attention to the text of Sextus, who is often credited with interpretations that do not 
belong to him, and at other times dismissively treated as a simple excerptor, we have gained 
some insight into the manner in which he frames his discussions and have learned how to read 
his texts in a manner that avoids these and other errors. This is important not only for a proper 
assessment of his quotation of Parmenides’ proem, but (as the following chapter also shows) for 
many other texts for which Sextus is our best source. With regard to Parmenides in particular, we 
have seen reasons to believe that Sextus’ quotation of the proem is independent of the 
allegorizing rationalist interpretation that he reports along with it, which increases Sextus’ value 
all the more. Diogenes Laertius’ chapter on Parmenides is something of a miscellany, but, by a 
stroke of good fortune, he affords us another view of the source of the rationalist interpretation 
recorded by Sextus.4 
 Comparing the two sources brought to light an alternative construal of the closing lines of 
the proem, regularly assigned to DK 7, which may have significant consequences for reading not 
only Parmenides’ poem, but many of the authors influenced by him, and for the standing of logos 
in early Greek philosophy generally. Rather than commanding the kouros to “judge by reason”, 
the goddess might just have been warning the youth not to judge her teaching superficially by the 
confusing language it employs, much in the way that Plato, in his Parmenides, has the Eleatic 
check the young Socrates’ impressive but immature impulse for logoi. The alternative construal 
helps us begin to put some of the repetitions detected in the first chapter into a more 
comprehensible perspective. 
4 This is by no means the only item of value in Diogenes’ chapter. As mentioned earlier (see page 68, with footnotes 
135 and 136), he records important information about Parmenides’ contacts with other thinkers and preserves traces 
of Parmenides’ expressions that call for special treatment.  
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 The third chapter, through a close reading of another passage of Sextus in which 
Empedocles is quoted, reinforced the chief points made in the previous two chapters and 
illustrated how the lessons learned there can further our understanding of authors other than 
Parmenides. The internal integrity of the proem as Sextus quotes it, the attitude towards logos 
and the senses expressed by the goddess in its closing lines, and the general reliability of Sextus’ 
testimony were all confirmed by consideration of Sextus’ passage on Empedocles. In the process, 
a number of important points for reading Empedocles’ poem(s) came to light (in particular, many 
of the ways in which DK 31 B 2 and 3 are modelled on Parmenides’ proem), as did prospects for 
“new” Empedoclean verses of the sort that the first chapter revealed in the case of Parmenides.5 
As with the preceding chapters, numerous scholarly confusions have been disentangled, and a 
securer basis has been provided for an important fragment in the collection of Empedocles’ 
writing that scholars have recently tended to mistreat.   
 From the first part as a whole, a methodical examination of the sources for the full 
catalogue of Parmenidean fragments emerges clearly as a desideratum. Yet more “new” 
fragments may appear when the sources are considered with a greater awareness of Parmenides’ 
penchant for repetition, and, beyond the discovery of new verses, the sources deserve more 
consideration for the guidance they can offer about the reconstruction of the poem. Due to the 
canonical status DK has assumed for contemporary scholarship, it is not as appreciated as it 
should be how these sources have contributed to the standard arrangement of the fragments. As a 
result, the arrangements occasionally proposed as alternatives to the DK ordering often ignore 
even the relatively explicit information that the quoting sources provide. A careful accounting of 
this information is therefore needed. In addition, the depth of Empedocles’ debt to Parmenides in 
the small portion of his poetry that we reviewed in chapter three gives a glimmer of the light that 
5 See page 97, footnote 190. 
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can be cast upon the task of reconstruction by a sensitive reading of authors influenced by 
Parmenides, even when they do not mention Parmenides by name. As well as the review of 
sources for verbatim fragments, therefore, an extensive comparison of a number of texts that 
show signs of such influence is also needed. In addition to Empedocles’ poem(s), that literature 
will include what remains of the treatises of Zeno and Melissus, Gorgias’ On Non-Being, most of 
Plato’s “middle” and “late” dialogues, as well as Aristophanes’ Clouds, Aristotle’s Physics, and 
the Pseudo(?)- Aristotelian de Melisso, Xenophane, Gorgia, among other works.  
 The second part illustrates how essential such a thorough review of the source material is 
as a preliminary step in our attempts to reconstruct, let alone interpret, Parmenides’ poem. 
Through a detailed response to an alternative to the DK arrangement proposed by a prominent 
Parmenidean scholar, we have reviewed the bases for some of the major modern arrangements of 
the fragments. Despite Cordero’s suggestions to the contrary, those orderings were not random 
or haphazard, nor primarily guided by the “conceptual content” of the fragments, but by 
statements of Sextus, Simplicius and others about the order of the fragments they preserved. 
Mistakes have certainly been made in reading the ancient evidence at times, and it is true that for 
the material in the Doxa, there are fewer explicit guides to placement than for the Aletheia 
fragments, but there is really nothing to lend support to Cordero’s proposal of moving material 
related to “physics” within the Aletheia. Nevertheless, Cordero’s challenge to the standard 
arrangement is in itself valuable, for it raises the question of the constitution of the text, which 
can indeed be improved upon. What is crucial in that process is reading the source texts without 
a preset view on Parmenides’ meaning, that is, trying to avoid the trap of interpreting the 
“conceptual content” of the fragments, and to limit oneself, in the first instance, to arranging the 
texts according to the leads provided by the reliable sources. A relatively unbiased survey of the 
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evidence has led us to the conclusion that the Doxa likely included all the fragments generally 
placed there, and then some. That is, the lines from Simplicius’ in Cael. also appear to belong to 
the Doxa.6 
 Assembling various points made throughout the chapter, we can construct a reliable 
skeleton to serve as the foundation for further reconstruction of the poem. The division of the 
poem into a Truth and a Doxa is not a modern invention, but testified to by ancient 
commentators in possession of the whole poem (most notably Simplicius), and reflected in 
remarks by earlier authors. Despite Simplicius’ Platonizing tendencies, his own indications of the 
order of the fragments are our best guide to the text, and nothing in what Cordero claims gives us 
cause to doubt his reports. From those, combined with Sextus’ testimony, we can be confident 
that the following fragments were found in the following order: Sextus’ 35-plus line proem (≈ 
DK 1.1-30 and DK 7.2-7a); DK 2; DK 6; fragment Z (≈ DK 7.1-2); DK 8; DK 9 or DK 12 (or 
the reverse); DK 13; DK 19. DK 11 and the combined fragment Y + DK 10 (if allowed), are to 
be placed in the general vicinity of DK 9 and 12, towards the beginning of the Doxa, and DK 19 
is to be placed at the conclusion of the arrangement of perceptible things, which presumably 
includes DK 14 -18 (the ordering of which is not directly indicated by the sources).  DK 3, 4, and 
5, along with other fragments that come to light, will have to be fit into that general structure. 
 It is only following that preliminary determination of placement that we ought to engage 
seriously in the more speculative task of relating the fragments to one another and trying to make 
sense of what we have. We have encountered repeatedly, throughout both parts of this 
dissertation, occasions where reasonably clear evidence from a source has been overlooked or 
rejected because of an editor’s insistence on what Parmenides must have meant to be saying. 
Assembling a new arrangement of the fragments offers us an opportunity for a fresh reading of 
6 Thus a place is found for the “new” fragment Y that came to light in the first chapter. 
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the poem, less encumbered by expectations of the logical character of the Aletheia (or the whole 
poem) or the cosmological character of the Doxa (or the whole poem). Such expectations are 
perfectly understandable, as both logical and cosmological interests, that is, the aspiration to 
maximal clarity in thought and expression and the project of giving a convincing and 
comprehensive account of the world in which we live, are both core concerns of the 
philosophical enterprise. Moreover, both are, I believe, important elements in the poem. Clearly, 
the goddess’ pistos logos in the Aletheia reflects early habits of what would later become 
formalized as the discipline of logic, and the Doxa, likewise, contained elements borrowed from 
prior speculation about the nature and structure of the “all”, and without doubt influenced 
subsequent efforts in what we think of as the scientific tradition to describe, with increasing 
accuracy and comprehensiveness, the change and stability of the world as we know it.  
 But while elements of the poem, it may be that neither of these two concerns suffice to 
define it. Indeed, when viewed as the essential aims of the poem, readers have felt a deep tension 
between the two, for the conclusions of what may be thought the strictly logical portion of the 
poem appear to invalidate the attempt in the Doxa to give an intelligent account of the 
phenomenal world. If we take the Aletheia as seriously as the goddess seems to suggest we 
should, what distinguishes the world described in the Doxa from any other “mortal opinions, in 
which there is no true trust”? Why aim to offer any description of the world at all? This is a 
tension almost all commentators on the poem are obliged to address, and the typical result is a 
scholarly impasse, some readers promoting Parmenides as the father of logic and privileging the 
Aletheia, others defending the importance of the scientific enterprise (and Parmenides’ place in it) 
by seeking ways to make the arguments of the Aletheia more compatible with it than they 
initially seem to be. For the former, the lack of unity in the poem is a sign that Parmenides’ mode 
197 
 
  
of expression was indeed ill-suited to his central message, while the latter, though in some cases 
more able to tell a coherent story about the poem, seem to give too little regard to the gulf that it 
is suggested exists between truth and doxa. Perhaps another look, less committed to either 
position, will reveal that some third way still remains. 
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